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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2025-062698
In the matter between:
PROPELL SECTIONAL TITLE SOLUTION
(PTY)(LTD) (Registration number: 1999/04482/07) Plaintiff/Applicant
and
THE BODY CORPORATE OF EDLYN COURT First Respondent
(Scheme number: 78/1988)
JUDGMENT
Maunatlala AJ:
[1] This is an application for summary judgment brought by the Plaintiff against the
Defendant for payment of R416,763.23, together with interest and costs. The claim arises
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED.
…………………….
…………………….
DATE……………………SIGNATURE…………………
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from a loan agreement, subsequent addendum, and repayment agreement concluded
between the parties.
[2] The Defendant has raised a special plea of prescription, contending that the debt had
prescribed before the conclusion of the repayment agreement and an addendum . This is
the primary issue before this Court.
The Factual Matrix
[3] The parties entered into a Revolving Arrear Levy Finance Agreement on or about 11
April 201 4. In terms of this agreement, the Plaintiff advanced funds to the Defendant to
cover arrears levies owed by defaulting owners, with the Defendant remaining liable for
advances not recovered.1
[4] On 22 August 2019, the Plaintiff gave notice in terms of clause 3.2.1 of the original
agreement, ceasing to provide further advances. 2The Defendant contends that this notice
"ended" the agreement and that the debt therefore prescribed three years thereafter, on or
about 22 August 2022.
[5] The Plaintiff however co ntends that the debt has not prescribed because in terms of
clauses 19.4 and 20 of their original agreement, the amounts advanced only become due
and payable by the Defendant once the Plaintiff has issued a notice to that effect, or in the
event of breach by the Defendant.3
1 Annexure POC2, clause 11.2
2 Annexure POC3
3 Para 35; Applicant’s heads of argument
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[6] During September 2023, the parties concluded an addendum to the agreement agreeing
that the Defendant would be liable for Financed Arrear Levies that cannot be recovered
from the Owners.4
[7] On 23 October 2023, the parties entered into a Repayment Agreement ("the RA")
wherein the Defendant:7.1. Acknowledged its indebtedness of R612,076.03;5
[7.2.] Agreed to a discounted amount of R350,000.00 plus interest;6
[7.3.] Undertook to make 60 monthly instalment payments.7
[8] The Defendant subsequently defaulted on the repayment agreement. The Plaintiff
issued a letter of demand on the Defendant on or about 25 March 2025. The Plaintiff, now
the Applicant, seeks summary judgment for the outstanding balance.
[9] The defendants contend that t his Repayment Agreement and the subsequent
addendum were entered into after the debt had already prescribed and does not revive the
debt.
The Prescription Defence
[10] The Defendant's central contention is that the debt prescribed on or about 23
September 2022 being three years after the Plaintiff gave notice that it would cease making
4 Para 9; Particulars of claim
5 RA, clause 3.1
6 RA, clause 3.3
7 RA, clause 4.1
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further advances. 8 The Defendant further contends that the subsequent addendum and
repayment agreement cannot revive a prescribed debt.9
[11] This argument is, with respect, fundamentally flawed and misunderstands the nature of
the original agreement. To this effect, I refer to the Constitutional Court decision in Trinity
Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Grindstone Investments 132 (Pty) Ltd 2018 (1) SA 94 (CC
where the court held, at paragraph 47 that “a contractual debt becomes due in accordance
with the terms of the contract and that, where demand is a condition precedent to
claimability, prescription commences only upon demand. “
[12] In determining when prescription commenced, the acceleration provisions contained in
clauses 19.4 and 20 of the original agreement take precedence. The respondents
proceeded on a premise that prescription commenced to run from the date of the Notice by
the Applicants ceding to make further advances, without due regard to the acceleration
clause which governs when the debt became due and, consequently, when prescription
commenced to run.
[13] It is worth pointing out that the provisions of Section 12 of the Prescription Act provides
that prescription will run from “the date on which the debt becomes due and payable” , in
this case, such a date would be determined by the creditor electing to make a demand as
contemplated in clause 19.4 and 20 of the Agreement. (“POC2”).10
[14] The agreement between the parties was not a term loan that became due on
termination. Clauses 19.4 and 20 of the original agreement provide that the amounts
advanced become due and payable only upon a notice of breach or demand. The notice
8 Para 5 of Special Plea v Para 9 of Respondent’s heads.
9 Para 9 of Respondent’s heads.
10 Prescription Act 68 and 69
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dated 22 August 2019 merely informed the D efendant that the Plaintiff would stop making
further advances; it did not demand payment of the existing indebtedness. In addition,
clause 3.3 provides that the agreement remains in force until the Defendant has discharged
all amounts due.
[15] The legal position regarding prescription and acceleration clauses is clear. In Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Miracle Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2016 (2) SA
153 (GJ), the Supreme Court of Appeal held that where a contract contains an acceleratio n
clause that requires an election by the creditor, the debt falls due and prescription
commences only when the creditor elects to terminate the agreement and demand
payment of the full amount.11
[16] The position is accurately summarised by Christie:
'If the contract contains an acceleration clause making the entire balance of
the debt payable on the debtor's failure to pay any one instalment, it will only
be necessary to examine the clause carefully in order to see whether anything
in addition to the debto r's default, such as a written demand, is required to
bring it into operation.'
[17] In this matter, the original agreement did not make the full amount due upon
termination of the facility. The Defendant was required to remain liable for financed arrear
levies that could not be recovered from owners. In terms of clauses 19.4 and 20, the debt
only became due and payable upon a demand or breach.
11 See para 15-18 of the case
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[18] The letter of demand was only served on 20 March 2025. 12 It is from this date that
prescription commenced to run in respect of the full outstanding balance.
[19] The Defendant's reliance on Miracle Mile is misplaced. That case concerned a
situation where the creditor failed to make an election to accelerate the debt. Unlike the
circumstances in that matter, the Plaintiff's contractual right to recover the outstanding
balance was dependent upon the occurrence of the circumstances contemplated in clauses
19.4 and 20 including demand upon default. The Plaintiff has clearly elected to enforce the
debt by issuing a letter of demand and launching these proceedings. Prescription in respect
of the outstanding balance therefore commenced no earlier than that date. I submit that the
debt has not prescribed
The Nature of the Defence
[20] The summary judgment procedure is a valuable mechanism to prevent delay and
abuse of process by defendants who have no real defence to a claim. A defence must be
bona fide and raise a triable issue, otherwise it would merely be delivered solely for the
purpose of delay . See Joob Joob Investme nts (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint
Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA) . 13 The Defendant's plea and affidavit resisting summary
judgment are replete with bald denials and vague allegations of a lack of accounting. The
Defendant does not, however, provide any specific particulars of what amounts were not
properly accounted for.
[21] In Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A), the Appellate Division
held that a defendant must "disclose fully the nature and grounds of his defence and the
12 Annexure POC10
13 At para 32.
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material facts upon which it is founded" and that the defence disclosed must be "bona fide
and good in law”.
[22] As this Court has recently reaffirmed in Hbgschindlers Attorneys and Notaries v Glen
Acre 16 (Pty) Limited and Another 2026 ZAGPJHC 371:
'a defendant cannot content him - or herself with bald denials... Something
more is required’.
More recently, the same principle was reaffirmed in SA Taxi Impact Fund (RF) Pty Ltd v
Vilakazi [2026] ZAGPJHC 369 , where the Court held that bald denials and vague
allegations which do not set out facts constituting a defence do not satisfy the requirements
for resisting summary judgment.14
[23] The Defendant's complaint that it "never received such advance" is contradicted by its
own plea, which admits that payments were made to the Plaintiff and that a payment of
R2,000.00 was made to "demonstrate its preparedness or willingness to pay off its debt". 15
The Defendant further attaches annexures "AD1" and "AD2" to its plea, acknowledging the
existence of the financed arrear levies.
[24] As was held in Botha v W Swanson & Company (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) PH F85 CPD, a
claim based on a certificate of balance in a loan agreement constitutes a liquidated amount
for the purposes of summary judgment. Clause 25 of the original agreement, which applies
to the RA, provides that a certificate issued by a director of the Plaintiff constitutes prima
14 at paras 19 and 47–50
15 Plea: Para 21 v Para 27
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facie proof of the indebtedness. 16 The Plaintiff has attached the requisite certificate as
annexure "POC9".
[25] The Defendant has failed to advance a de fence that is bona fide or good in law. The
opposition to this application bears all the hallmarks of a delaying tactic.
Order
[26] In the premises, the Plaintiff has established a clear claim, and the Defendant has
failed to disclose a bona fide defence. The Defendant's special plea of prescription is
dismissed with costs.
[27] Summary judgment is therefore granted in favour of the Plaintiff as prayed for in the
Notice of Motion:
1. Payment of the amount of R416,763.23 (Four Hundred and Sixteen Thousand
Seven Hundred and Sixty-Three Rand and Twenty-Three Cents);
2. Interest thereon at the rate of 16.75% calculated from 20 March 2025 to date of
payment;
3. Costs of suit on the attorney and client scale, including the costs of counsel on Scale
C.
MI Maunatlala
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
JOHANNESBURG, GAUTENG DIVISION
16 Annexure POC2, clause 25
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APPEARANCES;
For the Plaintiff/Applicant:
Adv PJ Badenhorst
Instructed by: Heerschop Pienaar Inc
For the Defendant/Respondent:
MacGillivray Pool Inc
DATE OF HEARING : …
DATE OF ORDER : 28 August 2026
DATE OF REASONS FOR JUDGMENT : …