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CONTROLLER OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS THIRD RESPONDENT
MINISTER OF MINERAL AND FOURTH RESPONDENT
PETROLEUM RESOURCES
DIRECTOR GENERAL: DEPARTMENT FIFTH RESPONDENT
OF MINERAL AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES N.O.
N KEKANA N.O. SIXTH RESPONDENT
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
FOURIE AJ:
INTRODUCTION:
[1] In the application at hand, the Applicant seeks, by way of urgent
application, final interdictory relief against the First Respondent, which
can only be described as a legality interdict seeking the First Respondent
to refrain from certain illegal activiti es which can be summarised, for
purposes of this Judgment, as the selling of petroleum products to end -
consumers as a retailer.
[2] This Court was tasked firstly to determine whether the Applicant had
sufficiently met the threshold for the matter to be dispensed with on the
Urgent Motion Court roll of 1 September 2026, and if so, thereafter,
whether the Applicant had sufficiently advan ced facts that sustained the
relief sought, being final interdictory relief.
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[3] Although the application was issued against several respondents,
specifically as interested parties and as the relevant statutory bodies that
deal with matters relating to petroleum products, when the matter was
heard, same was only opposed by the First Respondent , being the only
party against whom relief was sought.
MATERIAL FACTS:
[4] All the evidence presented to this Court indicates that the Applicant and
the First Respondent are, at least in some way , competitors in the sale of
petroleum products in the same geographical region.
[5] The facts of the matter can crisply be summarised by stating that the
Applicant, as a competitor of the First Respondent, alleges that the First
Respondent has established a facility for the sale of petroleum products .
The Applicant concedes that the First Respondent has a wholesale licence
to conduct wholesale petroleum sales but alleges that the First Respondent
does not have a retail petroleum licence and, as such, is precluded from
the sale of petroleum products to end-consumers.
[6] The Applicant alleges that, contrary to the activities for which the First
Respondent was licensed, and in the initial stages of August 2026, the First
Respondent commenced activities as a retailer for petroleum products.
[7] In support of the Applicant’s allegations, it alleges photographs depicting
the facility set up by the First Respondent, photographs of petrol pumps
indicating small quantities of petroleum being sold to end-consumers, and
till slips evidencing the sale of diesel in small quantities, i.e R 200.00.
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[8] In the latter part of July 2026, the Applicant requested the Department of
Mineral and Petroleum Resources to investigate the activities being
conducted by the First Respondent, which concluded that, when the site
of the First Respondent was attended on the 5th of August 2026, no retail
activities were observed at the site. It is necessary to highlight, however,
that the complained -of retail actions only commenced after 5 August
2025, and then from 10 August 2026.
[9] It is noteworthy from the relief sought by the Applicant that the Applicant
does not seek to interdict any lawful activities being conducted by the First
Respondent. The Applicant seeks merely that the First Respondent be
interdicted from conducting the activities of a retailer of petroleum
products if the First Respondent does not have a license authorising him
to do so.
[10] Although the Court is mindful that the interdict as sought by the Applicant
would only impact the First Respondent in so far as illegalities are
perpetrated, the Applicant still needs to convince the Court on the
principles applicable to the granting of in terdicts that they are entitled to
the relief they seek.
[11] The easiest way for the First Respondent to rebut the notion that they were
illegally conducting themselves would no doubt have been for the First
Respondent to respond to the allegations of the Applicant by simply
presenting the Applicant and the Court with proof of its retail licence.
Such a retail licence was not annexed to the answering papers of the First
Respondent nor was a reason for the absence thereof advanced.
[12] The First Respondent further fails to in any way deal with the allegation
that the First Respondent is not entitled to conduct the activities of a
petroleum retailer as alleged by the Applicant. It is further also not
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seriously contested by the First Respondent that the First Respondent is,
at the time of the application, in the process of selling petroleum products
from the facility as stated. In the evaluation of the prevailing legal
principles, it stands to reason that the First Respondent would only be
acting lawfully if it were either selling petroleum products as a wholesaler
or possessed the relevant certification to conduct the activities of a retailer.
[13] The crux of the First Respondent’s opposition to the application is that this
Court is precluded from dealing with the current application as the First
Respondent submits the only party who is authorised to investigate the
activities of the First Respondent and to put a stop to same, if necessary,
would be the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy and not the
Court.
[14] The argument by the First Respondent is that the Department has a period
of 90 days to investigate the complaints of the Applicant and to conduct
its activities flowing from its own investigation within the 90-day period,
during which time the Court would be precluded from dealing with or
intervening in the matter at all.
URGENCY:
[15] At the hearing of the matter , the Court already ordered the matter to be
regarded as urgent and to be dealt with on the Urgent Court Roll of
1 September 2026. The reasons for same are incorporated in the current
Judgment.
[16] The principles relating to urgency are well known , and there is no
justification for restating principles that are continually applied in our
Courts on a daily basis, specifically pertaining to urgency.
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[17] In so far as it is necessary, the manner in which the test in respect of
urgency has evolved has been dealt with by this Court and this Court shall
merely confirm those principles as set out in the matter of Witbank Taxi
Association1.
[18] In the current matter, no real complaint was levied by the Respondent in
their ability to adequately present their opposition when the matter was
ultimately heard.
[19] Urgency is dealt with under the same principle as points in limine in that
the Court, in evaluating urgency, needs to consider the submissions made
by the Applicant, and evaluate same against the relief sought by the
Applicant to see whether a matter can be accepted as urgent or not.
[20] When dealing with matters in which illegal actions are alleged, the Court
will evaluate the principles relevant to urgency as enunciated in East Rock
and Luna Meubelvervaardigers2 but the Court needs similarly to evaluate
the principles as stated by the Court in Hotz3 in which the Court stated
that, once a Court has made a ruling pertaining on whether or not the
actions of a Respondent is unlawful, the Court cannot grant legal
recognition and enforcement of such unlawful conduct, and subsequently
an application for int erdict should stand. The dictum of Hotz rings true
not only when the Court evaluates whether an interdict needs to be
granted, but also when evaluating whether the matter ought to be dealt
with on an urgent basis. If acts of illegality indeed exist, and a Court fails
to deal with such acts and prohibit such actions at the earliest available
opportunity, the essence of the same would be that, at least to some degree,
the Court would be giving recognition and allowance for such illegal acts
1 Witbank Taxi Association v Local Taxi Association and Another (2026 -069702) [2026] ZAMPMHC 15
(9 April 2026).
2 Incorporated in the reference for Witbank Taxi Association supra.
3 Hotz v UCT (230/20160) 2016 ZASCA 159.
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to proceed. Similarly, where illegal actions are alleged against a
Respondent, such a Respondent is deserving of their name being cleared
without a sword of potential illegality hanging over their heads.
[21] Considering the relief sought, the timeframes relevant to the matter at
hand and all ancillary facts presented to this Court, the Court was satisfied
that the matter was sufficiently urgent to be dealt with as such.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES:
[22] The Court has found in Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty)
Ltd and Others, where the SCA held that4:
“A real, genuine bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the Court is
satisfied that the party who purports to raise the dispute has in his affidavit
seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact set to be disputed. There will of
course be instances where a bare denial meets the requirement because there is no
other way open to the disputing party and nothing more can therefore be expected
of him, but even that may not be sufficient if the fact averred lies purely within
the knowledge of the averring party and no basis is laid for disputing the veracity
or accuracy of the averment. When the facts averred are such that the disputing
party must necessarily p ossess knowledge of them and be able to prove an
answering (or counter-failing evidence) if they be not true or accurate, but instead
of doing so rests his case on a bare or ambiguous denial, the Court would generally
have difficulty in finding that the test is satisfied. I say (generally) because factual
averments seldom stand apart from the broader matrix of circumstances, all of
which need to be borne in mind when arriving at a decision. A litigant may not
4 Wightman t/a JW Construction V Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) at 13 .
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necessarily recognise or understand the nuances of the bare or general denial as
against a real attempt to grapple with all relevant factual allegations made by the
other party, but when he signs the Answering Affidavit he commits himself to its
contents, inadequate as they may be and will only in exceptional circumstances
be permitted to disavow them. There is as a serious duty imposed upon a legal
adviser who settles an Answering Affidavit to ascertain and engage the facts
which his client disputes and to reflect such disputes fully and accurately in the
Answering Affidavit. If that does not happen, it should come as no surprise that
the Court takes a robust view of the matter.”
[23] In evaluating whether the defence raised by the Respondent is bona fide
and real, a short evaluation on those terms is necessary.
[24] Bona fide refers to the Latin phrase “in good faith” or honestly.
[25] Whether the defence is real would be evident from the supporting
evidence provided by a Respondent when alleging their defence. If a
Respondent makes a vague or unsubstantiated claim, it would not pass the
threshold of convincing the Court dealing with the matter that the defence
has any substance and is to be regarded as real.
[26] It would only be in circumstances of a Court being convinced of the bona
fides of a Respondent’s defence, substantiated sufficiently, for the Court
to be able to accept the defence as real, that the general principles of
Plascon-Evans with reference to Stellenbosch Farmers Winery would find
application, and rightly so, as the Court in those matter already expressed
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that vague denials or far -fetched or clearly untenable defences would
justify a rejection of a purported defence.5
[27] This Court reiterates the dictum as per Soffiantini, supra, that a
Respondent must provide enough evidence to the Court for the Court to
be able to ascertain whether denials are not fictitious or aimed at delay.
[28] Where a party is in possession of facts that would aid the Court to
ultimately come to a decision that is just under the circumstances, it ought
to be expected of that party to convey all the material facts in respect of
the matter to the Court. Not to do so is done at a party’s own peril6.
[29] The Applicant approached the Court for a prohibitory final interdict. The
granting of a final interdict requires three requisites, all of which must be
present for such an order to be obtained7. Although the locus classicus on
the point of final interdicts dates back to 1914, the fact that principles as
5 The general rule when dealing with disputes of fact in motion proceedings is as set out in PLASCON EVANS
PAINTS LTD v VAN RIEBEECK PAINTS (PTY) LTD [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A), where the
court referred to Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery (Pty) Ltd 1957 (4) SA 234 (C) at 235 E-G, held as follows:
“….. Where there is a dispute as to the facts a final interdict should only be granted in notice of motion proceedings
if the facts as stated by the respondent together with the admitted facts in the applicant’s affidavits justify such an
order ….. In certain instances the denial by the Respondent of a fact alleged by the Applicant may not be such as to
raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact (Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949 (3
SA 1155 (T) at pp 1163-5. If in such a case the res pondent has not availed himself of his right to apply for the
deponents concerned to be called for cross-examination under rule 6(5)(g) of the uniform rules of court and the court
is satisfied as to the inherent credibility of the applications factual averments, it may proceed on the basis of the
correctness thereof an include this fact amongst those upon which it determines whether the applicant is entitled to
the final relief which it seeks ……. More ever, there may be exceptions to this general rule, as for example where
the allegations or denials of the respondent are so far-fetched or clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting
them merely on the papers.”
Our courts are required to robustly approach disputes of fact in Soffiantini V Mould 1956 (4) SA 160 (E), the court
outlined this approach and stated as follows:
“In the case of Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949 (3) SA 1155 T at 1165 Murray, then
AJP said: “A bare denial of the applicant’s material averments cannot be regarded as sufficient to defeat the
applicant’s right to secure relief by motion proceedings in appropriate cases. Enough must be stated by respondents
to enable the Court to conduct a preliminary examination ….and to ascertain whether denials are not fictitious
intended merely to delay the hearing. Soffiantini v Mould, at 154 E-H.”
6 Skosana v Road Accident Fund (3257/23) [2026] ZAMPMHC 5; [2026] 1 All SA 588 (MM) (2 February 2026)
7 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221
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set out in Setlogelo supra have withstood the test of time is evident in the
value it adds to the judicial certainty and well-reasoned premise on which
final interdicts are to be obtained. In order to be successful, an Applicant
needs to show:
[29.1] A clear right.
[29.2] An injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and
[29.3] The absence of any other satisfactory remedy available to the
Applicant.
[30] The first two requirements for a final interdict are not seriously contested
on the papers, nor are any significant opposing allegations made that
would lead the Court to disregard the evidence presented by the Applicant
in respect of those elements.
[31] The simple question this Court is tasked with determining is whether an
alternative remedy is available to the Applicant, namely, an investigation
by the regulatory authorities, which could preclude the Court from
granting a final interdict as prayed for.
[32] At its core, an interdict should do no more than protect the rights of an
Applicant from unlawful conduct8.
[33] In Cream Majenta 127 (Pty) Ltd t/a BP Lyndon Park 9, the Court stated
that:
8 Durban University of Technology v Zulu and Others [2017] ZAKGPHC 16 (3 March 2017)
9 Cream Majenta 127 (Pty) Ltd t/a BP Lyndon Park v Shell South Africa Marketing (Pty) Ltd (6629/2009) [2009]
ZAGPPHC 107
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‘…..where it appears, either from a reading of the enactment itself, or from that
plus a regard to surrounding circumstances, that the legislature has prohibited
the doing of any act either wholly or partly in the interest of any person or class
of persons, any such person can claim an interdict to enforce the prohibition
without proof of damage….”
[34] The right of a party to approach the Court to seek protection against the
actions of another which is prohibited by law is well-established10.
[35] This Court shall not embark upon a study of the relevant definitions
embedded in the Petroleum Products Act, 120 05 1977, save to confirm
that Section 2A(1)(c) and (d) of the aforesaid Act state that:
‘A person may not ……..
(c) hold or develop a site without there being a site licence for that site;
(d) retail prescribed petroleum products without an applicable retail licence,
issued by the controller of petroleum products.
[36] The First Respondent’s submissions that this Court will be encroaching
on powers of the Department by granting the current interdict are
incorrect. By granting the interdict the Applicant is seeking, the Court
would do nothing more than to preclude acts of illegality. The Court is
not embarking upon an investigation into whether the First Respondent is
permitted to dispense petroleum products as a wholesaler or a retailer, nor
is the Court investigating or taking away any of the powers conferred upon
the Department by statute. By granting the Order the Applicant seeks, the
Court merely gives recognition to the express provisions of the Act, and
states that the First Respondent, as for any other person, is precluded from
illegally conducting themselves.
10 Milestone Beverage CC and Others v The Scoth Whisky Association (1037/2019) [2020] ZASCA 105; 2021
(2) SA 413 (SCA).
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[37] If the First Respondent produced a valid retail licence at the hearing of
this matter authorising them to conduct themselves as a retailer for
petroleum products, the application could not have succeeded.
[38] The Applicant complains that the First Respondent is conducting their
business as a retailer without a valid retail licence. The First Respondent
has not in opposition to the application provided any facts that stand in
opposition to the allegations as made by the Applicant. Accordingly, there
exists no dispute of fact on the question of whether or not the First
Respondent indeed possesses a valid retail licence.
[39] By seeking the order in the manner in which the Applicant is, the
Respondent is not precluded from conducting services as a wholesaler for
petroleum products, as they are seemingly authorised to do, and the First
Respondent is also not precluded from conducting themselves as a retailer
for petroleum products but only once they are properly certified and
licensed to same by the relevant regulatory authorities. Absent the
relevant licenses therefor, it is unthinkable that the First Respondents
would contend for any right to conduct themselves as a retailer of
petroleum products.
[40] The argument advanced by the First Respondent is seemingly that, under
all circumstances, a party, even if doing so illegally, will be allowed to
operate as a retailer for petroleum products in the initial 90 -day period
during which the regulator would be entitled to investigate their actio ns,
and only thereafter would members of the public be allowed to intervene
by seeking the Court’s assistance by way of interdict or review if the
Department did not sufficiently act.
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[41] The aforesaid is a proposition that not only allows for illegalities to be
perpetrated, but for which no authority exists.
[42] Irrespective of the legal principles a party requests the Court to apply or
the Rules of principles under which a matter is brought to be tried by the
Court, it ought to be known and accepted that no Order of Court could in
any way afford recognition to acts of illegality.
[43] At its core, an application for interdict is a discretionary remedy available
to a Court to intervene and preclude acts of illegality. It is an
inconceivable notion that a Court would apply its discretion in any way to
give standing or recognition to any possible illegal actions.
[44] As such and for all the reasons as stated aforesaid, the attempted defence
as raised by the First Respondent cannot be sustained, and the Applicant’s
application needs to succeed.
COSTS:
[45] The general proposition pertaining to costs is that a successful litigant
ought to be compensated for the costs incurred that were necessitated due
to a matter being brought to Court. In the current matter, the Court already
stated that, if a bona fide defence existed, opposing the matter would have
been the easiest task, and the First Respondent could have explained that
their actions were not illegal for several reasons. The First Respondent
failed to do so and elected to oppose the matter on a technical point. Even
though the First Respondent was allowed to pursue a technical defence,
once this defence is found to be without merit, it casts a shadow over the
alleged actions perpetrated by the First Respondent.
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[46] In the current matter the Court sees no reason why costs ought not to
follow suit.
ORDER:
[47] For the aforesaid reasons, the following Order is made:
[47.1] The application is enrolled and heard as one of urgency in
terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court, and the
Applicant’s non-compliance with the ordinary forms, service
requirements and time periods is condoned.
[47.2] The Applicant is granted leave to cite the Second Respondent
by the description as appearing in the Notice of Motion being
the presently unidentified entity or person conducting business
under the name (Taxi Energy) at the facility described in
paragraph 3 below.
[47.3] Service of the application upon the Second Respondent by the
Sheriff in the following manner is authorised as good and
sufficient service:
a. Affixing a copy to the conspicuous part of the premises
known as the Remainder of Portion 19 of the Farm
Schoemansdal 581 JU, Mpumalanga, situated at the
Matsamu Taxi Rank on the R570, at approximately
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GPS Co -ordinates: -25.6778787028593,
31.508710216004783 (the facility); and
b. Handing a copy to any person apparently over the age
of 18 years and apparently in charge of the facility.
[47.4] With immediate effect, and upon service of this Order, the
First and Second Respondents, and each of them, together with
their directors, members, employees, and any other person
acting through or on their behalf with knowledge of this Order,
are interdicted and restrained from selling petroleum products
to any end-consumers at or from the facility as contemplated
by the definition of “retail” in the Petroleum Products Act, 120
of 1977, unless and until:
a. A valid site license issued under the PPA is in force in
respect of the facility; and
b. A valid retail license issued under the PPA is in force
authorising the relevant retailer to retail petroleum
products at the facility.
[47.5] The First and Second Respondents, and each of them, are
interdicted and restrained from operating or holding out that
they operate a petroleum retail facility at the facility, whether
under the name “Taxi Energy”, “Taxi Energy Diesel”, or
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Counsel for the Appellant: ADV FJ NEL
Instructed by: MURRAY KOTZE & ASSOCIATES
ATTORNEYS
C/O CRONJE DE WAAL SKHOSANA
INC
Contact Number: 013 755 1280
Email: yolandi@cdwlaw.co.za
Counsel for the First Respondent: ADV SO MATIMBA
Instructed by: VICTOR NKWASHU ATTORNEYS
C/O SLABBER ATTORNEYS INC
Cell: 086 595 8172
Email: victor@vnainc.co.za
Date of hearing: 1 September 2026
Date of judgment: 4 September 2026