SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 2025-249106
In the matter between:
ANNA SOPHIA BELLSTEDT Applicant
And
THE TRUSTEES FOR THE TIME BEING OF THE
BELLSTEDT FAMILY TRUST (I[...])
ROLAND FREDRICH BELLSTEDT
MILLER BOSMAN LE ROUX HILL INC
(REG NO: 1993/004946/21)
ADAM GABRIEL BELLSTEDT
RALPH THEO BELLSTEDT
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
Coram: BARTHUS. AJ
Heard: 28 August 2026
Delivered Electronically: 8 September 2026
Summary: Trusts — Trustee conduct — Loan account — Absence of
contemporaneous authority — Invalid resolution — Fiduciary duties — Trustees
acting without joint participation and excluding co ‑trustee — Purported loan account
unsupported by evidence — Resolution passed in conflicted and procedurally
irregular meeting — Set aside — Condonation granted.
ORDER
1. Condonation for the late filing of the applicant’s replying affidavit is granted.
2. It is declared that the second respondent’s purported loan account against the
Bellstedt Family Trust is invalid and of no force or effect.
3. The resolution purportedly passed on 19 December 2025 approving repayment
of such loan account is reviewed and set aside.
4. The third respondent shall continue to hold the proceeds of the farm sale
pending lawful distribution to a valid Trust bank account.
5. The second respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs of Part A and Part B on
the attorney and client scale.
JUDGMENT
Barthus, AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1] This matter concerns the proper administration of the Bellstedt Family Trust
and the legality of a substantial financial claim asserted by the second respondent,
Mr Roland Bellstedt, against the trust estate. The applicant, Mrs Anna Bellstedt,
seeks declaratory and interdictory relief in Part B of her application, following the
grant of urgent relief in Part A by Adams AJ on 24 December 2025. The core
question is whether the second respondent has established any lawful basis for the
loan account he claims, and whether the resolution purportedly passed on 19
December 2025 approving repayment of that claim is valid.
[2] The applicant alleges that the second respondent has attempted to divert trust
assets for his personal benefit through an alleged loan account that is unsupported
by contemporaneous proof and advanced in circumstances that, she contends,
impaired her participation as co -trustee and were inconsistent with fiduciary
obligations. The second respondent contends that his payments towards the
acquisition and financing of the trust property were always treated as loan account
allocations and that the applicant is bound by the divorce settlement agreement to
recognise them.
[3] The Court is required to determine whether the alleged loan account exists in
law, whether the resolution of 19 December 2025 was validly adopted, and whether
the applicant’s late replying affidavit should be condoned. The matter raises serious
concerns regarding trustee conduct, compliance with the Trust Property Control Act,
and the protection of beneficiaries against improper depletion of trust assets. Before
delving into the merits of the matter, I shall deal briefly with the issue raised of
condonation for the late filing of the replying affidavit.
Condonation
[4] Although the delay in filing the replying affidavit was substantial, the Court is
satisfied that condonation should be granted. The matter was set down for
mid-August 2026, the respondents were aware of the issues raised in reply, and no
material prejudice has been demonstrated. The respondents also elected not to
supplement their answering affidavit, despite being afforded an opportunity to do so.
The issues raised are important to the proper administration of the Trust and to the
interests of the beneficiaries. The second respondent addressed the issues raised in
reply on the papers before the Court. In all the circumstances, and having regard to
the interests of justice, condonation is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Establishment and operation of the Trust
[5] The Trust was established in 2008 by Mr and Mrs Bellstedt as a family trust
for the benefit of their family, including their sons. This is common cause.
[6] The Trust purchased a farm in Paarl in 2009. The second respondent, a
dentist experiencing financial difficulties, lived on the farm rent free for approximately
sixteen years. The applicant’s founding affidavit records that “ Mr Bellstedt has lived
on the farm, rent free, since then.”
[7] The trustees are the applicant, the second respondent, and Mr de Kock, who
[7] The trustees are the applicant, the second respondent, and Mr de Kock, who
was appointed in 2018. The applicant alleges that Mr de Kock was not independent,
as he was the second respondent’s personal accountant and consistently aligned
himself with the second respondent in trust matters.
The proposed sale of the farm
[8] In June 2025, the second respondent indicated his intention to sell the farm
due to financial difficulties. The applicant and the Trust beneficiaries opposed the
sale.
[9] On 28 July 2025, a resolution was passed by the second respondent and Mr
de Kock authorising signature of a sale agreement. The applicant was excluded from
meaningful participation and was not provided with the offer to purchase.
[10] The applicant raised concerns regarding the absence of a Trust bank account,
the absence of financial statements, and the second respondent’s purported loan
account.
[11] The second respondent admitted at a trustee meeting that the Trust had no
bank account. The applicant asked where the sale proceeds would be paid. She was
told they would be paid into an attorney’s trust account.
[12] Despite assurances that the sale had been cancelled, the applicant later
discovered through a Windeed search that transfer documents had been lodged on
10 December 2025.
[13] On 17 December 2025, the second respondent’s attorney advised that the
proceeds would be paid out in accordance with a trust resolution. The resolution was
purportedly adopted on 19 December 2025 in circumstances where the second
respondent was present but did not vote because of his conflict of interest, leaving
Mr de Kock as the only trustee who voted in favour of it.
THE PURPORTED LOAN ACCOUNT
The applicant’s position
[14] The applicant repeatedly requested evidence of any loan agreement or trust
resolution authorising a loan account. She alleges that she never approved any loan
agreement, never attended any meeting recognising a loan account, and was
excluded from the 19 December 2025 meeting. These allegations are not disputed in
the answering affidavit.
[15] The applicant’s correspondence reveals that she consistently sought clarity on
the nature, origin, and quantum of the alleged loan account. Her enquiries were met
with silence, evasion, or contradictory explanations. She contends that the second
respondent’s claim is a fabrication designed to divert trust assets for his personal
benefit.
[16] Draft financial statements provided by Mr de Kock on 25 November 2025
reflected a loan account of R4 105 372. He explained these comprised additions and
improvements of R200 000 in 2011 and R1 166 000 in 2022, together with payments
towards the purchase price and bond instalments. No documentary evidence
supports these alleged advances. No loan agreement, no trustee resolution, and no
contemporaneous records were produced.
[17] The applicant further submits that, insofar as the second respondent’s case is
properly characterised as one based on enrichment rather than contract, any such
claim would face substantial difficulty in light of the age of the alleged payments,
which were made between 2009 and 2022, and the circumstances in which the
second respondent occupied the farm rent free for many years. It is unnecessary,
however, for this Court to determine prescription finally. The second respondent does
not plead or prove the ess ential elements of an enrichment claim, nor does he
establish a valid loan agreement or trustee authority binding the Trust. The claim
therefore fails at the anterior stage of proof and authority, quite apart from any
prescription defence that may also arise.
prescription defence that may also arise.
[18] The second respondent himself wrote to the applicant on 24 November 2025
asking whether her payments were donations, adding: “If you want these to be loans,
remember, what is good for the goose is good for the gander .” This statement
demonstrates that he understood that payments made by trustees require a
resolution to constitute loans.
[19] On 12 December 2025, the second respondent proposed a resolution
claiming his loan account was R2 949 372, reducing his claim by R1.1 million without
explanation. The applicant argues that this dramatic reduction demonstrates that the
alleged loan account is arbitrary and contrived.
The second respondent’s position
[20] The second respondent contends that the payments he made towards the
acquisition and financing of the farm were always treated as loan account
allocations. He argues that the Trust acquired the farm for R2 585 000, of which R1
300 000 was financed by an ABSA bond and the balance of R1 285 000 was paid by
him personally. He submits that this payment constituted a deposit advanced on
behalf of the Trust and that it was always understood to be recoverable from the
Trust estate.
[21] The second respondent further contends that he paid all bond instalments up
to 1 December 2019, amounting to R1 654 372.11, and that these payments were
similarly treated as loan account allocations. He argues that the applicant was aware
of these allocations and accepted them as such.
[22] The second respondent relies heavily on clause 10.2 of the divorce settlement
agreement concluded between the parties in August 2021. That clause records that
loan account allocations in favour of the second respondent would be reduced by the
monthly bond instalments paid after 1 December 2019, which would be treated as
rental. He contends that this clause constitutes an acknowledgment by both parties,
in their capacities as trustees, that a loan account existed in his favour at least up to
1 December 2019.
[23] The second respondent submits that the applicant’s present denial of the
existence of a loan account is inconsistent with her obligations under the settlement
existence of a loan account is inconsistent with her obligations under the settlement
agreement and amounts to an attempt to resile from a binding contractual and
judicially sanctioned arrangement.
[24] The second respondent further argues that the Trust deed empowers trustees
to accept interest free loans and to administer the Trust in accordance with
procedures they consider advisable. He relies on clause 6.4.10 of the Trust deed,
which permits trustees to borrow money for the purposes of the Trust, and clause
4.8, which permits trustees to follow administrative steps they deem appropriate.
[25] The second respondent contends that these provisions authorised him to
advance funds to the Trust and that the absence of a formal resolution does not
invalidate the loan account allocations.
[26] The second respondent also argues that the applicant’s conduct during the
administration of the Trust demonstrates that she accepted the existence of the loan
account. He submits that her silence over many years constitutes tacit acceptance of
the loan account and that she cannot now deny its existence.
[27] The second respondent further argues that the resolution passed on 19
December 2025 was validly adopted. He contends that the applicant was afforded an
opportunity to attend the meeting electronically and that she failed to comply with the
notice requirements. He submits that the meeting was quorate, that the trustees
present were entitled to vote, and that the resolution merely authorised
reimbursement of amounts previously advanced by him on behalf of the Trust.
[28] He argues that the applicant’s challenge to the resolution is motivated by her
opposition to the sale of the farm and the applicant’s desire to prevent the second
respondent from recovering funds he advanced over many years.
ANALYSIS
The loan account
[29] A party alleging a loan must prove the agreement relied upon, the advance
made pursuant to it, and the basis on which repayment is due. That pleading and
evidential requirement follows from the ordinary principles governing contractual
claims. Where the alleged debtor is a trust, the inquiry also requires proof that the
trustees authorised the transaction in accordance with the trust deed and the law
governing trustee decision making.
[30] The second respondent’s claim rests entirely on his own retrospective
characterisation of payments made more than a decade ago. The absence of any
contemporaneous documentation is striking. The Trust was established in 2008. The
payments allegedly constituting the loan account were made between 2009 and
2022. Yet the second respondent has produced no loan agreement, no trustee
resolution, no minutes, no correspondence, no bank records identifying the
payments as loans, and no accounting records contemporaneously refl ecting a loan
account.
[31] The financial statements produced by Mr de Kock in November 2025 are not
contemporaneous records. They are draft statements prepared after the dispute
arose and based on information supplied by the second respondent. They cannot
establish the existence of a loan. They merely reflect the second respondent’s
assertions.
[32] The second respondent’s own conduct contradicts his claim. His email of 24
November 2025 demonstrates that he understood that payments made by trustees
require a resolution to constitute loans. His statement that “ what is good for the
goose is good for the gander ” reveals that he intended to treat his own payments as
loans only if the applicant agreed to treat her payments as loans. This is inconsistent
with any assertion that his payments were always treated as loans.
[33] The dramatic reduction of the alleged loan account from R4.1 million to
R2.9 million within two weeks, without explanation, further undermines the credibility
of the claim. If the loan account were based on actual advances, its quantum would
not fluctuate arbitrarily.
[34] The reliance placed on clause 10.2 of the divorce settlement agreement is
misplaced. That clause does not create a loan account. At most, it records the
manner in which the parties to the divorce settlement proposed to treat certain
alleged loan account allocations as between themselves. It does not identify the
underlying loan agreement, the date on which any loan was concluded, the amount
advanced pursuant to such agreement, or any trustee resolution authorising the
Trust to incur a debt to the second respondent. Nor does it constitute a decision of
the trustees, taken in accordance with the Trust deed, to recognise or repay a debt
owed by the Trust. A settlement agreement between spouses, even if made an order
of court in matrimonial proceedings, cannot by agreement between those spouses
bind the Trust to a liability unless the Trust, acting through its duly authorised
trustees, validly assumed that liability.
[35] The Trust is a separate juristic arrangement administered by trustees for the
benefit of beneficiaries, and its assets cannot be treated as an extension of the
personal estate of either spouse. Clause 10.2 therefore presupposes, but does not
prove, the existence of a loan account. It cannot be used to manufacture trustee
authority, supply missing contemporaneous records, or convert disputed personal
payments into an enforceable debt against the Trust where the necessary proof is
absent.
[36] The second respondent lived rent free on the farm for sixteen years. If he had
paid bond instalments during that period, those payments would likely constitute
rental or occupation consideration rather than loans. The divorce settlement
agreement confirms this by treating post 2019 payments as rental. There is no basis
to treat earlier payments differently.
[37] The applicant’s repeated requests for documentation were ignored. The
[37] The applicant’s repeated requests for documentation were ignored. The
second respondent and Mr de Kock failed to produce evidence supporting the
alleged loan account. That failure is significant because trustees must administer
trust property with the care, diligence and skill required by s 9(1) of the Trust
Property Control Act 57 of 1988, must observe the provisions of the trust deed, and
must keep identifiable trust property separate from personal interests. The
importance of proper trustee authority, joint action and observance of the trust deed
is emphasised in Nieuwoudt NO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 1 and Land and
Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker2.
[38] The Court is satisfied that the second respondent has failed to establish the
existence of any loan account. His claim is unsupported by evidence, inconsistent in
its quantification, and advanced in circumstances that raise serious concerns about
transparency, accuracy, and good faith.
The 19 December 2025 resolution
[39] The resolution purportedly passed on 19 December 2025 lies at the heart of
the second respondent’s attempt to legitimise his alleged loan account. The
circumstances surrounding this meeting disclose procedural irregularities and a
failure to facilitate the applicant’s participation in a decision affecting trust assets,
which was inconsistent with the duties of trustees acting jointly and transparently.
[40] The operative notice of the meeting, dated 12 December 2025, expressly
required trustees who wished to attend electronically to notify the convenor and
request access via Zoom. The applicant attempted to join the meeting using
Microsoft Teams, relying on an earlier notice that had not been withdrawn. The
respondents made no effort to assist her, despite being aware of her repeated
requests for information and her clear opposition to the alleged loan account. Their
failure to facilitate her participation was not an oversight. It was a deliberate act of
exclusion.
[41] The meeting proceeded with only two trustees present, namely the second
respondent and Mr de Kock. The second respondent was present but did not vote
because of his conflict of interest in the proposed repayment of his own alleged loan
account. The applicant was absent, not through choice, but because she was
effectively prevented from attending. The respondents knew that she had been
querying the alleged loan account for months, that she had issued legal proceedings
concerning it, and that she had expressly indicated her intention to participate in any
concerning it, and that she had expressly indicated her intention to participate in any
meeting dealing with it. Proceeding in those circumstances disregarded her rights as
a trustee.
1 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA).
2 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA).
[42] The respondents argue that the meeting was quorate and that the trustees
present were entitled to vote. A quorum clause may permit trustees to take a majority
decision where the trust deed so provides and where proper notice is given, as
confirmed in Shepstone and Wylie Attorneys v De Witt N.O. and Others 3. That
principle does not assist trustees who rely on a meeting conducted in a manner that
effectively excludes another trustee from participation, particularly where the
resolution concerns a disputed personal claim by one of the trustees against the trust
estate. On the facts of this matter, the Trust deed does not authorise the
manipulation of procedural requirements to secure an outcome favourable to the
conflicted trustee.
[43] The resolution itself purported to authorise repayment of the second
respondent’s alleged loan account. It was passed after the founding affidavit and
notice of motion had been issued and served. The respondents were fully aware that
the loan account was disputed and that the matter was sub judice. Their decision to
proceed with the resolution in these circumstances was reckless, improper, and
inconsistent with the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
[44] The second respondent’s conduct in relation to the meeting was not merely
irregular. It was inconsistent with the candour and transparency expected of a
trustee. The applicant had been told that no further trustee meetings would be held.
The applicant was also informed that the sale of the farm had been cancelled. These
statements were false. The second respondent was actively proceeding with the sale
and preparing to pass a resolution approving repayment of the alleged loan account.
This conduct supports the inference that material information was withheld from the
applicant in circumstances where the second respondent stood to obtain a financial
benefit from the impugned resolution.
[45] Trustees are required to act with independence of judgment, transparency,
[45] Trustees are required to act with independence of judgment, transparency,
and fidelity to the trust deed. They must ensure that co -trustees are afforded a fair
opportunity to participate in decisions affecting the trust estate, and they may not
prefer a personal interest over the interests of the trust and its beneficiaries. These
duties are reinforced by Parker and by Tijmstra NO v Blunt -Mackenzie NO and
Others4, which illustrates that trustee conduct falling below the required standard
may justify judicial intervention. The respondents failed to meet those standards.
3 [2025] ZACC 14.
4 2002 (1) SA 459 (T).
Their actions undermined the integrity of the trust’s administration and prejudiced
both the applicant and the beneficiaries.
[46] The resolution of 19 December 2025 was invalidly adopted. It is set aside.
CONCLUSION
[47] The evidence shows that the second respondent and Mr de Kock
administered the disputed transaction in a manner that undermined transparency,
joint decision making, and the applicant’s ability to participate meaningfully in trust
governance.
[48] The second respondent’s claim to a loan account is unsupported by evidence
and inconsistent in its quantification. The second respondent failed to allege or prove
the existence of a loan agreement, and his reliance on the divorce settlement
agreement does not cure that deficiency. His attempt to legitimise the alleged loan
account through the resolution of 19 December 2025 was procedurally improper and
cannot stand.
[49] Trustees must act jointly where the trust deed requires joint action, or in
accordance with a valid majority decision mechanism where the deed permits it and
the meeting is properly convened. They must also act independently, transparently,
and in the best interests of beneficiaries, keep trust assets separate from personal
assets, and maintain proper records. The conduct of the second respondent and Mr
de Kock fell short of these standards. Their approach undermined the proper
administration of the Trust, prejudiced the applicant and the beneficiaries, and
sought to prefer the second respondent’s personal financial interest over the
interests of the Trust.
[50] The Court is satisfied that the second respondent has failed to establish any
legal entitlement to the funds he claims. The purported loan account and the
resolution of 19 December 2025 are invalid, and the applicant is entitled to the
declaratory and interdictory relief sought. The question of costs must be approached
in light of the seriousness of the second respondent’s conduct. He advanced a
in light of the seriousness of the second respondent’s conduct. He advanced a
substantial personal claim against the Trust without producing the basic documents
that one would expect to exist if the claim were genuine, persisted in that claim
despite repeated requests for proof, and sought to procure payment from trust
assets through a procedurally defective resolution adopted in circumstances that
impaired the applicant’s participation as co -trustee. The conduct was not merely
unsuccessful litigation conduct. It concerned the administration of trust property, the
protection of beneficiaries, and the fiduciary obligations of a trustee who stood to
benefit personally from the impugned resolution. In these circumstances, an ordinary
costs order wo uld not adequately reflect the Court’s disapproval of the manner in
which the second respondent dealt with the Trust and the applicant as co -trustee. A
punitive costs order on the attorney and client scale is therefore warranted.
[51] The administration of a Family Trust requires honesty, transparency, and
fidelity to the trust deed. The Court cannot permit trust assets to be distributed on the
basis of an unsubstantiated claim advanced through an invalid resolution. The
integrity of the Trust must be restored, the beneficiaries must be protected, and
trustees must act within the bounds of their authority. This judgment gives effect to
those principles.
[52] Finally, and before concluding, it is necessary to emphasise that language
used in affidavits and pleadings should remain measured, respectful, and directed to
the issues requiring determination. Discourteous or inflammatory remarks do not
assist the Court and risk distracting from the real dispute between the parties.
Certain language used by the applicant was perceived by the second respondent as
offensive. Counsel and litigants are reminded that allegations should be advanced
firmly where the facts justify them, but without unnecessary personal invective.
ORDER
[53] In the result, the following order is made:
1. Condonation for the late filing of the applicant’s replying affidavit is
granted.
2. It is declared that the second respondent’s purported loan account
granted.
2. It is declared that the second respondent’s purported loan account
against the Bellstedt Family Trust is invalid and of no force or effect.
3. The resolution purportedly passed on 19 December 2025 approving
repayment of such loan account is reviewed and set aside.
4. The third respondent shall continue to hold the proceeds of the farm
sale pending lawful distribution to a valid Trust bank account.
5. The second respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs of Part A and
Part B on the attorney and client scale.
_____________________________
V BARTHUS
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For applicant: ADV C FEHR
Instructed by: Van Wyk Van Heerden
For 2nd respondent: MR KULENKAMPF
Instructed by: Kulenkampf & Associates