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[2026] ZAGPPHC 925
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Tshabalala v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited (20069/2013) [2026] ZAGPPHC 925 (24 August 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO.:
20069/2013
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
Date:
24 August 2026
E
van der Schyff
In
the matter between:
DANIEL
BHEKIFA
TSHABALALA
APPLICANT
and
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED
RESPONDENT
In
re:
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMITED
PLAINTIFF
and
DANIEL
BHEKIFA
TSHABALALA
DEFENDANT
Delivered:
This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. If there
is a
discrepancy between the date the judgment is signed and the date it
is uploaded to CaseLines, the date it is uploaded to CaseLines
is
deemed the date the judgment is handed down.
JUDGMENT
VAN DER SCHYFF J
Introduction
[1]
The applicant (Mr. Tshabalala or the applicant)
seeks leave to appeal against the summary judgment granted by
Prinsloo J on 10 September
2013 in favour of the Standard Bank of
South Africa (the Bank or the respondent). The application for leave
to appeal is dated
27 September 2013. It was delivered to the
respondent’s attorney of record on 30 September 2013.
Subsequent to the application
for leave to appeal having been filed,
Mr. Tshabalala participated in Rule 46 proceedings aimed at obtaining
a warrant of execution
against his primary residence. In an amended
affidavit filed in those proceedings, Mr. Tshabalala, among others,
stated that his
offer to pay the arrears within a reasonable time of
three months was rejected by the Bank, but requested the Court’s
indulgence
in granting him 120 days to settle his debt with the Bank.
This culminated in an order handed down by the Honourable Mabuse J on
14 November 2016, in terms of which the relief sought under Rule 46
was postponed
sine die
to afford Mr. Tshabalala 120 days to settle the judgment debt.
[2]
The applicant did not pursue the application for
leave to appeal. It was enrolled by the respondent and argued on 14
August 2026.
Discussion
[3]
The application for leave to appeal has no
reasonable prospects of success. The transcript of the proceedings
before Prinsloo J
records that the applicant conceded the relief
sought by the Bank, and agreed to the order sought. After the Court
specifically
asked Mr. Tshabalala’s counsel whether he agreed
to the submissions made on behalf of the Bank, counsel responded:
“That
is indeed correct”.
[4]
The application for leave to appeal does not make
out a case for setting aside, or otherwise escaping the consequences
of that consent.
It seeks, instead, to revisit matters which preceded
the agreement pursuant to which the order was granted. There is
accordingly
no reasonable prospect that another court would interfere
with the order.
[5]
The applicant’s subsequent conduct supports
this finding. Although the applicant delivered the application for
leave to appeal
shortly after the order was granted, he thereafter
participated in proceedings directed at satisfying the judgment debt.
He undertook
to settle the judgment debt within a specific period.
That conduct at least raises the question whether his right to
challenge
the order was subsequently perempted. The respondent did
not raise the issue of peremption. It is, in any event, unnecessary
to
decide the issue. The application fails because no basis has been
established for challenging the consent order.
[6]
At the hearing, the applicant further submitted
that the Bank had taken an irregular step by having the application
for leave to
appeal set down. The point is without merit. The
application for leave to appeal was the applicant’s own
application. He
took no steps to prosecute it for many years. The
Bank approached the Deputy Judge President for directions and
requested that
the pending application be enrolled because Prinsloo J
had since retired. The matter was thereafter allocated for hearing.
There
is no irregularity which precluded the Court from hearing and
determining the applicant’s own application, nor was any
prejudice
demonstrated.
[7]
There is no merit in the contention that the
applicant waited to be furnished with written reasons for the order
having been granted.
Not only was the order granted by consent, but
the transcripts of the proceedings have also been available for a
substantial period
of time.
[8]
The requirements of
section 17(1)
of the
Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013
have not been met.
ORDER
In
the result, the following order is granted:
1.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed with costs
E VAN DER SCHYFF
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
For the applicant:
Adv. PL Mphahlele
Instructed by:
MG Molefe Attorneys
For respondent:
Adv. N Loopoo
Instructed by:
Ramsay Weber
Attorneys
Date of the
hearing:
14 August 2026
Date of judgment:
24 August 2026