IN THE IDGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MBOMBELA (MAIN SEAT)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED NO
11 SEPTEMBER 2026
DATE SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
THE MABELANE CPA CONCERNED GROUP
(Represented by the individuals listed in
Schedule "CPA-001" hereto)
And
Case No.: 2026-218509
APPLICANT
THE ERSTWHILE EXECUTIVE CO1\1MITTEE FIRST RESPONDENT
OF THE MABELANE COMMUNAL PROPERTY
ASSOCIATION
1
2
THE REGISTRAR OF THE COMMUNAL SECOND RESPONDENT
PROPERTY ASSOCIATIONS
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL: THIRD RESPONDENT
DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
THE MINISTER OF LAND REFORM FOURTH RESPONDENT
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
FOURIE AJ:
INTRODUCTION:
[1] In the application at hand, the Applicant seeks, by way of hyper-urgent
application, final interdictory relief against the First Respondent, which
can only be described as a legality interdict seeking the First Respondent
to refrain from certain illegal activities which can be summarised, for
purposes of this Judgment, as the holding of an AGM and significant
ancillary relief.
[2] Ordinarily, this Court would have preferred more time to deal with the
issues that present themselves specifically, as the current issues are
technical in nature and impact the lives of many individuals. Given the
timeframes available, however, this Court was requested to hand down
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this Judgment within a few hours, and the Judgment that follows
constitutes the most relevant portions highlighted for the purpose of
determining the matter at this stage.
[3] This Court was tasked firstly to determine whether the Applicant had
sufficiently met the threshold for the matter to be dispensed with on the
HYPER Urgent Motion Court roll of 1 1 September 2026, and if so,
thereafter, whether the Applicant had sufficiently advanced facts that
sustained the relief sought, being final interdictory relief.
[4] Although the application was issued against several respondents,
specifically as interested parties and as the relevant statutory bodies that
deal with matters pertaining to CPA’s, when the matter was heard, same
was only opposed by the First Respondent and the so-called State
Respondents.
URGENCY:
[5] At the hearing of the matter , the Court already ordered the matter to be
regarded as urgent and to be dealt with on the Urgent Court Roll of
11 September 2026 in respect of Prayer 3 in the NOM relating only to an
interdict to stop the AGM of 12 September 2026 . The reasons for same
are incorporated in the current Judgment. The Court struck all other relief
sought from the roll for want of urgency.
[6] The principles relating to urgency are well known , and there is no
justification for restating principles that our Courts apply daily,
specifically in respect of urgency.
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[7] In so far as it is necessary, the manner in which the test in respect of
urgency has evolved has been dealt with by this Court, and this Court shall
merely confirm those principles as set out in the matter of Witbank Taxi
Association1.
[8] In the current matter, the Respondent did not raise any real complaint
about its ability to adequately present its opposition when the matter was
ultimately heard.
[9] Urgency is dealt with under the same principle as points in limine in that
the Court, in evaluating urgency, needs to consider the submissions made
by the Applicant, and evaluate same against the relief sought by the
Applicant to see whether a matter can be accepted as urgent or not.
[10] When dealing with matters in which illegal actions are alleged, the Court
will evaluate the principles relevant to urgency as enunciated in East Rock
and Luna Meubelvervaardigers,2 but the Court needs similarly to evaluate
the principles as stated by the Court in Hotz3 in which the Court stated
that, once a Court has made a ruling pertaining to whether or not the
actions of a Respondent are unlawful, the Court cannot grant legal
recognition and enforcement of such unlawful conduct, and subsequently
an application for interdict should stand. The dictum of Hotz rings true
not only when the Court evaluates whether an interdict needs to be
granted, but also when evaluating whether the matter ought to be dealt
with on an urgent basis. If acts of illegality indeed exist, and a Court fails
to deal with such acts and prohibit such actions at the earliest available
opportunity, the essence of the same would be that, at least to some degree,
the Court would be giving recognition and allowance for such illegal acts
1 Witbank Taxi Association v Local Taxi Association and Another (2026 -069702) [2026] ZAMPMHC 15
(9 April 2026).
2 Incorporated in the reference for Witbank Taxi Association supra.
3 Hotz v UCT (230/20160) 2016 ZASCA 159.
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to proceed. Similarly, where illegal actions are alleged against a
Respondent, such a Respondent is deserving of their name being cleared
without a sword of potential illegality hanging over their heads.
[11] The court simply cannot accept that substantial redress will be
forthcoming if a court in more than a year’s time is requested to interdict
an AGM scheduled for tomorrow. The relief will have become moot
[12] Considering the relief sought, the timeframes relevant to the matter at
hand and all ancillary facts presented to this Court, the Court was satisfied
that the matter was sufficiently urgent to be dealt with as such.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES:
[13] The Court has found in Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty)
Ltd and Others, where the SCA held that4:
“A real, genuine bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the Court is
satisfied that the party who purports to raise the dispute has in his affidavit
seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact set to be disputed. There will of
course be instances where a bare denial meets the requirement because there is no
other way open to the disputing party and nothing more can therefore be expected
of him, but even that may not be sufficient if the fact averred lies purely within
the knowledge of the averring party and no basis is laid for disputing the veracity
or accuracy of the averment. When the facts averred are such that the disputing
party must necessarily p ossess knowledge of them and be able to prove an
answering (or counter-failing evidence) if they be not true or accurate, but instead
of doing so rests his case on a bare or ambiguous denial, the Court would generally
4 Wightman t/a JW Construction V Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) at 13.
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have difficulty in finding that the test is satisfied. I say (generally) because factual
averments seldom stand apart from the broader matrix of circumstances, all of
which need to be borne in mind when arriving at a decision. A litigant may not
necessarily recognise or understand the nuances of the bare or general denial as
against a real attempt to grapple with all relevant factual allegations made by the
other party, but when he signs the Answering Affidavit, he commits himself to its
contents, inadequate as they may be , and will only in exceptional circumstances
be permitted to disavow them. There is a serious duty imposed upon a legal
adviser who settles an Answering Affidavit to ascertain and engage the facts
which his client disputes and to reflect such disputes full y and accurately in the
Answering Affidavit. If that does not happen, it should come as no surprise that
the Court takes a robust view of the matter.”
[14] In evaluating whether the defence raised by the Respondent is bona fide
and real, a short evaluation on those terms is necessary.
[15] Bona fide refers to the Latin phrase “in good faith” or honestly.
[16] Whether the defence is real would be evident from the supporting
evidence provided by a Respondent when alleging their defence. If a
Respondent makes a vague or unsubstantiated claim, it would not pass the
threshold of convincing the Court dealing with the matter that the defence
has any substance and is to be regarded as real.
[17] It would only be in circumstances of a Court being convinced of the bona
fides of a Respondent’s defence, substantiated sufficiently, for the Court
to be able to accept the defence as real, that the general principles of
Plascon-Evans with reference to Stellenbosch Farmers Winery would find
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application, and rightly so, as the Court in those matters already expressed
that vague denials or far -fetched or clearly untenable defences would
justify a rejection of a purported defence.5
[18] This Court reiterates the dictum as per Soffiantini, supra, that a
Respondent must provide enough evidence to the Court for the Court to
be able to ascertain whether denials are not fictitious or aimed at delay.
[19] Where a party is in possession of facts that would aid the Court to
ultimately come to a decision that is just under the circumstances, it ought
to be expected of that party to convey all the material facts in respect of
the matter to the Court. Not to do so is done at a party’s own peril6.
[20] The Applicant approached the Court for a prohibitory final interdict. The
granting of a final interdict requires three requisites, all of which must be
present for such an order to be obtained7. Although the locus classicus on
5 The general rule when dealing with disputes of fact in motion proceedings is as set out in PLASCON EVANS
PAINTS LTD v VAN RIEBEECK PAINTS (PTY) LTD [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A), where the
court referred to Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery (Pty) Ltd 1957 (4) SA 234 (C) at 235 E-G, held as follows:
“….. Where there is a dispute as to the facts a final interdict should only be granted in notice of motion proceedings
if the facts as stated by the respondent together with the admitted facts in the applicant’s affidavits justify such an
order ….. In certain instances, the denial by the Respondent of a fact alleged by the Applicant may not be such as to
raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact (Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949 (3
SA 1155 (T) at pp 1163 -5. If in such a case the res pondent has not availed himself of his right to apply for the
deponents concerned to be called for cross-examination under rule 6(5)(g) of the uniform rules of court and the court
is satisfied as to the inherent credibility of the applications factual averments, it may proceed on the basis of the
correctness thereof an include this fact amongst those upon which it determines whether the applicant is entitled to
the final relief which it seeks ……. More ever, there may be exceptions to this general rule, as for example where
the allegations or denials of the respondent are so far-fetched or clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting
them merely on the papers.”
Our courts are required to robustly approach disputes of fact in Soffiantini V Mould 1956 (4) SA 160 (E), the court
outlined this approach and stated as follows:
“In the case of Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949 (3) SA 1155 T at 1165 Murray, then
AJP said: “A bare denial of the applicant’s material averments cannot be regarded as sufficient to defeat the
applicant’s right to secure relief by motion proceedings in appropriate cases. Enough must be stated by respondents
to enable the Court to conduct a preliminary examination ….and to ascertain whether denials are not fictitious
intended merely to delay the hearing. Soffiantini v Mould, at 154 E-H.”
6 Skosana v Road Accident Fund (3257/23) [2026] ZAMPMHC 5; [2026] 1 All SA 588 (MM) (2 February 2026)
7 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221.
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the point of final interdicts dates back to 1914, the fact that principles as
set out in Setlogelo supra have withstood the test of time is evident in the
value it adds to the judicial certainty and well-reasoned premise on which
final interdicts are to be obtained. In order to be successful, an Applicant
needs to show:
[20.1] A clear right.
[20.2] An injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and
[20.3] The absence of any other satisfactory remedy available to the
Applicant.
[21] The right of a party to approach the Court to seek protection against the
actions of another which is prohibited by law is well-established8.
MATERIAL FACTS:
[22] The matter concerns the interplay between recognition as members of a
CPA and the protection of interests in such CPA
[23] The Applicants and First Respondents have, for a considerable amount of
time, been embroiled in disputes about who should serve as the executive
council of the CPA and which members should be recognised as members
and beneficiaries.
[24] The current executive committee's term of office seemingly ended on 10
June 2026.
[25] The Applicants complain that the First Respondent continues to act ultra
vires in their positions thereafter.
8 Milestone Beverage CC and Others v The Scoth Whisky Association (1037/2019) [2020] ZASCA 105; 2021 (2)
SA 413 (SCA).
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[26] This Court does not deal with the ultimate structures and arrangements to
be put in place by the State Respondents, or the interim or long -term
structures of the CPA; they are not hyper urgent , and they are extremely
technical. The hyper urgent court is not designed to deal with those
enquiries.
[27] In any event , the court is comforted in that the State Respondents have
sufficient structures and mechanisms in place to deal with the issues of the
respective parties, absent which the parties can approach the court in an
appropriate manner to ventilate those issues.
[28] The State Respondents raise several concerns about the First Respondent's
actions, both in its conduct and in the manner in which it compiled its
member lists and took its decisions.
[29] The question before this court is simply whether the AGM scheduled for
12 September 2026 has been validly constituted. If it has not, it cannot
proceed.
[30] The First Respondent has failed to adduce evidence or argument that
grants them executive rights and authority after the expiry of their term.
[31] The First Respondent has further failed to indicate to the Court that the
AGM was constituted and arranged in line with the CPA's constitution.
[32] In the event of a deviation from the CPA's constitution , proper
authorisation and mandated resolutions were required. The same was not
presented by the First Respondent.
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[33] Even if the same was indeed resolved by the First Respondent, the same
would be the subject of scrutiny where the right to take such a resolution
is being challenged since the expiry of the term of office.
[34] The CPA constitutes more than 1500 members and no doubt many more
whose membership is awaiting verification.
[35] If the verification of membership has not been finalised and procedural
compliance with the CPA constitution in respect of convening an AGM
has not been proven, allowing the AGM to take place would not make any
practical sense.
[36] The State Respondents take issue with the beneficiary verification done
by the 1st Respondent. This is crucial to the matter at hand.
[37] It is inconceivable that the court will allow unidentified and unverified
persons to vote and ultimately decide the fate of a CPA and its executive
where the court is not satisfied that the meeting at which such vote is to
occur has not been validly constituted.
[38] To constitute a valid AGM , the court must be satisfied that the correct
persons have been given notice in the correct form of the meeting and that
the meeting was constituted by persons legally permitted to do so.
[39] This court was simply not convinced that any of the aforesaid thresholds
have been met by the First Respondent.
[40] The Applicant prays that the AGM of 12 September 2026 and any other
AGMS be interdicted. This relief is too wide. If the First Respondent is
able, in the future, to convene a valid AGM and comply with the
constitution of the CPA, then such AGM would need to be considered as
valid.
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[41] Only the AGM of 12 September 2026 suffers the fate the court ultimately
orders.
[42] Irrespective of the legal principles a party requests the Court to apply or
the Rules of principles under which a matter is brought to be tried by the
Court, it ought to be known and accepted that no Order of Court could in
any way afford recognition to acts of illegality.
[43] At its core, an application for interdict is a discretionary remedy available
to a Court to intervene and preclude illegal acts. It is an inconceivable
notion that a Court would apply its discretion in any way to give standing
or recognition to any possible illegal actions.
[44] As such and for all the reasons as stated aforesaid, the attempted defence
as raised by the First Respondent cannot be sustained, and the Applicant’s
application needs to succeed.
COSTS:
[45] Given the degree to which each party has been successful and applying
the principles of Biowatch 9 this court is satisfied that no cost order is
warranted and each party must pay their own costs.
ORDER:
[46] For the aforesaid reasons, the following Order is made:
9 Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and Others (CCT 80/08) [2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC);
2009 (10) BCLR 1014 (CC) (3 June 2009).
[ 46.1] The application is enrolled and heard as one of urgency in
terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court, and the
Applicant's non-compliance with the ordinary forms, service
requirements and time periods is condoned in respect of
prayer 3 of the Applicant's notice of motion. All other relief is
struck from the roll for want of urgency.
[ 46.2] The First Respondent is interdicted from orgamsmg,
convening, conducting, holding or in any manner interfering
with the purported Annual General Meeting and any elective
processes scheduled for 12 September 2026.
[ 46.3] Each party shall pay their own costs.
HFFOURIE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE IDGH COURT,
MPUMALANGA DIVISION
Counsel for the Applicant: ADVNDLOVU
NTSIMANGO ATTORNEYS
078 109 6614
Instructed by:
Contact Number:
Email: admin@ntsimangoattomeys.co .za
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Counsel for the First Respondent: ADV MANABELA
Instructed by: MANABELE S ATTORNEYS INC
C/O N MALUKA ATTORNEYS
Cell: 071 317 7607
Email: info@nmatinc.co.za
Counsel for the Second Respondent: ADV LAMULA
Instructed by: STATE ATTORNEY
Date of hearing: 11 September 2026
Date of judgment: 11 September 2026