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[2026] ZAGPJHC 988
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China Coal No 5 Construction SA v Bakubung Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others (2024/138173) [2026] ZAGPJHC 988 (1 September 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Case
Numbers:
2024-138173
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED.
In
the matter between:
CHINA
COAL NO 5 CONSTRUCTION SA
Applicant
and
BAKUBUNG MINERALS (PTY)
LTD
First Respondent
STANLEY
LEBETHE
Second Respondent
THABO
MASIBI
Third Respondent
This
Judgment was handed down electronically and by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by way of email and
shall be
uploaded on CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be on
1
September 2026
JUDGMENT
MALI, J
Introduction
[1]
This is an application to enforce an adjudication award of
R201 039 514,18 (Two Hundred and One Million and
Thirty
Nine Thousand Five hundred and Fourteen Rand and 18 cents). The First
Respondent opposes the application and has also launched
a counter
application, in which it seeks a stay of this application pending the
final determination of a review application to
be brought at a later
stage.
The Parties
[2]
The Applicant is China Coal No 5 Construction South Africa (Pty)
Limited, a private company duly incorporated and registered
in
accordance with the company laws of the Republic of South Africa.
[3]
The First Respondent is Bakubung Minerals (Pty) Limited, a private
company duly incorporated and registered in accordance
with the
company laws of the Republic of South Africa.
[4]
The Second Respondent, Stanley Lebethe, is a major male, employed by
the First Respondent as Project Manager. He is cited
herein as the
duly appointed Project Manager of the contract described more fully
below.
[5]
The Third Respondent, Thabo Masibi, is a major male, employed by the
First Respondent as Project Manager. Notwithstanding
the Second
Respondent’s formal appointment, he has in practice performed
the role and functions of Project Manager and is
cited herein on that
basis.
[6]
For ease of understanding, the Applicant and First Respondent will at
times below be referred to, respectively, as the
Contractor and the
Employer.
The Facts
[7]
It is common cause that on 28 November 2017, the Contractor and the
Employer (“the Parties”) entered into
a contract (“the
contract”) for the mining development, engineering, and
construction of the Capital Waste Infrastructure,
Ore Reserve
Development, and Related Equipping (“the works”) of a
platinum mine to be developed on two farms south
of the Pilanesberg
Complex, known as the Bakubung Platinum Mine Project (“the
mine”).
[8]
The relevant clauses of the contract are Z4 and W1 of the NEC3 core
clauses, which govern the appointment of the adjudicator,
the
procurement and enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision,
dissatisfaction notices, arbitration, and related dispute
resolution.
Clause W1.3 (10) expressly provides that the Adjudicator’s
decision is binding on the Parties unless and until
revised by the
Tribunal (as defined in the contract) and is enforceable as a
contractual obligation between the Parties, not as
an arbitral award.
[9]
Various disputes arose between the Parties at different times during
performance. The addenda concluded between them resolved
the disputes
then extant and provided that the Parties would proceed thereafter on
the amended terms from the date of each addendum.
Notwithstanding
these interventions, fresh disputes emerged in the latter stages of
the contract period, and despite attempts to
resolve them amicably,
the Parties could not reach settlement.
[10]
In early 2024, the Contractor invoked the contract’s dispute
resolution mechanism and referred certain disputes
to Mr Francois
Spies, a duly appointed adjudicator, for adjudication. The
adjudicator duly considered the matters referred to him
and, on 18
September 2024 completed his decision however the award was delivered
on 24 October 2024 (the “award”).
[11]
The Employer refuses to comply with the Adjudicator’s award,
hence this application. In turn, the Employer has
launched a counter
application seeking a stay of these proceedings pending the outcome
of its review application of the Adjudicator’s
award.
Alternatively, if the Employer is ordered to comply with its
contractual obligations and pay the amount awarded, it seeks
an order
directing that such payment be made into an independent attorney’s
trust account rather than to the Contractor.
This is because the
Contractor may be unable to repay the amount should the Employer’s
review application succeed.
Issue
[12]
The issue to be determined is whether the adjudication award is
enforceable; if so, whether the payment should be made to the
Contractor. Furthermore, whether the Employer is entitled to the
relief sought in the counter application for the stay of the
adjudication award pending the arbitration or review.
The Contractor’s
Arguments
[13]
According to the Contractor, the adjudicator completed his decision
within the agreed timetable on 18 September 2024
but published it
only on
24
October 2024. This followed the Employer’s failure and/or
refusal to pay its share of the adjudicator’s fee within
the
agreed period, and the Contractor having to pay the Employer’s
share of the fee to have the award released. It had been
agreed with
the adjudicator that he could hold a
lien
over his decision
until full payment of his fees had been made.
[14]
It was submitted for the Contractor that the Respondent’s
non-payment amounted to a repudiation of the contract,
in breach of
the doctrine of
pacta sunt servanda
, which requires strict
adherence to agreed terms.
[15]
The Contractor’s argument against the counterapplication is
that the Employer has been raising the issue of review
since 2024 but
has not taken steps to launch it.
The Employer’s
arguments
[16]
The essence of the Employer’s argument is that the Contractor
is a foreign company with no other business interests
in South
Africa. If the Employer is successful in arbitration, it will not be
able to recover its money.
[17]
The Employer does not gainsay that it is liable to pay the amount
certified by the adjudicator. However, it contends
that the amount
should be retained in the trust account pending the outcome of the
arbitration proceedings, given a reasonable
apprehension that the
funds may be dissipated if the Employer ultimately succeeds in the
arbitration. This contention is supported
by the Contractor’s
status as a business established specifically for the project. The
Contractor has no ongoing operations
beyond the project in question.
Although the Contractor asserted that it had approximately R30
million in its bank account, it
did not submit proof. In contrast,
the Employer adduced evidence of the Contractor’s annual
turnover from CIPC records, indicating
that, as at 2025, the
Contractor’s turnover was less than R1 million.
[18]
In this regard, the Employer makes the following averments:
“
The Contractor
is, to the best of my knowledge, currently a shell with no current
business activities. It was incorporated in 2017
by a foreign firm
that operated as an engineering contractor outside of South Africa.
The project to which this matter relates
was the foreign firm’s
first project in South Africa, which it undertook through the
corporate personality of the Contractor.
It was the only project
undertaken by the Contractor.
The foreign firm has
no other projects or business activities in South Africa and since
the termination of the contract, the Contractor
has wound down its
operations in South Africa, retrenched all its employees and has no
assets. From recent correspondence, it appears
that it does not even
operate a bank account in South Africa. The significance of the
Contractor’s status as a shell, with
no assets or operations,
will be dealt with later.”
[19]
The Employer summarily rejected the Contractor’s argument
regarding the apprehension of non-payment, based on the
Contractor’s
supposed inability to repay the amount should the Contractor be
unsuccessful in the ultimate arbitration proceedings.
Instead, the
Employer relied on that very fact as a ground for refusing to enforce
the award.
[20]
In response to the above, it is submitted on behalf of the Contractor
that there has never been any difficulty in paying
the adjudicator’s
fees. It was further submitted that the possibility of dissipation of
the funds does not arise from, and
is not provided for in, the
contract. The Contractor’s position is therefore that the
adjudicator’s award must be enforced
in accordance with its
terms: the Employer must pay now and pursue its remedies thereafter.
[21]
Furthermore, the Employer contends that the payment relief sought in
the Notice of Motion is not made out on the papers.
The adjudicator
did not grant the relief sought by the Contractor in respect of
low-performance damages. When regard is had to
paragraph 171 of the
adjudicator’s award, read with the section dealing with
low-performance damages at paragraphs 108 to
123, no finding is made
as to the quantum of “remaining low-performance damages”
referred to by the Contractor.
[22]
Accordingly, even if the award is to be enforced, as the Contractor
contends in paragraph 27 of its founding affidavit,
such enforcement
does not require payment of the amount claimed as low-performance
damages in the Notice of Motion. The payment
relief sought by the
Contractor does not form part of the relief granted by the
adjudicator. The Contractor sought a single amount
in the Notice of
Motion, namely R171 million, and did not dispute that this is the
only amount certified by the adjudicator.
[23]
It was further submitted on behalf of the Employer that the
adjudicator acted outside the scope of his mandate. The starting
point is what was referred to him. The Contractor contended that the
performance levels were never clearly established, that no
workable
program was in place, and that the Project Manager had failed to
administer the relevant contractual clause as required.
Accordingly,
the Contractor’s case was that the Employer was not entitled to
deduct the amounts claimed as low-performance
damages and that those
amounts ought to be repaid to the Contractor.
[24]
The Employer, on the other hand, contended that the low-performance
damages were calculated monthly based on the Contractor’s
performance during the relevant period. According to the Employer,
the amounts so calculated were retained and were to be paid
once the
Contractor completed the works at a future date. Because the
Contractor failed to achieve the required development, the
Employer
maintained that the amounts deducted as low-performance damages
remained due to the Employer.
[25]
The Contractor further submitted that the Employer’s own
conduct demonstrates that it is desirous of making payment.
This is
apparent from its counter application, in which it seeks an order
that the amount be retained in a trust account pending
the outcome of
the review and/or arbitral proceedings.
Law and Discussion
[26]
It is well established in South African law that a court should be
reluctant to interfere with an adjudicator’s
determination,
particularly where the Parties have agreed that the determination is
binding pending arbitration.
[27]
Much of the Employer’s argument concerning the Contractor’s
performance or non-performance does not arise
for determination in
these proceedings. The starting point is that the Employer is bound
by the agreement it entered into and cannot
simply seek to avoid its
contractual consequences. It is accordingly obliged to honour its
contractual undertaking and pay the
amounts it has been directed to
pay.
[28]
It is common cause that the Employer has not placed in issue the
Compensation Events awarded in the adjudication, which
amount to R71
819 190.07 (seventyone million eight hundred and nineteen thousand
one hundred and ninety rand and seven cents).
These amounts represent
costs incurred and/or expended by the Contractor, which the Employer
expects the Contractor to bear while
the Contractor pursues review
proceedings that, on the Employer’s own case, do not challenge
these amounts, and/or arbitral
proceedings which the Employer has, to
date, not pursued.
[29]
The Employer’s further submission is that the Contractor’s
failure to join the adjudicator is fatal to its
claim. That
submission is unpersuasive. The failure to join an adjudicator does
not extinguish or permanently bar an underlying
contractual claim,
provided that the applicable contractual notice and time-bar
provisions have been complied with.
[30]
The
approach to enforcement of adjudication: Errors of procedure, fact or
law by the Adjudicator do not constitute defences to the
enforcement
of the Adjudicator’s decision. As the learned authors of
Hudson’s
Building and Engineering Contracts
(13th ed)
[1]
explain, in the context of judicial support in the United Kingdom for
adjudication decisions under the Housing Grants, Construction
and
Regeneration Act, 1996:
“
The phrase ‘pay
now, argue later’ has often been used by the courts as
shorthand to describe the policy of the HGCRA
1996. The Technology
and Construction Court and the Court of Appeal have also said on many
occasions that adjudication is a form
of rough justice, in the sense
that within a very short period of time (usually 28 days) the
Adjudicator has to receive submissions
and evidence from the parties
and produce their decision. Inevitably the justice that is meted out
is not always as pure and as
well prepared for as cases which proceed
to a full trial in court or to a substantive hearing before an
Arbitrator. On the basis
of this premise, the courts have been
prepared to treat the issue of enforcement of adjudication decisions
in a robust fashion.
Thus, even if there is a challenge to the
validity of an Adjudicator’s decision, the decision is binding
and enforceable
until the challenge is finally determined [ ... ] It
has also been said by the Court of Appeal that the objective which
underlies
the Act and the statutory scheme requires the courts to
respect and enforce the Adjudicator’s decision unless it is
plain
that the question which they have decided was not the question
referred to them, or if the manner in which they have gone about
the
task is obviously unfair. It should only be in rare circumstances
that the courts will interfere with the decision of an Adjudicator,
and the court should give no encouragement to an approach which may
aptly be described as ‘simply scrabbling around to find
some
argument, however tenuous, to resist payment”.
[31]
In Freeman
NO and Another v Eskom Holdings Limited,
[2]
the
court held:
“
[17] The
adjudicator's decision, therefore, remains binding and enforceable
until revised in the final determination by an arbitrator.
Mr Kemack
referred me to the United Kingdom case of Bouygues (UK) Limited v
Dahl-Jensen (UK) Limited
[2000] BLR 49
[TCC] at 55, para. 35, which
bears out this conclusion. Bouygues, which is a matter of the Queen's
Bench Division, Technology and
Construction Court ("TCC"),
concerned a dispute arising from a sub-contract, which provided for
dispute resolution by
adjudication pursuant to the Rules of the CIC
Model Adjudication Procedure (2nd edition) which provided that:
‘
1.
The
object of adjudication is to reach a fair, rapid and inexpensive
decision upon a dispute arising under the contract and this
procedure
shall be interpreted accordingly
…
4.
The Adjudicator's decision shall be binding until the dispute
is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the
contract provides for arbitration or the parties otherwise agree to
arbitration) or by agreement.
5.
The parties shall implement the Adjudicator's decision without
delay whether or not the dispute is to be referred to legal
proceedings
or arbitration.
…’”
[32]
Having regard to these Rules, Justice Dyson held as follows:
“
The purpose of
the scheme is to provide a speedy mechanism for settling disputes in
construction contracts on a provisional interim
basis, and requiring
the decisions of Adjudicators to be enforced pending final
determination of disputes by arbitration, litigation
or agreement,
whether those decisions are wrong in point of law and fact. It is
inherent in the scheme that injustices will occur,
because from time
to time, Adjudicators will make mistakes. Sometimes these mistakes
will be glaringly obvious and disastrous in
their consequences for
the losing party. The victims of mistakes will usually be able to
recoup their losses by subsequent arbitration
or litigation, and
possibly even by a subsequent arbitration.” (Emphasis added)
[33]
In
Radon
Projects (Pty) Ltd v N V Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another,
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA)
[3]
,
interpreting the Adjudication Rules issued by the JBCC and the
adjudication clause in that matter, held that adjudication under
clause 40 is designed as a measure for the summary and interim
resolution of disputes, subject to their final resolution by
arbitration
where appropriate.
In
reaching this conclusion, the Court approved the description of
adjudication given by the English Technology and Construction
Court
in
Macob
Civil Engineering Ltd v Morrison Construction Ltd
[4]
,
namely that such legislation “has not abolished arbitration and
litigation of construction disputes” but “merely
introduced an intervening provisional stage in the dispute resolution
process.” The adjudicator’s determination remains
binding
unless and until it is overturned or varied by arbitration. Although
concerned with clause 40 of the JBCC Principal Building
Agreement,
the same reasoning applies with equal force to Clause W1 of the NEC3
contract before this Court, which performs an equivalent
function.
[34]
The
position was subsequently considered directly by the SCA in
Ekurhuleni
West College v Segal and Another.
[5]
The Court held that adjudication is designed for the summary and
interim resolution of disputes, and that the adjudicator’s
determination may be overturned at the final stage of the agreed
dispute resolution process. Importantly, the Court held that where
the parties have agreed to arbitration as the mechanism for finally
resolving their dispute, the appropriate remedy of a dissatisfied
party is ordinarily to proceed to arbitration rather than institute
piecemeal review proceedings (
Segal
at paras 9, 15, 18, 21-22) in the High Court. The Court stated that
review proceedings in such circumstances should generally only
be
entertained where necessary to prevent grave injustice or where
justice cannot otherwise be attained.
[35]
The
principle was stated even more emphatically by the SCA in
Framatome
v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd.
[6]
The Court, quoting Clause W1.3 (10) of the NEC3 contract before it,
confirmed that an adjudicator’s decision is binding and
enforceable as a contractual obligation pending its revision by
arbitration. The fact that the adjudicator may have made an error
does not, without more, entitle a party to refuse compliance. The SCA
expressly held that the requirement that payment be made
even before
arbitration is a strong indication that the parties intended to
exclude judicial interference with the adjudicator’s
determination at that interim stage.
[36]
Significantly,
the SCA in
Framatome
endorsed the principle expressed in
Hudson’s
Building and Engineering Contracts
[7]
that:
“
It should only be
in rare circumstances that the courts will interfere with the
decision of an Adjudicator…”
[37]
The authors
in
Hudson’s
Building and Engineering Contracts
[8]
warn further that courts should not encourage a party to engage in
“simply scrabbling around to find some argument, however
tenuous, to resist payment”.
The
SCA applied that principle in holding that the merits of the
adjudicator’s decision fell within the province of the
subsequent
arbitration and were not matters for the High Court to
interrogate at the enforcement stage.
[38]
The same
approach was followed in
Murray
& Roberts Limited v SASOL South Africa (Pty) Ltd,
[9]
where the High Court held that a court has no appellate jurisdiction
over an adjudicator, even where the adjudicator is demonstrably
mistaken.
[10]
The Court agreed with what was stated in
Segal
that mistakes of fact, law or procedure are inherent in a rapid
adjudication process and ordinarily fall to be corrected in the
subsequent arbitration.
[11]
It further held that a party dissatisfied with the adjudicator’s
decision cannot simply refuse to comply on the basis that
the
decision is alleged to be wrong.
[39]
More
recently, in
Amanz’Abantu
Services (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd
[12]
the High Court applied the above authorities of the SCA and held that
an adjudicator’s determination remains binding and
enforceable
pending arbitration. The Court applied the reasoning of the SCA in
Framatome
[13]
,
where the SCA had held that asking a court to revisit the substance
of an adjudicator’s decision was an impermissible attempt
to
“interrogate the merits”; a function that properly falls
within the purview of arbitration. It further held that
permitting a
party to withhold payment pending such an examination would subvert
the very object of adjudication, namely, to provide
an expeditious
interim remedy and a mechanism to sustain cash flow during the
pendency of the dispute.
[40]
Regarding
the apprehension that the Contractor will not be in a position to
repay the Employer, in
Ethekwini
Municipality
v
Cooperativa
Muratori & Cementisti - CMC di Ravenna Societa Cooperativa
[14]
it was
held:
“
[19] The second
of the above additional considerations, namely that it is public
funds being put at risk, is equally unhelpful to
the employer’s
case. The Constitutional Court had this to say in Beadica:
“
[84] Moreover,
contractual relations are the bedrock of economic activity and our
economic development is dependent, to a large
extent, on the
willingness of parties to enter into contractual relationships. If
parties are confident that contracts that they
enter into will be
upheld, then they will be incentivised to contract with other parties
for their mutual gain. Without this confidence,
the very motivation
for social coordination is diminished. It is indeed crucial to
economic development that individuals should
be able to trust that
all contracting parties will be bound by obligations willingly
assumed.”
[41]
As already noted in paragraph [28] above, the Employer’s
failure to challenge the Compensation Events awarded is
significant,
since those amounts represent costs, the Contractor has already
incurred while awaiting proceedings the Employer has
not pursued.
[42]
The Employer’s concern regarding the Contractor’s status
is misplaced at this stage. The Employer entered
into the contract
with knowledge of the material facts concerning the Contractor. Even
if some of those facts were unknown to the
Employer at the time, it
was nevertheless incumbent upon it to act based on the trust
underlying the contractual relationship,
as recognised in
Beadica
quoted above.
[43]
In the case
of
Rodpaul
Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a Rods Construction v MEC: KwaZulu-Natal
Provincial Department of Public Works
,
[15]
at paragraph 10, the Court applied the principles of
Ethekwini
above as follows:
[44]
“On the other hand, in opposing the argument of the respondent,
the applicant relies on
Ethekwini Municipality v Cooperativa
Muratori & Cementisti-CMC Di Ravenna Societa Cooperativa
,
where the SCA held that when parties enter into a contract, there is
always a possibility that a party may not recover its debt,
or part
thereof, in terms of a contract. In the circumstances, considering
public policy, the fear of non-payment of a debt cannot
be used as a
ground not to comply with a contract.”
[45]
The mere existence of a risk does not relieve the Employer of its
obligation to pay the Contractor. I accordingly find
that the
Contractor is entitled to its payment.
[46]
The counterapplication is limited to a stay of enforcement pending
the outcome of a review application. The Employer
contends that such
review is necessitated by the adjudicator’s alleged
jurisdictional overreach and procedural misconduct
–
allegations that, if established, would vitiate the award and
disentitle the Contractor from enforcing it. However, the
Employer
has not joined the adjudicator in these proceedings. It is the
Employer who bears the obligation to initiate a fresh review
application, should it choose to do so. The relief sought in the
counterapplication is accordingly interlocutory in nature. While
a
stay might serve to preserve the status quo, it cannot be granted
where it would have the effect of prejudging the enforcement
rights
that flow from the adjudicator’s award.
[47]
The Employer’s stated intention to review the adjudicator’s
decision does not justify a departure from its obligation
to pay. The
pay now, argue later
principle applies without exception here.
The Employer entered into the contract with full knowledge that the
Contractor had only
a single project in this jurisdiction and cannot
now rely on that fact to resist an obligation it assumed under the
contract. To
require the funds to be placed in a trust account would,
in the circumstances of this matter, undermine the very purpose of
interim
payment through adjudication and effectively deprive the
Contractor of the benefit of the adjudicator’s determination
pending
the resolution of a dispute that remains to be properly
ventilated.
Conclusion
[48]
As stated above, it is not for this Court to adjudicate upon the
alleged overreach or procedural misconduct of the adjudicator.
Those
are matters to be determined in appropriate review proceedings. What
is material for present purposes is that the adjudicator’s
determination is binding and enforceable pending any such challenge,
and the Employer is accordingly obliged to comply with it.
The
Employer’s assertion that it intends to review the
adjudicator’s decision cannot operate to delay or derail the
Contractor’s entitlement to payment. Having regard to the pay
now, argue later principle and the authorities discussed above,
the
counter application cannot succeed.
Costs
[49]
In exercising my discretion on costs, I agree with the Contractor’s
contention. The Employer has offered no satisfactory
explanation for
the delay in filing its answering affidavit. Moreover, the Employer
failed to pay the adjudicator’s fees,
which were ultimately
paid by the third party. These circumstances, viewed cumulatively,
demonstrate conduct that unnecessarily
delayed the resolution of the
matter and placed an unwarranted burden on the Contractor. I am
satisfied that a punitive costs order
is warranted.
[50]
Having regard to the above, the following order ensues:
Order
1. The First
Respondent shall forthwith and immediately give effect to the
decision of the Adjudicator dated 13 September
2024 and published on
24 October 2024 (“the decision”).
2. The First
Respondent shall forthwith and immediately cause to be certified and
thereafter pay, the amounts awarded in the
decision, namely:
2.1.
Compensation events - R71 819 190.07 (seventy-one million eight
hundred and nineteen thousand one hundred
and ninety rand and seven
cents);
2.2.
Repayment of low-performance damages of R129 041 642.79 (hundred and
twenty-nine million and forty-one
thousand six hundred and forty-two
rand and seventy-nine cents);
2.3.
Interest thereon as provided for in core clauses 51.3 and 51.4 of the
contract between the parties.
3. The First
Respondent shall forthwith and immediately pay the Applicant the sum
of R178 681.25 (one hundred and seventy-eight
thousand, six hundred
and eighty-one rand and twenty-five cents), as provided for in the
Adjudicator’s addendum decision
dated 24 October 2024, together
with interest thereon at the currently prevailing Prescribed Rate of
Interest calculated from 24
October 2024 to date of final payment.
4. The orders in
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3
supra
shall endure until such time, if
at all, that the said decision of the said Adjudicator is revised in
amicable settlement or an
arbitral award.
5. Costs of this
application, as between attorney and client.
NP
MALI
Judge
of the High Court,
Johannesburg
Date
of Hearing:
26
February 2026
Date
of Judgment:
APPEARANCES
1
September 2026
For
the Applicant:
Bruce
Berridge SC
Instructed
by:
SJ
Pratt Attorneys
For
the Respondent:
DA
Turner SC & DS Hodge
Instructed
by:
Le
Roux Lane Inc.
[1]
Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts (13th ed), in the
context of judicial support in the United Kingdom for
adjudication
decisions under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration
Act 1996).
[2]
[2010] ZAGPJHC 137.
[3]
Radon
Projects (Pty) Ltd v NV Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another
[2013] ZASCA 83
;
2013 (6) SA 345
(SCA)
para 8
[4]
Id
at para 5, quoting Macob Civil Engineering Ltd v Morrison
Construction Ltd [1999] EWHC 254
(TCC);
[1999] BLR 93
[5]
[2020] ZASCA 32
(“Segal”).
[6]
[2021] ZASCA 132
;
2022 (2) SA 395
(SCA) (“Framatome”).
[7]
Id at par 30
[8]
Id at par 30
[9]
[2020] ZAGPJHC 268.
[10]
Id
at para 19.
[11]
Id
at para 19.
[12]
[2022] ZAECQBHC 20.
[13]
Amanz’Abantu Services (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development
Corporation (Pty) Ltd
[2022] ZAECQBHC 20 para 11. Quoting and
applying
Framatome
above n 6.
[14]
[2023] ZASCA 95
;
2023 (6) SA 384
(SCA) (“Ethekwini”).
[15]
[2023] ZAKZPHC 84.