IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case No: 2026-169267
In the matter between:
PUBLIC SERVANTS’ ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA Applicant
and
REGISTRAR OF LABOUR RELATIONS First Respondent
MINISTER OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR Second Respondent
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR Third Respondent
Heard: 11 August 2026
Judgment Delivered: 24 August 2026 (By uploading on CaseLines and/or
circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email)
JUDGMENT
WHITCHER J
Introduction
[1] This is an application by the applicant ( the ‘PSA’) for interim interdictory relief
against the first respondent ( the ‘Registrar’). The application has been brought
on an urgent basis. The application is opposed by the Registrar.
[2] In essence, the PSA seeks an interim interdict to stay the operation of a Notice
of Intention to cancel the registration of the PSA as a trade union published on
(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: No
___________ 24 August 2026
Signature Date
2
29 June 2026 in terms of section 106(2B) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.
The PSA seeks to interdict the Registrar from acting in terms of and/or
enforcing the Notice pending the final determination of an Appeal it filed on 7
July 2026 against the Decision of the Registrar made on 23 June 2026 to
refuse to approve, certify, and register amendments to the PSA’s constitution in
terms of section 101(3)(a) of the LRA.
Trade Unions: the statutory framework
[3] Section 95 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (the ‘LRA’) regulates the
‘Requirements for registration of trade unions and employers’ organisations’.
[4] Section 95(5) lists mandatory provisions that must be included in the
constitution of any trade union applying for registration under the LRA.
[5] Section 95(7) provides that the Registrar must not register a trade union unless
the Registrar is satisfied that the applicant is a genuine trade union.
[6] Section 101(3) provides that the Registrar must register the changed or new
constitution if it meets the requirements for registration.
[7] Sections 98, 99 and 100 concern the duty of registered trade unions to maintain
audited accounting (financial) records , records of its members and elected
office-bearers and to provide same to the Registrar within stipulated time
periods every year.
[8] Section 106(2A) provides that the Registrar may cancel the registration of a
trade union if the Registrar (a) is satisfied that the trade union is not, or has
ceased to function as, a genuine trade union; or (b) has issued a written notice
requiring the trade union to comply with sections 98, 99 and 100 within 60 days
of the notice and the trade union has, despite the notice, not complied with
those sections.
[9] Section 106(2B) provides that the Registrar may not act in terms of section
106(2A) unless the Registrar has published a notice in the Government Gazette
at least 60 days prior to such action giving notice of the Registrar’s intention to
at least 60 days prior to such action giving notice of the Registrar’s intention to
cancel the registration of the trade union and inviting the trade union or any
interested parties to make written representation as to why the registration
should not be cancelled.
3
[10] Section 106(3) provides that when a trade union’s registration is cancelled, all
the rights it enjoyed as a result of being registered will end.
[11] Section 111(5) provides that an appeal from any decision of the R egistrar does
not suspend the operation of the Registrar’s decision.
[12] In 2018, the Minister of Labour in terms of s95(8) published Guidelines which
must be applied by the Registrar in determining whether a trade union is a
genuine trade union.
[13] The Guidelines are extensive, 22 in all, and require an obligation to consider all
relevant factors, including an analysis of the actual operation of the trade union,
its purpose (whether its principal purpose is to regulate the relations between
its members and their employers), how the constitution was drafted, the history
of the trade union, whether it is affiliated to a federation of trade unions,
whether it is under the control or influence of an employer and various other
factors.
[14] Clause 4 of the Guidelines provides that the guidelines are not concerned with
evaluating whether the constitution of a trade union complies with section 95(5).
[15] Many significant statutory rights contained in various labour statutes are only
available to registered trade unions.
Background
[16] The PSA is a registered trade union in terms of s 95 of the LRA. It has been so
registered since 1993. Further, the PSA has been incorporated as a non- profit
company (NPC) since 1942. As such, the PSA’s dual registration (both under
the LRA and the Companies Act1) has subsisted for approximately 29 years.
[17] The PSA enjoys the membership of over a quarter of a million public service
employees, it is a party to the Public Service Co- ordinating Bargaining Council
and other public bargaining councils , it is a party to collective agreements and
enjoys organisational rights in the workplaces it operates.
1 Act 61 of 1973.
4
[18] On 1 December 2021, the PSA submitted to the Registrar an amended
constitution for approval, certification and registration. The Registrar refused to
do so on the grounds of the PSA’s dual registration.
[19] In a written decision, the Registrar stated that:
‘In light of this dual registration which PSA enjoys in terms of the LRA and a
Company in terms of the Companies Act which is in direct contrary (sic) to the
provisions of the LRA, this Office will not be in a position to certify any
application for amendment/replacement of the Constitution in terms of section
101 of the LRA with this dual registration under the LRA and as a Company
under the Companies Act still in place.
You are hereby informed that your application for replacement of the
Constitution in terms of the LRA is refused with effect from 31 March 2022.’
[20] On 31 May 2022, the Registrar furnished further written reasons for rejecting
the amended constitution, premised essentially on the fact that the PSA’s past
annual financial statements were audited in compliance with the Companies
Act; this, as will be demonstrated, in the absence of any notice s in the past or
at the time in terms of section 106(2A)(b).
[21] The PSA subsequently launched an appeal against the entire decision of the
Registrar to this Court in terms of Section 111(3) of the LRA . The appeal was
upheld, but the Registrar launched an appeal against that judgment , providing
then further reasons for his decision, which the LAC found permissible.
[22] The Labour Appeal Court2 stated:
[7] The decision of the Registrar was predicated on the basis that the respondent
was operating in terms of a Memorandum of Incorporation of a company. He
concluded that the amended constitution did not meet the requirements of s95(5) of
the LRA. Furthermore, the Registrar was of the opinion that since the respondent is
also a registered non-profit company in terms of the Companies Act, it was not a
also a registered non-profit company in terms of the Companies Act, it was not a
genuine trade union as envisaged in s.97(1) of the LRA and was not independent
because it operated by means of a Memorandum of Incorporation of the company.
He opined that in view of its dual registration as both a company and a trade union
2Department of Employment and Labour Relations v Public Servants’ Association of South
Africa JA12/25.
5
this dual registration was contrary to the provisions of the LRA. Its audited financial
statements for the year ended on 31 March 2021 were submitted in terms of the
Companies Act. He accordingly refused to replace the constitution.
…
[31] The real issue in the appeal was whether the Registrar was entitled to refuse the
replacement of the constitution of the respondent. If regard is had to the amended
constitution submitted by the respondent for registration it does not align itself with
the provisions of s 95 of the LRA.3 The Registrar is empowered to refuse to register a
constitution which does not comply with the provisions of s95.
[32] In my view, one need not even go to the question of whether the respondent is a
genuine or independent trade union because what was before the Registrar was a
request for the replacement of the existing constitution of the respondent. The
Registrar had already decided the genuineness and/or independence when the
respondent was registered as such in 1993. In my opinion the submitted document,
referred to by the respondent as the ‘statute’…is not a constitution of a trade union. It
is the statute of the NPC.
Clause 3 thereof defines the document to mean the consti tution of the PSA as
provided for in terms of the Act and the Memoran dum of Incorporation as provided
for in the Companies Act.
…
[34] The contention by the respondent overlooks the fact that a company is a
separate entity from a trade union. A trade union is an association of employees
whose principal purpose is to regulate relations between employees and employers,
including any employers’ organisations. Therefore, the contention is at odds with the
provisions of s.95. In terms of the statute the activities of the NPC will be manage by
a board of directors of a company who owe a fiduciary duty to the company. The
respondent failed to submit audited financial statements of a trade union in terms of
ss96(1)(b) and 98 of the LRA.
ss96(1)(b) and 98 of the LRA.
[35] It is manifest from the [constitution] submitted by the respondent for approval by
the Registrar that it belongs to a company not to a trade union for the following
reasons: …
3 Section 95(5) lists inter alia the mandatory provisions that must be included in the constitution of any
trade union applying for registration under the LRA.
6
[23] After the judgment, the PSA wrote to the Registrar advising him that the PSA
has taken note of the judgment and is in the process of amending its
constitution accordingly. Significantly, the PSA stated therein that the PSA is
willing to engage constructively with the Registrar in relation to the amended
constitution.
[24] Pursuant to the above, on 15 May 2026 the PSA submitted an amended
constitution to the Registrar for approval and registration. According to the PSA,
in amending the constitution, it took account of the reasons the LAC listed for
its finding that the previous constitution did not align itself with the provisions of
s 95(5) of the LRA and sought to remedy that.
[25] The Registrar, however, again, refused to approve and register the amended
constitution.
[26] In a written decision dated 23 June 2026 (‘the Decision’) he stated:
The union was registered on the basis that it was a genuine trade union for the
purposes of section 95(7) which states that the registrar must not register a trade
union unless the registrar is satisfied that the union is a genuine trade union. As per
section 95(2) of the LRA, a trade union is independent if it is not under the direct or
indirect control of any employer or employer’s organisation and it is free of any
interference or influence of any kind from any employer or employer’s organisation.
The trade union is controlled by the Board of Directors under the Companies Act, as
amended.
[27] The Decision was not coupled with any indication as to why the proposed
amendments are deficient in terms of s95(5) . The sole basis for the Decision
was, once again, an alleged non- independence and non- genuineness of the
PSA.
[28] On 29 June 2026, that is shortly after the above decision, the Registrar issued
in the Government Gazette (Regulation Gazette 732 No. 54911, R.7626) a
Notice of Intention to cancel the registration of the PSA as a trade union,
recording therein the following reasons for the notice: [set out verbatim]:
recording therein the following reasons for the notice: [set out verbatim]:
The organization is not a genuine trade union as envisaged in the LRA.
The organisation cannot function in terms of a constitution as per the LRA.
7
The organisation failed to comply with the provisions of section 98, 99 and 100 of the
LRA.
[29] The Notice, as required, stated that PSA and all interested parties are invited to
make written representation as to why the registration of the PSA should not be
cancelled and that any representations must be lodged within 60 days of the
date of the notice.
[30] A copy of the Notice was not sent directly to the PSA. It was left to the PSA to
happen upon it in the Gazette.
[31] Following the Notice, the PSA sent written communiques to the Registrar,
essentially asking for further written particulars for the Registrar’s Decision and
Notice, advising the Registrar that these would assist the union in considering
remedial measures, and that it is committed to constructive engagement with
the Registrar on the issues.
[32] There was written response to these communications.
[33] On 7 July 2026, the PSA filed an Appeal in terms of s111(3) of the LRA against
the whole of the Decision of the Registrar issued on 23 June 2026.
[34] In broad summary, the PSA’s submissions on appeal are:
(i) As is evident from the Registrar’s decision (23 June 2026), he
disqualified the PSA from registering its amended constitution on his
view that the PSA is not a genuine trade union.
(ii) The Registrar erred in regarding as relevant whether the PSA is an
independent and genuine trade union in circumstances where the LAC
4
had already determined that issue in paragraph [32] of the judgment
(supra). In summary, it was the finding of the LAC that a decision to
refuse to register the PSA’s constitution had to be made upon a
consideration of the provisions of the constitution in terms of s95(5) . An
alleged non- genuineness or non- independence of the PSA does not
feature – it is an irrelevant consideration - because this had already been
4Department of Employment and Labour Relations v Public Servants’ Association of South
Africa JA12/25 (FA: Annexure FA10 p.002-83 to 101).
8
established when the PSA was initially granted registration as a trade
union in the first place.
(iii) The registrar erred in its consideration of whether the PSA is
independent and genuine trade union, by not examining the actual
operation of the PSA , the manner in which the PSA was formed and
section 95(2) of the LRA, read with the Guidelines issued in terms of
s95(8) of the LRA by the Minister of Employment and Labour. A failure to
have applied the dictates of the Guidelines in considering the PSA’s
genuineness as a trade union is fatal to the enquiry.
(iv) The Registrar erred in failing to afford the PSA the benefit of a hearing in
considering its independence and genuineness as set out in section
95(2) of the LRA, read with the Guidelines (supra).
Preliminary points raised by the Registrar
Locus standi
[35] The Registrar contended that the deponent to the founding affidavit has no
locus standi and no authority to bring these proceedings and to depose to a
founding affidavit because he is not an elected office- bearer of a trade union.
He is the General Manager of the NPC (supra), employed under a contract of
employment. This application is brought by a company manager in the name of
a trade union that does not, in substance, exist as a genuine trade union under
the LRA.
[36] The PSA also has no locus standi because it is not a genuine trade union within
the meaning of section 213 of the LRA , and therefore it cannot claim the rights,
protections and remedies that the LRA confers on genuine trade unions,
including the right to bring this application and to interdict the Registrar's
statutory processes.
[37] The LAC’s statement in paragraph [32] regarding the genuineness of the PSA
and its relevance in deciding whether to register a constitution is obiter and
does not preclude him from still considering genuineness of the PSA in the
separate and distinct context of a section 106 cancellation process.
9
[38] The locus standi points are rejected. The party bringing this urgent application
is the PSA – the PSA is the applicant - and the application is about alleged
infringements of its rights under the LRA and its right to protect same.
[39] The SCA in Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Rattan NO 5
reiterated:
The logical starting point is locus standi – whether in the circumstances the plaintiff
had an interest in the relief claimed, which entitled it to bring the action. Generally,
the requirements for locus standi are these. The plaintiff must have an adequate
interest in the subject matter of the litigation, usually described as a direct interest in
the relief sought; the interest must not be too remote; the interest must be actual, not
abstract or academic; and it must be a current interest and not a hypothetical
one. The duty to allege and prove locus standi rests on the party instituting the
proceedings. The rule that only a person who has a direct interest in the relief sought
can claim a remedy, is no more clearly expressed than in the judgment of Innes CJ
in Dalrymple:
The general rule of our law is that no man can sue in respect of a wrongful
act, unless it constitutes a breach of a duty owed to him by the wrongdoer, or
unless it causes him some damage in law.’
[40] In the broad sense, locus standi asks the following question: "Does this
applicant have a sufficient legal interest or right affected by the dispute to ask
the court for relief?" It focuses on the connection between the actual litigant and
the dispute in the case.
[41] The authority point is also rejected; and is petty. There is no rule that requires
affidavits delivered on behalf of an applicant to be deposed to by its office
bearers. All that is relevant is whether the deponent has personal knowledge of
the facts to which they attest. Nor is a deponent required to be authorised to
give evidence.
[42] The Supreme Court of Appeal held in Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia
Ltd
6 that:
[42] The Supreme Court of Appeal held in Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia
Ltd
6 that:
5 2019 (3) SA 451 (SCA).
6 2004 (3) SA 615 (SCA).
10
The deponent to an affidavit in motion proceedings need not be authorised by the
party concerned to depose to the affidavit. It is the institution of the proceedings and
the prosecution thereof which must be authorised.…. In any event, rule 7 provides a
procedure to be followed by a respondent who wishes to challenge the authority of
an attorney who instituted motion proceedings on behalf of an applicant. The
appellants did not avail themselves of the procedure so provided.
Urgency
[43] The Registrar’s claim of self-created urgency is also rejected. On the evidence,
the PSA did not unduly delay in bringing this application. It attempted to resolve
the dispute with the Registrar before launching this application, and the direct
issue in this matter did not arise in March 2022, as claimed by the Registrar.
The matter is about his decision made on 23 June 2026.
Premature application and no right to interdict the exercise of his statutory powers
[44] The Registrar contended that the application stands to be struck from the roll
because it has been brought when no final decision under the s 106(2B)
process has been made. The process is not a foregone conclusion.
Representations may persuade the Registrar that cancellation is not warranted.
A court is required to be slow to interdict the exercise of statutory powers ,
particularly at a pre- decision stage. If an adverse decision is ultimately made,
the applicant has adequate remedies. Section 113(3) of the LRA provides a
right of appeal to this Court. The Applicant may, in conjunction with such an
appeal, apply for a stay of the cancellation pending the determination of the
appeal. In NEWU v CCMA and Others
7, this Court confirmed that a deregistered
trade union is entitled to approach the court to have the decision to deregister it stayed
pending the outcome of the appeal against the decision of the registrar.
[45] These last points are tied up in the merits of the application and will be
addressed there.
addressed there.
The relief sought and the applicable test
[46] As indicated, the PSA seeks an interim interdict to suspend the operation of the
Notice of Intention to cancel the registration of the PSA as a trade union. The
7 [2011] 2 BLLR 180 (LC) at para [12].
11
PSA seeks to interdict the Registrar from acting in terms of and/or enforcing the
Notice pending the final determination of the Appeal it lodged against the
Decision of the Registrar made on 23 June 2026 to refuse to approve, certify,
and register amendments to the PSA’s constitution in terms of section 101(3)(a)
of the LRA.
[47] The requirements for an interim interdict are well settled. The applicant must
show a right, clear or prima facie though open to some doubt; a well -grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the interdict is refused and the final relief is
later granted; that the balance of convenience favours the interdict; and the
absence of another satisfactory remedy (see Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD
221 at 227, and Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W) as qualified in Gool v
Minister of Justice 1955 (2) SA 682 (C)).
[48] In terms of Economic Freedom Fighters v Gordhan and Others; Public
Protector and Another v Gordhan and Others 2020 (6) SA 325 (CC), the
interdict may properly be granted only where the court is convinced that the
appeal is likely to succeed. In Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River
Development Association (Pty) Ltd and Others 2023 (5) BCLR 527 (CC) t he
majority judgment referred to a viable review [appeal].
[49] In Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd
and Others 2023 (5) BCLR 527 (CC) t he majority judgment referring to the
holding in National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance
and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) ( OUTA) below, held that an application for
interim relief may be decided on some separate consideration of violated rights
unrelated to the claim for final relief.
[50] In OUTA it was stated:
“[T]he prima fac ie right a claimant must establish is not merely the right to approach a
court in order to review an administrative decision. It is a right to which, if not
protected by an interdict, irreparable harm would ensue. An interdict is meant to
protected by an interdict, irreparable harm would ensue. An interdict is meant to
prevent future conduct and not decisions already made. Quite apart from the right to
review and to set aside impugned decisions, the applicants should have
12
demonstrated a prima facie right that is threatened by an impending or imminent
irreparable harm.”8
[51] According to OUTA, a court must also keep in mind that a temporary restraint
against the exercise of statutory power well ahead of the final adjudication of a
claimant’s case may be granted only in the clearest of cases. 9 The majority
judgment in Eskom, held that this factor must apply on a sliding scale. The
more policy laden or polycentric the decision, the more the role this factor must
play in influencing the court’s determination. The lesser the policy-ladenness or
polycentricity, the lesser the influence of this factor . The ultimate question is:
what is the outcome dictated by the balancing exercise? The nature of rights
violations at issue is an important consideration in the balancing exercise.
Is the PSA a genuine trade union?
The Registrar’s submissions
[52] The Registrar contends that the PSA is an NPC and not a trade union. It is
managed and controlled by the Board of Directors of the NPC. Only a trade
union can be regarded as an association of employees formed with the sole
purpose of regulating relations between its members and employers, not a
company. The Constitution of the trade union entity within the PSA is drafted
and adopted by the Board of Directors of the Company. The company director
posing as office-bearers of the trade union. In short, the drafting and adoption
of the constitution including the election of the office bearers is not conducted in
terms of the provisions of the LRA. The Board of Directors of the company are
regarded as the office- bearers of the trade union. An entity that is incorporated
as an NPC, governed by a Board of Directors, managed by an employed
General Manager, reporting under the Companies Act, and amending its
constitution through company-law resolutions, is not a genuine trade union.
[53] The above affairs, demonstrates, and “confirms [his] view” that the PSA is not a
genuine trade union.
The PSA’s submissions
genuine trade union.
The PSA’s submissions
8 OUTA above n Error! Bookmark not defined. at para 50.
9 Ibid.
13
[54] The Registrar focuses exclusively on the dual registration of the PSA , whilst
disregarding other relevant facts on which he has never engaged the PSA.
[55] There is no provision of the LRA which implies that a trade union cannot hold
dual registration as a non- profit company . The PSA has operated in this
manner for decades and was registered by the Registrar’s office in expressly
this form.
[56] The use of the descriptor “statute’ has historically been no more than a label.
[57] The ‘directors’ of the PSA are democratically elected and are proper office
bearers. The PSA hold s an annual congress in September each year. A
national congress is held biennially. Prior to every congress, the PSA’s
branches are issued with a circular calling for them to nominate candidates for
election. Nominated candidates are vetted, following which a list of nominees is
issued to the PSA’s branches via a further circular. Each of the PSA’s branches
who attend at congress are thereafter issued with ballots in respect of voting for
candidates who are nominated to the PSA’s board of directors. The voting
process at congress is conducted through an independent service provider, the
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy , who oversees and ensures a
free and fair vote. The s ame entity also tallies the ballots case, with the results
of the vote announced on the same day as the voting at congress.
[58] This procedure accords with a democratic process as envisaged under the
LRA. The Registrar’s primary assumption about the governance of the PSA is
consequently false.
[59] The same is as regards the PSA’s financial statements, which have been
submitted to and received by the Registrar’s office every year without demur.
The Registrar’s complaint in this regard seems to include the innocuous
reference to ‘the Companies Act’ on the face of some of the PSA’s financials,
which elevates form over substance. This is because section 98(1) of the LRA
which elevates form over substance. This is because section 98(1) of the LRA
merely requires the PSA to keep its books and records of its income,
expenditure, assets and liabilities “ to the standard of generally accepted
accounting practice, principles and procedures.”
14
[60] The manner of audit of the PSA’s books means that they are audited annually,
to the standard of the International Financial Reporting Standards, in fact a
higher standard than that required under the LRA.
[61] The Registrar has never contended or shown that the PSA’s books are not
audited to “the standard of generally accepted accounting practice, principles
and procedures”.
[62] The PSA cannot change the financial statements submitted in the past , but it
had every intention to comply with the observations made by the LAC in the
future, which statutory time-period had not come by the time of the Registrar’s
Decision and Notice.
[63] The Registrar has never sent the PSA a section 106(2A)(b) notice. His claim he
sent one in 2022, telling ly is not proved, despite the ease with which that could
have been done. Further telling, it was not claimed in response to the PSA’s
pointed correspondence before this case, nor in the previous court
proceedings. Significantly, in the interim (since 2022) , at least three sets of
financial documents were submitted to the Registrar . No contemporaneous
complaint regarding these financials was ever raised by the Registrar or notice
sent. This failure is not explained.
[64] The Guidelines clearly contemplates a consultative enquiry – a request for
information, enquiries and the like. Prior to making his Decision and issuing the
Notice, the Registrar had not requested information from or requested the PSA
to make representations to him as to the trade union’s genuineness and has
produced no evidence of any analysis conducted in terms of the Guidelines.
This is not cured by the Notice because it already assumes the non-
genuineness of the trade union.
Findings
[65] In my view the PSA is entitled to the relief it seeks.
[66] The very basis for refusing to register the amended constitution – that the PSA
is allegedly not a genuine trade union – also formed the foundation for the
is allegedly not a genuine trade union – also formed the foundation for the
Notice of Intention to deregister the PSA. The Appeal concerns this common
denominator and is thus highly critical to the dispute about the Notice.
15
[67] Given the pronouncement in the LAC judgment regarding the genuineness of
the PSA, the context in which it was stated, which was in direct response to a
ground relied upon by the Registrar in the appeal, the extensive list of factors
stipulated in the Guidelines ( supra) read with the opposing submissions about
the genuineness of the PSA, and clause 4 of the Guidelines, I am satisfied that
the PSA has demonstrated a viable case for purposes of the intended Appeal.
[68] Self-evidently, the Registrar has far -reaching statutory powers – he has the
power to cancel the registration of an old -established trade union if he is
satisfied that the trade union is not, or has ceased to function, as a genuine
trade union. Given this far-reaching power, the Registrar’s ‘satisfaction’ must be
based on all relevant facts and a rational objective basis. In the absence of any
engagement with the PSA on the matter or any communique requesting
relevant information, it is safe to say no proper analysis was conducted. The
Registrar clutched onto (and remains so clutched) on only certain aspects of
the PSA (which appear to have no sinister implications) to make a far-reaching
decision.
[69] I am also convinced that the deregistration of the PSA is inevitable, any written
representations notwithstanding.
[70] This is evident from the high- handed manner the Registrar treated the PSA
before issuing his Decision and the Notice. In issuing both, he proffered no
evidence that properly applied his mind by conducting a consultative analysis of
the scope envisaged by the Guidelines to support his scant conclusions. A
decision does not escape review merely because it is preliminary. A preliminary
administrative decision attracts the audi principle and fair dealing where it lays
the foundation for a possible decision of grave consequences.
10 The absence
of an express statutory rule of engagement may not be used strategically.
10 The absence
of an express statutory rule of engagement may not be used strategically.
[71] After the Decision and Notice, the Registrar further spurned the PSA’s requests
for further particulars to clarify same.
[72] The PSA’s submissions on the section 106(2A)(b) notices convincingly
indicates that the Registrar issued none prior to any of his decisions.
10 Van Wyk NO v Van der Merwe 1957 (1) SA 181 (A) at 188A-D.
16
[73] Finally, the Registrar has evinced a mulish determination that the PSA is not a
genuine trade, despite no evidence of a proper consultative enquiry under the
Guidelines.
[74] If there was any doubt about the Registrar’s inevitable stance, this was fortified
by his stance under oath that the PSA is to be afforded no rights at all – even
attacking its locus standi – based on his categorical view that it is not a genuine
trade union. This approach border ed on malice and is telling that the PSA will
not get a fair hearing.
[75] It goes without saying that the deregistration of the PSA will have a profound
effect on the prosecution of its Appeal. The contention that the PSA can bring
another stay application and appeal in the event it is deregistered does not
assist an efficient prosecution of the PSA’s core dispute with the Registrar. The
PSA will be forced to become embroiled in multiple applications, all ultimately
dealing with the same issues.
[76] As to the balance of convenience, there is nothing before me that suggests it
would not be in the interest of the PSA’s members to suspend the operation of
the Notice pending the outcome of the appeal. The basis for the Notice and de-
registration does not rest on the need to protect union members from
maladministration of union finances or from officials using the resources of the
union for improper purposes or chronic dysfunctional organisational structures
or the like. The R egistrar’s own interest in ensuring compliance with the LRA
will not be jeopardised if interim relief is granted. On the other hand, given the
profound effect de- registration will have on the PSA’s structures, its
organisational rights, formalised recognition agreements , pending disputes on
behalf of their members and various other rights of its substantial membership,
the value of any ultimate success it might obtain on appeal, will be worth little if
it is not granted the interim relief it seeks.
[77] In the premises, I make the following order:
[77] In the premises, I make the following order:
1. Pending the final determination of the Appeal instituted in this Court under
Case number 2026-158790:
17
1.1 The First Respondent’s Notice of Intention to Cancel the Registration of
the Applicant as a trade union published in the Government Gazette
under R7626 on 29 June 2026 is suspended.
1.2 The First Respondent is interdicted and restrained from acting in terms
of and/or enforcing the Notice.
2. The costs of this application shall be costs in the Appeal.
____________________
B Whitcher
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant: L M Malan, SC with R Bosman, instructed
by Bowman Gilfillan Inc
For the Respondents: MM Mojapelo SC, with EB Ndebele,
instructed by the State Attorney, Pretoria.