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[2026] ZALCCT 151
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National Student Financial Aid Scheme v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2025/087146) [2026] ZALCCT 151 (7 September 2026)
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THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Case
No:
2025-087146
(1)
Reportable: No
(2)
Of interest to other Judges: Yes
(3)
Revised: No
7
September 2026
In
the matter between:
NATIONAL
STUDENT FINANCIAL AID SCHEME
Applicant
and
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION
First Respondent
C
M BENNETT
N.O.
Second Respondent
ZENOBIA
ABRAHAMS
Third Respondent
Heard
:
3 September 2026
Delivered
:
7 September 2026
JUDGMENT
DE KOCK, AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an
application in terms of s 145 of the Labour Relations Act (the
LRA)
[1]
to review and set aside
an arbitration award of the second respondent, Commissioner C M
Bennett (the Commissioner), issued under
the auspices of the first
respondent under CCMA case number WECT17350-23 and dated 29 April
2025. The applicant is the National
Student Financial Aid Scheme
(NSFAS), a public entity established by statute and the third
respondent’s former employer.
The first respondent is the
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA).
The third respondent is Ms Zenobia
Abrahams, who was reinstated in
terms of the arbitration award. Neither the CCMA nor the Commissioner
opposes the application.
Ms Abrahams opposes the application. Adv I
Jamie SC appeared for NSFAS and Mr M Aggenbach for Ms Abrahams.
[2]
The Commissioner found the dismissal procedurally fair but
substantively unfair. He ordered retrospective reinstatement with
effect
from 12 May 2025, with continuity of employment and full
accrual of benefits, and backpay of R1 045 000, being 20 months’
remuneration at R52 250 a month, payable by 25 May 2025.
[3]
The notice of motion seeks the setting aside of the award, costs
against any respondent who opposes, and further or alternative
relief. It does not, in terms, seek substitution or remittal. At the
hearing, however, Mr Jamie SC submitted that the relief sought,
in
the event that the review succeeds, is that the award be set aside
and the dispute remitted to the CCMA for arbitration afresh
before a
different commissioner. The Court proceeds on that footing.
Background
[4]
The following facts are common cause or are not disputed. Ms Abrahams
was engaged by NSFAS on 1 November 2006. At the time of her
dismissal, she held the position of Accountant: Budgeting and
Expenditure, was a shop steward of the Public Servants Association
(the PSA) and earned a gross basic salary of R52 250 a month.
Between 17 March and 11 October 2022, she forwarded or blind-copied
nine work emails, containing NSFAS information, to her personal Gmail
account. That she did so is common cause.
[5]
Ms Abrahams was placed on precautionary suspension on 17 March 2023.
A disciplinary hearing before an external chairperson, Ms
A Ralarala,
sat between 26 April and 18 August 2023 and resulted in a finding on
the merits and a recommendation of summary dismissal.
She was
dismissed on 14 September 2023. The arbitration was heard on 15 and
16 April 2025, and the award followed on 29 April 2025.
[6]
The charge, as amended, was recorded as common cause in the
pre-arbitration minute in these terms:
‘
1. Charge 1: Gross
Negligence / Intentional Disclosure of privileged and confidential
information
1.1. In that during the
period January 2022 to October 2022 you, without authorisation, blind
copied your personal email address,
outside of the NSFAS network, on
several confidential emails containing sensitive NSFAS information.
1.2. In doing so, you
exposed the organisation to reputational, financial and
organisational risk. Your conduct also constitutes
a breach of,
amongst others:
(a) Clause 14.5.2 (iv) of
the NSFAS Information Security Policy which, in order to prevent data
leakage, the installation of unauthorised
applications, or the spread
of malware, prohibits the forwarding of work-related emails to
personal accounts; and
(b) Clause 5.4.3 of the
NSFAS ICT Security Management and Acceptable Use Policy which sets
out various restrictions on email usage.’
[7]
Two entries in the NSFAS Disciplinary Policy Annexure are in issue,
and their content is common cause. Item 15 reads ‘Negligent
and/or intentional disclosure of privileged and confidential
information or documents’, for which the sanction is dismissal
on a first occurrence. Item 40 reads ‘Failure to follow or
observe NSFAS policies and procedures’, for which the sanction
is a final written warning on a first occurrence and dismissal on a
second.
[8]
Two policies underlie the charge. The first is the ICT Security
Management and Acceptable Use Policy (the Acceptable Use Policy),
whose clause 5.4.3 sets out restrictions on email usage. The second
is the Information Security Policy, whose clause 14.5.2 lists
twelve
prohibited acts to prevent data leakage, the installation of
unauthorised applications or the spread of malware. Item (iv)
of that
list is to ‘Forward work-related email messages to personal
accounts’; item (vii), separately, is to ‘Send
or
disclose confidential information to unauthorised people, violating
NSFAS’ policies or using email in a way that increases
NSFAS’
legal and regulatory liability’.
The
award
[9]
The Commissioner’s analysis runs from paragraph 17 to paragraph
25 of the award. It is short, and the case turns on a close
reading
of it. At paragraph 17 he recorded, as common cause, that Ms Abrahams
had breached the IT policies in so far as they prohibit
the
forwarding of work emails to private accounts. The breach was
therefore never in issue before him, and it is not in issue now.
[10]
At paragraph 18 he held that there had been no disclosure. His stated
reasons were that NSFAS had led no evidence of any disclosure
of
privileged and confidential information or documents; that Ms
Abrahams was herself already fully aware of the information; that
she
could not be described as an external party; and that the risk of the
documents becoming available to, in his words, ‘hackers
and the
like’ was a consequence that had to be probable rather than
merely possible to carry weight.
[11]
At paragraph 20 the Commissioner set out his test for gross
negligence:
‘
Gross Negligence
is an attitude of reckless disregard - despite knowing the probable
consequences of an act or omission, the person
proceeds with that
particular act or omission. The courts have alluded to leaving the
employer’s property so exposed that
thieves may carry it off.’
[12]
At paragraph 21 he asked whether Ms Abrahams had acted with reckless
disregard and found that she had not. He held that NSFAS had
vastly
overstated the risk, which he considered negligible, and he accepted
her explanations for retaining the material, weighing
them against
NSFAS’s reservation of a right to delete the contents of email
accounts on its servers.
[13]
Paragraph 22 is the pivot of the award. Having noted that NSFAS
accepted the policies had not been socialised in the accustomed
manner, and that the only policy acknowledged at log-on was the
Acceptable Use Policy, which in the form submitted into evidence
does
not contain the prohibition on forwarding emails to private accounts,
the Commissioner reasoned:
‘
In any event, both
entries in the disciplinary code recorded above at paragraph 19 infer
that the accused has knowledge of the policies.
It would hardly be
fair to discipline an employee for breach of a rule of which the
employee was unaware, so logically, when the
code refers to a failure
to follow or observe a policy, it is referring to a failure on the
part of someone who ought to have known
better.’
[14]
At paragraphs 23 to 25 the Commissioner concluded that the conduct
fell under item 40, that NSFAS had failed to prove that dismissal
was
an appropriate sanction for the breach of rule, and that the
dismissal was accordingly substantively unfair. He held that any
procedural defect arising from the failure to consult the PSA had
been cured.
The
test on review
[15]
The
distinction between review and appeal is the frame within which this
application must be decided, and both parties, correctly,
began
there. Under s 145 of the LRA, as informed by the Constitution, an
arbitration award will not be set aside merely because
the Court
would have decided the matter differently. The award stands unless it
is one that a reasonable decision-maker could not
reach on the
material before the Commissioner (
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
).
[2]
[16]
Reasonableness
is not, however, the only enquiry. The reasonableness of the outcome
is tested together with the process by which
it was reached. A review
court must ask whether the arbitrator considered the principal issue
before him, whether he undertook
the enquiry the dispute called for
and undertook it in the right manner, and whether the result is one a
reasonable decision-maker
could reach. Latent or patent
irregularities warrant interference where, singly or cumulatively,
they result in a misconceived
enquiry or a decision that no
reasonable decision-maker could reach (
Gold
Fields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others)
.
[3]
[17]
That an
error be present is not enough; it must be a material error. An error
or irregularity is material where it has a distorting
effect on the
arbitrator’s conception of the enquiry, on the delimitation of
the issues, or on the outcome, such that the
result is rendered
unreasonable; and a reviewing court will not set an award aside for
an error that could have made no difference
to the result (
Head
of the Department of Education v Mofokeng and Others (Mofokeng)
).
[4]
[18]
Two limbs
of the enquiry must be kept apart, because the parties’
arguments occupy different grounds. The first is whether
the outcome,
on the material before the arbitrator, falls within the range of
reasonable outcomes. The second is whether the arbitrator
misconceived the nature of the enquiry and whether he asked and
answered the right question at all. A misconception of the nature
of
the enquiry is a reviewable irregularity of a distinct order. Where
it is established and is material, the award falls to be
set aside
not because its result is one the Court would not have reached, but
because the arbitrator did not decide the question
the dispute
required him to decide. The Court has kept these two limbs distinct
in what follows. A discrete, material error of
law is likewise a
legitimate ground of review in its own right, and not merely a
species of unreasonableness (
National
Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry v
Deysel NO and Others
).
[5]
The
parties’ respective cases
[19]
NSFAS advances three grounds in its papers; a failure to determine
whether the transmission was a disclosure, the imposition of
an
evidentiary threshold requiring probable rather than possible harm,
and the application of a subjective rather than an objective
test for
gross negligence. As argued, however, they resolve into a single
proposition: that the Commissioner misconceived the nature
of the
enquiry. The third of these grounds, that the Commissioner applied a
subjective rather than an objective test for gross
negligence, was
not pressed in argument as a discrete ground of review; NSFAS
accepted that the characterisation of the conduct
as ‘gross
negligence’ was, on the facts, of no moment, the repeated and
deliberate blind-copying of confidential material
to a personal
account over several months being plainly intentional, and the Court
accordingly does not decide, as a freestanding
question, whether the
test the Commissioner articulated was correct, but treats the
complaint, with the others, as an aspect of
the misconception of the
enquiry.
[20]
The charge, NSFAS submits, was the forwarding of confidential
information outside its controlled environment, in breach of clause
14.5.2(iv); the Commissioner, however, decided the case as though the
charge were the disclosure of information to an external
third party,
a matter falling under clause 14.5.2(vii) which was never charged,
and in doing so imposed a requirement of probable
harm that no
element of the charge contained. Having answered the wrong question,
he classified the conduct under item 40 rather
than item 15, and the
sanction finding followed from that classification. NSFAS submits
that the misconception is material and
that the appropriate remedy is
remittal.
[21]
Ms Abrahams
answers that this is, in substance, a sanction review. The breach was
common cause; the only live question was the appropriate
sanction;
and on that question the standard is reasonableness. The Commissioner
applied the employer’s own disciplinary code,
which prescribes
a final written warning for a first offence of the kind he found, and
held that NSFAS had failed to discharge
the onus, which rested on it,
of proving that the trust relationship had broken down or that
continued employment had become intolerable.
On that footing, she
submits, the outcome falls within the range of decisions a reasonable
arbitrator could reach, and the grounds
advanced are in truth grounds
of appeal dressed as review. She relies in particular on the recent
restatement of the sanction-review
standard in
Mondi
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v National Bargaining Council for the Wood and
Paper Sector and Others (Mondi)
.
[6]
Evaluation
[22]
The starting point is what was, and what was not, in dispute. That Ms
Abrahams committed the conduct described in charge 1.1; that
she
blind-copied, over a period of some seven months, nine confidential
emails containing sensitive NSFAS information to her personal
Gmail
account is common cause, and the Commissioner so found at paragraph
17. What was in dispute was not whether that conduct
occurred, but
its character: whether it was to be treated as the negligent or
intentional disclosure of privileged and confidential
information
under item 15 of the code, or as a mere failure to follow a policy
under item 40. That characterisation drives the
sanction, and it is
the real question the arbitration had to decide.
[23]
The charge, properly read, is clear, and it was not said at the
arbitration to be unclear, ambiguous or misunderstood. Charge 1.1
sets out the conduct: the unauthorised blind-copying of confidential
emails to a personal address outside the NSFAS network. The
first
sentence of charge 1.2 states the consequence said to follow from
that conduct; exposure of the organisation to reputational,
financial
and organisational risk. The second sentence of charge 1.2 then
identifies the policy provisions said to have been breached
in the
doing of it: clause 14.5.2(iv) of the Information Security Policy and
clause 5.4.3 of the Acceptable Use Policy. The gravamen
of the charge
is therefore the placing of confidential information onto a personal
platform outside the employer’s control.
It is not, and it
nowhere purports to be, an allegation that Ms Abrahams passed the
information to some further, external person.
[24]
That distinction is drawn by the policy itself. Clause 14.5.2
prohibits, at item (iv), the forwarding of work-related emails to
personal accounts, and, separately and distinctly, at item (vii), the
sending or disclosure of confidential information to unauthorised
people. Ms Abrahams was charged under item (iv). She was not charged
under item (vii). Yet the Commissioner’s reasons at
paragraph
18 for finding ‘no disclosure’; that she was ‘already
fully aware of the information’, and that
she ‘cannot be
described as an external party’ are reasons that go only to
item (vii). They answer the question whether
confidential information
was passed to an unauthorised outsider. That was not the question the
charge posed. Whether Ms Abrahams
was herself aware of the
information, and whether she was an external party, are immaterial to
a charge of forwarding information
out of the controlled environment,
because the mischief at which item (iv) is directed is the removal of
the information from the
employer’s control, whatever the
identity or knowledge of the person to whose personal account it is
sent. On this central
question the Commissioner asked the wrong
question and answered it.
[25]
It may be
said against this reading that the charge is headed ‘Gross
Negligence / Intentional Disclosure of privileged and
confidential
information’, and that the Commissioner was therefore entitled,
indeed invited, to ask whether a disclosure
had occurred. That is the
best point available to Ms Abrahams, and the Court has weighed it. It
does not withstand scrutiny, for
three reasons. The first is that a
charge is read as a whole, and where its heading and its particulars
diverge, it is the particulars
that govern; the heading is a label,
and the label is of less importance than the substance of what the
employee is called upon
to answer. (
EOH
Abantu (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and Others).
[7]
[26]
The particulars here, in charge 1.1, identify the act charged as the
unauthorised blind-copying of confidential emails to a personal
account, and they tie it, in charge 1.2, to clause 14.5.2(iv); the
prohibition on forwarding and not to clause 14.5.2(vii). The
second
is that ‘disclosure’ is not a synonym for disclosure to
an outsider. The word is used in item 15 of the disciplinary
code
itself; ‘disclosure of privileged and confidential information
or documents’ to describe the very conduct with
which this
charge is concerned, and it is item 15 for which NSFAS contended.
Read in the light of the code it invokes, the heading
points towards
item 15, not away from it; it does not narrow the charge to a passing
of information to a third party. The Commissioner’s
error was
therefore not that he asked whether there had been a disclosure; he
was entitled to but that he gave ‘disclosure’
a meaning,
namely transmission to an external party, that neither the charge,
nor the policy, nor item 15 of the code requires,
and acquitted on
that narrowed meaning. The third is that the Commissioner nowhere
held that the heading entitled him to read a
third-party element into
the charge. He assumed it. An assumption is not a finding, and it is
one the Court is satisfied was wrong.
Whatever term the heading used,
then, the misconduct prosecuted was defined by the particulars and by
the policy provisions the
charge invoked; namely, the unauthorised
removal of confidential information to a personal account outside the
employer’s
controlled environment. That is the conduct the
Commissioner was required to characterise, and it is not answered by
asking whether
the information reached an outsider.
[27]
The Commissioner compounded that misdirection by requiring that harm
be probable rather than merely possible. He held that, for
the risk
of the material reaching ‘hackers and the like’ to ‘carry
weight’, the consequence had to be probable
and not merely
possible, and, finding no such probability established, concluded
that there had been no disclosure. But probability
of harm is no
element of the conduct charged. NSFAS is a public entity that holds
the personal information of tens of thousands
of students and is
obliged to safeguard it. It is entitled, through rational policies
whose lawfulness is not challenged in this
review, to determine for
itself what risks it will bear and to prohibit its employees from
removing confidential information from
its controlled environment,
without having to prove, in any given instance, that harm was
probable. The enquiry the Commissioner
was required to undertake was
not whether harm was probable, but whether the conduct charged was
established. This was established.
The Commissioner was then required
to determine how it fell to be classified, and what sanction was
appropriate. By making probable
harm the touchstone, the Commissioner
introduced a requirement the charge did not contain, and the policy
does not impose, and
he decided the matter on it.
[28]
The consequence of the misdirection is not confined to paragraph 18.
It carried directly into the classification of the conduct
and into
the sanction. Having found ‘no disclosure’, the
Commissioner reasoned that the conduct was not the intentional
disclosure of confidential information under item 15 but a failure to
follow a policy under item 40, for which the code prescribes
a final
written warning on a first occurrence. The whole of his sanction
reasoning, at paragraphs 23 to 25, proceeds from that
classification:
that the conduct is an item 40 matter; that a final written warning
is the prescribed sanction; that NSFAS therefore
failed to prove that
dismissal was appropriate; and that the dismissal was, in
consequence, substantively unfair. Remove the finding
of ‘no
disclosure’ and the classification that rests on it, and
nothing in the award supports the sanction finding.
[29]
It is at the point of materiality that this application is decided,
and it is decided against the award. The Commissioner’s
error
was not a stray remark that left the outcome untouched. It had a
distorting effect on his conception of the enquiry, on his
delimitation of the issues, and on the outcome, in the manner
Mofokeng
requires before an award will be disturbed. The
sanction finding; the dispositive holding of the award is not
independent of the
misconception; it is its product. This is
therefore not a case in which a correctly directed arbitrator would
necessarily have
reached the same result. On the contrary: an
arbitrator who recognised the conduct for what the charge alleged it
to be; the intentional
and repeated removal of confidential financial
material, including a trial balance and a payroll schedule of
salaries across the
organisation, from a public entity’s
controlled environment to a personal account over which the employer
had no control
might well have classified it under item 15, for which
the prescribed sanction is dismissal. Whether that classification is
ultimately
correct is not for this Court to decide; it is enough, for
materiality, that the misconception went to the heart of the
classification
and that a different and reasonable classification was
open. The materiality requirement is met.
[30]
The Court has not overlooked Ms Abrahams’s answer, and it does
not carry the day. First, this is not an appeal in disguise.
The
Court does not substitute its own view of the appropriate sanction
for that of the Commissioner; it finds that the Commissioner
misconceived the nature of the enquiry, which is a distinct and
established ground of review. Second,
Mondi
and the line of
authority on sanction reviews do not save the award. Those cases hold
that where an arbitrator has answered the
right question; has
properly identified the misconduct and weighed the appropriate
sanction, a review court will not interfere
merely because it would
have weighed the matter differently. They do not hold that the
deference owed to an arbitrator’s
assessment of sanction
extends to an assessment built upon a misconceived enquiry. Here the
Commissioner did not reach the sanction
question on a correct
footing; he reached it through a misclassification, and the
range-of-reasonableness standard has no purchase
on a finding reached
by asking the wrong question.
[31]
Third,
Makuleni
v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others
[8]
does not assist Ms Abrahams. The Court has not yielded to a lucid
argument that the result could merely be different; it has found
that
the Commissioner’s conclusion is untenable, because it rests on
a question that was not before him. Fourth, and finally,
the reliance
on the employer’s onus under
Edcon
Ltd v Pillemer NO and Others
[9]
(Edcon)
cannot rescue the award, because the Commissioner made no finding on
the trust relationship at all. The award nowhere holds that
NSFAS
failed to prove a breakdown in trust or that continued employment had
become intolerable; its sanction reasoning rests solely
on the
classification of the conduct as an item 40 breach. A reviewing court
may uphold an award on the reasoning the arbitrator
gave; it may not
uphold it on reasoning he did not employ. Whether NSFAS discharged
the
Edcon
onus is a question for the arbitrator who reconsiders the matter, not
a foundation on which this award can now be sustained.
[32]
One subsidiary matter should be recorded. The Commissioner’s
observation at paragraph 22, that it would be unfair to discipline
an
employee for breach of a rule of which she was unaware, and NSFAS’s
answering attack on his acceptance of Ms Abrahams’s
professed
unawareness of the policies, do not affect the outcome. The
Commissioner decided the matter on the footing that Ms Abrahams
‘ought to have known better’, and the classification of
the conduct under item 40 does not turn on her state of knowledge.
The knowledge question, like the appropriate sanction, is a matter
for reconsideration on remittal.
Finding
[33]
For these reasons the Court finds that the Commissioner misconceived
the nature of the enquiry. He answered a question; whether
confidential information had been disclosed to an external party, and
whether harm was probable that the charge did not pose, and
he left
undecided the question it did pose, namely the proper
characterisation of the conduct charged and the sanction it
warranted.
That misconception is a reviewable irregularity within the
meaning of s 145 of the LRA, and it is material, because the
classification
on which the entire sanction finding rests is its
direct product. The award cannot stand.
[34]
The remaining question is the remedy. Substitution is not appropriate
and was not sought. The Court has not heard the witnesses;
the proper
classification of the conduct, the assessment of Ms Abrahams’s
explanations and her knowledge of the rules, and,
if it is reached,
the question of the appropriate sanction all require an evaluation of
evidence and of credibility that is for
an arbitrator and not for a
court of review. The award falls to be set aside, and the dispute
remitted to the CCMA for arbitration
afresh before a commissioner
other than the second respondent. The Court expresses no view on what
the outcome of that reconsideration
should be. A correctly directed
commissioner may conclude that the conduct warrants dismissal, or may
conclude that dismissal was,
even so, an unfair sanction. A
conclusion of either kind, reached on the question the charge in fact
posed, would be that commissioner’s
to make and would fall to
be tested, if at all, against the standard of reasonableness.
Costs
[35]
Costs in this Court do not follow the result, and s 162 of the LRA
requires the Court to have regard to the requirements of the
law and
of fairness. The requirements of law and fairness are best met by
making no order as to costs against Ms Abrahams given
that it was
reasonable for her to defend an award made in her favour.
[36]
In the result, the following order is made:
Order
1.
The arbitration award of the second respondent dated 29 April 2025
under CCMA case number WECT17350-23 is reviewed and set aside.
2.
The dispute is remitted to the first respondent for arbitration
afresh before a commissioner other than the second respondent.
3.
There is no order as to costs.
C
de Kock
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the
Applicant:
Adv I Jamie SC
Instructed
by:
Cheadle Thompson & Haysom Inc
For the Third
Respondent:
Mr
M Aggenbach
Instructed
by:
Maurice Phillips Wisenberg Inc
[1]
Act 66 of 1995, as amended.
[2]
2008 (2) SA 24
(CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC);
[2007] ZACC 22
at para
110.
[3]
(2014) 35 ILJ 943 (LAC);
[2014] 1 BLLR 20
(LAC);
[2013] ZALAC 28
at
paras 14 and 16;
Herholdt
v Nedbank Ltd (Congress of South African Trade Unions as Amicus
Curiae)
(2013) 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA);
[2013] ZASCA 97
at para 25.
[4]
(2015) 36 ILJ 2802 (LAC);
[2015] 1 BLLR 50
(LAC) at paras 31 to 33;
SA
Library for the Blind v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and Others
(2019) 40 ILJ 422 (LC);
[2018] 12 BLLR 1210
(LC); [2018] ZALCPE 33
at para 27.
[5]
(2025) 46 ILJ 1679 (LAC);
[2025] 8 BLLR 790
(LAC);
[2025] ZALAC 25
at para 42.
[6]
(2026) 47 ILJ 1858 (LAC);
[2026] 8 BLLR 786
(LAC);
[2026] ZALAC 20
at paras 12, 20 and 21.
[7]
(2019) 40 ILJ 2477 (LAC);
[2019] 12 BLLR 1304
(LAC);
[2019] ZALAC 57
at paras 16 and 17.
[8]
(2023) 44 ILJ 1005 (LAC);
[2023] 4 BLLR 283
(LAC);
[2023] ZALAC 4
at
para 4.
[9]
(2009) 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA);
[2010] 1 BLLR 1
(SCA);
[2009] ZASCA 135.