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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 2026/154314
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED.
(4) Date: 14 August 2026
Signature:
In the matter between:
MINISTER OF POLICE First Applicant
MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS Second Applicant
And
PETER BOITUMELO MASAKE 1ST RESPONDENT
MFANAFUTHI PETERSON MTHETHWA 2ND RESPONDENT
MFANAFUTHI PETERSON KGATLA 3RD RESPONDENT
2
GOPOLANG GODFREY SEWEDI 4TH RESPONDENT
OUPA KHOMOTSO MOTHWA 5TH RESPONDENT
RICHARD STHEMBISO MASILELA 6TH RESPONDENT
GEZANI PHANUEL HLUNGWANI 7TH RESPONDENT
MAMUTHI LINDA SELEBALO 8TH RESPONDENT
THEMBA FRAIZER MAYISELA 9TH RESPONDENT
FANAFANA JOHANNES MAHLANGU 10TH RESPONDENT
CWALIZANDLA PIET MNGUNI 11TH RESPONDENT
MATTHEW MAROTHE TSOKELA 12TH RESPONDENT
RAKOBO BERNARD THOKA 13TH RESPONDENT
KGOSIETSILE DAVID CHISSICO 14TH RESPONDENT
LIVHUWANI ERNEST MOENG 15TH RESPONDENT
MOLEBOGENG MOENG 16TH RESPONDENT
MORGAN KGOADIAMOLEKE KGWALE 17TH RESPONDENT
PHUTI CAIPHUS RANOTO 18TH RESPONDENT
NTSAKISI JOB NKUNA 19TH RESPONDENT
VUSI SAMUEL KHUMALO 20TH RESPONDENT
DAMAN RAMOTLAKANE RAMALEPA 21ST RESPONDENT
NCEBA KENNETH MASELANA 22ND RESPONDENT
PHUTI THOMAS MDAKA 23RD RESPONDENT
ANY OTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS 24TH RESPONDENT
THE CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN 25TH RESPONDENT
MUNICIPALITY
THE MINISTER OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 26TH RESPONDENT
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SHERRIFF OF THE HIGH COURT: PRETORIA 27TH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
NYATHI J
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an urgent application in which the Applicants seek the eviction of the First to
Twenty-Fourth Respondents, together with all persons occupying through them, from
the South African Police Service ("SAPS") Single Quarters situated at Erf 1[...], P[...]
Street, Corner Pretorius and Bosman Streets, Pretoria.
[2] The Applicants contend that the building is state-owned property administered by the
SAPS, that all rights of occupation have been lawfully terminated, and that the building
has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation due to extensive structural, electrical,
sanitary and fire -safety defects. They seek urgent intervention on the basis that
continued occupation presents a substantial risk to life and safety.
[3] The Respondents oppose the application. They contend, inter alia, that:
(a) the application lacks urgency;
(b) the deponent lacks authority;
(c) material disputes of fact exist;
(d) their occupation arises from contractual employment -related accommodation
rights that have not been lawfully terminated; and
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(e) the Applicants seek to rely on circumstances substantially attributable to their
own neglect and failure to maintain the premises.
ISSUES
[4] The principal issues requiring determination are:
(a) whether urgency has been established;
(b) whether the Applicants have authority to institute the proceedings;
(c) whether material disputes of fact preclude final relief;
(d) whether the Respondents' rights of occupation have been lawfully terminated;
(e) whether the Respondents are unlawful occupiers;
(f) whether the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act 19 of 1998 ("PIE") applies; and
(g) whether it is just and equitable to grant an eviction order.
URGENCY
[5] Rule 6(12) requires an applicant seeking urgent relief to establish both the
circumstances rendering the matter urgent and why substantial redress cannot be
obtained in due course.
[6] In East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 506
(GSJ), the Court held that the essential enquiry is whether substantial redress can be
obtained at a hearing in due course.
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[7] The Applicants rely upon various reports identifying severe defects in the building
and the occurrence of fire incidents during November 2025 and June 2026.
[8] The Respondents correctly point out that concerns regarding the building's condition
have existed for a considerable period, some dating back several years.
[9] However, delay is not invariably fatal where a continuing danger exists. Courts have
repeatedly recognised that urgency may arise where there exists an ongoing threat to
safety, health or life.
[10] The evidence reveals that the complaints are not historical only. The Applicants
place before the Court current inspection reports and evidence of recent fire incidents.
The danger alleged is continuing rather than completed.
[11] In my view, the case raises issues affecting life, safety and bodily integrity. If the
Applicants' allegations concerning the condition of the building are substantially correct,
no subsequent order could reverse the consequences of a catastrophic fire, structural
collapse or electrocution.
[12] I am therefore satisfied that urgency has been established.
AUTHORITY
[13] The challenge to authority is not persuasive.
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[14] Rule 7 remains the principal mechanism by which authority may be challenged. The
Respondents do not demonstrate that the proceedings were not authorised by the
relevant organs of state. Their objection is directed primarily at the sufficiency of the
documentary proof placed before the Court.
[15] The courts have repeatedly held that a deponent need not be authorised to depose
to an affidavit and that authority to institute proceedings may be inferred from the
conduct of the litigant itself. See Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia Ltd 2004 (3)
SA 615 (SCA).
[16] I accordingly reject the authority point.
MATERIAL DISPUTES OF FACT
[17] The Respondents submit that extensive disputes of fact exist.
[18] It is indeed correct that where final relief is sought on motion, the approach in
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) applies.
[19] Not every disagreement on the papers constitutes a genuine dispute of fact. The
dispute must be real, bona fide and material.
[20] Several of the Respondents' challenges relate not to the existence of defects but to
their extent and severity. Importantly, the Respondents do not deny that:
(a) the building has substantially deteriorated;
(b) extensive repairs are required;
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(c) electrical infrastructure is defective;
(d) sanitation systems are compromised; and
(e) fire incidents have occurred.
[21] The Respondents largely contend that repairs should be undertaken rather than
eviction ordered.
[22] The disputes identified by the Respondents do not, in my view, require oral
evidence for the determination of the decisive issue before the Court, namely whether
they enjoy a continuing legal right to remain in occupation notwithstanding the
termination of their occupational arrangements and the condition of the building.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS RETAIN A RIGHT OF OCCUPATION
[23] The Applicants are the owner and lawful administrator of the premises. This is
common cause.
[24] The Respondents' occupation originated solely from employment -related
accommodation arrangements associated with SAPS service.
[25] The Respondents contend that tacit renewals occurred because occupation
continued and rentals were deducted for extended periods.
[26] There is force in the contention that prolonged occupation may, in appropriate
circumstances, support an inference of tacit continuation of contractual relations.
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[27] However, even accepting the Respondents' version at its highest, the evidence
establishes that the Applicants eventually issued notices terminating occupation and
requiring the premises to be vacated.
[28] The question is therefore whether such termination was lawful.
[29] The Respondents place significant reliance on Minister of Safety and Security v
Moodley 2011 ZASCA 93.
[30] The principle emerging from Moodley is that the lawfulness of termination
constitutes an anterior enquiry and must be determined before occupation can be
declared unlawful.
[31] Unlike Moodley, however, the present case does not concern solely administrative
fairness in terminating occupation. The Court is confronted with compelling evidence
that the premises themselves have become unsafe and unsuitable for continued
habitation.
[32] No contractual right can oblige an owner or organ of state to permit occupation that
threatens life and safety. Contractual rights exist within the framework of legality, public
policy and constitutional values.
[33] Even if the Respondents once enjoyed enforceable occupational rights, those rights
cannot be interpreted as creating perpetual entitlement to remain in a building
established to be unsafe.
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APPLICABILITY OF PIE
[34] I am not persuaded that PIE can be excluded merely because occupation
originated from employment.
[35] The Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasised that PIE must be interpreted
broadly and purposively. Occupation extending over many years and involving family life
ordinarily engages section 26(3) of the Constitution.
[36] Several Respondents have occupied the premises for lengthy periods and regard
the premises as their homes.
[37] I therefore proceed on the basis most favourable to the Respondents, namely that
PIE applies.
JUST AND EQUITABLE ENQUIRY
[38] The Court is required under section 4(7) of PIE to consider all relevant
circumstances.
[39] The guiding principles were articulated in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC), where Sachs J stressed the need for a judicial
balancing of competing constitutional rights.
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[40] The relevant circumstances include:
(a) the long duration of occupation;
(b) the existence of families and minor children;
(c) the employment relationship with SAPS;
(d) the absence of ownership rights on the part of the Respondents;
(e) the condition of the building;
(f) the public interest; and
(g) considerations of safety and dignity.
[41] The Court must further have regard to Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of
Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC).
[42] These authorities demonstrate both the need to protect vulnerable occupiers and
the obligation of courts to ensure that evictions occur in a humane and orderly manner.
[43] This case is distinguished by an overriding factor: the evidence establishes
substantial and serious risks associated with continued occupation. [my
emphasis].
[44] The Respondents do not meaningfully dispute that extensive refurbishment is
necessary before the building can safely accommodate residents. Indeed, their own
argument is that such refurbishment should be undertaken.
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[45] The difficulty with the Respondents' position is that refurbishment cannot
realistically occur while occupation of the entire building continues.
[46] Courts cannot compel organs of state to tolerate continued occupation where such
occupation itself creates or exacerbates a danger to human life.
[47] In the balancing exercise required by PIE, the rights to life, dignity and bodily
integrity assume particular significance. S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC)
recognised the right to life as the most fundamental of rights.
[48] The interests of justice therefore favour evacuation of the building.
ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION
[49] The City of Tshwane and the Minister of Human Settlements have been joined.
[50] The information presently before the Court is insufficient to justify refusing eviction
altogether.
[51] However, immediate summary eviction without provision for temporary alternative
accommodation would not be just and equitable.
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[52] Appropriate supervisory relief is therefore required.1
ORDER
[53] The following order is made:
53.1 The application is heard as one of urgency.
53.2 The First to Twenty-Fourth Respondents and all persons occupying through
them are declared unlawful occupiers for purposes of PIE.
53.3 An eviction order is granted.
53.4 The eviction is suspended for a period of 90 days from the date of this
order.
53.5 The Twenty-Fifth Respondent (City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality)
and the Twenty-Sixth Respondent (Minister of Human Settlements) shall, within
30 days, file reports indicating:
a. the availability of temporary emergency accommodation;
b. measures available to assist affected occupiers; and
c. the proposed relocation arrangements.
53.6 The matter is retained under judicial supervision for consideration of the
reports.
1 In Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No. 2) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA
721 (CC) the Constitutional Court held that the remedial powers of our courts to grant mandatory relief against
the government
‘includes the power where it is appropriate to exercise some sort of supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the order is
implemented’.
How these powers are exercised ‘depends on the circumstances of each particular case’ but ultimately a supervisory
order may be made ‘if it is necessary to secure compliance with a court order’.
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53.7 In the event that the premises have not been vacated by the expiry of the
suspension period, the Sheriff is authorised to effect the eviction.
53.8 Each party shall pay its own costs.
____________________
J.S. NYATHI
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Date of hearing: 05 August 2026
Date of Judgment: 14 August 2026
Appearances:
On behalf of the Applicant: Adv. P. Mthombeni; with him Adv. Mabuyakhulu
Applicants’ attorneys: State Attorney Pretoria
On behalf of the Respondents: Mr. T. Pillay
Attorneys for the Respondents: Pillay Thesigan Inc. Attorneys, Pretoria.
Delivery: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties' legal
representatives by email and uploaded on the CaseLines electronic platform. The date for hand -
down is deemed to be 14 August 2026.