Indluplace Properties Limited v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Others (2023/115357) [2026] ZAGPJHC 991 (31 August 2026)

40 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Administrative Law — Municipal obligations — City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality failing to provide resolution on account dispute — Applicant seeking compliance with section 11 of the City’s Credit Control and Debt Collection By-law, 2004 — Court ordering the City to provide a written resolution within 14 days — Costs awarded to the applicant.

1

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG


Case Number: 2023/115357


In the matter between:

INDLUPLACE PROPERTIES LIMITED Applicant

and

CITY OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY First Respondent
BRINK N.O., FLOYD Second Respondent
BRINK, FLOYD Third Respondent
JOHANNESBURG WATER SOC LTD Fourth Respondent
MAHLABA N.O., MOSEFE ISAYA KGAUGELO Fifth Respondent
MAHLABA, MOSEFE ISAYA KGAUGELO Sixth Respondent
MUKWEVHO N.O., NTSHAVHENI JULIAS Seventh Respondent
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
31 August 2026
DATE SIGNATURE

2

MUKWEVHO, NTSHAVHENI JULIAS Eighth Respondent


JUDGMENT
VETTER, AJ
A. INTRODUCTION
[1] Most of what this application originally sought has fallen away. What remains
is prayer 4 of the notice of motion. It asks for an order directing the first
respondent, the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, to provide its
resolution of the account dispute concerning City account number 4[ …] . The
resolution is sought for the purposes of section 11 of the City’s Credit Control
and Debt Collection By -law, 2004, and within 14 days. The applicant also
seeks costs. I refer to the first respondent as the City.
1
[2] The applicant no longer pursues the joinder of Johannesburg Water, and no
relief is pressed against the second to eighth respondents. Interim protection
against disconnection has already been granted, and the balance of the relief
was postponed sine die.
2
[3] The City must give the applicant a decision on its complaint. It has not done
so. Nothing pleaded, and nothing properly advanced at the hearing, answers
the applicant’s claim to that decision. I grant prayer 4 and costs.
B. THE COMPLAINT, AND WHAT THE CITY DID ABOUT IT
[4] The dispute concerns historical sewerage charges debited to the account
after the tariff applied to the property was changed. On 11 January 2024 the
applicant’s attorneys lodged a formal complaint, described as a section 11
dispute, and asked for a statement and debatement of the account. The

1 Notice of motion, prayer 4, CaseLines 01- 3; and applicant’s heads of argument, paras 16 to 17,
CaseLines 21-13.
2 Order of Twala J, 7 November 2023, paras 2 and 3, CaseLines 07- 1 to 07-2; and order of Leech
AJ, 20 September 2024, para 4, CaseLines 18-3.

3

City’s attorney replied on 30 January 2024 that his client was available for that
purpose. In April 2024 the City undertook to reconcile the impugned
invoices.
3
[5] On 8 May 2024 the City’s attorney wrote setting out what he described as his
client’s “preliminary views”. The letter continued:
“In light of the above, client has requested that the property rates
department furnish it with information confirming the correct tariff
which should be applied to this account, whereafter, it will determine
whether any corrective measure should be carried out on this
municipal account. Once I receive information regarding the above, I
will inform your offices accordingly and advise you of any further steps
the City will be taking.”4
[6] That is not a decision. It is a letter from the City’s attorney which records
preliminary views, says that the information needed to decide has been
requested, and promises a determination later. A response which discloses
no completed investigation and determines nothing does not resolve a
dispute.
5 The applicant’s attorneys said as much on 9 May 2024, disputing
the conclusions in the letter and asking for the supporting journals. 6 No
determination has followed, then or since.
[7] Section 11(5) of the By-law provides:
“The Council must — (a) investigate or cause the query or complaint
to be investigated within 14 days, or as soon as possible after the
query or complaint was received; and (b) inform the customer, in

3 Supplementary founding affidavit, para 39, CaseLines 08 -20; Louw to Papas, 30 January 2024,
CaseLines 08-94; and Papas to Louw, 10 April 2024, CaseLines 08-95.
4 Louw to Papas, 8 May 2024, paras 2 and 4 to 5, CaseLines 08-98 to 08-99.
5 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Glofurn (Pty) Ltd (136/2023) [2024] ZASCA 101 (19
June 2024) (Glofurn) at paras 20 to 21.
6 Papas to Louw, 9 May 2024, paras 1 to 7, CaseLines 08-100 to 08-101.

4

writing, of its decision as soon as possible after conclusion of the
investigation …” 7
[8] That duty rests on the City. More than two years after the complaint, it
remains undischarged.
C. THE PLEADED DEFENCES
[9] The City pleaded two defences to the relief now pressed. The first is that the
applicant failed to comply with the full query and dispute process, because a
customer whose query is not resolved within 90 days may appeal to the City
Manager or refer the matter to the Ombudsman. The second is that the
applicant does not dispute the demand management levy, so that no dispute
is pending over it.
8 A point of lis pendens was not persisted in at the hearing.
[10] The first defence does not answer the relief sought. The route the City relies
on is a remedy given to the customer where the City does not decide. On the
City’s own quotation of the clause, the customer may appeal a decision made
or a failure to make one. That is an answer to a customer who complains of
delay. It is not an answer to the City’s own duty to investigate and to
communicate a decision, because a remedy for inaction does not discharge
the obligation which the inaction breaches. The clause in any event comes
from the City’s Policy, which is not in the record, and I need not decide its
status: the duty enforced by this order is in the published By -law. Nor is that
an incursion into anything the City must decide for itself. The court’s function
is to see that the internal machinery is employed, not to resolve the account.
9
[11] The second defence is beside the point. Prayer 4 does not touch the demand
management levy. Whether the levy is disputed has no bearing on the City’s

7 Section 11(5) of the City of Johannesburg Credit Control and Debt Collection By- law, 2004,
CaseLines 01-19. Section 11(6) gives the customer an appeal against a decision under subsection
(5).
8 Answering affidavit, paras 17 to 18 and 26 to 30, CaseLines 12-9 and 12-11.

(5).
8 Answering affidavit, paras 17 to 18 and 26 to 30, CaseLines 12-9 and 12-11.
9 Body Corporate of Willow and Aloe Grove v City of Johannesburg (41604/2020; 13541/2022)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1451 (11 December 2023) at paras 93, 95 and 96; and Webster and Others NNO v
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (2021/26601) [2025] ZAGPJHC 383 (7 April 2025) at
paras 11 and 15.

5

duty to decide the query, which is disputed, and the order I make decides
nothing about it.
D. THE SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED FROM THE BAR
[12] The City delivered no updated heads. At the hearing its counsel advanced
four further points. A journal passed in 2021 was said to be administrative
action which the applicant was obliged to review under the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. The complaint was said to be time-
barred under the By -law. The applicant was said to lack standing because
the account stands in the name of the body corporate. And the letter of 8 May
2024 was said to have resolved the dispute. None of these defences was
pleaded, identified in the heads of argument, or put to the applicant in the
correspondence.
[13] In motion proceedings the affidavits serve the function of both pleadings and
evidence. It is for the parties to define the nature of their dispute, and for the
court to adjudicate upon the issues so defined. Parties may expand those
issues by the way in which they conduct the proceedings, but not at the price
of prejudice to an opponent who has had no opportunity to plead and prove
an answer.
10
[14] The difficulty here is not formal. Each of the four points needs facts which are
not on the papers. The review point needs a decision to review, and the only
document relied on for it says that the City had not yet decided. The time- bar
point needs it to be established when the complaint arose and what period is
said to have run. The standing point needs the terms on which the account is
held and the effect of section 9 of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management
Act 8 of 2011. The applicant has had no opportunity to answer any of that on
affidavit, and it cannot fairly be required to do so from the bar, more than two
years after the answering affidavit was delivered.

10 Fischer and Another v Ramahlele and Others (203/2014) [2014] ZASCA 88; 2014 (4) SA 614
(SCA); [2014] 3 All SA 395 (SCA) at para 13.

6

[15] I therefore decide none of the four points. I say only that the letter of 8 May
2024 is not a section 11 decision, which is apparent from its own terms and
does not depend on any fact the City was denied the chance to plead.
Nothing in this judgment decides who holds account number 4[ …] , the rights
of any person not before me, or any issue in the action pending between the
City and the body corporate cited as defendant in it. Nor does anything in it
prevent a point properly raised on proper papers from being considered in
appropriate proceedings.
E. RELIEF AND COSTS
[16] The order does not decide the correct tariff, the demand management levy,
the amount owing on the account, the City’s right to recover any amount
properly due, or the action pending between the parties. It requires the City to
do what its own By-law obliges it to do, and no more. That is all the applicant
asks.
[17] The applicant has succeeded. Both counsel agreed that costs should follow
the result on the party and party scale, with counsel on scale B, and I make
that order. The costs reserved by Twala J on 7 November 2023 fall to be
disposed of and follow the result. The costs of the urgent hearing were
determined by Leech AJ on 20 September 2024 and are not awarded again.
11
No relief was pressed against the second to eighth respondents and no order
is made in respect of them.
F. ORDER
[18] I make the following order:
1. The first respondent is directed to provide the applicant, in writing and
within 14 calendar days of the date of this order, with its resolution of
the account dispute concerning City account number 4[ …] , for the
purposes of section 11 of the City of Johannesburg Credit Control and
Debt Collection By-law, 2004.

11 Order of Leech AJ, 20 September 2024, para 5, CaseLines 18-3.

7

2. The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the balance of the
application, including the costs reserved by Twala J on 7 November
2023, on the party and party scale, such costs to include the costs of
counsel on scale B.
___________________________
VETTER AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG

8



Appearances

For the Applicant: Mr L Peter
Instructed by: Vermaak Marshall Wellbeloved Inc.

For the Respondent: Mr L Mokwena
Instructed by: Moodie & Robertson

Date of hearing: 26 August 2026
Date of judgment: 31 August 2026

This Judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email and publication on CaseLines and SAFLII. The date for the
handing down is deemed 31 August 2026.