THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case no: 2026-197084
In the matter between:
MR LC PRAC Applicant
and
SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL SPACE AGENCY Respondent
Heard: 26 August 2026
Delivered: 02 September 2026
This judgment was handed down electronically by consent of the parties , by
circulation to them by email. The date for hand- down is deemed to be 02 September
2026.
JUDGMENT
PRINSLOO, J
Introduction
[1] On 18 August 2026, the Applicant approached this Court urgently for relief,
pending the determination of his unfair discrimination dispute. He seeks an
order to direct the Respondent to implement and maintain reasonable interim
working arrangements that do not aggravate his medical condition and that are
consistent with the recommendations of his treating practitioners. The
Applicant also seeks an interdict to restrain the Respondent from requiring him
(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: No
(3) Revised
TDM 02/09/2026
____________ ______________
Signature Date
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to undergo medical testing at its instance, unless it has provided a clear and
properly motivated basis for such testing, from subjecting him to any
workplace violence, incapacity or management referrals, formal investigations
or disciplinary action that aggravates his medical condition and from engaging
in conduct that constitutes harassment, coercion or victimisation linked to his
medical condition.
[2] The Respondent filed an opposing affidavit wherein the issue of urgency was
disputed.
[3] The first issue to be decided is whether the Applicants’ case is urgent . In
deciding the issue of urgency, it is prudent to set out the chronological
sequence of events relevant to this application.
Material facts and relevant events
[4] The Applicant has been employed as the Respondent’s legal and compliance
practitioner since June 2024, and he reports to the manager of the legal and
compliance services section, Mr Michael Kabai. The Applicant had a mid- year
performance review with Mr Kabai in November 2025, which triggered several
subsequent developments, which I do not intend to set out in any detail.
[5] Relevant for purposes of this judgment is that the Applicant ’s case is that the
alleged conduct of Mr Kabai during the performance review meeting in
November 2025 had a serious impact on his mental and physical health. He
described his experience in detail in his founding affidavit.
[6] On 25 January 2026, the Applicant was injured during his weekend sport
activities, and he was booked off for a month to recover from two broken ribs .
On the Applicant’s own version, he welcomed the time off for his injury to heal,
because he could use it to recover ‘from the trauma I faced at the workplace.’
The Applicant also consulted a psychiatrist for assistance and on 2 March
2026, he was diagnosed with post -traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The
psychiatrist described his condition as a psychological injury at work because
psychiatrist described his condition as a psychological injury at work because
‘of the incident of aggression during my first performance review meeting..’
The psychiatrist booked the Applicant off for a month, being March 2026, and
his condition was to be reviewed at a follow -up consultation. The Applicant
submitted a leave application accordingly.
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[7] On 13 March 2026, the Applicant received a phone call from the Respondent’s
human resources division informing him that his sick leave and annual leave
had been exhausted and that he would be placed on unpaid leave. The
Respondent also requested a report from the Applicant’s psychiatrist on his
medical condition and required him to sign a consent form for an independent
medical assessment. The Applicant agreed to arrange for the medical report
as requested.
[8] The Applicant consulted his psychiatrist on 17 March 2026 and informed his
medical specialist about his leave issue . The psychiatrist subsequently
declared that the Applicant could resume his normal duties on 19 March 2026,
by working from home until his occupation-related stresses are addressed and
resolved by the employer as per the employee wellness report (EWS).
[9] The Applicant refused to sign the management referral form he was requested
to sign, because ‘it appears to me to be an incapacity management process,
not independent medical testing.’ On 18 March 2026 , the Applicant informed
the Respondent that he planned to return to work on 19 March 2026 and he
requested a remote working arrangement.
[10] Initially, the Applicant was booked off for the entire month of March 2026, but
after his leave days w ere exhausted, the psychiatrist confirmed that he could
resume his normal duties on 19 March 2026. On 18 March 2026, the
Respondent’s Ms Madlolo wrote a letter to the Applicant’s treating psychiatrist,
requesting clarification regarding his medical report dated 17 March 2026. She
also indicated that the Respondent required an independent medical
assessment on the Applicant’s fitness to resume work. On the same date, she
informed the Applicant not to return to work or attend to any work matters until
the aforesaid process was concluded.
[11] The Applicant has not been back at work since 18 March 2026.
[12] On 21 April 2026, the Applicant signed a consent form for an independent
[12] On 21 April 2026, the Applicant signed a consent form for an independent
medical assessment, in order to proceed with his injury on duty claim, which
the Applicant requested be reported and pursued in terms of the
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act
1. The Applicant,
1 Act 130 of 1993.
4
however, persisted with his refusal to sign the managerial referral form, as was
required by the Respondent, because his view is that it was a self -referral and
not a managerial referral, and ‘I refused to sign the managerial referral form on
the basis that it contains untrue and unfair allegations against me.’
[13] On 27 May 2026, the Applicant enquired of the Respondent when he would be
permitted to return to work, and on 2 June 2026, the Respondent replied. The
Applicant submitted that the:
‘Respondent was not scheduling the independent medical testing or
assessment that Ms Madlodlo promised to schedule in her aforementioned
email of the 21st of April 2026, neither were they keeping touch with me about
my return date, nor were they providing me with any support to establish my
well-being while knowing about my disorder or disability. From the 2 nd of June
2026 email from Ms Madlodlo, another two painfully long months went by with
no word from her on the independent medical testing or my return date.’
[14] On 27 July 2026 , the Applicant consulted his treating psychiatrist , who wrote
another medical report to the Respondent, encouraging them to allow the
Applicant to return to work, provided that he is assisted with the recommended
reasonable accommodation. Ms Madlodlo responded to the Applicant on 29
July 2026, recording that he was unwilling to sign the management referral
form, which is required for an independent medical assessment to indicate his
fitness to return to work. Ms Madlodlo further indicated that the Respondent
required an independent medical assessment to ensure workplace safety and
manage any issues pertaining to the Applicant’s fitness for work. He was once
again asked to sign the form and return it to his employer so the process could
be initiated.
[15] The Applicant responded that he had consented to an independent medical
assessment and signed the required form on 20 April 2026, and he explained
assessment and signed the required form on 20 April 2026, and he explained
that he was uncomfortable signing the managerial referral form. On 29 July
2026, he proposed that he and the Respondent’s human resources should
jointly consult Life Health to resolve the matter. The Respondent’s position, as
was communicated to the Applicant, is that the management referral form was
required for an independent medical assessment to indicate his fitness to
return to work, which the Applicant remained unwilling to sign. As an employer,
the Respondent required an independent medical assessment to ensure
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workplace safety and manage issues pertaining to the Applicant’s fitness for
work. He was once again requested to sign the form on 29 July 2026.
[16] The Respondent subsequently informed the Applicant on 29 July 2026 that
they had initiated an investigation into the Applicant's conduct in response to
his complaints or concerns. The investigation pertained to his refusal to be
subjected to an independent medical review, his allegations about bullying,
sick leave and medical documentation and his experience and qualifications.
The investigation was explained as a fact -finding procedure to gather relevant
information and to determine the facts of the matter. The Applicant was
informed of his right to reply to the allegations , attend an investigation, and
share his version of events. T he investigation was expected to be completed
by 11 August 2026. Once it was concluded, the Applicant would be notified of
the findings, and if it was found that there wa s a case to answer, the Applicant
would be invited to attend a formal disciplinary inquiry.
[17] On 31 July 2026, the Applicant responded to the aforesaid correspondence,
and he proposed an amicable settlement of the dispute, rather than a formal
investigation and disciplinary measures. He nonetheless provided his
preliminary responses to the allegations. In the letter of 31 July 2026, the
Applicant stated that he did not realise that his refusal to sign the managerial
referral form would prevent the independent medical review. His refusal to sign
was based on his own interpretation of the manage rial referral form’s intended
purpose. He , however, agreed to sign the form for the independent medical
review to be scheduled.
[18] On 3 August 2026, the Applicant wrote a letter to the Respondent, indicating ,
inter alia, that he had revoked all consents he had provided, and that he had
referred an unfair discrimination and harassment dispute to the C ommission
referred an unfair discrimination and harassment dispute to the C ommission
for Conciliation, Mediation and A rbitration (CCMA) under section 10 of the
Employment Equity Act
2 (EEA). H e proposed an amicable resolution of the
dispute. The Applicant proposed that the Respondent should consider either
ending or pending the attempts to compel him to undergo psychiatric medical
testing under the guise of poor performance and workplace safety, the
2 Act 55 of 1998, as amended.
6
‘retaliatory investigations and threats of disciplinary action’ pending the
resolution of his dispute referred to the CCMA or the Labour Court.
[19] The Respondent replied on 3 August 2026 to the effect that the investigation
would proceed and that the outcome thereof would be communicated to the
Applicant.
[20] On 11 August 2026, the Applicant received an email from the Respondent’s
investigator, informing him that an online meeting had been requested for 14
August 2026 to discuss the allegations. The Applicant accepted the invitation,
and he attended the investigation meeting from 9:15 am – 12:00 pm on 14
August 2026. He was questioned about the grievance he had reported against
his manager and asked to submit copies of all his qualifications and consent to
their verification. On 17 August 2026, the Applicant consented to the
verification of his qualifications.
[21] On 12 August 2026, the CCMA set the matter down for conciliation on 31
August 2026.
[22] The Applicant brought this urgent application on 18 August 2026, which was
enrolled for hearing on 26 August 2026. He explained that u pon receipt of the
correspondence from the Respondent about the investigation, h is health
collapsed and that he suffered a severe anxiety attack. He stated that, in this
state of medical distress, he succumbed to pressure from the Respondent and
on 31 July 2026, he had signed the managerial referral form and consented to
the Respondent’s requests ‘in a bid to resolve the disputes and to end my
trauma.’ He also requested an amicable resolution of the matter by calling for
a mediation to be scheduled with his manager and he enclosed a grievance
form. The Applicant stated that he believed that ‘the Respondent decided to
change their strategy from an incapacity related disciplinary action to a
misconduct disciplinary action.’
Applicable legal principles: Urgency
[23] Rule 38 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings i n the Labour Court
[23] Rule 38 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings i n the Labour Court
provides for urgent applications. An applicant who approaches the court on an
urgent basis essentially seeks indulgence and preference. Central to a
determination of whether a matter is urgent is whether the applicant has, in the
7
founding affidavit, set forth explicitly the circumstances which render the
matter urgent, and why substantial relief cannot be attained at a hearing in due
course. Thus, it is required of an applicant to adequately set out in his or her
founding affidavit the reasons for urgency, and to give cogent reasons why
urgent relief is necessary
3.
[24] What would an applicant who seeks to make out a case of urgency then have
to show? In Mojaki v Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipalit y and
others
4 the court referred with approval to the following dictum from East Rock
Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and others5:
‘An applicant has to set forth explicitly the circumstances which he
avers render the matter urgent. More importantly, the applicant must state the
reasons why he claims that he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a
hearing in due course. The question of whether a matter is sufficiently urgent
to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application is underpinned by the issue
of absence of substantial redress in an application in due course. The
rules allow the court to come to the assistance of a litigant because if the latter
were to wait for the normal course laid down by the rules it will not obtain
substantial redress.'
[25] In all instances where urgency is alleged, the applicant must satisfy the court
that indeed the application is urgent. In Vermaak v Taung Local Municipality 6
this Court has held that:
‘The consideration of the first requirement being why is the relief necessary
today and not tomorrow, requires a court to be placed in a position where the
court must appreciate that if it does not issue a relief as a matter of urgency,
something is likely to happen. By way of an example if the court were not to
issue an injunction, some unlawful act is likely to happen at a particular stage
and at a particular date.’
[26] The principles around urgency have been developed and considered by the
[26] The principles around urgency have been developed and considered by the
courts, and on numerous occasions the courts have made it clear that self -
created urgency is not to be entertained by an urgent Court.
3Transport and Allied Workers Union of SA vs Algoa Bus Company (Pty) Ltd (2015) 36 ILJ 2148 (LC).
4 (2015) 36 ILJ 1331 (LC) at para 17.
5 [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) at para 6.
6 (JR315/13) [2013] ZALCJHB 43 (12 March 2013) at para 12.
8
[27] In considering the previous Rule 87, the Court in Jiba v Minister: Department of
Justice and Constitutional Development and others8 held that:
‘Rule 8 of the rules of this court requires a party seeking urgent relief to set out
the reasons for urgency, and why urgent relief is necessary. It is trite law that
there are degrees of urgency, and the degree to which the ordinarily
applicable rules should be relaxed is dependent on the degree of urgency. It is
equally trite that an applicant is not entitled to rely on urgency that is self -
created when seeking a deviation from the rules.'
[28] In National Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others v Bumatech Calcium
Aluminates9 the Court held that:
‘Urgency must not be self -created by an applicant, as a consequence of the
applicant not having brought the application at the first available opportunity.
In other words, the more immediate the reaction by the litigant to remedy the
situation by way of instituting litigation, the better it is for establishing urgency.
But the longer it takes from the date of the event giving rise to the
proceedings, the more urgency is diminished. In short, the applicant must
come to court immediately, or risk failing on urgency. In Collins t/a Waterkloof
Farm v Bernickow NO & another the court held that:
“if the applicants seeks this court to come to its assistance it must come to
the court at the very first opportunity, it cannot stand back and do nothing and
some days later seek the court's assistance as a matter of urgency.” ’
[29] In Soobedar and another v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
and another 10 the Court restated the principles applicable to urgent
applications and held that:
‘The principles applicable to urgency are trite as can be gleaned from various
decisions of this and other courts. An applicant that approaches the court on
an urgent basis essentially seeks an indulgence, and to be afforded
an urgent basis essentially seeks an indulgence, and to be afforded
preference in order to prevent prejudice and harm that may materialise or
persist, if the conduct complained of continues. Central to a determination of
whether a matter is urgent is whether the applicant has in the founding
7 Repealed and replaced with the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Labour
Court. Published 3 May 2024 (GN 50608). Effective 17 July 2024.
8 (2010) 31 ILJ 112 (LC) at para 18.
9 (2016) 37 ILJ 2862 (LC) at para 26.
10 (2021) 42 ILJ 1761 (LC) at paras 19 and 20.
9
affidavit set forth explicitly the circumstances which render the matter urgent,
and the reason why substantial relief cannot be attained at a hearing in due
course.
It is trite that urgent relief will not be granted in circumstances where it is
apparent that the urgency claimed is self -created. Self -created urgency is
apparent in circumstances where an applicant failed to bring the application at
the first available opportunity. Thus, it is expected of litigants to react
immediately to remedy or prevent harm and/or prejudice, rather than standing
back and doing nothing until it is too late.’
[30] In Sihlali and others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and
another11(Shihlali) the Court dealt with an urgent application to interdict and
restrain the city from taking further steps in recruiting, interviewing and
appointing candidates to the advertised posts, pending the final determination
of another dispute between the parties. The Court held that although it has the
power to enforce the terms of employment contracts, it is not empowered to
prevent the conclusion of private employment contracts , nor to interdict a
process that might lead to the conclusion of an employment contract. It was
held that:
‘That being the case, how does advertising positions, as routinely done out of
necessity, thwart their expectations is beyond me. There is what is termed
self- created urgency. The situation herein is a classic case of such. By the
time the advertisements arose, the applicants had a gripe already, which gripe
they expressed in no uncertain terms to the mayor on 8 November 2016. The
applicants should have, if there was any urgency, approached this court then.
Why they did not do so, is not explained. Instead, what is apparent is that they
sat back, took their time until they obtained a legal opinion after almost three
months.’
Analysis
[31] Emanating from the provisions of Rule 3 8 and the principles set out in the
Analysis
[31] Emanating from the provisions of Rule 3 8 and the principles set out in the
authorities referred to, it is evident that urgency is not there for taking, and an
applicant seeking urgent relief must adequately and in detail set out the
reasons why the matter before the court should be treated with urgency.
11 (2017) 38 ILJ 1692 (LC) at para 21.
10
[32] The reasons proffered for urgency must be considered with due consideration
of the r espondent’s challenge to urgency. For any argument of urgency to be
sustained, the applicant must have acted with due haste upon gaining
knowledge of the respondent's prejudicial behaviour or actions, as i t is trite
that an applicant is not entitled to rely on a self-created urgency.
[33] The Applicant submitted that the matter is urgent because he faces a real risk
of serious harm to his health and thus to his life, arising from the Respondent’s
recent initiation of a formal investigation. His case is that the investigation is
calculated to aggravate his medical condition and to find a reason to dismiss
him, on account of his refusal to be subjected to incapacity hearings and
unlawful medical testing.
[34] The Applicant stated that the relief he seeks is necessary to protect him from
‘severe psychological and physical distress, pending the final determination of
the main dispute by the appropriate statutory dispute resolution forum.’ His
case is that effective substantive relief cannot be obtained in due course
through the ordinary processes because, unless this Court intervenes, there is
a material risk of harm to his health and well-being.
[35] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant failed to establish that this
matter is urgent or that substantial redress cannot be obtained in due course.
The Respondent’s case is that the dispute dates to 17 March 2026, when the
Applicant received a referral form requiring his consent to undergo an
independent medical assessment to determine how the Respondent could
support and accommodate him. The Respondent’s concerns were not found to
be based on an intention to discipline or victimise the Applicant but, arose from
the medical information that was made available to it and the Applicant’s
prolonged absence from work. The Respondent submitted that it considered it
necessary to establish, objectively and independently, whether the Applicant
necessary to establish, objectively and independently, whether the Applicant
was fit to resume his duties and whether there were any restrictions or
accommodation which ought to be considered or implemented.
[36] The Applicant refused back then and he therefore knew, by no later than 17
March 2026, of the alleged conduct he now relies upon as constituting an
urgent infringement of his rights. The Applicant was already advised on 18
March 2026 not to return to work, pending the completion of the said process.
11
The Applicant was requested to sign the relevant referral documentation for an
independent assessment in April 2026. The Applicant subsequently signed the
relevant managerial referral documentation at the end of July 2026, but shortly
thereafter he had revoked the consent he had furnished.
[37] The Respondent ’s case is that it was made clear that the independent
assessment is not a punitive measure or a means to victimi se or discriminate
against the Applicant, but it is an objective employment -related assessment
intended to establish the Applicant’s fitness for duty and the measures
reasonably required to facilitate his return to work.
[38] The Applicant has been paid his full remuneration for the entire period that he
had not been at work.
[39] Applying the above principles relating to urgency to the facts of this matter, I
cannot but find that the application cannot be entertained on an urgent basis
as any urgency that may exist, is self-created. I say so for the following
reasons:
[40] The facts placed before me show that there has been an inordinate delay on
the part of the Applicant in the bringing of this application, which is destructive
of any consideration of urgency.
[41] The Applicant has been aware since March or April 2026 that the Respondent
required an independent medical assessment to be conducted, and on his
own version, he consented to that. April 2026 was the very first opportunity for
the Applicant to come to Court to seek its assistance in relation to the relief he
now seeks, but he failed to do so. He also failed to provide an explanation as
to why he did not approach this Court at the earliest and first opportunity to do
so but, instead waited and did nothing since April 2026 to interdict an
independent medical assessment process, which he was very well aware of
and which he alleges before this Court, would prejudice him and constitute
discrimination and victimisation . The applicable authorities referred to supra
discrimination and victimisation . The applicable authorities referred to supra
confirmed that an applicant cannot s it back and do nothing, only to later seek
the court's assistance as a matter of urgency.
[42] An applicant that is well aware of the harm he or she alleges to suffer , who
takes no steps over a protracted period of time, and then launches an urgent
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application, is likely to have his or her application struck from the urgent rol l.
Thus, to the extent that an applicant wishes its matter to be accorded urgency,
in the same token it is expected of such an applicant to have acted with the
same urgency that the matter deserves, failing which the invariable conclusion
to be reached is that any urgency claimed is self-created.
[43] In casu , and apart from the medical assessment issue, the Applicant was
aware, as of 29 July 2026, of the investigation he now seeks to interdict. He
was invited to participate in the investigation on 11 August 2026, and he
indeed participated on 14 August 2026, providing his response to the issues
under investigation. I n his own account , he actively participated in the
investigation by answering phone calls, responding to emails , and answering
questions during a three-hour-long investigation meeting on 14 August 2026.
The horse has bolted with respect to the investigation by the time he filed this
urgent application to interdict it.
[44] In National Treasury and others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and
others
12 (OUTA), the Constitutional Court held that:
‘Under the Setlogelo test, the prima facie right a claimant must establish is not
merely the right to approach a court in order to review an administrative
decision. It is a right to which, if not protected by an interdict, irreparable harm
would ensue. An interdict is meant to prevent future conduct and not decisions
already made. Quite apart from the right to review and to set aside impugned
decisions, the applicants should have demonstrated a prima facie right that is
threatened by an impending or imminent irreparable harm.’
[45] I n OUTA, the Constitutional Court made it clear that an interdict is meant to
prevent future conduct . This principle has also been confirmed in United
Democratic Movement and Another v Lebashe Investment Group (Pty) Ltd and
Others13, where the Constitutional Court held that:
Others13, where the Constitutional Court held that:
‘In granting an interdict, the court must exercise its discretion judicially upon a
consideration of all the facts and circumstances. An interdict is “not a remedy
for the past invasion of rights: it is concerned with the present and future”. The
past invasion should be addressed by an action for damages. An interdict is
appropriate only when future injury is feared.’
12 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at para 50.
13 2023 (1) SA 353 (CC) at para 48.
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[46] Put differently: an interdict is appropriate only when future injury is feared. This
means that when the wrongful act giving rise to the injury has already
occurred, either it must be of a continuing nature or there must be a
reasonable apprehension that it will be repeated. 14 If the injury is one that
‘occurred once and for all and is finished and done with’, then the applicant
should allege facts justifying a reasonable apprehension that the harm is likely
to be repeated.15
[47] In casu, the Applicant seeks an order to interdict and restrain the Respondent
from conducting an investigation, which had already been conducted and of
which there is no likelihood that it would be repeated. The reality is that it
would serve no purpose to interdict an investigation that has already
happened – as the Constitutional Court has confirmed: an interdict is not a
remedy for the past invasion of rights.
[48] This application is a prime example of self -created urgency. It took months to
bring this application, and the Applicant offered no explanation as to why he
did not institute urgent legal proceedings immediately after becoming aware of
the issues, or why he did not bring an application at the very first opportunity.
[49] It is not sufficient for a party when approaching a court on an urgent basis to
adopt the approach that it is of right entitled to preferential treatment failing
which it would suffer prejudice in the event that its urgent application is not
granted. A party needs to demonstrate that it had also, in asserting its rights,
acted diligently and with the urgency that the matter it seeks to pursue
requires. The Applicant failed dismally in this regard.
[50] In essence, the Applicant waited too long to bring this application and by the
time he had approached this Court for relief, it became a matter of self -created
urgency. Even if there is urgency, such urgency is self -created. This Court
does not entertain self -created urgency and for this reason alone, the
does not entertain self -created urgency and for this reason alone, the
application falls to be struck from the roll.
[51] The Applicant must set forth explicitly the circumstances which render the
matter urgent, which he failed to do. He must also set out the reason why
14 A C Cilliers, C Loots et al, Herbstein & Van Winsen: Civil Practice of the High Courts and the
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa 5th ed, Juta, at p 1465.
15 Performing Right Society Ltd v Berman and Another 1966 (2) SA 355 (R) at 357 – 358.
14
substantial relief cannot be attained at a hearing in due course. This is the
second aspect where the Applicant has difficulty.
[52] The Applicant elected to invoke the statutory dispute resolution mechanism
under the EEA and referred his dispute to the CCMA on 3 August 2026. By 12
August 2026 the CCMA had already accepted the referral and enrolled the
matter for conciliation on 31 August 2026. This i ndicates that the Applicant is
not facing an indefinite or inordinate delay in obtaining redress through the
prescribed statutory process.
[53] The Applicant filed this urgent application more than two weeks after he had
referred his dispute to the CCMA and after he had obtained a date for
conciliation. He provided no explanation as to why he could not wait for the
outcome of the imminent conciliation process, alternatively why the process he
elected to institute would not afford him substantial redress.
[54] The Applicant cannot create urgency by approaching this Court days before
the statutory process he initiated has been set down for conciliation, without
clearly demonstrating that waiting for the scheduled conciliation date would
result in harm which cannot be adequately addressed through the ordinary
statutory remedies available to him.
Costs
[55] The last issue to be decided is costs. This Court has wide discretion in respect
of costs, having regard to the requirements of law and fairness. Mr Dzimba for
the Respondent did not seek a cost order against the Applicant, and correctly
so. I can see no reason to award costs in this matter.
[56] In the premises, the following order is made:
15
Order
1. The application is struck off the roll for lack of urgency;
2. There is no order as to costs.
_______________________
C. Prinsloo
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
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Appearances:
For the Applicant: In person
For the Respondent: Advocate Q M Dzimba
Instructed by: Enderstein Mulumbete Inc Attorneys