SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2026-193934
In the matter between:
A[…] O[…] K[…] Applicant
and
S[…] K[…] First Respondent
THE FAMILY ADVOCATE, JOHANNESBURG Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
Mahosi J
Introduction
[1] The applicant brought an urgent application seeking authorisation to relocate
permanently with the children from South Africa to Fujairah, United Arab Emirates. The
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
21 August 2026 _________________________
DATE SIGNATURE
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relocation is said to be necessitated by a time- limited offer of employment that includes
secure income, accommodation and schooling for the children.
[2] The first respondent, the minor children’s father, is self-represented and opposes
the application on the basis that it is not urgent and procedurally irregular . On the
merits, he alleges that the relief sought cannot properly be granted on the papers as
they stand.
[3] The applicant’s first hurdle is that of urgency.
Urgency
[4] Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court regulates urgent applications, and it
requires the applicant s to set out explicitly the circumstances rendering the matter
urgent and the reasons why they claim that the application could not be afforded
substantial redress at a hearing in due course. In this matter, the applicant contends
that her need for urgency stems from a fixed employment schedule. She states that she
received a job offer on 22 July 2026, which requires her to start work on 24 August
2026. The applicant explains that she initially planned to travel earlier to settle her
children and manage onboarding arrangements. However, she has not been able to do
so because she has respected the first respondent's refusal to consent and has not
taken the children without legal permission.
[5] The applicant argues that the urgency did not arise from any delay on her part,
as she approached the first respondent about relocation on the very same day the
employment opportunity became available. She asserts that if the matter is dealt with
through the ordinary legal process, she risks losing the job, accommodation, and related
benefits, and that any later judgment would be ineffective. Furthermore, she believes
that a later judgment affirming her right to relocate would provide no meaningful remedy
if the employment opportunity that made the relocation possible has already vanished.
[6] The applicant states that her attorney, recogni sed for high -profile cases,
[6] The applicant states that her attorney, recogni sed for high -profile cases,
prepared her application pro bono, despite managing multiple urgent matters during that
period. While acknowledging that the first respondent may encounter challenges due to
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increased geographical distance, the applicant believes these challenges can be
addressed through electronic communication, structured physical meetings,
professional intervention, access to school and medical information, and appropriate
travel arrangements. She asserts that the proposed order aims to preserve the first
respondent's parental rights while enabling necessary adjustments to facilitate the
relocation.
[7] The first respondent contends that the applicant’s statements contradict her claim
for urgent court intervention. In her founding affidavit, the applicant suggests that her
departure and the children ’s relocation are severable, as family members can assist
with the children’s travel to Fujairah if she must leave for her job first. This Court agrees
that this concession undermines the urgency of the situation. If the applicant can secure
her position while making proper arrangements for the children, there is no real urgency
to relocate them.
[8] The first respondent argues that the timing and management of this application
do not demonstrate the urgency that is now being claimed. He submits that the founding
affidavit, certificate of urgency, and notice of set down were filed after the urgent roll had
already closed. Additionally, the first respondent contends that the timeline set for
submitting answering and replying papers did not comply with Consolidated Practice
Directive 1 of 2003, which states that the urgent roll closes at noon on the Thursday
prior to the following Tuesday and requires applicants to allow respondents adequate
time to consider the appropriate notice.
[9] The record shows that the application was served on the first respondent on
Thursday, 13 August 2026, at 23:36, but was filed only on Friday, 14 August 2026.
According to the timetable outlined in the Notice of Motion, the first respondent was
required to submit his answering affidavit by 17:00 on 16 August 2006. However, the
required to submit his answering affidavit by 17:00 on 16 August 2006. However, the
replying affidavit was due on 12 August 2026, a day before the application was initiated.
The applicant’s attorney attributed the incorrect date of the filing of the replying affidavit
to a simple typo but failed to explain why the founding affidavit was only filed on 14
August 2026. Additionally, the replying affidavit was delivered only on the eve of the
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hearing, without any application to condone the resultant non- compliance. It is apparent
that the applicant did not pursue her litigation with the urgency she requests this Court
to acknowledge, suggesting that her self -imposed abbreviated timetable was
inadequate.
[10] Even if urgency were established, the first respondent argues that this matter is
not suitable for a final determination based on the current documents. He correctly
points out that relocation disputes require a thorough, fact -intensive inquiry into the
children’s best interests , which remains materially incomplete herein. The Office of the
Family Advocate has not prepared a relocation- specific report, and the existing report
was compiled without interviewing the first respondent. Furthermore, the children ’s
views have not been independently surveyed as required by section 10 of the Children’s
Act1.
[11] The first respondent asserts that the United Arab Emirates is not a party to the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. As a result, he
argues that any order this Court issues regarding the return of the child or contact
arrangements would rely on the a pplicant’s voluntary cooperation, rather than a
reciprocal enforcement mechanism. This situation clearly warrants closer examination
before making any decisions about permanently relocating the children to that
jurisdiction. Additionally, the founding affidavit does not address the security conditions
in the intended destination, including travel advisories and reported incidents in
Fujairah.
[12] The first respondent notes that no parenting plan or court order governs care and
contact arrangements. Further, t he parties dispute the nature and history of contact,
including the first respondent’s previously rejected offers of supervised contact .
Additionally, the first respondent’s conviction for assault, which is pertinent to the
assessment of contact and the child ’s best interests, is currently being contested.
assessment of contact and the child ’s best interests, is currently being contested.
Furthermore, the parties still have unresolved financial matters. These are material
disputes of fact that directly affect the children’ s best interests, and which cannot be
1 Act 38 of 2005, as amended.
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fairly or safely resolved through affidavits, especially not within the tight timeframe of an
urgent application.
Conclusion
[13] In light of the above, t he applicant has not demonstrated that this matter cannot
be adequately addressed in the normal course, nor that any urgency which does exist is
other than of her own making. The proper course is to ventilate the relocation
application on a normal opposed motion roll, with the benefit of a completed Family
Advocate’s investigation addressing relocation specifically, an independent
ascertainment of the children ’s views, and a full opportunity for both parties to place
complete evidence before the Court.
[14] This Court is mindful that striking the matter off leaves the children’ s day-to-day
situation unregulated in the interim. That is a legitimate concern, but it is a consequence
of the manner in which this application was brought, not a reason to condone a
defective urgent application or to grant final relief on an inadequate record. Either party
may still approach the Court, on proper notice, for interim relief regulating contact
pending the hearing of the relocation application in the normal course.
Order
[15] Accordingly, the following order is made:
1. The application is struck from the urgent roll for want of urgency.
2. There is no order as to costs.
_________________________
D Mahosi
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Johannesburg
Heard on: 18 August 2026
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Delivered on: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email and uploaded on Caselines. The date and time
for hand-down is deemed to be 21 August 2026.
Appearances
For the applicant: Mr Muhammed Vally of MViP Attorneys
For the first respondent: Self