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[2026] ZALCCT 149
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Labour Association Workers Union obo February and Others v APL Cartons (Pty) Ltd and Others (2025/084497) [2026] ZALCCT 149 (7 September 2026)
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THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Case
no:
2025-084497
(1)
Reportable: No
(2)
Of interest to other Judges: No
(3)
Revised: No
7
September 2026
In
the matter between:
LABOUR
ASSOCIATION WORKERS UNION
obo
COLLEN FEBRUARY AND OTHERS
Applicant
and
APL
CARTONS (PTY)
LTD
First Respondent
ELRIDGE
EDWARDS N.O.
Second Respondent
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
Third Respondent
Heard
:
2 September 2026
Delivered
:
7 September 2026
JUDGMENT
DE KOCK, AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an application to reinstate a review application deemed
withdrawn under rule 37(15) of the Rules of this Court, and to
condone the late filing of the transcribed record and the sworn
translations of it.
[2]
The review
it seeks to revive is a review of an arbitration award of
Commissioner Elridge Edwards dated 22 April 2025 under CCMA
case
WECT19021-24, holding that the CCMA lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate
a claim brought under s 73A of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act
(BCEA).
[1]
[3]
The applicant is a registered trade union, the Labour Association
Workers Union (LAWU), acting for Mr Collen February and a number
of
others. It appears through its general secretary, Mr Haroun Abdul,
who has conducted the matter throughout and who deposed to
the
founding affidavit in this application and to the affidavits in the
review. He is not a lawyer. About ten of the individual
applicants
attended the hearing.
[4]
The first respondent, APL Cartons (Pty) Ltd, opposes the application.
It is represented by Mr Stelzner SC, instructed by Murray
Fourie &
Le Roux Inc of Worcester, Mr Le Roux having appeared at the
arbitration. The second and third respondents, the Commissioner
and
the CCMA, abide, save that the Commissioner has filed an explanatory
affidavit dated 30 June 2025.
Background
[5]
The underlying claim rests on a deferred compensation scheme. The
applicant says weekly deductions ran from 1996; the first respondent
says the scheme terminated over the period 1998 to 2016. Mr Abdul
told the Court that the scheme was administered by Sanlam, that
the
first respondent was its sole beneficiary, that in May 2021 a payment
was made out of it to one former employee, and that it
was when the
other former employees learned of that payment that the present
dispute was referred. The number of individual applicants
is not
settled on the face of the papers: the award is headed for LAWU on
behalf of Mr February and 144 others, the first respondent’s
heads give 144 in one place and 114 in another, and the union’s
own emails of 1 and 2 November 2024 list names 1 to 151 and
describe
the matter as brought on behalf of 150 others. The founding affidavit
says a list of applicants is attached; none is.
[6]
On 15 November 2021, under CCMA case WECT13778-21, the union signed
an agreement to withdraw an earlier dispute, the stated reason
being
an absence of jurisdiction. Mr Abdul’s account is that the
withdrawal was on the advice of the commissioner then seized
with the
matter, who told him that the CCMA lacked jurisdiction and that the
remedy lay with the long-term insurance ombud; that
the ombud in turn
found that Sanlam had paid the first respondent as beneficiary and
that the matter was one for the CCMA. The
present dispute was
arbitrated before Commissioner Edwards at Worcester on 9 April 2025,
and on 22 April 2025 he issued the award
holding that the CCMA lacked
jurisdiction. The award was emailed to the parties the same day.
[7]
The review was filed on 5 June 2025. The six-week period from 22
April 2025 expired on 3 June 2025, so the review was two days
late.
No condonation was sought when the review was launched. The amended
notice of motion and amended founding affidavit filed
on 21 November
2025 ask for condonation and attribute the delay to the technical
failures of the Court Online platform from 27
May 2025 and to an eye
operation undergone by Mr Abdul on 5 June 2025; the applicants’
heads repeat that explanation.
[8]
On 20 June 2025 the Registrar gave notice under rule 37(9), addressed
among others to Mr Abdul, that the CCMA had dispatched the
record of
the proceedings, including the recording, that the recording was to
be downloaded within five days, and that the record
was to be filed
within 60 days. The CCMA’s own notice of filing under rule
37(7), listing the award, a bundle of documents
and the audio
recording, is dated 24 July 2025; five weeks after the Registrar had
notified the parties that the record had been
received. Parts of the
record were, on any view, not accessible: the first respondent’s
attorneys wrote to the CCMA on 14
August 2025 asking for parts of the
record that had not been filed; on 20 August 2025 the CCMA said the
outstanding documents had
been uploaded the previous day; on 22 and
25 August 2025 the attorneys reported that they could not find them
on Court Online,
and the CCMA uploaded them again; and on 16
September 2025 the attorneys reported that they still could not find
them and had received
no notice of filing from the Court, whereupon
the CCMA sent the documents by email, the recordings being too large
to send. The
union, for its part, wrote to the CCMA on 24 September
2025 asserting that the record was incomplete.
[9]
The first part of the transcription was filed on 21 November 2025 and
the second on 28 November 2025, both in Afrikaans. On 21
November
2025 the first respondent served a notice under rule 37(15) and (16).
This application was filed on 2 April 2026. Sworn
English
translations of both parts of the transcription were filed on 10 July
2026.
[10]
On 20 August 2026 the first respondent’s attorneys filed the
balance of the record, being the first respondent’s own
arbitration bundle and the points
in limine
papers. In the
same letter they told the Registrar that the CCMA’s filings of
24 July 2025; being its notice of filing, the
award and its bundle
‘
are not to be found on court-on line, nor on caseline’
,
and asked the Registrar to follow the matter up. On 26 August 2026, a
week before the hearing, the Registrar placed the CCMA’s
notice
of filing, its bundle and the Commissioner’s explanatory
affidavit on the court file for the first time. Mr Stelzner
accepted
at the hearing that the whole of the CCMA’s record reached the
court file only a couple of weeks before the hearing.
Whether
the review was deemed withdrawn
[11]
Rule 37(14)
requires a transcribed record to be delivered within 60 days of the
date on which the applicant is advised by the Registrar
that the
record has been received. Rule 37(15) deems an applicant who fails to
do so to have withdrawn the application, absent
the respondent’s
written consent to an extension. Rule 37(18) provides that an
application so deemed withdrawn may not be
reinstated without an
order of court, on application by the defaulting party, on good cause
shown. A ‘day’, for these
purposes, excludes Saturdays,
Sundays, public holidays and the period from 16 December to 15
January, and a period of days is calculated
by excluding the first
day and including the last.
[2]
[12]
Rule 37(13) ends with this proviso:
‘
provided that,
should it transpire that the person or body upon whom a notice of
motion is served in terms of subrule (2) has failed
to deliver a
complete record, the 60-day period contemplated in subrule (14) will
commence running only once a complete record
has been delivered.’
[13]
Neither party had addressed the proviso in its papers. The Court
raised it at the outset of the hearing and heard both sides on
it.
The first respondent’s case is that the 60 days ran from the
Registrar’s notice of 20 June 2025; that the union
then had the
recording, which is what it had to transcribe; that 60 days from that
date expired on or about 11 September 2025;
and that whatever had to
be done thereafter to complete the record was done by the first
respondent’s own attorneys because
the union was not doing it.
Mr Stelzner accepted the Court’s summary of that case as being
that, no matter what happened
after the fact, the period ran from 20
June 2025. He relied, in addition, on two documents from the union’s
own papers: the
founding affidavit, which under the heading ‘degree
of lateness’ says that the 60-day period ‘
expired on
or about 19 August 2025’
, and the CCMA’s notice of 24
July 2025, annexed to it, which records dispatch of the record to the
Registrar and the union’s
obligation under rule 37(10).
[14]
The union’s case is that the 60-day period ‘
never even
started running’
, because the record was incomplete by
mutual admission, the first respondent’s attorneys having said
so on 14 August 2025
and the union on 24 September 2025, and because
the CCMA placed a complete record on the court file only in the last
days before
the hearing. Mr Abdul referred the Court to a judgment of
the Labour Appeal Court, which he called ‘
Maxfield’
,
for the proposition that time limits in the Practice Manual must not
be applied mechanically. He gave no citation, the case is
not
referred to in the union’s papers, and the Court has not been
able to identify it. It is not relied on.
[15]
Neither case can be accepted. The first respondent’s reading
cannot be reconciled with its own conduct. Its attorneys asked
the
CCMA on 14 August 2025 for parts of the record that had not been
filed; the CCMA’s own notice of filing is dated 24 July
2025,
five weeks after the Registrar’s notice; and the first
respondent’s heads record that as at 27 March 2026 those
items
were ‘
still not part of Court record’
and that as
at 20 August 2026 its own arbitration bundle was still not part of
the record. The record delivered as at 20 June 2025
was not a
complete record, and the proviso says what follows from that.
[16]
But the union’s reading goes too far in the other direction.
The proviso is directed at a failure by ‘
the person or body
upon whom a notice of motion is served in terms of subrule (2)’,
that is the CCMA to deliver a complete record. What the CCMA had
to deliver, it delivered to the Registrar: the recording by 20 June
2025 and the balance of its documents, on its own account, by 19
August 2025. What went wrong after 19 August 2025 was that the
documents could not be found on Court Online, and that the CCMA’s
filings of July 2025 did not reach CaseLines until the
Registrar
placed them there on 26 August 2026. That was a failure of the
Court’s platforms, not a failure by the CCMA to
deliver, and
the proviso does not speak to it. Nor did any of it impede the union
in doing what rule 37(14) required of it. The
recording was received
and accessible from 20 June 2025; the union downloaded it, had it
transcribed, and filed the transcription.
Mr Abdul did not suggest
that any part of the recording was missing. His complaint was that
the CCMA’s documentary bundle,
and a certificate, were not on
the court file, and that complaint, while justified, does not bear on
the transcription. The union’s
own founding affidavit, deposed
to before the point was raised, fixes the expiry of the period at
about 19 August 2025, whichh
is consistent with the union having had
what it needed from 20 June 2025.
[17]
The Court accordingly holds that a complete record was delivered by
the CCMA on 19 August 2025, and that the 60-day period contemplated
in rule 37(14) commenced on that date. Computed under rule 1, it
expired on 12 November 2025. The first part of the transcription
was
delivered on 21 November 2025 and the second on 28 November 2025,
seven and twelve days late respectively. There was no written
consent
by the first respondent to an extension; on the contrary, it served
notice under rule 37(15) on the day the first part
was filed. The
review was therefore deemed to have been withdrawn, and rule 37(18)
applies. The union’s application, which
seeks condonation and
reinstatement, is correctly treated as one for reinstatement under
that subrule, and the Court so treats
it.
[18]
Two things should be said about that finding. The first is that the
default it rests on is a short one; days, not months. The second
is
that the question whether a transcription in Afrikaans required a
sworn English translation before it could count as delivery
of the
‘transcribed record’ does not arise on this finding and
is not decided. The translation, and the time it took,
are relevant
to the explanation for the delay and to nothing else.
Reinstatement
The
test
[19]
An
applicant seeking reinstatement must show good cause. The test is
settled: the application must be
bona
fide
;
the applicant must give a reasonable explanation covering the entire
period of the default; must show reasonable prospects of
success in
the main application; and must show that it is in the interests of
justice to grant the order (
Samuels
v Old Mutual Bank
).
[3]
The
explanation for the delay
[20]
The founding affidavit, supplemented by what Mr Abdul told the Court,
explains the default in filing the transcription. In July
2025 the
union paid a first typist, whose Afrikaans transcript proved
unusable; it then engaged a second typist in Worcester, who
completed
the work on 21 November 2025; the first volume was uploaded that day
and the second on 28 November 2025, after the first
respondent’s
attorneys pointed out the omission. Mr Abdul was in theatre for eye
surgery on 19 August 2025, the day on which,
on the Court’s
finding, the period began to run. The Court accepts that a default of
seven to twelve days, in those circumstances,
is adequately
explained.
[21]
The explanation for what followed is less complete. The application
for reinstatement was brought only on 2 April 2026, more than
four
months after the first respondent’s rule 37(15) notice of 21
November 2025. Mr Abdul says that the first respondent’s
attorneys notified him on 2 March 2026 that an English translation
was required, that he approached the Department of Justice and
then a
translation firm on 31 March 2026, obtained a quotation on 14 April
2026, paid it in two instalments in April and May 2026,
resolved a
dispute about value-added tax, and uploaded the translations in July
2026; that he did not know, as a layperson, that
an Afrikaans record
had to be translated; and that the union is small and had to find the
money. What is not explained is why,
having been served with a notice
on 21 November 2025 stating that the review was deemed withdrawn, the
union did nothing about
reinstatement until April 2026. Nor is there
an explanation for why nobody else at the union could attend to the
matter during
the periods of Mr Abdul’s incapacity. The Court
does not, however, regard the explanation as so poor that the
application
must fail on that ground alone. If the prospects of
success in the review were good, the Court would be slow to shut out
a claim
of this age and this kind on the explanation.
Prospects
of success
[22]
This is where the application fails, and the weakness is structural
rather than a matter of degree. The award rests on three findings,
each of which goes to the CCMA’s jurisdiction and each of which
would dispose of the matter on its own. The first is that
LAWU did
not establish its authority to represent the individuals on whose
behalf it referred the dispute: it conceded that it
had no mandate
from those still employed, whom it had included in the referral
without their knowledge, and it produced nothing
to show that the 76
original applicants were its members. The second is that the same
dispute was resolved when the union withdrew
it under WECT13778-21 on
15 November 2021, and that the correct course, if the withdrawal
agreement was defective, was to approach
this Court to set it aside
rather than to refer afresh. The third is that LAWU failed to
demonstrate that the claim falls within
the scope of s 73A of the
BCEA.
[23]
The ruling
under review is a jurisdictional ruling, and on review of a
jurisdictional ruling the question is whether the commissioner
was
right or wrong, not whether the outcome was reasonable (
Madondo
v Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others
).
[4]
If the CCMA in fact lacked jurisdiction, the manner in which the
Commissioner reached that conclusion will not assist the applicant.
To show prospects, the union must therefore show a
prima
facie
case that the Commissioner was wrong about its authority, about the
withdrawal agreement and about s 73A; all three, since any
one of
them suffices to sustain the award.
[24]
The founding affidavit engages with none of them. Its prospects
section is directed entirely at the conduct of the hearing: that
the
Commissioner arrived an hour late, that he allowed an attorney to
appear without a formal application under CCMA rule 25, that
he
proceeded without a certificate of non-resolution, that he rushed the
proceedings and that he refused closing argument. Mr Abdul
pressed
the last of these at the hearing, saying that the Commissioner told
the CCMA’s case management on 20 April 2025 that
he had already
made up his mind and would not read the union’s written closing
submissions. Those are complaints about the
conduct of the hearing.
They are not answers to a want of jurisdiction. On the certificate
point the first respondent has an answer
in any event: once 30 days
have elapsed since referral, a certificate is not a precondition to
arbitration. And on the complaint
that the hearing was rushed, the
Commissioner’s explanatory affidavit records, without
contradiction on affidavit, that he
reminded Mr Abdul of his right to
apply for a postponement and that Mr Abdul confirmed he would not be
applying for one.
[25]
The applicants’ heads do rather better, though not by much.
Section 6, headed ‘Jurisdiction (section 73A of the BCEA)’,
asserts in two sentences that the Commissioner erred in finding no
jurisdiction because of a prior voluntary withdrawal, and that
the
dispute concerns a deferred compensation scheme established in 1996
which falls within the statutory ambit of s 73A. At the
hearing Mr
Abdul added that the withdrawal of 15 November 2021 was on the advice
of the commissioner then seized with the matter,
and relied on a
judgment of this Court, which he called ‘
Nkapai’
,
for the proposition that a CCMA withdrawal form is not a settlement
agreement and does not bar a fresh referral of the same dispute.
Again, no citation was given, the case is not in the union’s
papers, and the Court has not been able to identify it; it is
not
relied on. Even taking the point at its highest, it engages only the
second finding.
[26]
The third finding was the subject of the first respondent’s
principal submission on the merits. Section 73A of the BCEA came
into
operation on 1 January 2019; the scheme, on the papers, was
terminated by 2016; a claim which arose by 2016 could not, it
was
submitted, be brought under a provision that did not then exist. Mr
Abdul conceded the commencement date. His answer, given
in reply, was
that the claim is not for the deductions as such but for money which
the first respondent received from Sanlam as
the sole beneficiary of
the scheme and has failed to pay over to the former employees. If
that is the claim, the failure to pay
on which it rests post-dates 1
January 2019, and the commencement argument may not be the complete
answer the first respondent
says it is. The Court does not decide
that question, because it does not need to and because it was not
argued on either side with
reference to authority. What matters for
present purposes is that the claim so characterised was not how the
referral was framed,
is not developed in the founding affidavit in
this application or in the heads, and, although the award records
(para 24)
that the applicants averred that the respondent had
received payouts from the fund in 2021 and paid some former employees
but not
others, nothing in the review papers engages the
Commissioner’s third finding on that footing. Prospects on a
review must
be shown on the case that was before the arbitrator and
on the grounds pleaded in the review. They cannot be built on a
characterisation
offered for the first time from the bar in reply.
[27]
That leaves the first finding, and it is the one the first respondent
presses hardest. Nothing in the founding affidavit or the
heads
engages it. Mr Abdul’s explanation at the hearing, that
employees still in service, bound by the closed-shop agreement
with
another union, were deliberately excluded from the referral, does not
meet the Commissioner’s finding that the union
produced nothing
to show that the original applicants were its members, and that some
of those it purported to represent said on
affidavit that it did not.
On a jurisdictional review the union would have to show that finding
to be wrong. It has not attempted
to.
[28]
The Court is therefore unable to find that the review has reasonable
prospects of success. Two sentences of assertion in heads
of
argument, unsupported by anything in the founding affidavit, silent
on the first finding altogether and answering the third
only by a
characterisation of the claim that was never pleaded, do not suffice.
[29]
Two matters
in the papers should be corrected, since both sides overstate same.
The first respondent says that the confirmatory
affidavits do not
refer to or confirm the contents of the main affidavit. They do: each
of the three records that the deponent
has read the affidavit of Mr
Abdul and confirms its contents as far as they apply to him. The fair
criticism is that the founding
affidavit does not cross-refer to
those affidavits, not that they fail to confirm it. The applicant,
for its part, attributes the
principles governing condonation to ‘
the
Constitutional Court in Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd; Melane v
Santam Insurance Co Ltd
is
a decision of the Appellate Division of 1962.
[5]
The
state of the record
[30]
Whatever the outcome, the state of this record calls for comment. A
review filed in June 2025 reached a hearing in September
2026 with
the CCMA’s own bundle placed on the court file only on 26
August 2026, with the first respondent’s arbitration
bundle
filed by its own attorneys on 20 August 2026, and with the parties
still at odds about when the record became complete.
The Registrar’s
rule 37(9) notice issued before the CCMA’s notice of filing.
That is not what the Rules contemplate,
and it is not attributable to
one side alone.
[31]
Much of the
delay was driven by a question neither side addressed as one of law:
whether a record transcribed in Afrikaans required
a sworn English
translation at all. The arbitration was conducted in Afrikaans
between Afrikaans-speaking parties in Worcester.
The first respondent
insisted on translations; the applicant, at considerable cost and
delay, provided them. The applicant’s
reliance on
Van
Straaten v Wehnke NO and Others
is, in this connection, closer to the mark than it may appear: that
judgment holds that a transcription produced from an electronic
record is sufficient however it was created, that the Court should be
slow to uphold technical points which obstruct access to
justice for
impoverished litigants, and that prohibitive transcription costs
engage s 34 of the Constitution.
[6]
What
Van
Straaten
does not do is supply prospects of success where there are none, and
the applicant’s heads describe it a little loosely as
concerned
with ‘
transcription
formatting’
.
Conclusion
[32]
The review was deemed withdrawn on 12 November 2025, and the
application for its reinstatement must be decided on good
cause. The
default in delivering the transcription was short and is explained;
the delay in bringing this application is only partly
explained. The
application fails on prospects. The founding affidavit engages none
of the three jurisdictional findings on which
the award rests; on a
jurisdictional ruling the test is correctness; procedural complaints
about the conduct of the hearing do
not answer a want of
jurisdiction; and the finding on the union’s authority, which
is on its own sufficient to sustain the
award, has not been
challenged at all. In those circumstances it would not be in the
interests of justice to reinstate the review.
Costs
[33]
The first respondent seeks costs on scale B, and meets the obvious
objection directly: it contends that the usual rule
that a union and
an employer in a continuing relationship each bear their own costs
does not apply here, there being no relationship
between these
parties, the first respondent being party to a closed-shop agreement
with another union and not recognising the applicant;
it
characterises both the referral and this application as vexatious;
and it points to the death of a witness and to the age of
the company
and Sanlam records that would have to be found if the matter went
further. At the hearing Mr Stelzner left the question
in the Court’s
hands.
[34]
Costs in
this Court are governed by s 162 of the Labour Relations Act
(LRA)
[7]
, which permits an order
for costs ‘according to the requirements of the law and
fairness’. The rule of practice that
costs follow the result
does not apply. The norm, as the Labour Appeal Court put it in
Member
of the Executive Council for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal v Dorkin NO
,
[8]
is that costs orders are not made unless those requirements are met,
and the Court must strike a fair balance between not unduly
discouraging workers, employers and unions from approaching it and
not allowing them to bring frivolous cases that should not be
brought. The Constitutional Court in
Zungu
v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others
[9]
set aside costs orders made in this Court and in the Labour Appeal
Court for no better reason than that the party had lost; the
discretion must be exercised judicially, and reasons must be given.
[35]
Against an order stand the considerations that would ordinarily weigh
with the Court, and the Court has given them weight:
the applicant is
a small union funded by member subscriptions; the record in this
matter was never properly assembled, and not
solely through the
applicant’s fault; the applicant’s default in the period
that mattered was one of days; and the
elderly former employees
behind the claim are not the ones who should pay for the way it has
been conducted.
[36]
They are outweighed. First, the reason for the Court’s
customary restraint is absent. The practice of leaving a
union and an
employer to bear their own costs rests on the continuing relationship
between them and the need not to sour it. There
is no such
relationship here. The first respondent does not recognise the
applicant, it is party to a closed-shop agreement with
another union,
and the persons for whom the applicant acts left its employ years
ago. Second, the applicant is not a novice litigant.
It is a
registered trade union; its general secretary, on the Commissioner’s
finding, which is not challenged, has appeared
at the CCMA for many
years; and it has pursued this dispute in one forum or another since
2021. Third, and decisively, the applicant
persisted in the face of
repeated and specific warning. It was told on 21 November 2025 that
the review was deemed withdrawn; on
2 March 2026 that no sworn
translation had been filed and that the first respondent would ask
the Court to confirm the withdrawal;
and in the first respondent’s
practice notes of 27 March and 10 April 2026 and its answering
affidavit of 10 April 2026,
in detail, why the review could not
succeed. It filed no reply. It came to court with a founding
affidavit that engaged none of
the three jurisdictional findings on
which the award rests, heads of argument that engaged one of them in
two sentences, and a
finding on its own authority to bring the claim
that it did not challenge at all. A party that brings an application
for an indulgence
in that state, after those warnings, puts its
opponent to the expense of a full opposed hearing for no purpose that
its papers
could serve. The conduct of a party in proceeding with a
matter is a consideration that s 162 permits the Court to take into
account,
and it tells against the applicant here.
[37]
The Court does not find that the application was vexatious in the
sense of having been brought to harass; Mr Abdul’s
sincerity
was evident. But sincerity is not a substitute for prospects, and
fairness has a claim on both sides. The first respondent
has been
called on to answer the same claim before the CCMA in 2021 and again
in 2025, before the ombud, and now twice in this
Court, in its
answering affidavit and at a full hearing, each time at its own
expense. It is entitled to have the expense of this
application met.
The order is made against the applicant union, which brought the
application and conducted it, and not against
the individuals on
whose behalf it purported to act. The first respondent asks for costs
on scale B, and the Court sees no reason
to depart from that.
[38]
In the result, the following order is made:
Order
1.
The application for the reinstatement of the review application under
case number 2025-084497, deemed to have been withdrawn in
terms of
rule 37(15) of the Rules of this Court, is dismissed.
2.
The applicant, the Labour Association Workers Union, is ordered to
pay the first respondent’s costs of the application on
scale B,
including the costs of counsel.
C
de Kock
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the
Applicant:
H Abdul
From:
LAWU
For the First
Respondent:
RGL Stelzner SC
Instructed
by:
Murray Fourie & Le Roux Inc
[1]
Act 75 of 1997, as amended.
[2]
Rule 1 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Labour
Court, GN 4775, GG 50608, 3 May 2024.
[3]
[2017] ZALAC 10
;
[2017] 7 BLLR 681
(LAC); (2017) 38 ILJ 1790 (LAC)
(25 January 2017) at para 17; applied in
Mogale
and Another v Tshifhiwa NO and Others
[2024] ZALCJHB 468 (18 November 2024) at paras 21 and 23.
[4]
[2015] ZALCD 9; (2015) 36 ILJ 2314 (LC) (28 January 2015) at paras
47 and 48, following
Asara
Wine Estate and Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Van Rooyen and Others
(2012) 33 ILJ 363 (LC).
[5]
1962 (4) SA 531 (A).
[6]
[2023] ZALCJHB 269; (2024) 45 ILJ 180 (LC) (12 September 2023) at
paras 20 and 31. The judgment says nothing about translation
and
nothing about the 60-day period.
[7]
Act 66 of 1995, as amended.
[8]
[2007] ZALAC 41
; (2008) 29 ILJ 1707 (LAC) at para 19.
[9]
[2018] ZACC 1
; (2018) 39 ILJ 523 (CC);
[2018] 4 BLLR 323
(CC);
2018
(6) BCLR 686
(CC) (22 January 2018) at paras 23 to 26.