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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG.
Case No: 2025-054615
In the matter between:
In the matter between:
THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA, LTD Plaintiff
And
GEORGE BOUDOURIS Defendant
(Identity Number: 7[…] )
Coram: Noko J
Heard on: 2 June 2026
Delivered on: 21 August 2026
Summary: Summary Judgment – defences underpinned by facts not raising
triable issues – summary judgment granted.
____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
____________________________________________________________________
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
SIGNATURE DATE: 21 August 2026
Noko J
2
On the application for summary judgment, the following order is made:
1. Cancellation of the instalment sale agreement is confirmed.
2. The Defendant is ordered to return to the Plaintiff a 2019 Mercedes -Benz
GLC 250 with engine number 2[… ] and chassis number W[…] .
3. The Plaintiff’s claim for damages is postponed sine die.
4. Interest on the damages at the rate of 9.000% per annum from 7 J anuary 2025
to date of payment, both dates inclusive.
5. The Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of suit.
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
____________________________________________________________________
NOKO J
Introduction
[1] The plaintiff commenced an application for summary judgment against the
defendant, seeking an order to cancel an instalment sale agreement, to return the motor
vehicle, and to postpone the damages claim sine die. The application was preceded by the
service of a summons on the defendant , who filed a notice to defend, a plea, and a
counterclaim.
[2] The defendant opposes the application for summary judgment and has filed an
affidavit setting out the defences pleaded in the plea and counterclaim.
[3] The parties would be referred to as they appear in the action.
Parties
[4] The plaintiff is Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, a company with limited
liability, incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa, with
its registered offices at 9th Floor, Standard Bank Centre , [..] S[…] Street, Johannesburg.
The defendant is George Boudouris, an adult male with his domicilium address at […]
M[…] M[… ], 9[…] B[…] F […] Dr, F[…] , Johannesburg.
Noko J
3
Background
[5] The parties entered into an instalment sale agreement (the agreement) on
7 July 2022 for the purchase of a motor vehicle, namely a 2019 Mercedes -Benz 250 (“the
vehicle”), with engine number 2[ … ], chassis number W […] , and registration number
J[…] . The plaintiff was duly represented by its authorised representative, and the
defendant acted in his personal capacity.
[6] The purchase price was R 465 134.36 (Four Hundred and Sixty- Five Thousand
One Hundred and Thirty- Four Rands and Thirty -Six Cents). The total cost of the
agreement, including interest, costs and charges, w as R 583 656.60 (Five Hundred and
Eighty-Three Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty- Six Rands and Sixty Cents). The
defendant agreed to pay a monthly instalment of R 9 727.61 over 60 months.
[7] The agreement provides, inter alia, that the plaintiff shall remain the owner of the
vehicle until the defendant pays all amounts due under the agreement. It further provides
that the total amount due shall be as shown on the Certificate of Balance, which shall be
prima facie evidence of the outstanding amount.
[8] In pursuance of the agreement, the plaintiff delivered the vehicle to the defendant,
who commenced making monthly payments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff avers that the
defendant breached the agreement by defaulting on his monthly payments and has been in
arrears in the amount of R 61 532.13 as at 7 January 2025. The plaintiff, registered as a
credit provider in terms of the National Credit Act
1 (NCA), dispatched a Notice dated 24
March 2025, in terms of section 129(1) read with section 130 of the NCA, demanding
payment and informing the defendant of the options available to him under the NCA.
[9] The defendant failed to heed the notice in terms of section 129 of the NCA, and
the plaintiff sued out a summons for the relief set out above. The summons was served ,
and the defendant served a plea and raised the defences, inter alia , challenging the
and the defendant served a plea and raised the defences, inter alia , challenging the
Court's jurisdiction and further alleging that the agreement was tainted with fraud.
2 The
1 Act 34 of 2005.
2 Other defences include disputing indebtedness, debt settled, impossibility of performance and the
counterclaim.
Noko J
4
plaintiff subsequently launched an application for summary judgment in terms of Rule 32
of the Uniform Rules of Court, which the defendant opposes and which is now before me.
Issues for determination
[10] The issues for determination are whether the plaintiff satisfied the requirements
for summary judgment; whether the defence raised triable issues; and whether the
defendants’ counterclaim is sustainable.
Legal principles.
[11] The test for the adjudication of a summary judgment application w as restated by
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Cohen,
3 as determining “… whether the facts put up by
the defendants raise a triable issue and a sustainable defence in the law, deserving of their
day in court. The defendants must fully disclose the nature and grounds of their defence
and the material facts on which it is founded. All a defendant has to do is set out facts
which, if proven at trial, will constitute a good defence to the claim.”
4 The bar is low, and
the party should show that there is a defence and that he/she would be entitled to leave to
defend, even if the prospects of success with such a defence are poor.
Contentions and analysis.
[12] The plaintiff contends that it has a liquidated claim, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Balance annexed to the particulars of claim. Further, the defendant has
raised frivolous and preposterous defences that bear no relation to the legal jurisprudence
of the Republic of South Africa and are the product of a creative mind, allegedly
supported by AI. Those defences are addressed below.
Jurisdiction
[13] The defendant contends that this Court has no jurisdiction because he is not a
living being but a legal persona “… created and assigned to the living S oul, George, who
acts on its behalf. ” “There are no legal persons in the natural world of creation. ” As a
living Soul , he is an “… original creation of Natures God and should not be confused
living Soul , he is an “… original creation of Natures God and should not be confused
with a legal person or natural person.” Further, he is “…privately domiciled in a non-
3 Cohen N O & Others v D [2023] ZASCA 56.
4 Id at para 31.
Noko J
5
military occupied private estate on the land and soil of creation, known as the Kingdom
of God, which is …not subject to the jurisdiction of the Republic of South Africa.” 5
[14] In turn, the plaintiff contends that this Court has jurisdiction in terms of section
21(1)
6 of the Superior Courts Act 7 as the defendant is identified and resides within its
jurisdiction. The allegation that the Republic of South Africa is the public trustee and that
the Court, by assuming jurisdiction, operates as a “trustee de son tort ”, because he is a
living soul acting as an agent for the true party, is denied.
[15] I have considered the submission of both parties and find the defendant's
contentions strange and contradictory. In one sentence , he states that he is not a living
being but a legal persona , and in the same breath, that he is not a legal or a natural
persona. All this gives the impression that the defendant denies his existence in this
world altogether; alternatively, his version as a natural person recognises him as a living
Soul. He may be correct that the Court has no jurisdiction over his soul, but it certainly
has jurisdiction over him as a natural person. Accordingly, it is ordered that in his
capacity as a natural person who entered into a contract in that capacity, he is a subject
falling within this Court's jurisdiction and his defence or point on limine falls to be
dismissed.
Indebtedness.
[16] The defendant contends that, when the agreement was entered into, the plaintiff
received consideration of R 583 656.60, recorded it as an asset in its books, and
simultaneously recognised a liability of R 465 134.36 on the balance sheet , representing
money owed by the plaintiff. The books would then show that the plaintiff received R
5 See definition of a living Soul in the Defendant’s Answering Affidavit at CL 01-115.
6 “Persons over whom and matters in relation to which Divisions have jurisdiction
6 “Persons over whom and matters in relation to which Divisions have jurisdiction
(1) A Division has jurisdiction over all persons residing or being in, and in relation to all causes arising and
all offences triable within, its area of jurisdiction and all other matters of which it may according to law
take cognisance, and has the power-
(a) to hear and determine appeals from all Magistrates' Courts within its area of jurisdiction;
(b) to review the proceedings of all such courts;
(c) in its discretion, and at the instance of any interested person, to enquire into and determine any
existing, future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstanding that such person cannot claim any relief
consequential upon the determination.”
710 of 2013.
Noko J
6
583 656.60 but paid out only R 465 134.36, leaving a difference of R 118 522.24, which
is now due to the defendant. Consequently, any monies paid to the plaintiff constituted
unjust enrichment.
[17] He contends that the plaintiff’s reference to the debt in its books is, in fact,
payment by the defendant to the plaintiff for a valuable financial product which the
defendant provided to the plaintiff. To this end, the vehicle was fully paid for, and the
plaintiff’s contention that ownership remained with the plaintiff is devoid of legal basis.
[18] In addition, he argues that the amount in the certificate of balance is incorrect
because it failed to consider the amount tendered (which was not processed, credited,
accounted for, or protested by the plaintiff), and that, had it been reflected, the balance
would have been zero.
[19] He further contends that the signed agreement should qualify as collateral given to
the plaintiff, which is a valuable financial product ,
8 or money-instrument, and can under
certain circumstances be sold. The agreement was “… created, issued and delivered to the
plaintiff in exchange of the vehicle purchased” by the living soul.
[20] On the other hand, the plaintiff disputes the allegation that the agreement was a
valuable financial product or promissory note in the amount of R 583 656.60, which
constituted payment. It was a credit instalment transaction in terms of which an amount
of R 465 134.36 was advanced to the defendant towards the purchase of the vehicle.
[21] The defendant fails to distinguish between the principles governing his
obligations and rights under the agreement and the accounting principles for recording in
a creditor's books. The agreement is a valuable financial product in the creditor's hands,
and it may be sold to a third party provided it is linked to the defendant's payment of
instalments; without that link, it is not worth the paper it is written on. The bank may sell
instalments; without that link, it is not worth the paper it is written on. The bank may sell
the agreement to a third party, who will expect payment of the instalments from the
8 As defined in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, in the amount of
R 583 656.60. “This valuable financial instrument, containing a promise or undertaking to pay, is in legal
and financial character, a promissory note (a note), which is a form of money, as defined under the
Currency and Exchanges Act 1933.” CL 015-124.
Noko J
7
defendant. He purchased a vehicle on credit and paid instalments until he defaulted. He
did not extend any credit to the bank. Accordingly, the defendant's contention defies legal
logic and is bound to fall flat.
Fraudulent misrepresentation
[22] The defendant further contends that the plaintiff committed fraud, inducing him to
enter into the agreement from which he now seeks to resile, by failing to disclose the full
facts and the truth of the matter at hand, “creating an illusion that a debt was owed”. He
further argues that the plaintiff made fraudulent misrepresentations and engaged in
deception when entering into the credit agreement, which was simply a valuable financial
product. The defendant contends that he was unaware of the true character of the
financial instrument he created.
9
[23] In turn, the plaintiff contends that the defendant has provided no evidence of the
alleged fraud. In addition, the agreement is a standard agreement entered into in
accordance with the NCA.
[24] In evaluating this defence, the Court is enjoined to consider whether it raises a
triable issue. The SCA in C W
10 at para 36 referred with approval to the sentiments
expressed regarding the requirements for proving fraud, as set out in Geary 11 namely: (a)
a representation by the other party; (b) knowledge by the representor that the
representation is false; (c) that the representation induced the representee to act; (d) that
the representee suffered damages as a result.
[25] The facts are that the plaintiff sold a motor vehicle to the defendant on credit and
delivered the vehicle to the defendant. The defendant takes no issue with the vehicle or
contends that there are defects or that the model year is incorrect. There is no evidence
that he has suffered any prejudice, which he would need to show to prove fraud. There is
9 The defendant further contends that there was an error, as he has in fact provided the plaintiff with
valuable consideration in the amount of R 583 656.60, and the plaintiff provided book-entry credit in the
amount of R 465 134.36. In the end, there was an error, and the plaintiff did not account for the defendant’s
originally issued financial products. For accounting purposes, the financed portion and future obligations of
an instalment sale are recognised on the balance sheet as financial liabilities (under loans/borrowings or
amortised cost) and are subject to credit risk evaluations under IFRS 9 Financial Instruments.
10 C W v G T [2023] ZASCA 23.
11 Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove 1964 (1) SA 434 (A).
Noko J
8
no evidence of any fraud or deception on the part of the plaintiff. Accordingly, this
defence has also been rejected.
Impossibility of performance
[26] The defendant raises a defence of impossibility of performance and argues that
the agreement cannot be enforced. He stated that “[a] current search on the internet
reveals that the total amount of debt in the Republic, which requires to be paid by this
legal tender money, is in the region of R 8.5 trillion. Therefore, it is wholly impractical,
and legally impossible, to expect anyone to pay the existing debts in legal tender, as there
is simply not enough in existence or in circulation.”
[27] The plaintiff contended that the reliance on the assertion that transactions are
subject to payment by coins limited to R 50.00, and that it would be impossible to
perform, is misguided. The parties have agreed on payment terms, and the agreement is
not being challenged on the basis of non- compliance with the law requiring payment in
coins. The defendant fails to demonstrate that performance under the agreement would be
impossible.
[28] It is trite that where a party raises a defence of impossibility of performance, the
court has discretion to permit a party to resile from the agreement. The defendant would
have to demonstrate that it is objectively unable, beyond all doubt, to render performance.
Such a contract would be void if it is shown that the impossibility is absolute. If any other
person can perform, bar the defendant, the impossibility is subjective and would not
affect the enforceability of the agreement.
12 It was stated in MV Snow 13 (albeit in
relation to vis major) that:
12 See Senyatsi J in Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Willis and Another [2024] ZAGPJHC 1263,
where he stated at para 20 that “[s] upervening impossibility occurs when the performance of contractual
obligations becomes objectively impossible due to unfo reseeable and unavoidable events that are not the
fault of any party to the contract.” He further quoted the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier
[2007] ZACC 5; 2007 (5) SA 323 ( CC); 2007 (1) BCLR 691 (CC) at para 75 , where the court held that
“[f]or instance, common law does not require people to do that which is impossible. This principle is
expressed in the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia – no one should be compelled to perform or comply
with that which is impossible. This maxim derives from the principles of justice and equity that underlie the
common law. Over the years the maxim has become entrenched in our law and has been applied to avoid
time-bar provisions in statutes…”
13 Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner of MV Snow Crystal [2008] ZASCA 27; 2008 (4) SA
111 (SCA); [2008] 3 All SA 255 (SCA).
Noko J
9
“…As a general rule impossibility of performance brought about by vis major or casus
fortuitus will excuse performance of a contract. But it will not always do so. In each case
it is necessary to ‘look to the nature of the contract, the relation of the parties, the
circumstances of the case, and the nature of the impossibility invoked by the defendant,
to see whether the general rule ought, in the particular circumstances of the case, to be
applied’. The rule will not avail a defendant if the impossibility is self -created; nor will it
avail the defendant if the impossibility is due to his or her fault. Save possibly in
circumstances where a plaintiff seeks specific performance, the onus of proving the
impossibility will lie upon the defendant.”14
[29] The defendant has failed to objectively explain why it is impossible for him or
any other person to make payment as agreed. He is also not required to make payment in
coins below R 50.00. He failed to explain why this internet search should be an authority
for the Court to conclude that he would not be able to make the payment he has
undertaken. The defence raised is therefore unsustainable.
Legal tender
[30] The defendant contends that he tendered R 242 042.86 to settle the whole
indebtedness in terms of the Bills of Exchange Act
15, and that the plaintiff improperly
refused to accept it. The tender was made on behalf of George Boudouris -Trusts to settle
the debt. By failing to accept the payment and credit the defendant’s account, the plaintiff
contravened section 126 of the NCA, which provides that the credit provider must accept
every payment tendered. Consequently, the bill is discharged in terms of section 43(b) of
the Bills of Exchange Act.
[31] The defendant maintained that the tender is an instrument issued under the Bills of
Exchange Act, as amended by Act 56 of 2000, section 2(3), which provides that “…an
unqualified order to pay coupled with –(b) a statement of the transaction which gives rise
unqualified order to pay coupled with –(b) a statement of the transaction which gives rise
to the bill, is unconditional within the meaning of the said subsection.” The defendant
therefore argued that the plaintiff’s contention that it is not a valid tender or financial
instrument is rejected.
14 Id at para 28.
15 Act 34 of 1964.
Noko J
10
[32] In reply, the plaintiff contends that the defendant’s assertion that the rejection of
the tender of payment (accepted bill) of R 242 042.86 violates sections 126(b) and (c) of
the NCA and the Bills of Exchange Act is baseless. Importantly, the alleged instrument
was not authorised by the National Treasury and could be construed as a discharge of a
debt. The plaintiff further submits that the tender has been rejected.
[33] It is trite that the credit provider’s obligation to accept payments by bill of
exchange arises only if the parties’ agreement provides for such a method of payment.
16
If it does not, the credit provider is not obliged to accept such payments. The same
applies if the credit provider has previously agreed to accept a negotiable instrument
instead of legal tender. In any event, the tender was made on behalf of the trust, which is
not a party to this lis and/or to the credit agreement entered into between the parties.
[34] To the extent that the defendant has not demonstrated that an alternative tender for
the payment is sanctioned by the agreement, then cadit quaestio.
[35] The defendant further contends that the plaintiff failed to comply with the
provision of the NCA in that the notice in terms of section 129 of the NCA was not
served, since the arrears amount was not disclosed together with a breakdown of how the
arrears were calculated. He referred to Reinecke
17 where it was remarked that “…s 129
NCA notice was not complied with, which must reflect the correct arrears amount,
together with a breakdown of that amount.” The plaintiff has therefore breached the
agreement and cannot now claim to validly cancel same and claim the return of the
goods.
[36] In retort, the plaintiff contended that the defence is flawed and that compliance
with section 129(1) of the NCA is “… not disputed on any tenable basis”
[37] I have considered the defendant 's contention and find that the judgment he
[37] I have considered the defendant 's contention and find that the judgment he
referred to is distinguishable, as there was a dispute regarding the alleged arrears and
further that the bank sought an order for a money judgment. In this instance , the
16 Matador Buildings Pty Ltd v Harman 1971(2) SA 21 CPD at 25H (albeit referring to payment by
cheque).
17 Firstrand Bank Limited v Reinecke (A103/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 57 (21 February 2025).
Noko J
11
defendant disputes the existence of the agreement on various grounds and at the same
time argues that he has paid all that is due . His case does not address the arrears claimed
by the plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff in casu is not seeking a money judgment.
[38] It has been shown that the defence raised by the defendant is contradictory and is
approbating and reprobating. It was stated in Erasmus 18, where Lord Shaw in
Johannesburg Municipal Council v D Stewart and Co 1909 S.C (H.L) 53 was quoted as
stating that:
"It does not appear to me to be sound law to permit a person to repudiate a
contract,
and thereupon specifically found upon a term in that contract which he has thus
repudiated."
19
[39] The courts in general frown on a party who fails to put up an intelligible defence
by blowing hot and cold. This defence is also unsustainable.
Counterclaim
[40] The defendant’s counterclaim is based on the allegation that the amount of R118
was transferred to MERCEDEZ FINANCIAL SER (VAF) in payment of goods and also
repayment of the total instal ment paid, including the interest, fees and charges received
by the plaintiff as unjust enrichment, as there was no debt existing and same was settled
by the bill tendered on 2 February 2024 in the amount of R 232 042.86. In the premises,
the defendant claims the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim, alternatively that it be reduced,
having regard to the value of the counterclaim, which an independent auditor must
determine.
[41] In its plea to the defendant ’s counterclaim, the plaintiff denies the defendant ’s
averments and specifically denies that the agreement constitutes a money instrument or
security of which the defendant is entitled to reclaim the value; that the defendant has
provided the plaintiff with any creations, money instruments or securities of value; that
18 Erasmus v Pienaar 1984 (4) SA 9 (T).
19 Id at 24B.
Noko J
12
the plaintiff was unjustly enriched by receipts of payments from the defendant s made on
the strength of the agreement; or that any deceptive practices or fraudulent non-disclosure
were committed.
[42] The plaintiff contends that the counterclaim, based on the assertion that the
defendant was a creditor, is legally untenable and unsustainable.
[43] The contention underlying the counterclaim that the plaintiff owes the defendant
has been dealt with together with the contention that there was a valid tender, and it has
no sound legal basis in our law and falls to be dismissed.
Conclusion
[34] The defences raised by the defendant are indeed attractive yet peculiar. However,
they have no legal foundation within the scheme of credit agreements. His arguments
only invite a debate of no practical value or may be mistaken for seeking refuge in a
mirage of confusion.
[35] Ordinarily, the common law principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali (or
generalia specialibus non derogate ) restrains a party from bypassing a statute which
comprehensively governs a specific matter to have recourse to a separate general statute
or common law. The agreement between the parties falls within the four corners of the
NCA, which defines the instalment agreement as:
“instalment agreement means a sale of movable property in terms of which all or part of
the price is deferred and to be paid by periodic payments; possession and use of the
property is transferred to the consumer; ownership of the property either passes to the
consumer only when the agreement is fully complied with, or passes to the consumer
immediately subject to a right of the credit provider to re -possess the property if the
consumer fails to satisfy all of the consumer’s financial obligations under the
agreement.”
20
20 See section 1 of the NCA.
Noko J
13
[44] The plaintiff's case aligns with the definition and is not open to any criticism.
Reference to other statutes is unfounded. It therefore defies logic to find any aspect of the
defence rational. The resistance to the claim is also fraught with insurmountable
shortcomings.
[36] All other issues should not detain this Court as they were not raised in the plea as
the basis of the defence.21
Costs
[37] Costs should follow the result.
Order
[45] As a result, I make the following order
1. Cancellation of the instalment sale agreement is confirmed.
2. The Defendant is ordered to return to the Plaintiff a 2019 Mercedes -Benz
GLC 250 with engine number 2[… ] and chassis number W[…] .
3. The Plaintiff’s claim for damages is postponed sine die.
4. Interest on the damages at the rate of 9.000% per annum from 7 January 2025
to date of payment, both dates inclusive.
5. The Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of suit.
M V NOKO
Judge of the High Court
DISCLAIMER: This judgment was prepared and is handed down electronically by
circulation to the Parties /their legal representatives via email and by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The date for hand- down is deemed to be 21
August 2026.
Appearances:
21 Bragan Chemicals Pty Ltd v Devland Cash and Carry Pty Ltd and Another [2020] ZAGPPHC 397 at
para 7; MJG Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Foloyi Construction and Projects CC [2024] ZAMPMHC 37 at para 12.
Noko J
14
For the Plaintiffs: R Bvhumbi, i nstructed by Findlay and
Neimeyer.
For the Defendant: G Boudouris (In person)