IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Reportable / Not Reportable
Case no: 11060/2024
In the matter between:
JEROME NORMAN CLASSEN Applicant
and
BRANDVLEI CORRECTONAL SUPERVISION First Respondent
AND PAROLE BOARD
THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER: Second Respondent
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND Third Respondent
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
Coram: SLINGERS J et NORTON AJ
Heard: 13 August 2026
Delivered: 08 September 2026
Summary: Administrative Review - Review of Life long Parole – Different
parole dispensations under Act 8 of 1959 - s65(3)(a) provides for
lifelong parole for prisoners serving life imprisonment
ORDER
(i) the condonation application for the late bringing of the review
application is granted;
(ii) the application is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
Slingers J:
Background
[1] On 9 November 2000 the applicant committed the offence for which he was
convicted on 14 March 2002. On 15 March 2002 he was sentenced to life
imprisonment and on 20 October 2018 the decision was taken to place the
applicant on parole. In accordance with this decision, t he applicant was
placed on day parole from 4 March 2019 until 3 June 2019 and on 4 June
2019 he was released on lifelong parole.
[2] The applicant takes no issue with the decision to place him on parole but
questions why he was placed on lifelong parole instead of being placed on
parole for a limited period after which he would be released unconditionally.
[3] As a result of his dissatisfaction with being placed on lifelong parole and being
of the view that he was unfairly prejudiced thereby, the applicant instituted
proceedings in the Equality Court during November 2022 . The applicant,
having failed to obtain legal assistance drafted and instituted the application
on his own.
[4] On 23 March 2023 the Equality Court application came before Mr Justice
Henney wh o directed that the application be removed from the Equality
Court’s roll and that the applicant institute review proceedings.
[5] It is this review application which serves before us and in which the applicant
seeks to review and set aside the decision to place him on lifelong parole.
Furthermore, the applicant seeks a declarator that the decision to place him
on lifelong parole constitutes unfair discrimination against him and that any of
the respondents’ policies which justify the unlawful discrimination, including
Circular 8 of 2019, are invalid and are to be set aside.
[6] After the matter came before Mr Justice Henney, the applicant unsuccessfully
approached the Cape Bar for assistance. The reafter, the applicant
approached Legal Aid South Africa, with his application being approved in
January 2024. This resulted in the review application being instituted during
April 2024.
[7] It is common cause that t he review application was brought well outside the
180 days provided for in section 7 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act 3 0f 2000 (‘PAJA’). The applicant seeks condonation for this delay.
[8] The respondents opposed the application for condonation i n its answering
affidavit and heads of argument. In opposing the condonation application, the
respondents argued that the delay in bringing the review application was
excessive and that the applicant failed to provide an adequate explanation for
the entire extent of the delay in bringing the applicatio n. However, during the
hearing of the application, the respondents informed the court that they were
not persisting with their opposition to the condonation application.
The applicant’s case
[9] The applicant contends that the decision to place him on lifetime parole i s not
justifiable by a proper application of the respondents’ policies nor is it
consistent with the proper application of the legislative framework applica ble
to parole regimes. It is the applicant’s case that the decision to place him on
lifelong parole was based on an incorrect interpretation of the decisions in
lifelong parole was based on an incorrect interpretation of the decisions in
Van Vuuren v Minister of Correctional Service 1; Van Wyk v Minister of
1 2010 (12) BCLR 1233 (CC)
Correctional Services and others 2 and Phaahla v Minister of Justice and
Correctional Services3 and that the decision to do so was irrational, arbitrary,
discriminatory and unlawful.
[10] Furthermore, that the decision to place him on lifelong parole was inconsistent
with and not in keeping with how the respondents have dealt with other
prisoners serving a life sentence in the same situation as him.
[11] In support of this contention, t he applicant states that he has met and lived
with many other offenders who were in the same category such as he was in
respect of when the offence was committed, the sentencing period and their
eligibility for parole. Put plainly , although these other offenders were subject
to the same parole regime as he was in terms of the Correctional Services Act
8 of 1959, they were not placed on lifelong parole but were placed on parole
for specific periods, after which they were released unconditionally.
[12] The applicant does not name any of these other offenders no r does he
provide any details pertaining to these allegations which could be followed up
on, and which could then either be verified or refuted.
[13] In support of his claim of the discriminatory application of lifelong parole , the
applicant cites the case of Janusz Walus (‘Walus’), who was placed on parole
for only three years.
[14] The applicant argues that he duly served his sentence and that he was well
behaved in prison, focused on rehabilitation and studied towards his LLB,
which he subsequently completed.
[15] The applicant contends that t he provisions of the Correctional Services Act 8
of 1959 were applicable to his parole determination and that he is not aware
of any provision thereof that could be interpreted to justify the decision to
place him on lifelong parole.
2 2012 (1) SACR 159 (GNP)
3 2019 (2) SACR 88 (CC)
[16] It is the applicant’s case that the decision to place him on lifelong parole was
communicated to him verbally and that he was informed that it was a decision
taken by higher officials . He was also advised that the decision to place him
on lifelong parole was based on the policies of the Department of Correctional
Services.
[17] The applicant says he was threatened to be very careful as the first
respondent could still recommend that the decision to grant him bail be
refused and he could be sent back to prison w hen he pressed for answers
and/ or reasons for placing him on lifelong parole.
[18] The applicant states that the manner in which the respondents have treated
him displays a serious lack of regard for human rights. When the officials
from the Department of Correctional Services visit his place of abode with
their marked vehicles , which are easily recognisable as are the officials’
brown uniforms, it impacts on him emotionally and even physically.
[19] During one visit during 2022, Correctional Services officials arrived in the
dead of night , cordoned off the road with their vans and instead of knocking
on the applicant’s door, an official shouted out his name and surname in the
road as loudly as possible. This incident caused the applicant’s landlord to
request that he vacate the premises. Th e applicant is regularly searched in
public, which he avers, is motivated to humiliate him.
The answering affidavits
[20] The respondents state that during the applicant’s sentence, a number of
challenges to the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, being the successor
to Act 8 of 1959 , were made. These challenges resulted in the decisions of
Van Vuuren v Minister of Correctional Service; Van Wyk v Minister of
Correctional Services and others and Phaahla v Minister of Justice and
Correctional Services . Importantly, the decision of Phaahla v Minister of
Justice and Correctional Services determined that the date on which
Justice and Correctional Services determined that the date on which
offenders committed the offence and not the date on which they were
sentenced would determine eligibility for parole.
[21] These cases resulted in different parole dispensations for prisoners
sentenced to life imprisonment between 1987 and 1 March 1994 and those
sentenced to life imprisonment between 2 March 1994 and 30 September
2004. Those sentenced to life imprisonment between 1987 and 1 March 1994
were subject to a parole dispensation which provided for a parole period of
two years while those sentenced to life imprisonment between 2 March 1994
and 30 September 2004 were subject to a parole dispensation which provided
for lifelong parole.
[22] The answering affidavit is deposed to by Mr Alister Adonis, who was the
chairperson of the Brandvlei Parole Board (‘Adonis’) at the time the decision
was taken to place the applicant on lifelong parole. Adonis states that this
decision was:
(i) rationally connected to the information before him at the time;
(ii) a reasonable decision taken in accordance with the law and was
consistent with the requirements of the controlling legislation; and
(iii) was not taken because of irrelevant considerations or because relevant
considerations were ignored.
[23] Adonis goes on to state that he duly explained all the conditions applicable to
his parole to the applicant and advised him that it was in accordance with the
parole policy applicable to the applicant. This is not denied by the applicant in
his replying affidavit.
[24] In addressing the position of Walus, the respondents state that the
determination of his parole had to be dealt with under a different parole
dispensation because Walus was sentenced to life imprisonment prior to
March 1994. The applicant falls under the parole dispensation governing
those sentenced to life imprisonment during the period 2 March 1994 to 30
September 2004 whereas Walus fell under the parole dispensation governing
offenders who were sentenced between 1987 and 1 March 1994.
[25] In the matter of Walus v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and
Others4 the court held that Walus would only be required to serve two years of
his sentence on parol . Prior to March 1994 and the coming into operation of
section 65 of the 1959 Act , the period to be served on parole was governed
by Chapter VI (5) (k) (v) of the Correctional Services B -Order. This
determined that the parole of offenders sentenced to incarceration for crimes
committed prior to 1 March 1994 (including offenders sentenced to life
incarceration), would not exceed three years, less any period of amnesty or
special remission of sentence which would be deducted from the three-year
parole period.
[26] The parole policy applicable to the applicant’s parole, as preserved by section
136(1) of the 1988 Act, provided that offenders wh o were sentenced to life
imprisonment when placed on parole would be placed on parole for life. 5
Furthermore, the respondents aver that the applicant enjoyed the same
benefits and protection of the law and was treated in the same manner as
other parolees in his position.6
[27] It is the respondents’ contention that parole is an extension of the applicant’s
sentence in the form of community corrections. Support for this contention is
found in Phaahla where the Constitutional Court accepted that parole is a
manner of serving out one’s sentence and that it remains punishment
although a lesser one than imprisonment . However, it still amounts to a
deprivation of liberty for a set period, albeit outside of prison. Parolees remain
subject to the supervision and authority of the Department for the remainder
of their sentence.7
[28] The respondents agree with the applicant that his parole stood to be
determined under the Correctional Services Act of 1959 and the policies
relevant thereto. However, they disagree with his contention that there is
4 [2021] ZAGPPHC 96 at para 37
5 Vol 1, page 86, para 27 of the answering affidavit
4 [2021] ZAGPPHC 96 at para 37
5 Vol 1, page 86, para 27 of the answering affidavit
6 Vol 1, page 87, para 29; see also page 89, para 37
7 2019 (2) SACR 88 (CC) at para 35
nothing under the 1959 Act that a person in the position of the applicant
should be placed on lifelong parole.
[29] The policy applicable to the applicant’s parole dispensation provided that the
term ‘life’ meant exactly what the word implied and therefore, offenders who
were sentenced to life imprisonment, when placed on parole, would be placed
on parole for the duration of their natural life in the community under
supervision.
[30] The applicant incorrectly states that there is no legal justification for the
decision to place him on lifelong parole.
Discussion
[31] In Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier, Westerns Cape
and Another8the court held that:
‘[87] The role of the Courts has always been to ensure that the administrative
process is conducted fairly and that decisions are taken in accordance with the law
and consistently with the requirements of the controlling legislation. If these
requirements are met, and if the decision is one that a reasonable authority could
make, Courts would not interfere with the decision.’
[32] In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Others; In Re: Ex
Parte application of President of RSA and Others the Constitutional Court
held that:
‘As long as the purpose sought to be achieved by the exercise of public power is
within the authority of the functionary, and as long as the functionary's decision,
viewed objectively, is rational, a Court cannot interfere with the decision simply
because it disagrees with it or consider that the power was exercised inappropriately.
A decision that is objectively irrational is likely to be made only rarely but, if this does
occur, a Court has the power to intervene and set aside the irrational decision.’ 9
8 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC)
9 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Others; In Re: Ex Parte application of
President of RSA and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 90
I
[33] The written heads of argument filed on behalf of the applicant state that the
review is brought on the grounds set out in section 6(2)(a)(i), (ii), (c), (d), (e)(i),
(iii) –(v), (f)(ii)(bb), (cc) and (i) of PAJA.10
[34] Section 6(2)(a)(i) and (ii) provide that:
‘(2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative
action if-
(a)the administrator who took it-
(i) was not authorised to do so by the empowering provision;
(ii) acted under a delegation of power which was not authorised by
the empowering provision.’
[35] Section 6(2)(c) to (e)(i) and (iii) to (v) provide that:
‘(c)the action was procedurally unfair;
(d)the action was materially influenced by an error of law;
(e)the action was taken-
(i)for a reason not authorised by the empowering provision;
(ii)...
(iii) because irrelevant considerations were taken into account or
relevant considerations were no considered;
(iv) because of the unauthorised or unwarranted dictates of another
person or body;
(v) in bad faith; or’
[36] Section 6(2)(f) (ii) (bb) and (cc) provide that:
‘(f) if the decision itself-
(i) ...
(ii) is not rationally connected to –
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision;
(cc) the information before the administrator’
[37] Section 6(2)(i) provides that:
10 Paragraph 46 of the applicant’s heads of argument read with footnote 37. This is the first time the
grounds of review are set out explicitly.
‘(i) the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful.’
[38] A decision must be objectively capable of furthering the purpose for which the
power was given and for which the decision was purportedly taken, and it
must be supported by the evidence and informa tion before the administrator
as well as the reasons given for it.11
[39] Prior to the repeal of Act 8 of 1959, section 65 thereof provided that:
‘65 Release of prisoners and placement of prisoners on parole
(1) A prisoner shall be released upon the expiration of the term of imprisonment
imposed upon him.
(2) A prisoner may, in accordance with the provisions of this section be placed on parole
before the expiration of his term of imprisonment if he accepts the conditions of such
placement.
(3) (a) A placement contemplated in subsection (2) shall be subject to the
conditions mentioned in the warrant for such placement and shall extend for the
period between the date of such placement and the expiration of the term of
imprisonment. (own emphasis)
(b) When the Commissioner, a parole board or the court approves placement on parole,
or when a parole board submits a report as contemplated in section 63 (2), he or it may
in addition to any other condition which may be determined or recommended, also
determine or recommend that the prisoner-
(i) be subjected to such monitoring as he or it deems fit;
(ii) be placed under house arrest;
(iii) does community service;
(iv) seeks employment;
(v) takes up employment and remains employed;
(vi) takes part in treatment, development and support programmes;
(vii) be restricted to one or more magisterial districts;
(viii) lives at a fixed address;
(ix) refrains from going to any specific place;
(ix) refrains from going to any specific place;
(x) refrains from contacting any specific person by word or action.
(c) ......
(d) ......
11C Hoexter and G Penfold Administrative Law in South Africa 3rd edition (2021) at 464
(4) (a) A prisoner serving a determinate sentence shall-
(i) if a non-parole-period was fixed, not be considered for placement on
parole unless he has served the non-parole-period or half of his term of
imprisonment, whichever is the longer;
(ii) if a non-parole-period was not fixed, not be considered for placement on
parole unless he has served half of his term of imprisonment:
Provided that no such prisoner shall serve more than 25 years before being considered
for placement on parole.
(b) A person who has been sentenced to-
(i) periodical imprisonment, shall be detained periodically in a prison in the
manner prescribed by regulation;
(ii) imprisonment for corrective training, may be detained in a prison for a
period of two years and shall not be placed on parole unless he has served at
least 12 months of his sentence;
(iii) imprisonment for the prevention of crime, may be detained in a prison for
a period of five years and shall not be placed on parole unless he has served at
least two years and six months of his sentence;
(iv) an indeterminate sentence, by virtue of his having been declared an
habitual criminal, shall be detained in a prison until, after a period of at least
seven years, he is placed on parole;
(v) life imprisonment, shall not be placed on parole until he has served at
least 25 years of his sentence: Provided that he may be placed on parole when he has
reached the age of 65 years and he has served at least 15 years of his sentence;
(vi) imprisonment contemplated in section 52 (2) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1997, shall not be placed on parole unless he has served at least four
fifths of the terms of imprisonment imposed or 25 years, whichever is the shorter:
Provided that the court when imposing such imprisonment may order that the prisoner
be considered for placement on parole after he has served two thirds of the term of
imprisonment.
imprisonment.
(5) (a) If any parolee fails to comply with any condition of his parole the Commissioner
may issue a warrant for the arrest of the parolee, which may be executed by a peace
officer as defined in section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), and
which shall serve as authority for the detention of the parolee.
(b) Within 72 hours after the arrest of the parolee and after the Commissioner has
ascertained all the relevant facts and is still of the opinion that the parolee has
breached the conditions of his parole the Commissioner shall refer the matter to the
parole board, if the parolee was placed on parole by a parole board.
(c) The Commissioner or the parole board, as the case may be, may, if it is in the interest
of the parolee in respect of his treatment, rehabilitation or integration into the
community or if it is in the interest of the community-
(i) cancel the parole;
(ii) amend any condition of the parole; or
(iii) add any condition.
(d) Before acting in terms of paragraph (c) the Commissioner or the parole board shall
make the reasons for the proposed action known to the prisoner and shall afford him an
opportunity to submit oral or written representations in regard thereto: Provided that the
prisoner may be represented as provided for in section 63 (6) (b).
(e) If the prisoner does not accept the amended or new conditions, his placement on
parole shall be cancelled, after which he shall be detained in a prison for the unexpired
period of his sentence of imprisonment: Provided that the Commissioner or the parole
board may at a later date again place such prisoner on parole should the prisoner
accept the amended or other conditions.
(6) If a person serving a sentence of life imprisonment has breached a condition of his
parole the Commissioner shall refer the matter to the court which sentenced the
prisoner, which shall determine the period of imprisonment that such a prisoner shall
serve before the prisoner may again be considered for parole.
(7) ......
(8) ......
(9) ......
[40] It is evident from section 65(3)(a) that the parole perio d shall be the period
from the placement on parole until the expiration of the term of imprisonment
that was imposed during sentencing. By way of example if an offender was
sentenced to 12 years ’ imprisonment and was placed on parole after serving
10 years of such sentence , then in accordance with section 65(3)(a), the
10 years of such sentence , then in accordance with section 65(3)(a), the
offender would be placed on parole for the two years remaining from that
offender’s sentence.
[41] Similarly, if an offender was sentenced to life imprisonment and was placed
on parole, then that offender would be placed on lifelong parole.
[42] In terms of the parole dispensation applicable to the applicant, the only
discretion the appeal board had was whether or not to place the applicant on
parole. The period on which he was to be placed on parole was governed by
section 65(3)(a) of Act 8 of 1959.
[43] In Van Wyk v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 12 the court found
that Order BVI (1A)(22), which was the policy directed at providing guidelines
for parole in respect of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment , was
unconstitutional. Following Van Wyk, the respondents determined the
applicant’s parole in accordance with the predecessor of Order BVI (1A)(22) .
This policy provided that the term lifelong meant exactly that- the duration was
lifelong.
[44] The applicant argues that it is not clear why the predecessor of Orde r BVI
(1A) (22) would have applied to the determination of his parole placement
when, on the facts , it was clear that it had been replaced by Order BVI
(1A)(22) which had been struck down.
[45] A comparison of section 65(3)(a) with the parole policy which governed the
applicant’s parole dispensation shows that the policy sought to give effect
thereto. Thus, even if the policy was found to be invalid or inapplicable, the
decision to place the applicant on lifelong parole would have been authorised
by section 65(3)(a) of Act 8 of 1959.
[46] As set out earlier, the appl icant was sentenced after March 1994, on 15
March 2000 for an offence committed on 9 October 2000. In accordance with
the decision of Van Wyk, the applicant’s parole dispensation was that
applicable to offenders who had been sentenced to life imprisonment after 1
March 1984.
12 [2011] ZAGPPHC 125, 2012 (1) SACR 159 (GNP)
[47] The condition of lifelong parole is authorised by section 65(3)(a) of Act 8 of
1959. The imposition of lifelong parole is also consistent with the principle
that parole is an extension of the applicant’s sentence of imprisonment for life.
[48] Objectively viewed, the decision to place the applicant on lifelong parole was
rational and authorised in terms of the applicable legislation.
[49] The applicant alleged that he has been treated differently and less favourably
than other offenders who fall under the same parole dispensation as he does.
However, the applicant has provided no factual basis for this allegation. He
compared his case to that of Walus, but as shown above, Walus fell under a
different parole dispensation.
[50] In the circumstances, the applicant has not made out a case to review the
decision to place him on lifelong parole and to set it aside.
[51] The applicant raised serious issues pertaining to his treatment at the hands of
officials from the Department of Correctional Services. These issues fall
outside the scope of what this court has been called upon to determine. The
applicant is advised to report any mistreatment and/or abuse by the officials of
Correctional Services to the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services.
CONDONATION
[52] As correctly contended for by the respondents, the applicant’s explanation for
the delay in bringing the review application fell short of an explanation for the
entire duration of the period of delay. However, the court was mindful that the
applicant had for most of the delay been self -represented. While he was self-
represented, the applicant had done what he could to ventilate the matter in
court. After the applicant obtained legal representation, the review application
was prepared and instituted.
[53] Furthermore, at the hearing of the application, the respond ents did not persist
with their opposition to the condonation.
[54] It was also not the applicant’s original intention to institute review
proceedings. He did so after his application before the Equality Court was
removed and he was directed to institute review proceedings.
[55] The abandonment of the opposition to the condonation could be considered
as consenting thereto. Thus, in terms of section 9(1) of PAJA the 180 period
within which to bring the review application has been extended.
[56] In the event that the respondent’s decision not to persist with their objection to
the condonation application cannot be considered as consent in terms of
section 9(1) of PAJA, after considering the matter holistically, it cannot , in my
view, be said that the applicant was wilful and/or negligent in advancing his
matter. And it would be in the interest of justice to grant the applica tion for
condonation in terms of section 9(2) of PAJA.
Costs
[57] During the hearing of the application, the respondents’ legal representative
advised the court that they were not pressing for costs. The court is also of
the view that this is not a matter where costs should follow the result.
[58] Therefore, no order will be made in respect of costs.
Conclusion
[59] In the circumstances, I make the following orders:
(iii) the condonation application for the late bringing of the review
application is granted;
(iv) the application is dismissed.
________________________________
HM SLINGERS
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree.
________________________________
ML NORTON
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For applicant: Mr Nduli
Instructed by: Legal Aid, SA
For respondent: Mr Van Wyk
Instructed by: State Attorney, Cape Town