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IN THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case no.: CT02826ADJ2026
In the matter between:
AECI MINING LIMITED Applicant
And
AEL LOGISTICS (PTY) LIMITED First Respondent
COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMISSION Second Respondent
Presiding member:
Date of decision:
Richard Bradstreet
1 September 2026
DECISION (Reasons and Order)
1. This application concerns a company name objection brought in terms of
section 160 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“ the Act ”), in which the
Applicant seeks a determination that the First Respondent’s name does not
satisfy the requirements of section 11 of the Act. The Applicant further seeks
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a default order in terms of regulation 153 of the Companies Regulations 2011,
the First Respondent having failed to file an answering affidavit in response to
the application.
2. The Applicant, AECI Mining Limited, is a company incorporated under the laws
of the Republic, with its registered office at 1st Floor, AECI Place, 24 The
Woodlands, Woodmead, Gauteng. It is a wholly -owned subsidiary of AECI
Limited, whose explosives operations in South Africa date back as far as
1896, and which, from 1999, conducted its explosives business under the
name African Explosives Limited (“AEL”). The Applicant is the proprietor of the
registered AEL trade marks relied upon in this application, which were
assigned to it by AEL Mining Services Limited with effect from 30 May 2022.
3. The First Respondent is AEL Logistics (Pty) Limited, a company incorporated
on 25 July 2022 under registration number 2022/622331/07, with its registered
office at 6 Shiloue Street, Leslie, Mpumalanga. Its principal business is not
disclosed on the register. The Applicant’s investigations indicate that the First
Respondent operates, or intends to operate, in the transportation and logistics
field, and that one of its directors is engaged in the haulage of coal and mining
commodities.
4. The Second Respondent is the Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission (“the Commission”), the entity responsible for the registration of
companies and the maintenance of the companies register. No relief is sought
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against the Commission save the consequential relief in the event of the First
Respondent’s non-compliance, and no costs are sought against it.
5. The basis of the objection is that the First Respondent’s name is confusingly
similar to the Applicant’s registered and well-known AEL trade mark, and that
the name falsely implies or would reasonably mislead a person into believing
that the First Respondent is associated with the Applicant. The objection is
founded on sections 11(2)(b) and 11(2)(c)(i) of the Act.
DEFAULT RELIEF
6. The Main Application was lodged with the Tribunal on 30 June 2026, and the
Tribunal allocated case number CT02826ADJ2026 to the matter on that date.
On 30 June 2026 the Applicant’s attorneys served a copy of the application on
the First Respondent by e- mail, addressed to the electronic addresses
recorded for its directors – the same addresses through which the Applicant’s
attorneys had previously corresponded with the First Respondent. On 2 July
2026 the Sheriff of Highveld Ridge served a copy of the application at the First
Respondent’s business address by delivering it to an employee of the First
Respondent, and proof of service was filed with the Tribunal on 8 July 2026.
7. In terms of regulation 143, the First Respondent had until 30 July 2026 to
serve and file an answer. It did not do so, and the Applicant filed its
application for a default order on 27 August 2026. I am satisfied that there has
been adequate service, and thus compliance with regulation 153(2)( b). It also
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appears that the Applicant passes the “good cause” test in that a reasonable
explanation is given as to why the application should be heard by the Tribunal,
and there has been no undue delay in bringing the application. The matter
may therefore be dealt with on the papers on a default basis.
APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
8. Section 160(1) of the Act provides that a person with an interest in the name of
a company may apply to the Tribunal for a determination whether the name
satisfies the requirements of the Act. The Applicant, as the proprietor of the
registered AEL trade marks and of a substantial reputation in them, clearly has
such an interest. In terms of section 160(2)( b), such an application may be
made “on good cause shown at any time after the date of the reservation or
registration of the name that is the subject of the application”, and, for the
reasons given above, good cause has been shown.
9. Section 11(2) of the Act provides, so far as is relevant, that the name of a
company must not be confusingly similar to a registered trade mark, or to a
mark in respect of which an application has been filed in the Republic for
registration, or to a well -known trade mark as contemplated in section 35 of
the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (section 11(2)( b) read with section
11(2)(a)(iii)); and must not falsely imply or suggest, or be such as would
reasonably mislead a person to believe incorrectly, that the company is part of,
or associated with, any other person or entity (section 11(2)(c)(i)).
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Confusing similarity
10. “Similar”, for the purposes of section 11(2)(b), means “having a marked
resemblance or likenes s (Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC 2001 (1) SA 844
(SCA) para 14). The comparison of a company name with a trade mark
involves a value judgment, and the marks are to be considered as they would
be encountered in normal and fair use in the ordinary course of business
(Cowbell AG v ICS Holdings Ltd 2001 (3) SA 941 (SCA) para 10; SmithKline
Beecham Consumer Brands (Pty) Ltd v Unilever plc 1995 (2) SA 903 (A) at
912H).
11. The ultimate test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that ordinary
members of the public, or a substantial section thereof, may be confused or
deceived into believing that the goods, services or business of the one are
those of, or are connected with, the other ( Adidas AG v Pepkor Retail Ltd
(187/12) [2013] ZASCA 3; 2013 BIP 203 (SCA) para 28). The comparison is
made through the eyes of the notional ordinary customer of the goods or
services in question, who is possessed of imperfect recollection and who is not
engaged in a careful side- by-side analysis, and account must be taken of the
class of persons likely to be the customers concerned ( Reckitt & Colman SA
(Pty) Ltd v SC Johnson & Son SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 (2) SA 307 (A) at 315F–G).
12. The absence of a common field of activity is a relevant factor, but it is not
decisive: in Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Holiday Inns Inc
1977 (2) SA 916 (A) at 929 A, Rabie J A explained, with reference to English
authority that “as a matter of common sense, one of the important
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considerations is whether there is any kind of association . . . between the field
of activities of the plaintiff and the field of activities of the defendant", but that
this is “simply a question which is involved in the ultimate decision whether
there is likely to be confusion”. T he crucial question in every case remains
whether there is a reasonable likelihood of confusion, and the onus of
establishing the objection rests on the Applicant (Bata supra at para 8).
ANALYSIS
13. The Applicant relies upon its registration, in South Africa, of the trade mark
AEL, and of a corresponding AEL logo, in classes 9, 13 and 42, each filed on
22 February 2010 and each registered. Those registrations cover, in broad
terms, detonator and blasting systems, ammunition and explosives, and
technical and engineering services relating to blasting, explosives and mining.
The Applicant relies, in addition, on a substantial reputation in the AEL mark
and on its status as a well-known mark within the meaning of section 35 of the
Trade Marks Act. The relevant comparison is that between the Applicant’s
registered word mark AEL and the First Respondent’s name, AEL Logistics
(Pty) Limited.
14. The dominant and memorable element of the First Respondent’s name is the
letter combination “AEL”. It stands at the front of the name and performs the
function of identifying the undertaking. The word “Logistics” is descriptive of a
field of commercial activity and adds little distinctiveness; the corporate suffix
“(Pty) Limited” does no more than denote the form of the entity. Stripped of
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the descriptive and the formal, what remains is “AEL”, which is the Applicant’s
mark, reproduced letter for letter.
15. Mindful of the fact that AEL is a short mark, being a three- letter combination,
and that a short or acronymic mark may – in certain cases – be a weak one, in
the sense that a small alteration or addition may be enough to shift the
dominant impression and so to distinguish the later name. That consideration
does not assist the First Respondent here, for two reasons. First, nothing in
the First Respondent’s name alters the mark: the acronym is not varied by so
much as a letter, but taken over whole, with only a descriptive word appended.
Second, and in any event, AEL is not a weak mark. It is a registered mark of
long standing and, on the uncontroverted evidence before me, one that enjoys
a substantial reputation in the mining and explosives sector. Whatever latitude
a genuinely commonplace three- letter combination might attract, an
established and well-known mark taken over in its entirety attracts none.
16. Although the classes in which the AEL mark is registered – viz. explosives,
ammunition and blasting- related goods and services – do not necessarily
extend to transport or logistics , this is not enough to answer the objection.
The enquiry under section 11(2)( b) is whether the First Respondent’s name is
confusingly similar to the Applicant’s mark, not whether the two trade in
identical goods, and the absence of a precise overlap in the register is, as the
authorities make clear, a factor to be weighed rather than a bar to relief. In the
present case, it carries little weight because the fields are not remote from one
another: the Applicant’s business in explosives and mining solutions is one in
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which the carriage and logistics of goods is an everyday incident, and the First
Respondent’s intended activity – the haulage of coal and mining commodities
– lies squarely in the same commercial sphere. A member of the public
encountering “AEL Logistics” in that sphere would have no reason to think that
it was not the logistics arm of, or otherwise connected with, the well -known
AEL undertaking. The protection accorded to a well-known mark is, moreover,
not confined to the goods and services of its registration.
17. There is a further feature of the matter which makes the risk of confusion
difficult to dispute. The First Respondent advertised for drivers on social media
alongside an image of a truck bearing the Applicant’s AEL logo. This
demonstrates that the First Respondent was aware of the AEL brand and was
nevertheless prepared to present its business to the public in association with
the Applicant’s mark. In those circumstances, any suggestion that the
adoption of “AEL” was merely coincidental is difficult to sustain. The more
probable inference is that the name was adopted in order to evoke an
association with the Applicant and to benefit from the reputation attaching to
its mark.
18. Taking these considerations together, and applying the value judgment
required by Cowbell supra, I am satisfied that the First Respondent’s name is
confusingly similar to the Applicant’s registered AEL trade mark, contrary to
section 11(2)( b) of the Act. The risk of confusion is, in my view, real and
substantial.
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19. It follows, therefore, that section 11(2)( c)(i) is also contravened, and on the
facts of this matter that conclusion is reached independently as well as
consequentially. A member of the public confronted with the name “AEL
Logistics”, in a field adjacent to that in which the Applicant’s well -known mark
has long been used, is reasonably likely to draw the inference that the First
Respondent is a part of, an extension of, or otherwise associated with, the
Applicant. That inference would be incorrect.
20. The Applicant sought its costs only in the event that the application was
opposed. It was not opposed, and therefore no question of costs arises.
ORDER
21. In the result, I make the following order:
(a) The application for a default order in terms of regulation 153 is granted.
(b) It is determined that the name of the First Respondent, AEL Logistics
(Pty) Limited, does not satisfy the requirements of section 11(2)( b) and
section 11(2)(c)(i) of the Act.
(c) The First Respondent is directed, in terms of section 160(3)( b)(ii) of the
Act, to –
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(i) choose a new name that does not consist of, incorporate, or is
not confusingly similar to, the trade mark AEL, or any other mark
confusingly or deceptively similar to it, and that does not imply
an association with the Applicant; and
(ii) file a notice of amendment to its Memorandum of Incorporation
giving effect to that change, within 3 (three) months of the date
of service of this order.
(d) In the event that the First Respondent fails to comply with paragraph (c)
within the period stated, the Second Respondent is directed, in terms of
section 160(3)( b)(ii) read with section 14(2) of the Act, to change the
First Respondent’s name on the companies register to its registration
number, 2022/622331/07, followed by the expression “(Pty) Ltd”, as the
First Respondent’s interim name.
(e) This order must be served on the Respondents by the Recording
Officer (Registrar) of the Tribunal.
Richard Bradstreet
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Member of the Companies Tribunal
1 September 2026