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A. INTRODUCTION
[1] On 19 March 2025 default judgment was granted against the applicant on claims
1, 2 and 7 in an action in which he was the second defendant. He was sued as
guarantor of the obligations of the first defendant. He applies for the rescission
of that judgment under rule 42(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court and, in the
alternative, under the common law.
[2] The application is dismissed. On claims 2 and 7 the summons was served at an
address which the applicant had chosen in writing as his domicilium citandi et
executandi, and the judgment on those claims was therefore not erroneously
granted. The share sale agreement on which he relies discloses no defence, so
the common law does not assist him either. Claim 1 is different. I do not decide
whether service was good there. Assuming in his favour that it was not, I refuse
rescission in the exercise of the discretion which rule 42 confers. He has put up
no answer to claim 1, and that is what defeats him on either footing.
[3] The three respondents were the plaintiffs in the action. Nothing turns on the
differences between them, and I refer to them together as the respondents. The
first defendant in the action was JBG South Africa (Pty) Ltd. Three guarantees
signed by the applicant are in issue, and because each bears on a different claim
I distinguish them by date. The continuing guarantee of 30 January 2022 is given
in favour of Sunlyn (Pty) Ltd and its cessionaries for the obligations of the first
defendant, and records 501 Embassy Towers, 175 Empire Place, Sandton as
the domicilium address (the continuing guarantee ). The KMG guarantee of 18
February 2022 is given in favour of KMG Office Supplies (Pty) Ltd and its
cessionaries. The April guarantee executed on 14 April 2022 records an address
in Germiston.
[4] Claim 1 arises from a master rental agreement concluded on 23 December 2021
between KMG and the first defendant, KMG’s rights under which were later
between KMG and the first defendant, KMG’s rights under which were later
ceded to Sunlyn. Claims 2 and 7 arise from agreements between Sunlyn and
the first defendant, concluded on 12 April 2022 and 1 February 2023 respectively.
B. THE ISSUES
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[5] Four questions arise, and they must be taken in this order:
a. should the founding affidavit be admitted? It was commissioned while the
applicant was in Dubai, through a video meeting, and the respondents
object to it;
b. was the judgment erroneously sought or erroneously granted? That
question arises under rule 42(1)(a) and turns on whether the respondents
were procedurally entitled to the judgment they took. If they were, the rule
is not engaged, and the applicant must fall back on the common law;
c. does the share sale agreement disclose a defence to the respondents’
claims? If it does not, the application fails at common law, because a bona
fide defence is an essential element of the good cause which the common
law requires; and
d. if rule 42(1)(a) is engaged in respect of claim 1, should rescission
nevertheless be refused in the exercise of the discretion which rule 42
confers?
C. SHOULD THE FOUNDING AFFIDAVIT BE ADMITTED?
[6] The founding affidavit was commissioned through a video meeting while the
applicant was in Dubai. Regulation 3(1) of the regulations governing the
administering of an oath or affirmation requires the deponent to sign the
declaration in the presence of the commissioner of oaths, and “presence” there
means physical proximity. There was accordingly no literal compliance.
1
[7] The regulations are directory rather than peremptory. Where they have not been
followed the court has a discretion to admit the affidavit if there has been
substantial compliance, although it will not readily find substantial compliance
where the departure was a deliberate election. 2 The explanation of what was
1 Regulations Governing the Administering of an Oath or Affirmation, GN R1258 in GG 3619 of 21 July
1972, regulation 3(1), quoted in FirstRand Bank Ltd v Briedenhann 2022 (5) SA 215 (ECGq)
(Briedenhann) at para 15. On the meaning of “presence”, Briedenhann at para 29.
2 Briedenhann above n 1 at paras 48, 51-2 and 57.
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done – the audiovisual link, the verification of the applicant’s identity, the
administration of the oath and the signing – came only in reply, supported by two
confirmatory affidavits. It should have been given when the affidavit was filed.
[8] But the objection was itself first taken in the answer, and the respondents did not
seek to file a further affidavit challenging what the reply set out. The authenticity
of the affidavit is not in issue. Nobody suggests that the applicant did not take
the oath or did not sign, and no prejudice going to the merits has been identified.
To refuse the affidavit would be to require the same allegations to be made again
in a differently attested document, at further cost and delay and to no other end.
I accordingly admit the founding affidavit and the confirmatory affidavits delivered
with the reply.
D. WAS THE JUDGMENT ERRONEOUSLY SOUGHT OR ERRONEOUSLY
GRANTED?
[9] Rule 42(1)(a) requires two things of an applicant: that the order was granted in
his absence, and that it was erroneously sought or erroneously granted. Both
must be shown. Absence, for this purpose, is not simply a question of who was
in court. The words protect a litigant whose presence was precluded, not one
whose absence was elected.
3 On the applicant’s version his absence was of the
first kind, and the respondents do not contend otherwise. The question is
therefore whether there was an error.
[10] The error the rule contemplates is a procedural one. What an applicant must
show is that there existed, when the judgment was issued, a fact of which the
judge was unaware which would have precluded the granting of the judgment.
4
A judgment granted against a party in his absence is therefore erroneously
granted where the party who obtained it was not procedurally entitled to it. That
is so where notice of the proceedings was required and was not in fact given,
3 Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption
and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State [2021] ZACC 28; 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC)
(Zuma) at paras 54, 56 and 61.
4 Zuma above n 3 at para 62, adopting the formulation in Nyingwa v Moolman NO 1993 (2) SA 508
(Tk) at 510D-G.
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notwithstanding a return of service which says that it was. 5 But a judgment
properly taken is not made erroneous by a defence disclosed afterwards.
[11] The applicant’s case is aimed squarely at the first of those propositions. He left
501 Embassy Towers in September 2022. The summons was affixed to the
principal door there in November 2024 and never came to his attention, and he
learnt of the judgment only on 11 June 2025, when his bank told him that his
account had been frozen. I accept that account. In Lodhi the Supreme Court of
Appeal referred with approval to Fraind v Nothmann, where a default judgment
was rescinded on facts of that shape. The return recorded service at the
defendant’s residential address, and that address had ceased to be his
residence.
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[12] The distinction between that case and this one is decisive. Whether a residential
address is a place at which the rules permit service depends on a fact, namely
that the defendant lives there. When the fact ceases to be true the return is
wrong and service has not been effected as the rules require.
[13] Service at a chosen domicilium depends on no such fact. It depends on the
debtor’s own election, which holds good until he revokes it. The Appellate
Division put the position in these terms:
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“It is a well-established practice (which is recognised by Rule 4(1)(a)(iv)
of the Uniform Rules of Court) that, if a defendant has chosen a
domicilium citandi, service of process at such place will be good, even
though it be a vacant piece of ground, or the defendant is known to be
resident abroad, or has abandoned the property, or cannot be found.”
[14] That principle answers the applicant’s general complaint. He accepts that 501
Embassy Towers was correct when he signed the guarantees. The continuing
5 Lodhi 2 Properties Investments CC v Bondev Developments (Pty) Ltd [2007] ZASCA 85; 2007 (6) SA
87 (SCA) (Lodhi) at paras 24, 25 and 27. Para 24 is quoted with approval in Zuma above n 3 at para
58 and in Rossitter v Nedbank Ltd (96/2014) [2015] ZASCA 196 (1 December 2015) ( Rossitter) at
para 16.
6 Fraind v Nothmann 1991 (3) SA 837 (W) at 839G -I, described in Lodhi above n 5 at para 24 and
cited in Zuma above n 3 at para 58.
7 Amcoal Collieries Ltd v Truter 1990 (1) SA 1 (A) at 5J-6C, quoted in Van der Merwe v Bonaero Park
(Edms) Bpk 1998 (1) SA 697 (T) (Van der Merwe) at 701A-F.
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guarantee selects it as his domicilium for all purposes arising from that
guarantee, and the particulars of claim identified it as his chosen domicilium. The
sheriff’s return records that on 6 November 2024 the combined summons,
particulars of claim and annexures were served there, by affixing to the principal
door after diligent search and enquiry. 8 His departure two years earlier was a
fact of which the judge was unaware, but it was not one which would have
precluded the judgment, because service at that address never depended on his
still being there. He does not allege that he told any respondent of a replacement
address, and where the instrument prescribes no procedure for changing a
chosen domicilium the debtor must see to it that notice of the change reaches
the creditor.
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[15] That disposes of claim 7. It arises from an agreement between Sunlyn and the
first defendant, the applicant himself identifies the continuing guarantee as the
guarantee relevant to it, and he takes no separate service point in respect of it.
[16] Claim 2 can be disposed of almost as shortly. The April guarantee does record
the Germiston address. But the continuing guarantee was signed on 30 January
2022, before the claim 2 agreement was concluded on 12 April 2022, and it
covers agreements between Sunlyn and the first defendant whether actual or
contingent, present or future.
10 It therefore extends to claim 2 on its own terms.
A domicilium clause confers on a creditor an entitlement to serve at the address
chosen in that instrument; it does not withdraw an entitlement conferred by
another one. The Germiston address is an additional choice, not a substitute,
and service at 501 Embassy Towers was good in respect of claim 2.
[17] Two further complaints, which are directed at the judgment as a whole, do not
assist the applicant either. The first concerns the notice of set down. Rule 31(4)
requires proceedings under rule 31(2) and (3) to be set down on not less than
requires proceedings under rule 31(2) and (3) to be set down on not less than
five days’ notice to the party in default. Its proviso is what matters here: no notice
of set down shall be given to a party in default of delivery of a notice of intention
8 Particulars of claim para 5, CaseLines 02 -8; return of service, CaseLines 02 -242; the continuing
guarantee, CaseLines 02-191, clauses 1 and 11; and founding affidavit para 8.5, CaseLines 27-15.
9 Van der Merwe above n 7 at 700H and 701C-E/F.
10 The continuing guarantee, CaseLines 02-191, clause 1.
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to defend. The applicant delivered none; on his own version the summons never
reached him. The respondents nevertheless sent a notice, to an email address
which the applicant says he could not access. They were not obliged to send it
at all, and a step taken out of caution which the rules did not require is not
converted by the sending of it into a procedural requirement whose imperfect
performance vitiates the judgment. The second concerns the alleged non-
service of a notice under rule 41A and a reference in the summons to the
Mpumalanga Division. Assuming both complaints to be well founded, neither is
said to have caused the default. The applicant’s case is that the summons did
not reach him at all, which has nothing to do with either.
[18] The requirements of rule 42(1)(a) are accordingly not met in respect of claims 2
and 7. The judgment on those claims was neither erroneously sought nor
erroneously granted. Claim 1 stands differently. I come to it after the defence
he advances, because the answer to that defence bears on it as well.
E. DOES THE SHARE SALE AGREEMENT DISCLOSE A DEFENCE?
[19] At common law a judgment taken by default may be rescinded on good cause
shown. Good cause has two essential elements: a reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the default, and a bona fide defence which, prima facie, carries
some prospect of success. Establishing one of them is not enough. A party who
shows no prospect of success on the merits will fail however reasonable and
convincing his explanation for the default may be.
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[20] The defence the applicant advances is that a share sale agreement concluded
with Mr Ottapathu on 2 August 2023 released him from his obligations under the
guarantees. He does not have to prove that defence. He has to set out facts
which, if established at a trial, would entitle him to succeed. He has not done so,
and the reason lies in the agreement he relies on.
[21] Clause 4.1 made the coming into force of the agreement, apart from certain
[21] Clause 4.1 made the coming into force of the agreement, apart from certain
identified clauses, subject to the fulfilment or waiver of stated conditions. One of
11 Chetty v Law Society, Transvaal 1985 (2) SA 756 (A) (Chetty) at 765A-E; and Zuma above n 3 at
para 71.
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them, clause 4.1.3, was that all third-party surety creditors should agree in writing
unconditionally to release the seller and the applicant from their obligations.
Clause 4.3 provided that unless the conditions were fulfilled or waived by 31
August 2023, or by an agreed later date, the agreement would be of no force and
effect save for identified provisions.
12
[22] The applicant’s own instrument therefore tells him that a release of his suretyship
obligations required the written agreement of the surety creditors, which is to say
the respondents. Nowhere in his papers does he allege that any respondent
made such an agreement. Paragraph 7.3 of the founding affidavit sets out what
he says he did: he resigned, he delivered share documents, and he implemented
cession and restraint arrangements. Paragraph 7.4 alleges that Mr Ottapathu
did not perform and foreshadows a claim against him. Neither paragraph alleges
that clause 4.1.3 was fulfilled or waived. Paragraph 5 of the replying affidavit
does not repair the omission: it asserts the conclusion, that he was released and
so owed no duty to notify a change of domicilium, without alleging the fact on
which the conclusion depends.
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[23] Clause 6.2 of the share sale agreement takes the matter no further. It provides
that if sureties remained extant at the closing date the purchaser would indemnify
and keep indemnified the seller and the applicant in respect of the purchaser’s
breach of that clause.
14 The respondents were not parties to that undertaking.
An indemnity given by Mr Ottapathu to the applicant is a promise about which of
the two of them bears a loss. It says nothing about whether the applicant remains
bound to his creditors, and it cannot release him from obligations owed to people
who never agreed to it.
[24] Nor does Phoenix Salt assist. The applicant invokes it for the distinction between
a variation of a contract and a separate indemnity. The distinction the Supreme
a variation of a contract and a separate indemnity. The distinction the Supreme
Court of Appeal drew was between variation and waiver: a variation alters the
terms of a contract, while a waiver is the abandonment of a right by the person
12 Share sale agreement, clauses 4.1, 4.1.3 and 4.3, CaseLines 27-300 to 27-301.
13 Founding affidavit paras 7.3 to 7.4, CaseLines 27-12; and replying affidavit para 5, CaseLines 27-
378.
14 Share sale agreement, clause 6.2, CaseLines 27-303.
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who holds it, the contract remaining intact. The applicant is right that a waiver
need not be in writing and may be established by conduct inconsistent with the
enforcement of the right.
15 But a waiver requires an act by the holder of the right.
The right to be paid under the guarantees belongs to the respondents, and the
applicant identifies no act of theirs, in words or in conduct, from which an
abandonment of it might be inferred.
[25] What the applicant does have, on his own account, is a complaint against Mr
Ottapathu. If he performed his side of the share sale agreement and Mr
Ottapathu did not procure the releases which clause 4.1.3 required, his remedy
lies against Mr Ottapathu. That is where he said in his founding affidavit that he
intended to go. The rescission of a judgment obtained by his creditors is not the
instrument for that grievance. It would not give him what he says he is owed,
and it would visit the consequences of another man’s alleged default on parties
who had no hand in it.
[26] The share sale agreement therefore answers none of the three claims on which
judgment was taken. No bona fide defence having been disclosed, the applicant
fails at common law on claims 1, 2 and 7. It is unnecessary to decide whether
his explanation for the default, and for the period from 11 June to 2 October 2025,
is reasonable and acceptable.
F. CLAIM 1
[27] The applicant’s service complaint in respect of claim 1 is that the summons ought
to have been served at an address in Gaborone, Botswana. He puts up the KMG
guarantee, as annexure FA11, to establish that he chose that address.
16 The
document does not say what he says it says. Clause 11 provides that the
guarantors choose as their domicile, for all purposes arising out of that
guarantee, the addresses set out below. Four guarantor rows follow. The first
15 Phoenix Salt Industries (Pty) Ltd v Lubavitch Foundation of Southern Africa [2024] ZASCA 107;
2026 (1) SA 460 (SCA) at paras 18 and 22-3.
2026 (1) SA 460 (SCA) at paras 18 and 22-3.
16 Founding affidavit para 9.1, CaseLines 27 -16 to 27- 17; applicant’s updated heads para 7.1.3,
CaseLines 28-39; and the KMG guarantee, CaseLines 02-145, annexed as FA11 at CaseLines 27-332
to 27-333.
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bears the name JB Sports Holdings Proprietary Limited and the registration
number BW00000431067, and it is against that name that the Gaborone address
appears. The second bears the applicant’s name, and both the street address
field and the identity field opposite it are blank. He set out no address. The
Gaborone address is not his, he never chose it, and no service was required to
be effected there.
[28] The complaint he makes therefore fails. Its failure does not establish that 501
Embassy Towers was a competent address for claim 1. The KMG guarantee
reaches the claim 1 agreement on its face, because it covers agreements
concluded between the Hirer and the User and defines the Hirer as KMG and its
cessionaries, but the applicant chose no domicilium in it. The continuing
guarantee records his choice of 501 Embassy Towers. But it is given for the
obligations of the first defendant to Sunlyn and its cessionaries, and the claim 1
agreement was concluded with KMG, whose rights came to Sunlyn by cession
rather than the other way about. Two questions follow. The first is whether the
continuing guarantee reaches claim 1 at all. The second is whether a s ingle
summons served at an address validly chosen for two of the three claims joined
in it is, for that reason, validly served for the third. Neither was raised by either
party, neither was argued, and I decide neither.
[29] I assume in the applicant’s favour, without deciding, that the judgment on claim
1 was erroneously granted within the meaning of rule 42(1)(a). The question is
then not whether the rule is engaged, but whether rescission must follow.
[30] It need not. Rule 42 provides that a court may rescind an order, not that it must.
The Constitutional Court has held that once an applicant has met the
requirements for rescission the court is endowed with a discretion. The rule is
an empowering provision which does not compel the court to set anything aside,
an empowering provision which does not compel the court to set anything aside,
and the discretion must be exercised judicially. That accords with what the
Appellate Division and the Supreme Court of Appeal had already said.
17 A line
of High Court authority had held the contrary, that the word “may” in the subrule
17 Zuma above n 3 at para 53; Tshivhase Royal Council v Tshivhase 1992 (4) SA 852 (A) at 862J -
863A; and Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape) [2003] ZASCA 36; 2003
(6) SA 1 (SCA) at para 5.
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confers no power to refuse rescission once the jurisdictional facts are
established.18 That view cannot survive Zuma.
[31] A formulation in Rossitter requires more attention. The Supreme Court of Appeal
there said that if a default judgment was erroneously sought or granted a court
should, without more, grant the order for rescission. Read in isolation, that sits
uneasily with the discretion recognised in Tshivhase, Colyn and Zuma. What the
passage was addressing, and what Rossitter establishes, is that good cause
need not be shown in addition to an operative error under the subrule. That is
why the appeal there succeeded although the explanation for the default was
described as far from satisfactory. It does not answer the separate question
whether the discretion should be exercised in favour of rescission on the facts of
a particular case, which is the question before me.
19
[32] The considerations which govern the exercise of the discretion are settled. The
court has regard to fairness and justice on all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case, and it will not exercise the discretion in favour of rescission where
unfavourable consequences would follow.20
[33] It has been exercised in refusing rescission before. In Van der Merwe provisional
sentence had been granted eight days after service where rule 8 required ten,
and that the order had been erroneously granted was common cause. Maritz AJ
nevertheless refused rescission, because on the material before him a court
rehearing the matter would probably grant provisional sentence again, and the
interests of justice would not be served by setting the order aside.
21
18 Mutebwa v Mutebwa and Another 2001 (2) SA 193 (TkH) at para 17 and Tshabalala and Another v
Peer 1979 (4) SA 27 (T) at 30D
19 Rossitter above n 5 at paras 8 and 16, and the authorities cited there. See also Ferris v FirstRand
Bank Ltd [2013] ZACC 46; 2014 (3) SA 39 (CC) at para 13. Compare Williams v Shackleton Credit
Bank Ltd [2013] ZACC 46; 2014 (3) SA 39 (CC) at para 13. Compare Williams v Shackleton Credit
Management (Pty) Ltd [2023] ZAWCHC 279; 2024 (3) SA 234 (WCC) at paras 22-3, where the contrary
view is taken, on the footing that the position is uncertain, and an alternative conclusion is given.
20 Chetty above n 11 at 760H and 761E, and Naidoo v Matlala NO 2012 (1) SA 143 (GNP) at para 4,
each referred to with approval in Zuma above n 3 at para 53 fn 20.
21 Van der Merwe above n 7 at 709D-F, as described in Nkosi above n 18 at para 35 and in Pienaar
N.O v Nano Inks KZN (Pty) Ltd (4052/24P) [2025] ZAKZPHC 20 (4 March 2025) at para 24. Van der
Merwe v Bonaero Park (Edms) Bpk 2000 (4) SA 329 (SCA) is an appeal in the same matter, but it is
not an appeal against the refusal of rescission; it concerns the defendant’s entry into the principal
12
[34] Nkosi is closer to this case. There the default judgment had been erroneously
granted, because a notice under section 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of
2005 had been misdirected to the wrong branch of the post office. The applicant
nonetheless disputed neither his indebtedness nor his breach of the loan
agreements, and the only answer he advanced was the very defect which had
produced the error. Vivian AJ refused rescission, holding that it is a judicial
exercise of the discretion to refuse where rescission will have no practical effect
and will merely cause delay. The conduct of that applicant weighed against him
as well; he had been notified of three hearings and attended none. That feature
is absent here.
22
[35] The position here is the same in the respect that matters. The question is not
whether the applicant is liable on claim 1. It is what rescission would achieve.
The applicant does not allege that claim 1 has been paid or discharged, that the
amount claimed is wrong, or that it has prescribed. He does not dispute the
guarantee on which it is founded, or the cession pleaded in the particulars. The
only answer he advances to any of the claims is the share sale agreement, and
for the reasons already given it discloses none. Rescission would therefore
return the parties to an action in which the applicant has put up nothing capable
of defeating claim 1, at further cost to both of them. That is a reason about this
claim and this record rather than a general appeal to finality. Nor does it depend
on the assumption I have made in his favour: whether or not service at 501
Embassy Towers was good for claim 1, he has disclosed no answer to it on these
rescission papers.
[36] That is also why claim 1 would fail if the assumption were wrong. If the rule is
not engaged, the applicant is remitted to the common law, where a bona fide
defence is not a discretionary consideration but a requirement of the good cause
defence is not a discretionary consideration but a requirement of the good cause
he must show. He has none, as I have already found. Claim 1 fails on either
route, and it fails for the same reason. This conclusion does not rest on any
case under rule 8(10) and the condonation of a late notice of appearance. See para 1 of that judgment
and Nkosi at fn 10.
22 Nkosi above n 18 at paras 30 to 31, 36, 42 and 43 to 46. On the conduct factor see also Chetty
above n 11 at 760H and 761E, cited in Zuma above n 3 at fn 20.
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criticism of the way in which the applicant has conducted this application. He
learnt of the judgment only after it had been taken, and he has prosecuted the
application properly.
[37] Claims 2 and 7 fail because rule 42(1)(a) is not engaged and the common law is
not satisfied. Claim 1 fails on the exercise of the discretion, on the assumption
that the rule is engaged, and at common law in any event. Because the two rest
on different footings, I separate them in the order.
G. COSTS
[38] Costs follow the result. The respondents seek them on the attorney and client
scale. Each of the three guarantees provides that the applicant will pay legal
costs awarded against him on the attorney and own client scale, which is the
higher of the two.
23 The respondents therefore ask for less than their bargain
gives them, and I award no more than they seek. Where parties have stipulated
for the scale on which costs are to be paid a court will ordinarily hold them to it,
and the undertaking operates upon an award being made rather than creating
an entitlement independent of one.
[39] The order is not punitive. The commissioning of the founding affidavit required
determination, and the service challenge, although unsuccessful, was not
frivolous. Nothing in this judgment is a finding that the application was vexatious,
reckless, mala fide or an abuse of process.
H. ORDER
[40] I make the following order:
23 Clause 10 of each of the three guarantees, which provides that the applicant will pay legal costs
awarded against him “on an attorney and own client scale”: the KMG guarantee, CaseLines 02-145;
the continuing guarantee, CaseLines 02-191; and the April gua rantee, CaseLines 02-151. See also
particulars of claim para 94, CaseLines 02 -36. The competing contentions on costs appear at
respondents’ heads, CaseLines 28-30 to 28-31, and applicant’s heads, CaseLines 28-44.
14
1. The application for the rescission of the default judgment granted on 19
March 2025 under case number 2024-126579 is dismissed in so far as it
concerns claims 2 and 7.
2. The application for the rescission of that judgment is dismissed in so far as
it concerns claim 1.
3. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the application on the
attorney and client scale.
________
VETTER, AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Appearances
For the Applicant: Mr N M A Muller
Instructed by: Marran Incorporated
For the Respondents: Mr B C Bester
Instructed by: Van Wyk Attorneys
Date of hearing: 24 August 2026
Date of judgment: 31 August 2026
15
This Judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email and publication on CaseLines and SAFLII. The date for the
handing down is deemed 31 August 2026.