SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
1. REPORTABLE: No
2. OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
3. REVISED:
DATE: 27 August 2026
SIGNATURE OF ACTING JUDGE:
CASE NUMBER: 2026-038046
In the matter between:-
HARRY KIBEL First Applicant
ALL THOSE WHO ARE CARRYING OUT
CONSTRUCTION WORKS AT ERF 1[…] M[…] Second Applicant
VENTURE STORAGE (PTY) LTD Third Applicant
and
THE CITY OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY Respondent
In re :
THE CITY OF EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY Applicant
and
HARRY KIBEL First Respondent
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ALL THOSE WHO ARE CARRYING OUT
CONSTRUCTION WORKS AT ERF 1[…] M […] Second Respondent
VENTURE STORAGE (PTY) LTD Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email subsequent to the orders granted in the urgent court on 17
and 21 August 2026 and a request for reasons from the respondent on 24 August
2026. The date and time for hand- down of these reasons is deemed to be 27 August
2026.
PRETORIUS AJ:
Introduction
[1] In this matter two orders were granted by me during the week of 17 August 2026
in the urgent court, the first on 17 August and the second on 21 August. On 24 August
2026 the respondent ( the Municipality) requested reasons for the two orders. These are
the reasons for those orders.
[2] Both orders are interlocutory and preservatory. Neither order determined the
merits of the applicants’ application brought on 17 August 2026. In particular, neither
order finally determined:
(2.1) whether section 18(1), read with section 18(5), of the Superior Courts Act 10
of 2013 (the Act) suspended the demolition order of 21 April 2026;
(2.2) whether the applications for leave to appeal in the High Court remain pending
after they were struck from the roll;
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(2.3) whether the application lodged with the Supreme Court of Appeal ( the SCA
petition) is competent or has suspensive effect;
(2.4) whether the application was barred by res judicata or issue estoppel arising
from the dismissal o f Part A of the applicants’ suspension and rescission
application by Van Nieuwenhuizen AJ;
(2.5) whether the orders of 3 March and 21 April 2026 were appealable or
rescindable; or
(2.6) the merits of Part B of the rescission application.
[3] The purpose of both orders was to preserve the remaining structures and regulate
the further conduct of the proceedings until those questions could be determined on an
adequate record. Demolition is irreversible and irreparable.
1 If execution proceeded
before the threshold issues were properly determined, later success in the High Court, the
Supreme Court of A ppeal or the rescission proceedings could be rendered practically
hollow.
Background
[4] This application has a complex procedural history over a six- month period during
which various applications were brought by the respective parties and several orders were
made.
[5] On 3 March 2026 Twala J granted an immediately operative rule nisi. Among
other things, the order joined Venture Storage (Pty) Ltd, declared the construction at Erf
1[…] M[…] (the property ) illegal on an interim basis, interdicted further construction,
directed the applicants to demolish the structures within five days and authorised the
Municipality to demolish them upon non-compliance.
1 Knoop NO v Gupta (Execution) 2021 (3) SA 135 (SCA).
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[6] On 24 March 2026 Senyatsi J granted an agreed procedural order regulating the
filing of affidavits and advancing the return day to 21 April 2026. The order also
prohibited further construction and access for construction or accommodation.
[7] On 21 April 2026 Dlamini J confirmed the rule nisi. On 30 April 2026 the
applicants delivered an application for leave to appeal in respect of the orders of Twala J
and Dlamini J.
[8] On 6 May 2026, while demolition was underway, Fisher J ordered that the
demolition be suspended pending determination of the application for leave to appeal.
[9] On 1 June 2026 Twala J ordered, in the application for leave to appeal directed at
the 3 March order, that the leave application “ is struck off the roll for the reason that the
rule is not appealable”. On 7 July 2026 Dlamini J ordered, in the application for leave to
appeal directed at the 21 April confirmation order that the leave application “is struck off
the roll for the reason that the order is not appealable as it was granted on an unopposed
basis and in default of the respondents’ appearance”.
[10] The applicants thereafter launched a two part rescission application. Part A
sought a stay under Rule 45A pending Part B in which rescission was sought . Van
Nieuwenhuizen AJ dismissed Part A. Reasons for the dismissal were requested but had
not been furnished when the present application was heard. Part B, I understand, remains
pending.
[11] An application for leave to appeal was thereafter lodged with the Supreme Court
of Appeal. The applicants contend that its lodgement suspended the operation and
execution of the demolition order under section 18(1), read with section 18(5), of the Act.
The Municipality disputes that proposition, contending principally that the orders a re not
appealable and that the Supreme Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction.
[12] On the morning of 17 August 2026, municipal officials attended at the property
[12] On the morning of 17 August 2026, municipal officials attended at the property
and demolition recommenced. The applicants’ attorneys requested an undertaking that
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demolition would stop. The Municipality disputed that any suspension was operative and
no undertaking was given. The applicants then approached the urgent court while
demolition was in progress.
The order of 17 August 2026
[13] The applicants approached the court on an extremely urgent basis without
application papers. Both sides were represented and addressed the court. The immediate
factual position was that demolition had commenced and might continue before a
properly constituted application could be filed and heard.
[14] I was not then in a position fairly to determine the disputed statutory and
procedural issues in the absence of papers properly supported by the relevant evidence. It
was nevertheless necessary to prevent the proposed written proceedings from being
rendered nugatory before they could be heard. The order of 17 August was accordingly
granted for the following reasons.
[15] In terms of paragraph 1 of the said order, the Municipality was ordered to suspend
demolition pending the determination of the written application to be brought on the
timetable fixed in paragraphs 1.1 to 1.4. That relief was warranted for the following
reasons:
(15.1) demolition was not merely threatened but was undisputedly underway;
(15.2) structures demolished before the hearing could not practically be restored by
a later order. The applicants faced possible irreparable harm if no holding
order was made;
(15.3) the order did not stay execution indefinitely. It operated for one day, until the
written application could be heard at 11h30 on 18 August;
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(15.4) the order did not determine whether section 18 applied, whether the SCA
petition was competent, or whether the underlying demolition orders were
valid or appealable;
(15.5) the prejudice to the Municipality was a brief delay in execution. The
prejudice to the applicants was the possible permanent destruction of the
subject matter before judicial consideration of the application; and
(15.6) without a temporary cessation order, the right to approach the court would
have been deprived of practical content.
[16] The 17 August order is therefore an urgent holding order. Its purpose was to
preserve the status quo only until the Municipality had received written papers, answered
them and had been heard. The purpose of the order was further to ensure that the interim
protection sought was immediately supported by a proper written case. The applicants
had approached the court without papers because demolition was in progress. The
truncated timelines ordered limited prejudice to the Municipality by ensuring that it
received the applicants’ pleaded case on the same afternoon , whilst giving it sufficient
time to answer considering that the demolition was underway . The Municipality was
already represented and was familiar with the core dispute. I engaged both counsel
regarding the proposed truncated timelines and both counsel indicated that it was suitable
in the circumstances.
[17] The order provided that the applica tion be heard in the same court on the
following day. This preserved continuity which served both efficiency and fairness.
[18] The 17 August order struck a proportionate balance between immediate
preservation, prompt written papers, a right of answer and an expedited hearing.
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The hearing on 18 August 2026
[19] Application papers were delivered and the application was argued on 18 August.
The applicants, relying on section 18(1), read with section 18(5), of the Act, contend that
the Municipality was not entitled to continue demolishing the structures at the property
while the SCA petition, which was lodged on 6 August 2026 under case number
870/2026, was pending. Consequently, the operation and execution of the demolition
order of Dlamini J on 21 April were automatically suspended in the absence of the
Municipality obtaining an execution order under section 18(3).
[20] The applicants dispute that the 21 April order was granted in default and therefore
incapable of appeal. They say that the underlying application was opposed, an answering
affidavit was filed, and their attorney attended court intending to seek a postponement.
They contend that the order was granted before their representative was heard and in
circumstances that violated the audi alteram partem principle.
[21] They also contend that the demolition orders are vulnerable becaus e Venture
Storage was joined by Twala J’s order of 3 March 2026 and was simultaneously
subjected to immediately operative interdictory and demolition relief before service.
They rely on alleged non- joinder of FirstRand Bank, which holds mortgage bonds over
the property, disputes concerning the approved building plans and ownership, and the
alleged failure to determine the matter in accordance with the Plascon-Evans rule.
[22] Finally, the applicants say that demolition would cause irreversible proprietary
and commercial harm and render any later success before the SCA or in the pending Part
B rescission application practically ineffective. They contend that no comparable
prejudice would be caused to the Municipality by preserving the property and tendered
that no further construction or occupation would occur. The applicants contend that there
that no further construction or occupation would occur. The applicants contend that there
is no evidence that the remaining structures pose an immediate danger to the public.
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[23] The applicants accordingly sought a suspension of the demolition and
consequential interdictory relief pending determination of the SCA petition, which,
according to the applicants, triggered statutory suspension under section 18.
[24] The Municipality contends that section 18 of the Act does not suspend the
demolition orders because there is no competent appeal process pending. Relying on
Pitelli v Everton Gardens Projects CC2 and Lee v Road Accident Fund,3 the Municipality
argues that an order granted by default is susceptible to rescission, not appeal. The
Supreme Court of Appeal therefore has no jurisdiction, and the mere administrative
lodgement of a petition cannot trigger section 18.
[25] The Municipality further contends that the High Court applications for leave were
struck rather than dismissed and that the statutory prerequisite for approaching the SCA
under section 17(2)(b), being a refusal of leave by the High Court, was therefore no t
satisfied. However, at the same time, the Municipality contends that those applications
cannot properly be re -enrolled because the underlying orders were judicially determined
to be unappealable. On either basis, according to the Municipality, there is no valid
application for leave pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal capable
of suspending execution.
[26] The Municipality also relies on the earlier dismissal of Part A of the rescission
application by Van Nieuwenhuizen AJ. It says that substantially the same stay was
sought there, including relief linked to the contemplated SCA petition, and rejected. The
present proceedings accordingly seek to revisit an issue already decided by another judge
of the same Division and are barred by res judicata or issue estoppel, alternatively
constitute forum shopping or an abuse of process. The applicants elected to pursue
rescission after the default characterisation and should not change remedies after failing
to obtain a stay.
to obtain a stay.
2 Pitelli v Everton Gardens Projects CC 2010 (5) SA 171 (SCA).
3 Lee v Road Accident Fund 2024 (1) SA 183 (GJ). Pitelli and Lee establish that an order granted in a
party’s absence is ordinarily not appealable while it remains rescindable. Whether those principles
applied to Venture Storage depended on unresolved facts concerning service, affidavits, representation
and the events of 21 April.
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[27] The hearing revealed material disputes.
(27.1) First, the exact effect of the orders striking the applications for leave from the
roll is uncertain. During argument the Municipality’s counsel accepted that
the leave application before Dlamini J remained alive because it had been
struck rather than dismissed. That proposition raised the question whether
section 18(1) might operate by reason of the High Court application itself.
The respondent’s c ounsel subsequently contended that, although notionally
capable of re- enrolment, the application could never be heard because the
underlying order was unappealable. Whether or not the Dlamini J order of 21
April was by default is however disputed by the applicants who relied on
their attorney’s presence at court when it was granted. Th at position requires
fuller investigation.
(27.2) Secondly, res judicata could not be finally determined without knowing the
reasons for Van Nieuwenhuizen AJ ’s order dismissing Part A of the
application before her. The original Part A relief concerned a Rule 45A stay
pending the rescission relief in Part B. The Municipality contends that
amended relief concerning an intended SCA petition was also argued before
Van Nieuwenhuizen AJ , whilst the applicants contend that the present
application rested in addition on a later, actually lodged petition and a distinct
statutory cause. Reasons for the dismissal of Part A were requested by the
applicants but were not yet available.
(27.3) Thirdly, the nature of the alleged default on 21 April i s unclear. The
Municipality initially contended that no answering affidavit existed. During
the hearing an answering affidavit filed on 2 March 2026 was identified. The
Municipality then distinguished Venture Storage’s position from that of Mr
Kibel, contending that Venture Storage had filed no affidavit after joinder.
The applicants further identified a postponement application allegedly filed
The applicants further identified a postponement application allegedly filed
on 21 April and a confirmatory affidavit by their attorney, Ms Erasmus. The
full documents and their party-specific effect were in dispute.
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(27.4) Fourthly, the SCA petition appeared in an unsigned form in parts of the
record, while correspondence recorded later formal lodgement and allocation
of a case number on 6 August 2026. As mentioned, the effect of the SCA
petition was and remains in dispute.
(27.5) Fifthly, the applicants’ notice of motion sought an order directing suspension,
while the founding affidavit advanced the case that section 18 itself caused
automatic suspension. During argument the applicants’ counsel accepted that
declaratory relief would more accurately reflect the statutory case and
tendered an amended draft. That development furthermore reinforced the
need for procedural regularisation before final relief.
[28] On consideration and reflection of the record and submissions advanced, I
concluded that the final determination of the issues raised in the present application
would be unsuitable . The order of 21 August therefore continued preservation and
directed focused supplementation on the disputes identified.
The order of 21 August 2026
[29] Paragraph 1 of the 21 August order extends the suspension of the demolition
provisions in the orders of 3 March and 21 April pending final determination of the
present application and subject to compliance with the remainder of the order. This is, in
my view, justified because demolition remained irreversible , the threshold issues could
materially affect whether execution was lawful , those issues could not fairly be resolved
on the incomplete and disordered record, preservation did not finally determine any
party’s substantive rights, preservation is temporary and subject to an expedited process
and the applicants are required to cure the deficiencies that prevented final determination.
[30] The proviso that suspension would lapse if the applicants failed to deliver the
affidavit required by paragraph 3 of the order serves three purposes:
(30.1) it prevents open ended protection without diligent prosecution;
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(30.2) it places responsibility on the applicants to produce the relevant documents
and information; and
(30.3) it protects the Municipality from delay caused by non-compliance.
[31] Paragraph 1 of the 21 August order does not constitute a finding that section 18
automatically applied. The statutory issue i s expressly reserved in paragraph 7 of the
order. The stay serves as an interim preservation measure pending final determination.
[32] Paragraph 2 of the 21 August order removed the application from the urgent roll
and directed that it proceeds in the ordinary course, subject to the expedited timetable .
The application could not properly be determined as a conventional urgent motion
because the hearing revealed material factual disputes , absent documents , disputed
procedural histories, a potentially dispositive res judicata issue dependent on outstanding
reasons and a need to distinguish the procedural position of each applicant.
[33] Removal was preferable to dismissal. Dismissal would have treated defects in the
urgent record as dispositive and permitted irreversible execution. Postponement on the
urgent roll would have retained a matter requiring substantial supplementation in a forum
not designed for extended factual development. However, t he expedited timetable
recognises that the demolition dispute remains time sensitive.
[34] Paragraph 3 of the 21 August order require s the applicants to supplement their
papers within ten court days. The ten day period balances urgency against the nature and
complexity of the required material.
[35] The complete record of t he suspension and rescission application i s required
because the Municipality raised res judicata and issue estoppel. Determining those
defences requires a comparison of the parties, causes, issues, relief and reasons for the
decision. The original relief sought alone was insufficient. At the hearing, the
Municipality alleged that the applicants amended the proposed order before Van
Municipality alleged that the applicants amended the proposed order before Van
Nieuwenhuizen AJ to include relief linked to the SCA petition and that supplementary
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submissions were invited. The original and amended relief, directives and post hearing
submissions should be considered with the reasons for the decision, which reasons were
not yet available.
[36] The request for reasons and any reasons furnished a re required because the bare
dismissal of Part A did not reveal whether it was based on the requirements of Rule 45A,
the prospects or procedural status of Part B , the contemplated or later SCA process , res
judicata, abuse or election , absence of urgency or prejudice or another ground. I could
not infer the ratio of Van Nieuwenhuizen AJ’s decision. Nor could I determine the
preclusive effect of that decision without reasons and the record.
[37] The final lodged SCA petition, proof of service and any directions issued by the
Supreme Court of Appeal a re required because section 18(5) ties statutory suspension to
lodgement with the Registrar “ in terms of the rules ”. In this regard it is necessary to
distinguish an unissued petition served in anticipation of filing, the final lodged petition,
the date and scope of lodgement, the component concerning the 21 April order, said to be
timely, and the component concerning the 3 March order, for which condonation i s
sought.
[38] The Municipality challenge s the S upreme Court of A ppeal’s jurisdiction. The
best available proof of the actual proceeding before the S upreme Court of A ppeal is
therefore indispensable.
[39] The complete answering affidavit of 2 March 2026 is required because the
existence and effect of that affidavit became contested at the hearing. The default
analysis under Pitelli and Lee turns in part on whether the affected party placed a version
before the court of first instance. It was necessary to determine who deposed to the
affidavit, on whose behalf it was filed , whether it purported to speak for Venture Storage
before or after joinder, which disputes it raised and whether those disputes formed part of
before or after joinder, which disputes it raised and whether those disputes formed part of
the record before Dlamini J. A filing sheet or selected extracts could not answer those
questions.
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[40] The transcript of 21 April recorded that Dlamini J asked about a postponement
application. The applicants alleged that a postponement application had been filed and
that Ms Erasmus was present in court to move it. The Municipality disputed the
significance of those allegations. The postponement application and proof of filing and
service are required to determine whether it was properly before court , which party
brought it , whether the Municipality knew of it , whether it explained the applicants’
apparent non-appearance when the matter was called and whether the 21 April order was
correctly characterised as a true default order.
[41] Counsel’s submissions about Ms Erasmus’s presence and conduct cannot serve as
evidence. Ms Erasmus’ account of the event as set out in her letter of 26 May 2026
appears to be disputed by the Municipality. A complete account of the events from her
on affidavit is necessary because she was the person said to have attended court on 21
April 2026, intended to seek a postponement and allegedly approached Dlamini J after
the order. Her affidavit and direct account are required to distinguish personal
knowledge from what Mr Kibel had been told and to test the allegations against the
transcript and the Municipality’s version.
[42] The records of the 1 June and 7 July leave hearings a re required because the
orders alone recorded only the result and brief stated reasons. The transcripts could
establish whether the applicants were represented , the submissions that were made
concerning appealability and default , whether striking rather than dismissal was
deliberate, whether any direction concerning re -enrolment was given and the nature of
the judicial decision said to have been made.
[43] Recognising that transcripts might not be obtainable within ten court days,
paragraph 3.6 of the 21 August order requires evidence of the steps taken to procure
them. That avoids penalising the applicants for transcription processes beyond their
them. That avoids penalising the applicants for transcription processes beyond their
control while requiring diligence and expedience.
[44] The proceedings involved different versions of the respective applicants’
representation. It appears that d ifferent counsel and attorneys appeared at different
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stages, which inflates the disputes between the parties. A party -by-party procedural
matrix is therefore required. It is not intended as evidence replacing the source
documents. It is instead intended to identify, for each material date , whether the party
concerned had been cited and served , its legal representation , the papers filed for it , its
appearance or absence and the alleged consequence of any default. That structured
account is necessary to avoid conflating Mr Kibel’s opposition with Venture Storage’s
later position.
[45] Paragraph 4 of the 21 August order afford s the Municipality ten court days after
the applicants’ supplementation to deliver a supplementary answering affidavit. Fairness
requires the Municipality to have a full opportunity to answer the applicants’
supplemented papers, particularly the applicants’ account of the Part A proceedings , the
claimed effect of the SCA petition , the party specific default analysis , the alleged
continued pendency of the High Court leave applications and the applicants’ proposed
formulation of relief. Ten court days corresponds with the applicants’ period and i s
sufficient considering that the Municipality is already familiar with the litigation.
[46] Paragraph 6 of the 21 August order regulates conduct pending final determination.
The conditions a re reciprocal and designed to preserve both the property and the
Municipality’s regulatory interests.
[47] The suspension of demolition or preparatory demolition steps (paragraph 6.1) i s
necessary because permitting preparatory steps could undermine the stay or create a fait
accompli. It maintain s the status quo while the threshold issues are determined. The
prohibition impose s delay, not a permanent deprivation, on the Municipality. If the
Municipality ultimately prevails , execution c an proceed. If the applicants prevail , the
subject matter will remain available for effective relief.
subject matter will remain available for effective relief.
[48] Paragraph 6.2 prohibit s further construction and occupation for construction or
accommodation, which condition is proportional. The stay i s not intended to permit the
applicants to exploit the delay by progressing allegedly unlawful construction, increasing
the scale of the dispute or allowing occupation that might create safety or eviction
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complications. The condition substantially preserve s the position already reflected in the
earlier procedural order and in undertakings expressed by the applicants. It protects the
Municipality and the public while demolition is stayed.
[49] No evidence was placed before me to the effect that the remaining structures were
unstable, at risk of collapse, occupied or posed an immediate danger to the public or any
person. The Municipality did not rely on an urgent safety risk as a reason why
demolition had to proceed before the procedural and appellate disputes were determined.
The preservation order (paragraph 6.3) nevertheless permits non- destructive municipal
safety inspections and prohibits further construction and occupation, thereby addressing
any legitimate precautionary concern without permitting irreversible demolition. The
order therefore permits inspection but confines it to non-destructive activity and require s
reasonable notice. This balances preservation with public safety oversight.
[50] Paragraph 6.4 permit s either party to approach the court on supplemented papers
for variation in a genuine emergency. An interlocutory preservation order remains
subject to variation if circumstances call for it. Examples might include an objectively
demonstrated structural collapse risk, an unauthorised resumption of construction and
occupation of the site amongst others . Requiring supplemented papers discourage s
unilateral action and ensure s that any variation would be judicially supervised on
evidence.
[51] Paragraph 7 of the 21 August order reserves all issues concerning section 18, the
competence and effect of the SCA petition, the status of the High Court leave
applications, res judicata or issue estoppel, the rescission application and costs. T he
order is preservatory, not dispositive. It prevent s the interim stay from being
misconstrued as a final determination of these issues.
misconstrued as a final determination of these issues.
[52] Costs were reserved because responsibility for the need for urgent proceedings
and supplementation could be assessed only after the threshold issues and the parties’
conduct are fully considered.
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Conclusion
[53] The order of 17 August was required to stop actual demolition for the brief period
necessary to exchange written papers and hear the parties.
[54] The hearing on 18 August demonstrated that the application could not safely be
decided finally on the urgent record. The order of 21 August accordingly extends
preservation, impose s reciprocal safeguards, direct s focused supplementation and
reserves every disputed substantive issue.
[55] The orders seek to avoid the greater risk of irreversible injustice. The
Municipality’s execution rights were delayed but not extinguished. The applicants
received protection but only subject to strict compliance, no further construction or
occupation, municipal safety inspections and expedited adjudication.
[56] For these reasons the following orders were granted:
On 17 August 2026 –
1. The respondent is ordered to cease and/or suspend the demolition of the
structures on Erf 1 […] M[…], also known as 1[…] K[…] Road, M [… ],
pending the determination of a written application to be brought by the
applicants as follows:
1.1 The applicants shall serve and file the aforesaid application by 16h00
on Monday, 17 August 2026;
1.2 The respondent shall serve and file its answering affidavit by 08h00 on
Tuesday, 18 August 2026;
1.3 The applicants shall serve and file their replying affidavit, if any, by
10h00 on Tuesday, 18 August 2026;
1.4 Whereafter the application will be heard before the above Honourable
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Court at 11h30 on Tuesday, 18 August 2026.
On 21 August 2026 –
1. The operation and execution of the demolition provisions contained in the
orders dated 3 March and 21 April 2026 remain suspended as per the order of
17 August 2026 subject to this order and pending the final determination of
the application brought by the applicants on 17 August 2026 (“ this
application”). Should the applicants fail to deliver the affidavit provided for
in paragraph 3 below, the suspension will lapse.
2. This application is removed from the urgent roll and is to proceed in the
ordinary course, subject to the expedited timetable in paragraphs 3 to 5 below.
3. The applicants shall supplement their papers within ten court days by
delivering, amongst others, a supplementary affidavit with the following
documents and evidence:
3.1 the complete Part A and Part B record of the application which served
before Van Nieuwenhuizen AJ (“the rescission application”), including
the original and amended relief placed before Van Nieuwenhuizen AJ,
all directives and post -hearing submissions before her, the request for
reasons and the reasons, if available;
3.2 the final signed, commissioned and lodged application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, proof of service and any
Supreme Court of Appeal directions;
3.3 the complete 2 March 2026 answering affidavit;
3.4 the 21 April 2026 postponement application and proof of filing and
service;
3.5 Ms Erasmus’s confirmatory affidavit and direct account of the hearings;
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3.6 transcripts or available records of the 1 June and 7 July 2026 leave
hearings or, if not available within the ten day period, evidence of the
steps taken to procure the transcripts; and
3.7 a party -by-party procedural matrix identifying representation, papers
and defaults.
4. The respondent (Municipality) shall deliver a supplementary answering
affidavit within ten court days thereafter.
5. The applicants may reply within five court days after receipt of the
supplementary answering affidavit.
6. Pending final determination of this application:
6.1 no demolition or preparatory demolition step may occur;
6.2 no further construction or occupation for construction or
accommodation may occur;
6.3 the respondent (Municipality) may conduct non- destructive safety
inspections on reasonable written notice to the applicants; and
6.4 either party may approach the Court on supplemented papers for a
variation of this order in a genuine emergency.
7. All issues concerning section 18, the competence and effect of the application
for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the status of the High
Court leave applications, res judicata or issue estoppel, Part B of the
rescission application and costs are reserved.
_________________________________
JF PRETORIUS
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ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
DATE OF HEARING: 17 and 18 August 2026
DATE OF ORDERS: 17 and 21 August 2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27 August 2026
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANTS: Adv M Kohn
INSTRUCTED BY: Michael Popper and Associates Inc
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Adv EN Sithole
INSTRUCTED BY: José and Associates