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IN THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: CT02663ADJ2026
In the matter between:
BRIDGESTONE CORPORATION APPLICANT
(a company incorporated in Japan)
And
BS TYRES (PTY) LTD FIRST
RESPONDENT
(Registration No. 2024/645950/07)
COMMISSIONER OF THE COMPANIES AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMISSION
SECOND
RESPONDENT
Presiding Member of the Companies Tribunal: DR MINAH TONG-MONGALO
Date of Decision: 28 August 2026
DECISION (Reasons and an Order)
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1. This is an application by Bridgestone Corporation (the Applicant) in terms of
section 160(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act), read with
regulations 142 and 153 of the Companies Regulations, 2011. The application
concerns the registered name BS TYRES (PTY) LTD (the First Respondent).
2. The Applicant seeks a determination that the First Respondent's name does
not satisfy sections 11(2)(a)(iii), 11(2)(b) and 11(2)(c)(i) of the Act. It asks that
the First Respondent be directed to choose and register a compliant name
and that consequential relief be granted if it fails to do so.
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3. The Applicant relies on its BRIDGESTONE trade marks, including long-
standing registrations in class 12 for tyres and related goods. It contends that
the letters 'BS' are derived from the first letters of 'Bridge' and 'Stone' and that,
when combined with the descriptive word 'TYRES', the First Respondent's
name is confusingly similar to BRIDGESTONE and falsely suggests an
association with the Applicant.
4. The application is unopposed. The absence of an answer does not, however,
entitle an applicant to relief as a matter of course. Regulation 153(2) permits a
default order only where the initiating application was adequately served and
the order sought is justified by the allegations and evidence before the
Tribunal.
B. THE PARTIES
5. The Applicant is Bridgestone Corporation, a company incorporated under the
laws of Japan, with its principal place of business at 1- 1 Kyobashi 3- Chome,
Chuo-ku, Tokyo, Japan. It conducts a substantial international tyre and
rubber-products business and is the proprietor of the BRIDGESTONE trade
marks relied upon in these proceedings.
6. The First Respondent is BS Tyres (Pty) Ltd, a private company incorporated
in South Africa on 15 October 2024 under registration number
2024/645950/07. Its registered address is 157 Reedbok Street, Leondale,
Roodekop, Gauteng, 1401. The Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission's disclosure certificate records Mr Bongani Simphiwe Mbuyisa as
a director.
7. The Second Respondent is cited in its official capacity as the functionary
responsible for the companies register. No substantive relief is required
against the Second Respondent for purposes of the order made below.
C. JURISDICTION
8. The Tribunal derives its jurisdiction over company name disputes from
sections 160 and 195 of the Act. A person with an interest in a company name
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may apply for a determination whether that name satisfies the requirements of
the Act.
9. The Tribunal's task in this matter is confined to the company -name
requirements in section 11 and the remedies authorised by section 160. The
papers also refer to trade mark infringement and passing off. Those causes of
action are not determined in this decision.
D. SERVICE AND THE APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT ORDER
10. The CTR 142 application was signed on 20 March 2026 and stamped as
received by the Tribunal on 23 March 2026 under case number
CT02663/ADJ/2026.
11. The Sheriff's return records that the initiating application was served at the
First Respondent's registered address on 26 March 2026 at 12:40 by delivery
to Ms Noncedo Zulu. The return describes her as the wife of the owner, a
person apparently over the age of 16, in control of and apparently employed
at the premises. The address corresponds with the registered address in the
Commission's disclosure certificate.
12. The contemporaneous email record shows that the stamped CTR 142 and
founding affidavit were transmitted to the Second Respondent at
corporatelegalservices@cipc.co.za on 25 March 2026. The reference to 25
May 2026 in the supporting affidavit is an evident typographical error when
read with that email record.
13. The First Respondent did not deliver an answer within the 20 business days
prescribed by regulation 143(1), or at any later time before the default
application was made on 25 May 2026. I am satisfied that the initiating
application was adequately served and that the procedural time period for
seeking a default order had elapsed.
14. The CTR 145 form attached to the default application contains a different
case number in its 'Concerning' field. The covering page, supporting affidavit,
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parties, record and relief all identify this matter and the correct Tribunal case
number. I treat the isolated mismatch as a patent clerical error. It causes no
uncertainty about the application that is before the Tribunal.
15. Regulation 143(4) permits factual allegations that have not been denied to be
treated as admitted. It does not convert a legal conclusion into a fact or relieve
the Tribunal of the duty under regulation 153(2) to decide whether the
evidence justifies the order sought.
E. STANDING AND GOOD CAUSE
16. As proprietor of the BRIDGESTONE trade marks and as a trader in the
market to which the word 'TYRES' refers, the Applicant has a direct and
substantial interest in the First Respondent's name. It accordingly has
standing under section 160(1) of the Act.
17. The Applicant became aware of the First Respondent's registration in January
2025. Its attorneys sent a demand by email on 14 February 2025, a follow -up
on 7 March 2025, and a further demand by courier on 22 April 2025. The
Applicant states that it thereafter monitored the register before commencing
these proceedings in March 2026. No response to the demands was received.
18. In Highly Nutritious Food Company (Pty) Ltd v Companies Tribunal and
Others,
1 the High Court held that good cause under section 160(2)(b) is not
assessed by delay alone; the Tribunal must consider the explanation and the
merits. It must thus consider interests of justice as a whole.
19. The explanation for the period after April 2025 is terse. The delay is
nevertheless not extreme; the Applicant objected soon after learning of the
registration, maintained a consistent position, and the continued registration
gives the dispute an ongoing character. Considering the matter as a whole, I
am satisfied that good cause has been shown to entertain the application.
That finding does not determine its merits.
1 (91718/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 471 at paragraph 18.
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F. APPLICABLE LAW
20. Section 11(2)(a)(iii) provides, subject to specified exceptions, that a company
name must not be the same as a registered trade mark belonging to another
person. Section 11(2)(b) provides that a company name must not be
confusingly similar to a name or mark contemplated in section 11(2)(a),
subject to the statutory exception for companies controlled by the same
person.
21. Section 11(2)(c)(i) provides that a company name must not falsely imply or
suggest, or be such as would reasonably mislead a person to believe
incorrectly, that the company is part of, or associated with, another person or
entity.
22. If the Tribunal determines that a name does not satisfy the Act, section
160(3)(b)(ii) permits it to direct the company to choose a new name and file a
notice of amendment to its Memorandum of Incorporation within a period, and
on conditions, that are just, equitable and expedient.
G. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
23. Whether names or marks are confusingly similar is a value judgment based
on the likely reaction of the ordinary customer who encounters them in the
normal course of business. The question is whether there is a reasonable
probability, and not merely a possibility, of confusion. See Cowbell AG v ICS
Holdings Ltd.
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24. The comparison is global. The marks must be considered as wholes, having
regard to their visual, aural and conceptual impressions and to any dominant
components. The court must place itself in the position of a customer with
imperfect recollection and must avoid undue peering and dissection. See
Yuppiechef Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Yuppie Gadgets Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2016]
2 2001 (3) SA 941 (SCA) at paragraph 10.
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ZASCA 118 at paragraph 26; and National Brands Ltd v Cape Cookies CC
and Another [2023] ZASCA 93 at paragraph 24.
25. The word 'similar' requires a marked resemblance or likeness that is
recognisable on comparison. An overbroad approach can confer an
unacceptable monopoly on features that are not themselves distinctive. See
Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC 2001 (1) SA 844 (SCA) at paragraphs 9 and 14;
and National Brands, above, at paragraphs 26 and 27.
26. Reputation and the field in which the parties trade are relevant surrounding
circumstances, but they do not replace the threshold comparison. Nor may a
claimed meaning or abbreviation be assumed where the evidence does not
establish that consumers would understand the expression in that way. The
reasoning in National Brands, above, at paragraphs 28 and 29 is instructive in
this regard.
H. EVALUATION
27. The BRIDGESTONE word mark and the registered company name BS
TYRES are not the same. The First Respondent's name does not reproduce
the mark, and the differences are substantive rather than minute. Section
11(2)(a)(iii) is therefore not contravened.
28. Visually, BRIDGESTONE is a single eleven -letter word. BS TYRES is a two -
letter initialism followed by a separate, ordinary descriptive word. Apart from
the letters B and S, which occur at different positions in BRIDGESTONE, the
expressions have no shared sequence, structure or overall appearance.
29. Aurally, BRIDGESTONE is ordinarily pronounced as two joined words or
syllabic components. BS TYRES is naturally spoken as the two separate
letters 'B' and 'S' followed by 'tyres '. The sounds, cadence and length are
materially different.
30. Conceptually, BRIDGESTONE is a distinctive composite expression and the
Applicant's trade mark. BS TYRES, viewed without the Applicant's
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explanatory exercise, conveys a business identified by two initials and the
goods or services with which it deals. The link asserted by the Applicant is not
apparent on first impression.
31. The central difficulty is the proposition that 'BS' will be understood as an
abbreviation of BRIDGESTONE because B is taken from 'Bridge' and S from
'Stone'. That proposition requires the BRIDGESTONE mark first to be divided
into two components and then reduced to their initial letters. It is the kind of
analytical dissection that the authorities caution against.
32. The evidence establishes extensive use and reputation in BRIDGESTONE,
including substantial international operations and trade in South Africa. It does
not establish that the Applicant trades under BS, owns a BS trade mark relied
upon in this application, or that customers, dealers, the media or the tyre
industry commonly use BS to identify the Applicant. The Applicant's own
examples and trade mark schedule consistently present the full
BRIDGESTONE mark.
33. Two letters are capable of being the initials of a great many names. Without
evidence of acquired recognition, the mere ability to construct BS from parts
of BRIDGESTONE is insufficient to create a marked resemblance between
the expressions as a whole.
34. The word TYRES accurately describes the commercial field in which the
Applicant has a formidable reputation. That common field is relevant to the
confusion enquiry, but TYRES is descriptive and does not resemble
BRIDGESTONE. A shared field of activity may intensify confusion where a
sufficient similarity already exists; it cannot create similarity between
otherwise dissimilar names.
35. I accept for purposes of this unopposed application that BRIDGESTONE is
well known in relation to tyres. The strength of that reputation does not extend
the statutory protection to every unexplained use of the letters B and S in a
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tyre-related company name. Such a conclusion would grant a monopoly wider
than the mark and wider than the evidence supports.
36. Taking the expressions as a whole and allowing for imperfect recollection,
there is no reasonable probability that a substantial number of persons would
believe that BS TYRES is BRIDGESTONE or another manifestation of the
BRIDGESTONE mark. The claim under section 11(2)(b) has therefore not
been established.
37. For substantially the same reasons, the name BS TYRES does not, by itself,
objectively imply an association with Bridgestone Corporation. There is no
evidence of get -up, representations, conduct, common branding or public
usage capable of supplying the missing link. The requirements of section
11(2)(c)(i) have not been met.
38. The Applicant's factual evidence is largely uncontested, but the conclusion
that BS is an abbreviation recognised as referring to BRIDGESTONE is
neither a proved fact nor an inevitable inference from the admitted material.
Regulation 143(4) does not require the Tribunal to accept it as a legal
conclusion.
39. It follows that, although the application was adequately served and the
Applicant has shown good cause for it to be entertained, the order sought is
not justified by the allegations and evidence as required by regulation 153(2).
I. ORDER
40. The application for a default order is dismissed.
41. There is no order as to costs.
DR MINAH TONG-MONGALO
MEMBER OF THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL