IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case No: 2026-103333
In the matter between:
AGRISA COMMODITIES (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
ADV AZHAR BHAM SC N.O. First Respondent
ARBITRATION FOUNDATION OF
SOUTHERN AFRICA Second Respondent
MAHEK PREPACKERS CC Third
Defendant
Neutral citation: Agrisa Commodities (Pty) Ltd v Adv Azhar Bham N.O. &
Others Case No 2026-103333 [2026] ZAWCHC (04-09-
2026)
Coram : MAPOMA, AJ
Heard : 12 August 2026
Judgment : 04 September 2026
Summary : Application for interim stay of arbitration proce edings
pending review of arbitration ruling on point in limine that may be dispositive
of the matter – applicable test for interim relief applied - requirements for
interim relief - prima facie right – applicable test - relevance of prosects of
successful review - whether the impugned ruling on point in limine was based
on prescription only and not jurisdictional challenge determinant of prospects
of success
ORDER
1. The further conduct of the arbitration proceedings before the first
respondent under the auspices of the second respondent under Case
number M.348 are stayed pending the finalisation of the review application
in Part B of the application.
2. The third respondent shall pay costs of Part A of the application, including
counsel’s costs at scale C of the High Court.
JUDGMENT
MAPOMA, AJ
[1] The applicant, Agrisa Commodities (Pty) Ltd (Agrisa)approached this Court
with an application on an urgent basis, seeking in Part A the stay of the
arbitration proceedings that are presided over by the firs t respondent
(Arbitrator) under the auspices of the se cond respondent, the Arbitration
Foundation of Southern Africa (AFSA), pending the finalisation of the review
application in Part B of this application. The application is opposed by the third
respondent, Mahek Prepackers cc (Mahek), while the first and second
respondents have filed their respective notices to abide by the decision of the
Court.
[2] In the review application in Part B , the applicant seeks to review and set
aside the decision of the arbitrator dismissing Agrisa’s jurisdictional challenge,
asserting that the arbitrator lacked power to arbitrate its dispute with Mahek.
According to Agrisa, the jurisdictional ruling is incompetent for lack of
jurisdiction and that the jurisdictional point Agrisa raised is dispositive of the
matter and thus reviewable.
[3] Mahek opposes this application on various grounds, the first and foremost
being that the matter is not urgent, and that if at all there is any urgency, such
was self -created. It is also argued that the application does not meet t he
requirements that set the threshold for the granting of the interim relief. The
thrust of the respondent’s contention i s that the applicant has no prima facie
right to the interim interdict, as the review application, among other reasons, has
no reasonable prospects of success. Below, I set out the relevant background
facts leading up to this matter.
[4] This application was initially set down for hearing on the urgent roll o f 28
May 2026. It was postponed at the instance of Mahek due to unavailability of
their counsel on that day. This result ed in the matter being removed from the
roll and re -enrolled on the urgent roll of 10 June 2026. However, t he matter
could not be heard on the urgent roll of 10 June 2026, due to the voluminous
nature of documents and the congested roll , hence it was granted early
allocation for hearing on 12 August 2026.
[5] Agrisa, the applicant herein, and the defendant in the arbitration
proceedings, is a commodity trade r in agricultural products , inter alia , white
maize (“the grain” ). Mahek, the third respondent , who is the claimant in the
arbitration proceedings , is a milling company, milling various agricultural
products that include, white maize . Until th e disagreement that culminated in
these proceedings, Mahek was Agrisa’s customer as it would, from time to time,
purchase grain from Agrisa.
Agreements
[6] In May 2023, the parties signed the AgriSA Master Agreement ( "the master
agreement"), which is an umbrella agreement that governs the purchase and sale
of grain through the forward procurement provision, which is relevant to the
price sensitive 'position', and the contract confirmation, which relates to specific
transactions or orders. Along with the master agreement is the industry wide
agreement called SAGOS 1, Version 9 (effective from 1 August 2012) that
governs the purchase and sale of grain and various products in the industry
(“the SAGOS agreement”).
[7] Both the master agreement and the SAGOS contract provide for dis pute to
be settled through the arbitration process. In particular, the master agreement
provides for the alternative dispute resolution through AFSA. The standard
agreement form for the Contract Confirmation Contract is derived from the
SAGOS 1 Version 9 industry -wide standard terms and includes provisions for
dispute resolution as per the SAGOS Rules of Arbitration, to which the parties
consented to.
Dispute
[8] The arbitration proceedings are about Mahek’s claim for damages against
Agrisa. In its claim, Mahek alleged that Agrisa breached the terms of the
forward procurement provisions of the purchase contract, resulting in Mahek
suffering damages in the amount of R73 943 265.24. The specifics of the
damages claim are not necessary or these particular proceedings.
[9] On 2 April 202 5, Mahek through its attorneys, addressed a letter to Agrisa
notifying the latter of Malek’s claim. The relevant paragraph of the letter read s
as follows:
“2. In accordance with clause 16 .2.3 of the SAGOS 9 version 1 agreement (Contract for
purchase and sale of grain, pulses, oil seeds and products derived therefrom) as
concluded between Agrisa and Mahek, I hereby give you notice of my client ’s claim
against Agrisa arising from Agrisa’s unlawfully and wrongful conduct in respect of my
client and my client’s position in grain futures.”
[10] Clause 16.2.3 that is quoted in the above notification of claim provides as
follows:
“16.2.3 Any claim for any failure to perform in terms of the contract shall be notified in
writing to the other party within 28 consecutive days from the date on which the
other party could reasonably have become aware of such failure. Thereafter it must
be referred in writing to the AFSA secretariat within 21 consecutive days from the
date of such notification to the other party.”
[11] Subsequently, Agrisa responded to Mahek’s notification, objecting and
contending that the notice was inadequate and non-compliant with Clause 16 of
the SAGOS contract. Referring to clause 16, which it claimed is time specific,
Agrisa took issue that the notice did not comply with clause 16 in that it lacked
particularity regarding the claim . Agrisa demanded that they be properly
notified of the claim with specific details as they d id not accept what Agrisa
referred to as a ‘broad and generalised notice of an unspecified claim.’
[12] On 3 April 2025, Mahek contested Agrisa’s interpretation of the clause 16,
contending that the information insisted upon by Agrisa would be provided in
due co urse. According to Mahek, Agrisa was not entitled to demanded
information at notification stage. This is the precise issue that gave rise to the
point in limine at the arbitration and subsequently to the review proceedings.
[13] On 23 April 202 5, Ma hek referred the claim to AFSA for dispute
resolution and determination. In the referral, Ma hek elaborated in more detail
on the factual basis of its claim . Further details were also given in Ma hek’s
subsequent Statement of Claim (“the SoC” ), in which it a lleged that Agrisa
committed breach of contract by closing Ma hek’s positions on 12 March 2025 ,
as a consequence of which Mahek suffered damages in the amount claimed.
[14] In response to the claim, Agrisa submitted a Statement of Defence (“the
SoD”), wherein it took a preliminary point that the claim had prescribed ,
because Mahek’s notification of the claim by the letter dated 2 April 2 025 was
inadequate, in that it did not set out the dispute as required by Clause 16 of the
SAGOS agreement, lacking detail in respect of the dispute or the alleged claim
for any failure to perform in terms of the contract.
[15] Agrisa contended that although the notice dated 2 April 2025 was sent
within the required 28 days, the notice was inadequate in that it did not properly
and sufficiently identify the dispute between the parties and the nature thereof .
Further criticism of the notice was that it did not provide any details of the
dispute or the claim as it did not adequately inform the other party of its failure
to perform as required by the SAGOS agreement. According to Ag risa, the
referral letter of 23 April 2025, which for the first time identified the dispute
was 42 days after the claim arose. Accordingly, so argued Agrisa, Mahek's
claim was time-barred and had prescribed.
[16] Mahek delivered a replication in respon se to Agrisa’s preliminary point in
the SoD, as argued against enforcement of clause 16 on a variety of grounds,
whereafter Agrisa in turn delivered a rejoinder . In the rejoinder, Agrisa
augmented its preliminary point by setting out the relief it sought and concluded
by its prayer for the dismissal of the claim should be granted , ‘with the result
that the claim or claims are either time barred or the arbitrator has no power
or jurisdiction to determine them.’
[17] On 14 January 2026, having considered the parties’ submissions, the
arbitrator issued a ruling directing the separate determination of the point in
limine. In his ruling, the arbitrator reasoned that if the p lea in limine were to
succeed it would dispose of the matter, and as such, it would be just,
expeditious and econ omical for Ag risa’s p lea in limine as set detailed in the
relevant paragraphs of the SoD, together with Mahek’s replication and Agrisa’s
rejoinder to be dealt with first as separated from other issues.
[18] Having considered the witness statements, oral e vidence and written
arguments on the plea in limine, the arbitrator delivered his award on 28 March
2025, dismissing Agrisa’s point in limine . This was followed by the review
application, the determination of Part A of which is the subject of the current
proceedings. During the argument of this matter, a contentious issue emerged
which has a bearing on the interim relief sought . The issue is specifically
whether the point in limine was a jurisdictional issue. This issue will be dealt
with in the discussion below.
Issue for determination
[19] In the context of these proceedings in Part A, this Court must resolve two
distinct questions. The first is whether the application is urgent as contemplated
in rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court . Should the court determine
adversely, this matter will fall to be struck from the roll. The corollary is that if
the Court finds in the affirmative, the second issue will arise.
[20] The second issue is whether Agrisa has made out a case for the grant of
interim relief for the stay of the arbitration proceedings pending the finalisation
of the review application sought by Agrisa in Part B.
Urgency
[21] Regarding urgency, Agrisa averred that the arbitrator had directed that the
arbitration proceedings , which set down for further hearing on 1 2 and 18
October 2026, would continue notwithstanding that Agrisa had indicated that it
seeks to review the impugned arbitrator’s ruling. According to the applicant, the
arbitrator indicated that he would only stay the proceedings if the parties agreed,
or if the court ordered so. It was averred that Mahek was not a menable to the
stay.
[22] It was further argued that Agrisa would suffer irreparable harm if it were to
be compelled to participate and incur expenses in the arbitration proceedings it
contends are incompetent , more so if the review court sets aside the arbitration
ruling. It was further submitted that the applicant would be unable to secure
substantial redress in the forthcoming hearing if the relief sought is denied.
[23] Mahek argued that this application should be struck from the roll due to
lack of urgency. In developing the submission , Mahek contends that any
urgency, if it exists, is self-created, as Agrisa, the applicant unduly delayed
without reasonable explanation . The impugned award was delivered on 28
March 2026, yet the review was launched only on 7 May 2026.
[24] Mahek contended that t he review application itself was launched out of
time outside the six-week timeframe allowed by section 33 of the Arbitration
Act of 1965 for bringing a review of an arbitration award . According to the
respondent, the applicant’s dilatory attitude is calculated to frustrate the
arbitration process which is an expedited process that was agreed between the
parties to resolve the disputes and should not be countenanced by the Court.
[25] Having duly considered the submissions by the parties, I am persuaded by
the argument that if the matter were to be dealt with through the normal
timeframes, the applicant will not be able t o obtain substantial redress , as the
matter would be outdated by the time it is prepared for adjudication , rendering
any decision academic. Accordingly, I find that it serves the interests of justice
for the issue to have been appropriately presented on an urgent basis, and it
must be adjudicated accordingly. This leads me to the subsequent question of
whether the stay ought to be granted.
Interim Relief for Stay of the Arbitration Proceedings
[26] In terms of s ection 33(3) of the Arbitration Act 42 1965 , a court may, if it
considers that the circumstances so require, stay the enforcement of the
arbitration award pending the finalisation of the review application. Further, the
court has inherent common law discretion, which must be exercised judicially. 1
This power is also derived from section 173 of the Constitution if the interests
of justice justify.
[27] The general principles for granting of a stay of execution was summarised
in Gios t/a Shakespear Pub v Van Zyl,2 as that:
“a) A court will grant a stay of execution where real and substantial injustice requires it or
where injustice would otherwise result;
b) The court will be guided by factors usually applicable to interim interdicts , except
where the applicant is not asserting a right, but attempting to avert injustice;
c) The court must be satisfied that:
i) The applicant has a well -grounded apprehension that the execution is taking place
at the instance of the respondent;
ii) Irreparable harm will result if the execution is not sta yed and the applicant
ultimately succeeds in establishing a clear right;
d) Irreparable harm will invariably result if there is a possibility that the underlying causa
may ultimately be removed that is where the underlying causa is the subject matter of
an ongoing dispute between the parties.
e) The court is not concerned with the merits of the underlying dispute the sol e inquiry is
simply whether the causa is in dispute.” (own underlining)
[28] The test for the granting of interim interdict is trite. It is commonly
referred to as the four -part test, which assesses if the four established common
law criteria for interim relief are satisfied. These requirements, which are well
1 Stoffberg NO v Capital Harvest (Pty) Ltd (unreported WCC case No 2130/2021 dated 2 March 2021) at para
[17] to [25]
2 2011(1) SA 148 (LC) at 155H-156B
established as articulated in the historic decision of Setlogelo v Setlogelo ,3
stipulate that the applicant must show: a) a prima facie right, even if open to
some doubt, b) a well -grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim
relief is not granted and ultimate relief is eventu ally granted; c) that the balance
of convenience favours the granting of the interim relief; and, d) that the
applicant has no other adequate or satisfactory remedy. The above requirements
were refined in Webster v Mitchell.4
[29] The Constitutional Court in National Treasury and Others v Opposition to
Urban Tolling Alliance and Others (OUTA) 5 confirmed that the Setlogelo test,
as adapted by case law, continues to be a useful and accessible reference for the
courts for issuing of interdicts. The caveat though is that when applying the test,
the court must have regards to the constitutional principles that include
separation of powers and the principle of legality especially when dealing with
the challenge of public power.6
[30] Due care is particularly required when considering application for interim
relief, as such relief when granted, might interfere with the separation of
powers. In such instances, interim relief may only be granted in the clearest of
cases. The Constitutional Court pronounced on this position in International
Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd, 7 where
Moseneke DJP remarked:
“When a court is invited to intrude into the terrain of executive especially when the
executive decision-making process is still uncompleted, it must do so only in the clearest
3 1941 AD 221
4 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W) at 1189
5 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at paragraph [45]
6 Mare v CSOS and Others (supra) at paragraph [31]
7 International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012(4) SA 618 (CC) at
paragraph [101]
of cases and only when irreparable harm is likely to ensue if in the dictatorial life is not
granted...”
[31] The above legal position varies in instances where the interim relief sought
relates to review that involves administrative action , as opposed to executive
action, in which case a less restrictive approach is adopted. This may hold true
and weigh heavily in favour of granting interim relief in cases where a review
court may, in due course, refused to set aside the impugned administrative
action on the basis that it has already been implemented. In City of Cape Town v
SANRAL,8 Binns-Ward J remarked that the Constitution contemplates that
effective remedies should be available for breaches of fundamental right to
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action.
Evaluation
[32] In what follows, t he Court will evaluate the relevant facts in this matter
while considering the aforementioned legal principles to determine whether the
interim relief sought in the form of stay of the arbitration proceedings is
warranted in this case. The crux of the matter is whether Agrisa has met the
four-part test requirement for interim interdict.
Prima facie right
[33] Agrisa contends that it has a prima facie right to review a decision that it
considers irregular and thus unlawful, and as such, it has a right not to be
subjected to unlawful quasi -judicial proceedings. To fortify this argument,
Agrisa argues that the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to arbitrate the matter based
on two ground s, which Agrisa contends were misconstrued by the arbitrator.
The first is that the notification of claim was inadequate for it did not comply
8 2013 JDR 1022 (WCC) at Paragraph 78; See also Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa, 3ed, p808;
with clause 16 of the SAGOS agreement. The second is that the re is no dispute
to adjudicate, because at the time the claim was referred, it was out of time and
had prescribed. Absent the arbitrable dispute, there is no jurisdiction on the part
of the arbitrator, so it is argued.
[34] The stance taken by the arbitrator that the arbitration proceedings had to
proceed notwithstanding the review application cannot be faltered, for unless
the jurisdictional ruling is set aside by court, it remains in force. This accords
with the principle of Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town ,9 as
affirmed by the decision in MEC for Health Eastern Cape v Kirland
Investments (Pty) Ltd.10 This position holds even if there is a review application
unless the court orders the stay of the award if the circumstances so require.
[35] Mahek refutes Agrisa argument , and contends that Agrisa has no prima
facie right, primarily because the review is ‘still born’ and due to its
hopelessness, it holds no reasonable prospects of success. Mahek asserts the
impugned ruling was not a jurisdiction ruling, and that Agrisa seeks to introduce
a new jurisdictional point that was never placed before the arbitrator. According
to Mahek, the only issue that Agrisa took on the plea in limine was prescription
of the claim owing to inadequate notice, which lacked merit. Mahek argued that
the issue of lack of jurisdiction was only introduced in the review application.
[36] Before dealing with above contentions, I must set out the courts’ approach
on the test for existence of prima facie right. In OUTA,11 the Constitutional
Court made it clear that mere right to approach the court relying on the right to
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair as
9 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA)
10 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC)
11 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at paragraph [49]
pronounced in section 33 of the Constitution, read with PAJA, is not enough to
satisfy the requirement of prima facie right to interim interdict pending review
of the impugned decision. The court held that prima facie for this purpose is a
right to which, if not protected by an interdict, irreparable harm would ensue.12
[37] The above notwithstanding, i n evaluating prima facie right in interim
interdict to suspend an order pending review , the court hearing the interdict
must examine the grounds of the pending review to satisfy that the review has
prospects of success. In Economic Freedom Fighters v Gordhan and Others:
Public Protector; Public Protector v Gordhan and Others ,13 the court clearly
articulated the need to evaluate the stay of the impu gned decision pending
review to assess the prospects of succe ss of the review. Adopting this principle,
in Ramaphosa v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others ,14 the Court held
that the review must rest on strong grounds which are likely to succeed, and the
interdict may properly be granted only where the Court is persuaded that the
review is likely to succeed.
[38] In Webster v Mitchell , the court held that in assessing prima facie right,
the right to be set out by an applicant for a temporary interdict need not show by
balance of probabilities. If it is prima facie established though open to some
‘doubt’, that is enough. The Court will thus assess prima facie right in this case
having regards to the prospects of success and the grounds of opposition
advanced by the respondent.
[39] The parties are ad idem that the issue of whether the applicant has met the
required threshold for prima facie right to the relief it seeks turns on whether the
12 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC at paragraph [50]
13 2020 (6) SA 325 (CC)
14 2026-138228[2026] ZAWCHC 371 (24 July 2026) at paragraph 13
applicant enjoys reasonable prospect of success in the review. The central issue
that permeates the review grounds is the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the arbitrator. Having looked at the grounds of review, it appears to me that
central in Agrisa grounds of review is the very point of lack of jurisdiction . The
determination in my view is best left for the review court, but the issue of
whether there are r easonable prospects of suc cess remains for consideration by
this Court to determine whether the applicant has a prima facie right to the relief
sought.
[40] As I mentioned above , essentially Mahek contends that the jurisdictional
issue is not an issue for review , for it is not a matter that served before the
arbitrator. Mahek argued that what is before the review court is in essence
nothing more than an appeal masquerading as a review. Thus, the acid test is
whether Agrisa did not raise the jurisdictional point in the p lea in limine at the
arbitration proceeding that resulted in the impugned ruling as contended by
Mahek. Agrisa contends it did.
[41] Advancing his argument that Agrisa raised the jurisdictional point for the
first time in the review , Counsel for Mahek, referred the Court to both Agrisa’s
statement of defence and rejoinder to illustrate that the jurisdiction point was
never before the arbitrator . Indeed, in the statement of defence articulating the
point in limine , Agrisa argues that the ‘the claim in this arbitration is time-
barred and has subsequently prescribed”. However, in the rejoinder Ag risa
captured the relief it sought as that Mahek’s claims should be dismissed as ‘the
claims or claims are either time barred or the Arbitrator has no power or
jurisdiction to determine them.”
[42] I am not persuaded by the arguments that the jurisdictional point did not
feature in the ruling that is under review. It seems to me, the prescription was
based on the provisions of clause 16, non-compliance of which would give rise
to absence of arbitrable dispute which is a jurisdiction al issue. If the point in
limine taken by Agrisa was prescription of the claim due to inadequate notice, it
stands to reason that if the arbitrator were to find that the claim had prescribed,
the consequence would be absence of the dispute and thus absence of
jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator.
[43] In any event, Agrisa spelt out this point in the rejoinder before the
arbitrator considered the plea in limine. While I am not at liberty to ‘gaze into a
crystal ball ’ and foretell the outcome of the review on the above issue , I am
unable to find that do the basis postulated by the respondent, the applicant’s
review has no reasonable prospects if success . On the contrary, my view is that
the applicant has a formidable case that is arguable in the review proceedings.
Though it may be open to some doubt , the point raised by the applicant enjoys
reasonable prospects of success on review. I therefore find that the applicant has
met the threshold of a prima facie right in this matter.
Irreparable harm
[44] In Outa,15 the court held that an applicant for an interim interdict is
required to establish a right to which irreparable harm would ensue if not
protected by an interdict . The test is objective, namely , whether a reasonable
person, confronted by the same facts, would apprehend the probability of
harm.16 Actual harm need not be established by probabilities.17
15 See Outa (supra) paragraph 50
16 RS v MS 2014(2) SA 511(GJ) paragraphs 26-28
17 SANRAL v City of Cape Town; Protea Parkway Consortium v City of Cape Town [2014] All SA 497 (WCC)
[45] Agrisa contends that being compelled to participate at considerable costs in
arbitration proceedings whose validity it challenges before the arbitrator, whose
competence to make any determination carries a risk of irreparable harm if the
proceedings continue. It was further argued that should the review court find in
Agrisa’s favour, that decision would be dispositive of the matter , but the harm
would be irreparable, in that by that time the arbitration proceedings would have
been finalised and the outcome irreversible.
[46] This is countered by Mahek, who argued that Agrisa’s participation in the
arbitral proceedings that were agreed upon does not met the test of irreparable
harm. It was further argued that the scale of substantial prejudice would be tilted
in favour of Mahek if the stay is granted and review ultimately fails.
[47] In Builda Construction Cape Propriety Limited v Verveen and Another ,18
in a case where the applicant contested the arbitration forum, the court held that
it would be impractical to continue with arbitration proceedings whilst the
applicant was challenging the arbitration forum. The court held if the applicant
is successful later on review and the findings confirm that the matter was not
arbitrable, the applicant having been forced to participate in such proceedings
and having incurred costs, the prejudice applicant would suffer would be greater
than the respondent if the arbitration proceedings were not stayed.
Balance of convenience
[48] For the applicant to succeed, t he balance of convenience must be in favour
of the grant of the stay. The court must weigh the prejudice the applicant will
suffer if the interim order is not granted against the harm the respondent will
18 [2023] ZAGPPHC 178 (22 March 2023)
suffer if it is granted, bearing in mind the wider public interest and the
underlying principles of the democratic society.
[49] I have concluded that prima facie right to the stay pending review has been
established, and that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not
granted, more so in the event of the applicant succeeding in the review. Having
considered the balance of prejudice to both parties, I take the view that the
prejudice applicant will suffer if the stay is not granted.
Absence of other adequate remedy
[50] It is tri te that in order for the applicant for interim interdict to succeed ,
there must be no alternative legal remedy available which provides satisfactory
redress for the harm complained of.
[51] According to the applicant, t he arbitrator indicated to the applicant that he
can only halt the arbitration proceedings if it is by the order of this Court. The
applicant submits that he has no other alternative remedy in the present
circumstances except to seek th e stay of the arbitration process pending the
review in p art B. The respondent contends that the applicant is not short of
alternative remedy, for it has access to the arbitration process as alternative
remedy. It is further argued that if the applicant is not satisfied with any
misdirection of the arbitrator, the applicant would be at liberty to approach the
court to review any unsatisfactory interim award from the arbitration process.
[52] I do not find the arbitration process whose impugned interim award is
awaiting review as an adequate alternative remedy. Having considered the facts
of this case, I am satisfied that the applicant has no alternative remedy suited for
the present situation but these proceedings. Accordingly, I hold the view that the
applicant has met all the requirements f or the interim relief sought , and I am
therefore satisfied that the applicant has succeeded in the application for the stay
of the arbitration proceedings pending the finalisation of the review application
in Part B.
Costs
[53] It is an established principle that costs follow the results . I find no reason
to deviate from this principle in this case . The applicant has succeeded in this
application and is therefore entitled to an award of costs.
Order
[54] In the result, the following order is made:
1 . The further conduct of the arbitration proceedings before the first
respondent under the auspices of the second respondent under Case
number M .348 a re stayed pending the finalisation of the review
application in Part B of the application.
2 . The third respondent shall pay costs of Part A of this application,
including counsel’s costs at scale C of the High Court.
_______________________
ZL MAPOMA
Acting Judge of the High Court
Appearances
Counsel for the Applicant : Adv RGL Stelzner SC and
Adv JR Adv Whitaker
Instructed by : Jordaan Ferreira Inc, Somerset West
Counsel for the 3rd Respondent : Adv In person
Instructed by : Dasoo Attorneys, Johannersburg