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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
Case Number: 2026-187627
In the matter between:
In the matter between:
CCG SYSTEMS (PTY) LTD First Applicant
(Registration number: 2006/015478/07)
CHAKANETSA WALTER MUWANDI Second Applicant
ISABELLE DAYLE MUWANDI Third Applicant
PHUMUDZO LEONARD MUKWEVHO Fourth Applicant
MASHUDU VHUTSHILO MUKWEVHO Fifth Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF POLICE First Respondent
WARRANT OFFICER VINCENT PULE MOKOENA Second Respondent
MAGISTRATE AME OOSTHUIZEN – RANDBURG Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
(1) REPORTABLE: No
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
(3) REVISED: No
31/08/2026 ________________________
DATE SIGNATURE
2
MANOIM J:
1. This urgent application challenges the lawfulness of searches and seizures
carried out by members of the South African Police Service in July 2026 under
warrants issued by a magistrate in terms of section 21, read with section 20
and Chapter 2 , of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The searches
occurred on two separate days at two different pr emises. A third warrant ,
issued for another address, was never executed. The applicants challenge the
legality of all three warrants , which are identical except for the names and
addresses of the persons to be searched.
2. Cited as respondents in this application are the Minister of Police (the first
respondent), and the officer responsible for obtaining the warrants , Warrant
Officer Vincent Mokoena, the second respondent. The police oppose the
application. They allege they acted lawfully in terms of sections 20 and 21 of
the Act.
3. The third respondent is the Magistrate who issued the warrant. She has
elected to abide.
4. The first applicant is a private company , CCG Systems Pty Ltd (CCG). The
remaining four applicants are variously two of the directors of CCG (the
second and fourth applicants) and their respective wives (the third and fifth
applicants).
5. The record does not disclose much about the business of CCG, but according
to the applicants ’ founding affidavit , it is engaged in resour ce planning
3
systems and bids for numerous contracts with State organs across the
country.
6. Before I consider the validity of the search and the warrants , some
background information is necessary for context. This information comes from
the answering affidavit filed on behalf of the first and second respondents.
7. The answering affidavit has been deposed to by Colonel Marietjie Roodt, who
says she was fully involved in the investigation that gave rise to the searches ,
and she is the officer to whom Mokoena reports.
8. According to Roodt , in April 2025 a whistleblower told the police that they
were aware of corrupt activities involving officials of the Ngaka Modiri Moloma
District Municipality ("the Municipality") and persons associated with CCG.
The whistleblower allegedly provided information to the police that CCG was
bribing the mayor of the Municipality to secure tenders or the extension of
tenders without a competitive process being followed. An enquiry was then
opened.
9. She does not disclose what happened after this enquiry was opened, until the
police held a meeting with some of the applicants on 2 July 2026 at which she
says the allegations were put to them. Only the fourth applicant , Mukwevho,
was present at this meeting as well as CCG’s business development
manager, a Ms Lugiva. Roodt says she told t hem that the police were
investigating allegations of tender fraud, money laundering, and bribery
relating to the relationship between CCG and the mayor and officials of the
municipality. She describes Mukwevho as ‘unforthcoming’ with information.
4
10. On Mukwevho’s version, a minute was kept of the meeting which he enclose d
with the founding affidavit. It is a series of questions from the police to him
which he answers , although sometimes saying he needed to check with his
technical directors. At the end of the minute is a sentence that says : “removal
of Ngaka Modiri documents on the CCG database will be seen as a criminal
act and action will be taken. It amounts to defeating the ends of justice.”
11. I have set out the versions of this meeting, which are largely consistent, as the
police seek to rely on what information was disclosed in defence of the
challenged warrant. Since the applicants had among other issues challenged
the intelligibility of the language of warrant the police argued that the prior
meeting had explained the ambit of the investigation and hence the applicants
had been fully briefed on its scope.
12. On 21 July 2026, Mokoena, the second respondent, went to the Magistrate,
the third respondent , to obtain search warrants. He had deposed to an
affidavit on which the warrants were then based. He asked for and was issued
with three warrants.
1 It was stated that Mokoena would oversee the searches
and would be accompanied by named officials. Roodt’s name is included in
the list.
13. On 24 July 2026, the first search took place at CCG’s business premises.
Certain items were seized. Some were returned the following day. The
applicants describe this as a two -day search, but it is not clear if the second
day can be described as part of the search although nothing turns on this.
1 The three warrants were numbered 55/2026, 56/2026 and 57/2026.
5
14. The essential facts of the search are largely common cause. The description
of the atmosphere is not. The applicants describe it as intimidating with armed
police on site. The police describe the applicants as evasive, requiring them to
wait for Mukwevho and his lawyer to arrive. The two significant facts are that
the applicants present were shown a copy of the search warrant as was their
attorney, but the warrant did not contain the affidavit which Mokoena had
submitted to the Magistrate, a fact I return to later.
15. On 31 July 2026, Mokoena issued an ex parte application for the issuing of a
search, access o r seizure warrant in terms of section 29(1)(a) of the
Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020 ("Cybercrimes Act") . Roodt says that the police
process is that this warrant is only “completed once the electronic devices or
articles that are to be looked at or mirrored are in the possession of the
investigators/officials mandated with the investigation. It would serve no
purpose to issue this warrant in the absence of electronic devices and/or
gadgets.”
16. The validity of this two -stage process was a collateral issue in the present
case, but it is not necessary for me to consider it for present purposes.
17. On 3 August 2026, the second impugned search and seizure too k place. This
was at the home of the Muwandi’s, the second and third applicants. Only Ms
Muwandi was present, but she called her attorney and two of them arrived,
one of whom was present at the 24 July search. Various items were seized
again.
6
18. The seized articles (laptops and mobile phones) were then booked in at the
police station. The police were then awaiting an application for the requisite
warrant to be issued in terms of the Cybercrimes Act.
19. A meeting was then held on 4 August between the police, the applicants and
their attorney at which warning statements were signed and the applicants
invoked their right to silence.
20. The present application was launched on 4 August 2026. Short time periods
were given for the respondents to reply. The third respondent , the Magistrate,
timeously complied and indicated her intention to abide. What she did do was
to file the documents that had been served before her on 21 July , this being
the date the three warrants were issued by her. These were the minutes of the
meeting, largely a pro forma document, the warrants themselves , and the
affidavits in support of their issue by Mokoena. The conten t of these three
affidavits is the same.
Urgency
21. The first point taken by the first and second respondents is that the application
was not urgent as it was only made on 4 August 2026, when the search
complained of had taken place on 24 July 2026. They contend that this
application should have been brought much closer to the date of the first
impugned search. I do not consider this a point of great substance, and it
appears more of a rote response one gets in the urgent court. The applicants’
delay in bringing the application was not substantial. There were attempt s to
deal with the police that followed , including the meeting on 4 August . If they
had had their items returned it may have obviated the need for this
7
application. The objection is ironic given that the respondents then explain
why they were not able to respond more quickly to the application, as the
State Attorney has to satisfy internal processes before briefing counsel.
22. I am satisfied that the application was brought with sufficient expedition and
that, although the respondents had little time to respond, they were able to file
a detailed reply.
Spoliation issue
a. Was there consent
23. The next issue was whether the requirements for a spoliation action have
been met. It is worth noting that in reply the applicants denied that they were
bringing a spoliation application, but rather that it was a review. But, in final
argument they reverted to relying on spoliation. It has been held that
spoliation is an appropriate remedy in applications to challenge the lawfulness
of seizures by the police. As explained by the Constitutional Court in an action
concerning a seizure of articles by the police, there are two elements:
“All that the despoiled person need prove is that -
(a) she was in possession of the object; and
(b) she was deprived of possession unlawfully”
2
24. The one defence raised by the respondents, which I deal with now, is consent.
It is trite that in spoliation actions a respondent can raise consent as a
2 Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2014 (5) SA 112 (CC), paragraph 13.
8
defence. The respondents contend that the applicants consented to handing
over the impugned items with their attorneys present.
25. This point was not pursued in oral argument by counsel who appeared for the
respondents, and correctly so. It ill behoves the police to encourage members
of the public to resist searches , especially when what purports to be a validly
issued warrant is produced.
26. The applicants may not have physically resisted handing over the seized
items, but their unhappiness at doing so is quite evident and they can hardly
be deemed to have consented.
b. Was the deprivation unlawful
27. It is common cause that the respondents rely on sections 20 and 21 of the
Criminal Procedure Act to justify the search and seizure. The warrants purport
to be issued pursuant to those provisions. If the respondents have not
properly complied with the strictures of those provisions, then the deprivation
that follows would be unlawful.
28. In their founding papers , the applicants had thrown the kitchen sink at th e
respondents, raising numerous points ranging from the meritless
3 to the
tenuous4.
3 One point since made in the founding papers, since conceded in reply, was that the affidavit had not
been made under oath – this was both factually and legally incorrect – it was, and even if it had been
affirmed this complies with the terms of section 2 of the Interpretation Act, 33 of 1957, which in defining
the term oath says it includes an affirmation.
4 The applicants objected to the description of the objects as too wide, but court decisions have shown
that the same description has been considered acceptable, and secondly that they were not given an
inventory of the items seized, that too does not constitute a basis to impugn the search. See Cine Films
(Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of Police 1972 (2) SA 254 (A) and Van Rooyen & another v Minister of Police &
others 2019 (1) SACR 349 (NCK) at [53].
9
29. In final argument in fresh heads of argument , the applicants’ counsel confined
themselves to fewer issues. I do not need to consider all of them as two have
merit and are uncontroversial.
30. The first is that the warrant was not accompanied by the affidavit. The
applicants only saw the affidavit once the Magis trate had filed her papers. In
terms of the case law , it is a requirement that the affidavit accompany the
warrant so that it if is requested it can be shown to the persons being
searched. This is more than formalism. The affidavit gives the addressee
more information about the basis for the search, and hence its lawfulness ,
than does the face of the warrant.
31. In the replying affidavit , the fourth applicant states that his attorneys had
sought what he describes as the “supporting statement” from the police but it
had been refused.
32. I understand that when the fourth applicant refers to the supporting statement,
this is a reference to the affidavit. In terms of section 21(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act:
“Subject to the provisions of sections 22, 24 and 25, an article referred to in
section 20 shall be seized only by virtue of a search warrant issued–
(a) by a magistrate or justice, if it appears to such magistrate or justice from
information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that any
such article is in the possession or under the control of or upon any person or
upon or at any premises within his area of jurisdiction; (My emphasis).
10
33. There are circumstances where the failure to disclose the affidavit may
compromise the legality of the search . In Goqwana v Minister of Safety and
Security NO & Others the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) explained it in this
way:5
“It is accordingly imperative that the affidavit or sworn statement in support of
the warrant should accompany the warrant and be handed over together with
it. This would, additionally, facilitate the expedition of any court application in
which a person may wish to contend that his or her rights were adversely
affected by the search. This injunction accords with the constitutionally
enshrined right of every person to have access to information ‘that is held by
another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any
rights.’ This right is embodied in the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2
of 2000.”
34. This case is no different. The detail on the face of the warrant says the
following about the basis for the search:
“A. the following offence(s) *have been/are being/are intended to be
committed, namely [set out the common law or statutory offence with
applicable Act name and number as well as the relevant offence section.
Also state essential facts of the offence including date/period/place/
area/identified offender(s)]:
CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE AT NGAKA MODIRI MOLEMA
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY B Y THE MUNICIPAL MANAGER, MAYOR AND
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, WITH THE DIRECTORS OF THE SERVICE
5 [2015] ZASCA 186; [2016] 1 All SA 629 (SCA); 2016 (1) SACR 384 (SCA)
11
PROVIDER KNOWN AS CCG SYSTEMS KNOWN AS MR PHUMUDZO
MUKHWEVHO, MRS MASHUDU VHUTSHILO MUKWEVHO, MR
CHAKANETSA WALTER MUWADI (CEO), AND MRS ISABELA DAYLE
MUWADI.
6”
35. However, in the affidavit more information is disclosed. Thus , Mokoena states
there that:
“I have received an information from the whistle blower who gave information
about the alleged corruption activities. The information was followed and
further investigation was conducted. The above- mentioned persons are
implicated in a corruption activity in Ngaka Modiri Moloma District Municipality
where the mayor will receive bribes and influence the awarding of
contracts/tenders in favour of the above persons company which is known as
CCG Systems. Thereafter the awarded supplier will pay bribes to stay on
contract which is not advertised and it will be extended without being
advertised.
The search and seizure warrant is aimed at the articles/ exhibits that is
reasonable suspected and believed beyond the reasonable doubt to have
been used in the commission of the offence/s. The articles to be searched
and seized are as follows: Documents, Computers(laptops), Cell phones,
Hard drives, and any electronic Devices, or any Document or Articles that is
suspected to have been used by the above- mentioned suspects in the
commission of the offence/s will also be seized for the purpose of
investigations and offer evidence in court during the trial.”
6 The text in bold type is what appears on the pre-printed form. The text in capital letter is what was filled
in on the form, including the choice of capitals.
12
36. The cases make clear that the intelligibility of the search warrant is a crucial
issue. If, as in this case , the succinct language of the warrant is made more
intelligible by the language used in the affidavit, then its absence from the
search documents detracts from the intelligibility of the warrant and is
prejudicial to the persons who are the subject of the search.
7
37. The second issue of legality is that the offence is not disclosed. It is now
common cause that the search was intended to be based o n a statutory
offence, the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act , 12 of 2004
(PRECCA). As the Constitutional Court has made clear in Minister of Safety
and Security v Van der Merwe and Others:
“The main question in this application for leave to appeal is whether search
and seizure warrants are valid, despite their failure to mention the offences to
which the search relates. The answer depends on whether the common- law
intelligibility principle, properly understood, requires that the offence be
specified in the search and seizure warrants issued in terms of s 21 of the
Criminal Procedure Act.
[55] What emerges from this analysis is that a valid warrant is one that, in a
reasonably intelligible manner:
(a) States the statutory provision in terms of which it is issued
(b) identifies the searcher;
(c) clearly mentions the authority it confers upon the searcher;
7 As to the importance of intelligibility see Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others 2005 (5)
SA 62 (SCA); 2005 (1) SACR 317 (SCA) at para 59.
13
(d) identifies the person, container or premises to be searched;
(e) describes the article to be searched for and seized, with sufficient
particularity; and
(f) specifies the offence which triggered the criminal investigation and names
the suspected offender.”8
38. In Goqwana, the case most similar to the present one , goods were seized on
the grounds that the suspect person was engaged in gambling , in
contravention of the relevant statute. However, the search warrant did not
mention the specific section, relying instead on the particulars of the activity .
The court noted:
“… there is no statutory offence known as ‘illegal interactive gambling (online
gambling)’ – this being the ‘offence’ described in the search warrant. This
underscores the importance of it ordinarily being desirable that when dealing
with a statutory offence, as opposed to a common law crime, the warrant
should pertinently refer to the specific statute and the section or subsection
thereof in order to enable the person in charge of the premises to be searched
(assisted, if needs be, by his or her lawyer) and also the police official
authorised in terms of the search warrant to know precisely that for which the
search has been authorised.”
9
39. The same situation applies here. T he warrant simply refers to corruption. But
corruption is not a common law offence. As I mentioned, it is now common
cause that the police intended to search and seize in terms of PRECCA .
82011 (2) SACR 301 (CC), paragraph 55.
9 Goqwana, supra, at paragraph 29.
14
There was thus a failure to identify the statute and hence meet the
requirements set out in the Van der Merwe case. On this basis alone , the
warrant is invalid , and accordingly the search. Since all three warrants are
identical in this respect (they differ only as to the addresses for the searc h)
they are all infected by this failure and fall to be set aside.
Preservation order
40. This is a matter where the errors that have occurred are of a purely technical
nature. In Goqwana the court referred to the judgment in Polonyfis , where the
SCA held that a court:
“… in the absence of an ‘abuse of power’ or a ‘gross violation’ of the rights of
a person to be searched, it would be slow to find that a search warrant is
unlawful on purely technical grounds.”
10
41. The applicants were as aware of the allegations made against them from the
meeting they had with the police prior to the search being conducted, as they
would have been had the affidavit accompanied the search warrant and the
statutory offence been stipulated in the warrant.
42. The police are investigating matters of substantial public interest concerning
the alleged corruption of public office bearers . It was no doubt for this reason
that, in argument , counsel for the respondents had suggested that if I was
against them on the validity of the warrant, I should grant a preservation order.
10 Goqwana, supra, at paragraph 32, quoting from Polonyfis v Minister of Police 2012 (1) SACR 57 (SCA).
15
This type of order has been discussed by the Constitutional Court in the Thint
case and has been implemented in subsequent cases.11
43. I discussed the issue with the applicants ’ counsel. He argued that the
respondents never sought such a remedy in their answering papers , and
therefore it would be unfair to grant one without the applicants being given an
opportunity to respond.
44. Although this is a case where a preservation order would be appropriate, I am
sympathetic to the applicants’ argument. The request for such an order is not
merely a matter of law. The nature of the order sought is one that the
applicants should be given an opportunity to respond to. For instance, they
would be entitled, inter alia, to be told where the goods would be kept, and on
what event the continued preservation would be contingent on . These goods,
after all, are the tools of trade of the applicants and their company. They had a
right to be heard on these issues, and they have not been given that
opportunity. For this reason, as a matter of fairness I cannot grant such an
order on the present facts.
45. I was however concerned with some of the language in the proposed draft
order which could have been read to be granting a final interdict against a
further search. At my suggestion, the applicants agreed to amend the wording
of the order sought to make clear that it was not final in relation to the search.
This means that the police remain free to seek a fresh warrant, provided it
complies with the applicable legal requirements.
11 Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions & others; Zuma v National Director of Public
Prosecutions & others 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 219. See Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate
for the District of Vredendal, Kroutz NO & others [2017] 2 All SA 599 (WCC) at para 217 and Van Den berg v
Page and others Case number: 10636/16 (WCC) June 2016 paragraphs 10- 11.
16
Costs
46. The applicants seek the costs of two counsel including senior counsel. Whilst
I appreciate that the presence of senior counsel in their team has focussed
the issues and reduced them , the fact that the applicants required this should
not be paid out of the respondents’ purse. This is a matter where the law was
clear and a good point nearly got submerged in a sea of bad ones. The
respondents did not make use of two counsel , nor of senior counsel. A fair
costs order would allow the costs of one counsel on Scale B.
ORDER
It is declared that:
1. This application is urgent as provided for in Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of
Court and the Applicants’ non-compliance with the Rules is condoned.
2. The search and seizure warrants numbered 55/2026, 56/2026 and 57/2026,
issued on 21 July 2026, by the Third Respondent in terms of Section 21, read
with Section 20 and Chapter 2, of the Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of
1977), under reference NCCIU Enquiry No: 01/04/2025, and in respect of the
premises situated at:
2.1. 3[…] W[… ], corner I […] and S[… ] Street, H[…] G[…] Extension 31, Gauteng
Province (warrant 55/2026);
2.2. 1[…] M[…] Drive, 1 […] W[…] P[…] , J […] H[…] , M […] , Gauteng Province
(warrant 56/2026);
2.3. 3[…] L[…] Drive, W[…] C[…] , M[…] , Gauteng Province (warrant 57/2026);
17
are declared unlawful and invalid and are set aside.
3. The searches and seizures conducted by the Second Respondent and other
members of the First Respondent, pursuant to the above warrants, on 24 and
25 July 2026, at 1[…] M[…] Drive, 1[…] W[…] P[…] , J[...] H[…] , M[…] ; and on
3 August 2026 at 3[…] L[…] Drive, W[…] C[… ], M[…] , are declared unlawful.
4. The First and Second Respondents, and any other person acting as agent on
behalf of the First and/or Second Respondents who are in possession of the
articles and/or items which were seized, are ordered to restore the Applicants’
possession of, and to return, all articles and items removed from the aforesaid
premises on 24 and 25 July 2026, and on 3 August 2026, including all and/or
any copies and/or mirror images made of any of the articles and items
forthwith. Insofar as it is not practical or possible to return any of the mirror
images made, it is ordered that such image(s) must be destroyed forthwith.
5. The First and Second Respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this
application, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved,
including the costs of one counsel on Scale B in terms of Rule 67A of the
Rules.
___________________________
MANOIM J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Appearances
For the applicants: J Cilliers SC and WS Jungbluth
Instructed by: G P Bouwer Attorneys
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For the first and second respondents: T Langa
Instructed by: Office of the State Attorney
Date of hearing: 20 August 2026
Date of Judgment: 31 August 2026