SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG
CASE NO: 5511/2022
(1) Reportable: Yes/No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised: Yes/No
SIGNATURE
DATE 26/08/2026
In the matter between:
FIRSTRAND BANK LTD Applicant
and
MORNé IZAK BUYS First respondent
EMRI SNYMAN Second respondent
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email. The date and time for hand -down is deemed
to be 26 August 2026 at 10h00.
JUDGMENT
2
Schutte AJ
Introduction
[1] In deteriorating financial circumstances, overindebted customers are drawn, or
even forced, into more debt. And for that reason, amongst others, the National Credit
Act 34 of 2005 (the “NCA”) seeks to balance the scales between c onsumer and
credit provider. In this judgment, I will show that the N CA can only be fully
appreciated by those consumers who embrace the protections offered by it.
[2] For the sake of convenience, I refer to the applicant as “the bank”, and where I
refer to legislation, it will be to the NCA.
The common cause facts
[3] In 2015, the parties entered into a home loan agreement in terms of which the
bank advanced R1 550 000 to the respondents, repayable together with interest over
a period of 20 years. As security for the loan, the bank caused a bond to be
registered in its favour over the respondents’ residential property.
[4] The respondents breached the terms of the loan agreement by failing to make
timeous payments.
[5] On 14 November 2022 , the first respondent contacted the bank to make
payment arrangements. Also on the same day, the bank sent a section 129(1) notice
by registered post to the respondents. At the time of the parties ’ discussion on 14
November, the section 129(1) notices had not been received by the respondents.
[6] On 25 November 2022 , the respondents contacted the bank, ostensibly in
response to the section 129(1) notice . The respondents and the bank concluded ,
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what I will , for the sake of convenience , label a payment arrangement, and the
details of which I will refer to herein later.
[7] On 6 December 2022, the outstanding bond amounted to R1 718 249 .23,
whilst the arrears were R225 785.22. The bank, as the plaintiff, proceeded with
summons against the respondents, as defendants , claiming payment in the amount
of R1 718 249.23 from the respondents. The sheriff served the summons on
14 December 2022.
[8] The respondents complied with the payment arrangement, and by March 2023
the bank pended the litigation, as agreed.
[9] Two years later, o n 6 March 2025 , the respondents served their application s
for debt review . The respondents ’ bond rep ayments remained in arrears . O n 19
August 2025, the bank served its application for default judgment on the
respondents.
[10] The respondents eventually filed their plea , in which they raised various
special pleas. The bank then applied for summary judgment , which the respondents
oppose. The summary judgment application together with an application to declare
the respondents’ property specially executable served before me. At the time of the
hearing, the respondents’ debt review applications had not been finalised.
The test for summary judgment
[11] In terms of Rule 32(3)(b) , the respondents must satisfy the court by affidavit
that they have a bona fide defence to the action and in their affidavits disclose “fully
the nature and grounds of the defence and the material facts relied upon therefor.”
[12] In considering whether the respondents have raised a triable issue, I will have
regard to their plea and answer in the application for summary judgment, read
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together with the bank’s supporting affidavit in the application for summary judgment
and the bank’s particulars of claim.
The first special plea: Non-compliance with section 130(1)(b)(i)
[13] In their first special plea the respondents argue that their payment
arrangement with the bank constituted a response as envisaged in section
130(1)(b)(i) and that, by virtue of section 129(1) , the bank was barred from issuing
summons against the respondents.
[14] The bank’s section 129 notice informed the respondents that the arrears on
their home loan account , at that stage, amounted to R230 791.08, whilst the then
instalment was R17 994.14. The outstanding bond balance, at the time, was
R1 725 042.63. The notice informed the respondents that:
“In order to rectify this situation, we propose that you either:-
3.1. pay the default amount within 10 business days of delivery hereof;
3.2. contact us directly on 0[...] to discuss the possibility of making a firm arrangement
to bring the default in terms of the Credit Agreement up to date; or
3.3. refer the Credit Agreement to a debt counsellor, alternative dispute resolution
agent, consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that any dispute may
be resolved under the Credit Agreement, or develop and agree on a plan to bring the
payments under the Credit Agreement up to date.
4. If you fail to respond to this notice or reject our proposals contained in paragraph 3
above, within 10 business days from delivery of this notice, we may exercise our
rights, amongst any other remedies available to us, to issue summons against you for
the full outstanding account balance. Should judgement be obtained it may potentially
lead to the loss of your home should we proceed to selling your home by means of a
public auction, which would result in your or any occupiers being evicted there from.”
[15] It was after receipt of this notice, on 25 November 2022, th at the respondents
[15] It was after receipt of this notice, on 25 November 2022, th at the respondents
and the bank concluded a payment arrangement. The terms of the a rrangement
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were as follows : The respondents would pay R23 000 by 24 December 2022, and
R30 000 each by 24 January, 24 February, and 24 March 2023. The bank alleged
that the payment arrangement also included a term that the bank would only pend
litigation once the respondents had complied with the payment terms of the payment
arrangement. The respondents, in their answering affidavits, stated that they did not
recall that term.
[16] I have no issue in accepting that the parties had indeed agreed that litigation
would only be pended once the respondents have complied with the payment terms
of the payment arrangement. The objective facts support my finding: Firstly, there is
no evidence before me that the respondents objected to the summons which had
been served on them a mere three weeks after conclusion of the payment
arrangement. Secondly, the bank pended litigation , exactly as agreed. Thirdly, the
respondents’ answer, that they did not recall the agreement that litigation would be
pended, constitute a bare denial which is outweighed by the bank’s direct evidence.
Fourthly, the payment arrangement addressed only a portion of the arrears. A week
before the issuing of summons, the arrears amounted to R225 785.22.
[17] Section 130(1) of the NCA states as follows:
“Subject to subsection (2), a credit provider may approach the court for an order to
enforce a credit agreement only if, at that time, the consumer is in default and has
been in default under that credit agreement for at least 20 business days and —
(a) at least 10 business days have elapsed since the credit provider delivered a
notice to the consumer as contemplated in section 86 (10), or section 129 (1), as the
case may be;
(b) in the case of a notice contemplated in section 129 (1), the consumer has —
(i) not responded to that notice; or
(ii) responded to the notice by rejecting the credit provider’s proposals.”
[18] Section 129(1) of the NCA stipulates as follows:
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“(1) If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider—
(a) may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing and propose that the
consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt counsellor, alternative dispute
resolution agent, consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that the
parties resolve any dispute under the agreement or develop and agree on a plan to
bring the payments under the agreement up to date; and
(b) subject to section 130 (2), may not commence any legal proceedings to enforce
the agreement before—
(i) first providing notice to the consumer, as contemplated in paragraph (a), or in
section 86 (10), as the case may be; and
(ii) meeting any further requirements set out in section 130.”
[19] The respondents’ case is that the payment arrangement was in response to
the bank’s section 129 notice and therefore that they had responded to the notice as
envisaged in section 130(1)(b)(i). Because they responded to the section 129 notice,
the respondents argue, the bank could not proceed with the issuing of summons.
[20] The respondents’ argument boils down to th e payment arrangement which
included a term that litigation would proceed, constitutes a response , which
prevented the bank from proceeding with litigation. Put bluntly, the respondents say
the bank’s reservation of its right to proceed with litigation is exactly the reason why
the bank could not have proceeded with litigation. The internal contradiction in this
argument is obvious and unsustainable.
[21] There is another reason why the respondents’ argument must fail. Their
argument loses sight of clause 4.35 of the loan agreement in terms of which the
parties agreed that no waiver or relaxation of any provision of the loan agreement
shall operate as an estoppel against the bank , nor shall it preclude the bank from
enforcing any of its rights under the loan agreement.
[22] The NCA does not define the word “respond”. Does “respond” mean that the
[22] The NCA does not define the word “respond”. Does “respond” mean that the
consumer must simply confirm receipt of the bank’s section 129(1)(a) notice? Does
7
“respond” mean advancing a reasonable payment proposal, even if unacceptable to
the bank?
[23] Recently, in Lueven Metals (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service,1 the Constitutional Court had this to say about the interpretation of
legislation:
“While text, context and purpose are three aspects of the statutory interpretive
exercise, this Court has emphasised that statutory provisions should be accorded
their textual meaning whenever appropriate and be “interpreted purposively”,
“properly contextualised” and “construed consistently with the Constitution” at all
times. In such an interpretive scheme, these aspects are not isolated enquiries but
parts of a unitary interpretative exercise.”
[24] I will, as did the Constitutional Court in Lueven, discuss each aspect
separately.
[25] If regard is had only to the text, then section 130(1)(b) seems to suggest that a
credit provider may only enforce a credit agreement in court if the consumer has not
responded to the section 129(1) notice or responded by rejecting the credit provider’s
proposals. The text, in isolation, supports the respondents’ argument that a response
to the section 129(1) notice is enough to exclude debt enforcement through litigation.
[26] But the text should be contextualised. In my view , “respond” should be
interpreted with due regard to what the notice is suppose d to convey to the
consumer. Section 129(1) (a) prescribes the minimum content of the notice. These
are: Firstly, to draw the consumer’s attention to the default. Secondly, to propose that
the consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt counsellor , an alternative dispute
resolution agent, a consumer court , or an ombud. Thirdly, to inform the consumer
that the purpose of referral would be that the parties resolve any dispute or develop
and agree on a plan to bring the payments under the agreement up to date.
1 Lueven Metals (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service [2026] ZACC 24 at
para 14.
8
[27] Properly contextualised, section 129(1) expects of the credit provider to inform
the consumer of the default and of the consumer’s rights if the consumer disputes
any issue relating to the credit agreement and , if not, to guide the consumer to an
appropriate institution that may assist the consumer in negotiating in a structured
manner a payment plan with the credit provider.
[28] The reason why the consumer’s attention is drawn to the debt counsellor is,
with respect, sound, because a consumer does not, in terms of section 86(2), enjoy
the protection offered by the d ebt review process if the process is commenced after
litigation has commenced regarding the relevant credit agreement . The section
129(1) notice is in essence a war ning to the consumer that, if the consumer is over -
indebted, the consumer is to approach a debt counsellor , because an application for
debt review brought after the institution of litigation will not bind the credit provider
regarding the specific credit agreement.
[29] The function of an alternative dispute resolution agent is, if regard is had to
the definition clause, “to assist in the resolution of consumer credit disputes through
conciliation, mediation or arbitration ”.2 Conciliation and mediation are intended to
avoid litigation, whilst arbitration suggests an alternative method of litigation. In terms
of section 130(3)(c)(i), a credit provider may not proceed with enforcement steps
where a dispute has been recorded by an alternative dispute resolution agent. This
clause ties in with the section 129(1) obligation on credit providers to inform the
consumer of the consumer’s right to refer the matter to an alternative dispute
resolution agent. Arbitration is an alternative to litigation, not a continuation thereof.
[30] Section 130(3)(c) states that a court may not determine a matter where the
matter is already before a debt counsellor, an alternative dispute resolution agent, a
consumer court or the ombud with jurisdiction.
consumer court or the ombud with jurisdiction.
[31] Properly contextualised, to respond to a section 129(1) notice is not to contact
the credit provider to arrange to rectify the default but to refer the matter to achieve
the protection offered by section 130(3). It is for that reason that I stated in the
2 Section 1 of the NCA.
9
introduction that the NCA rewards those consumers who wholeheartedly embrace its
provisions.
[32] If my house is on fire and I phone the fire brigade, they have not responded to
my emergency by merely answering the phone or even returning my call. Once the
fire has been put out, the firemen can proclaim that they had responded to my
emergency. That is when the cause of my emergency has been eliminated.
[33] Likewise, a consumer who negotiates to pay the arrears off over a period will
have responded to the notice when the arrears have been paid in full. A consumer
who disputes the credit agreement will have only responded to the notice when the
consumer refers the notice to the entities mentioned in section 129(1)(a). If the credit
provider refuses to accept the consumer’s payment proposals, a consumer will have
only responded if the consumer refers the notice to the section 129(1)(a) entities.
[34] Properly contextualised, the respondents’ interpretation of section 129(1) is
unsustainable.
[35] The purpose of section 129 (1) is to avoid immediate litigation by compelling
the credit provider to first notify the consumer of the default and of the consumer’s
rights. Section 130(1)(b)(i) seeks to further avoid litigation where, amongst others,
the consumer has responded to the section 129(1) notice. In my view, the purpose of
sections 129(1) and 130(1)(b)(i), if read together, is to give a consumer in default
ample opportunity to avoid litigation. My view is supported if regard is had to the Act’s
preamble wherein it is stated that one of the Act’s purposes is “to promote a
consistent enforcement framework relating to consumer credit.”
[36] The respondents’ interpretation is that section 129(1) affords a consumer who
has defaulted on the terms of a credit agreement a second , legislative -mandated,
bite at the cherry . In the respondents’ interpretation, the credit provider will have no
choice but to delay litigation if the consumer contacts the credit provider and offer s to
choice but to delay litigation if the consumer contacts the credit provider and offer s to
pay part of the arrears over a period . Such an interpretation would encourage a
10
defaulting consumer to make a half -hearted attempt at settling the arrears . I do not
read section 129(1) to come to assistance of those consumers.
[37] The parties did not refer me to any case law. But i n my research, I came
across FFS Finance t/a Ford Credit v Van Der Merwe ,3 wherein the facts were as
follows: The credit provider applied for default judgment following the consumer’s
default o f monthly instalments in terms of a vehicle finance agreement. The
consumer contacted the credit provider to make payment arrangements. The credit
provider informed the consumer to settle 50% of the arrears immediately and the
balance within 3 months. The consumer could not make such an undertaking; hence,
no agreement had been concluded.
[38] The court held that the credit provider had preference for only one payment
option, being the one proposed by the credit provider. The court held that by
reaching out, the consumer had proven that the consumer had no hostile mindset ,
but rather that the consumer understood the issue and was keen to resolve the
issue. The court held that the credit provider’s approach had “the tendency to negate
a genuine attempt made to reach a resolution of the indebtedness without resorting
to litigation as envisaged in the NCA ”.4 The court held that a credit provider should
meaningfully engage with a consumer and that negotiating alternative payment terms
should never be a tick -box event. A credit provider may no t see the consumer’s
response as a “noisy irritation to be endured” by the credit provider. 5 The court held
that a consumer’s proposal is an essential pre-requisite for litigation.
[39] I support the notion that the NCA compels credit providers to treat consumers
with fairness and dignity, but I disagree that section 129(1) imposes that obligation.
Section 129(1) imposes an obligation on the consumer to respond to the default by
either rectifying it or referring the matter to any of the therein listed entities. A
either rectifying it or referring the matter to any of the therein listed entities. A
consumer who fails to convince the credit provider to accept the consumer’s payment
proposal is not defenceless. The consumer will be at liberty to refer the matter, and
once that is done, litigation may not be commenced.
3 FFS Finance t/a Ford Credit v Van Der Merwe [2025] ZAWCHC 230.
4 Ibid at para 8.
5 Ibid at para 10.
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[40] In my view, the dictum in FFS Finance t/a Ford Credit may result in courts
having to investigate the fairness of every offer to settle arrears made by a consumer
by, amongst others, having to consider the consumer’s financial position. This
investigation will only be done after litigation has been commenced, thereby leaving
the parties uncertain as to whether the section 129(1) response was indeed a
response. In my view, such an exercise would be impractical and not be sanctioned
by the NCA.
[41] I have also read my sister Leso’s judgment in Firstrand Bank Limited v
Ligcabho Property Trust and Others .6 She found, amongst others, that the credit
provider’s refusal to engage in mediation in terms of Uniform Rule 41A was at odds
with the purpose of the NCA. In the current matter, the credit provider had engaged
with the consumer and complied with the terms of the payment arrangement. The
current matter is thus distinguishable on the facts from the matter that served before
my sister.
[42] Section 129(1) requires the credit provider to inform the consumer, and
nothing more. To respond to the section 129(1)(a) notice is to settle the arrears or to
refer the notice to a debt counsellor, an alternative dispute resolution agent, the
consumer court or the ombud. Anything short of that is a non -response to the notice.
The respondents’ response to the bank’s section 129(1) notice was thus not a
response as envisaged in section 129(1). It follows that t he respondents’ first special
plea does not constitute a defence to the bank’s claim.
The second special plea: Non-compliance with loan agreement
[43] In their second special plea, the respondents argue that the bank was not
authorised to commence litigation because of clause 4.25.19 of the loan agreement,
which states as follows:
6 Firstrand Bank Limited v Ligcabho Property Trust and Others (121975/2025) [2026] ZAMPMBHC 93
(20 August 2026).
12
“4.25.19. If the Act applies and the Customer is in default under this agreement, then
the Lender will draw the default to the Customer’s notice in writing, and will propose
that the Customer refers this agreement to a Debt Counsellor with the intent to
develop and agree on a plan to bring the payments under this agreement up to date.
The Customer further has the right to approach an Alternative Dispute Resolution
Agent, Consumer Court or Ombud with jurisdiction in order to resolve any dispute
under this ag reement. If the Customer is in default under the agreement which is
being reviewed in terms of Section 86 of the Act and the review has not been
finalised within 60 (sixty) business days after the date on which the Customer applied
for the debt review, the Lender may give notice to terminate such review in the
prescribed manner to the Customer, the Debt Counsellor and the National Credit
Regulator. If the Customer is in default and has been in default under this agreement
for at least 20 (twenty) business d ays and at least 10 (ten) business days have
elapsed since the Lender delivered a notice to the Customer as stipulated in Section
86(10) or Section 129(1) of the Act, as the case may be, and if in the case of a notice
as stipulated in Section 129(1), the Customer has not responded to that notice or
responded to the notice by rejecting the Lender’s proposal, the Lender may then
approach the Court for an Order to enforce or terminate this agreement.”
[44] Clause 4.25.19 aligns with sections 129(1)(a) and 130 (1). What I have said
about the respondents’ first special plea equally applies to their second special plea.
The second special plea is also no defence to the bank’s claim.
The third special plea: Non-compliance with section 130(3)
[45] In their third special plea, the respondents say that they have paid R353 500
towards the arrears for the period between November 2022 and September 2024.
The respondents say they then applied for debt review and informed the bank of their
The respondents say they then applied for debt review and informed the bank of their
debt review applications on 6 December 2024.
[46] The respondents argue that because of their payments towards the arrears
and their debt review applications , the court may in terms of section 130(3) only
determine the matter if the court is satisfied that the bank has complied with section
129, which the respondents say the bank has not.
13
[47] I have already found that t he bank has complied with section 129. Th e third
special plea is thus also without substance and no defence to the bank’s claim.
The fourth special plea: Non-compliance with s ections 130(3)(b) and
130(3)(c)(ii)(cc)
[48] The respondents say th at their debt review application was served on the
bank on 6 March 2025 and that they had complied with the November 2022 payment
arrangement. The respondents argue that they have responded to the section 129(1)
notice, thereby precluding the bank from commencing litigation. I have already found
that the respondents’ response to the section 129(1) notice was not a response as
envisaged in section 129(1). It follows that th e fourth special plea is also without
merit.
The fifth special plea: Non-compliance with sections 130(4) and 86(2)
[49] The respondents argue that the bank was supposed to issue a new
section 129(1)(a) notice and because the bank did not do so, the respondents were
entitled to apply for debt review, which effectively suspended the bank’s litigation in
terms of section 88(3).
[50] Section 129(1) regulates a pre -litigation procedure. It does not regulate the
procedure after issuing of summons. Here, the bank has issued summons and then
pended the litigation once the respondents had paid part of the arrears. A few years
later, when it became clear that the respondents could not rectify the default, the
bank proceeded with litigation. The bank did this after serving the application for
default judgment on the respondents , prompting the respondents to enter an
appearance to defend.
[51] I deviate. The obligation to serve subsequently on a party in matters where the
summons had been served more than 6 months before the next step is undertaken is
set out in our division’s practice directives. In this matter, our practice directives have
14
alerted the respondents to the bank’s intention to proceed with litigation. Our practice
directives have secured fairness to the respondents.
[52] I have already found that the respondents have not responded to the
section 129(1) notice. The bank was thus entitled to proceed with litigation, whilst the
respondents’ debt review application had no impact on the bank’s pending litigation.
The respondents’ fifth special plea is thus also without substance.
The respondents’ defence to the bank’s claim
[53] The respondents have not mounted any defence to the claim by the bank. It
follows that the respondents failed to show a bona fide defence or any triable issue. I
accordingly grant summary judgment against the respondents as per the order
hereunder.
[54] In conclusion. The NCA comes to the assistance of those co nsumers who
adhere to its provisions. The respondents had an opportunity to refer the matter to ,
amongst others, a debt counsellor but failed to do so, thereby losing the protection
offered by the NCA.
The bank’s rule 46 application
[55] The property in question is the respondents’ primary residence. Whilst it is
always difficult to declare a person’s property specially executable, such an order
must be made once an applicant has made out a case therefor, and no basis exists
for the court to exercise its discretion in favour of the respondent(s).
[56] The respondents have, in their opposing papers, not seriously engaged any
issue relating to the executability of the property. The ir opposing papers are mostly a
repeat of their special pleas.
15
[57] The parties agreed that the current market value of the property is
R1 800 000, whilst the current municipal value is R1 050 000. The outstanding
municipal rates and taxes are R4000, whilst the outstanding bond is R1 755 879.53.
It would be fair to set the reserve price as high as possible to hopefully secure a
purchase price favourable to the respondents. In my view, R1 700 000 represents a
reserve price fair to all the parties.
[58] To allow the respondents the opportunity to sell the property in the open
market, I will suspend the issuing of a writ of execution for a period of six months.
Costs
[59] It is trite that, in these types of matters , costs follow the result. The bank’s
counsel urged me to award costs on an attorney scale because the respondents
have agreed to such a cost order in the loan agreement. I disagree. In FFS Finance
South Africa (RF) (Pty) t/a Ford Credit,7 the court reminded that punitive cost orders
in commercial contracts should not be rubberstamped by courts. Our courts have
held that c osts are within the discretion of the court and not subject to the parties’
agreement.8 Nothing in the respondents’ litigation behaviour is indicative of any
ulterior motive.
[60] Whilst it is so that I have rejected the respondents’ special pleas, the delay in
finalisation cannot be blamed on the respondents alone. The bank has enrolled this
matter on the opposed motion roll, instead of the unopposed motion roll, as directed
by our division’s practice directives. Had the bank done so, this matter would have
been dealt with months ago.
[61] I see no reason to deviate from th e principle that costs follow the result. The
appropriate cost order is party and party costs on scale A. In my view, scale B would
7 FFS Finance South Africa (RF) (Pty) t/a Ford Credit v Lamola [2023] ZAGPPHC 1891; 2024 (2) SA
427 (GP) at para 36.
8 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 (2) SA 1045 at para 25.
16
appropriately address the value of the bank’s claim and the technical nature of the
respondents’ defences.
Order
[62] I therefore make the following order:
1. Summary judgment is granted against the defendants/respondents, the one
paying the other to be absolved, as follows:
1.1. Payment of the amount of R1 718 249.23.
1.2. Interest on the amount of R1 718 249.23 calculated at a rate of 11.10% per
annum, calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears from 1 DECEMBER
2022 to date of payment (both days inclusive);
1.3. An order specially declaring the undermentioned immovable property
executable in favour of the plaintiff:
ERF 9[...] K[...] EXTENSION 2 TOWNSHIP
REGISTRATION DIVISION I.S., PROVINCE OF MPUMALANGA
MEASURING 1950 (ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND FIFTY) SQUARE
METRES
HELD BY DEED OF TRANSFER T9674/2015
SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED THEREIN
(Better known as 1[...] K[...] AVENUE, K[...] EXTENSION 2,2271 and hereinafter
referred to as “the mortgaged property”).
1.4. Authorising the registrar to issue a writ of execution , after 28 February 2027 ,
against the mortgaged property.
17
1.5. Setting a reserve price at R 1 700 000 (One million seven hundred thousand
Rand).
1.6. Costs of the suit on a party and party scale, scale B.
__________________
SCHUTTE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG
18
Appearances
On behalf of the applicant: Advocate Ellis
On behalf of the respondents: Advocate le Roux
Date heard: 13 August 2026
Judgment delivered: 26 August 2026