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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: CT02796/ADJ/2026
In the matter between:
LOUGOT PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD APPLICANT
(Registration number: 1992/003294/07)
And
WONDERLAND PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD FIRST RESPONDENT
(Registration number:2024/095469/07)
THE REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES SECOND RESPONDENT
___________________________________________________________________
Presiding Member of the Companies Tribunal: NOMAGCISA CAWE
Date of Decision: 24 August 2026
___________________________________________________________________
DECISION (Reasons and an Order)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Applicant is LOUGOT PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (Pty) Ltd, a company
duly incorporated in terms of the company laws of South Africa, with registration
number 199 2/003294/07, and its registered address at 147 North Reef Road,
Bedfordview, Gauteng, 2007.
Applicant forms part of The Wonderland Group of Companies, including the entity
WONDERLAND PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (Pty) Ltd.
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1.2 Applicant conducts business as “Wonderland Properties” under The Wonderland
Group”. It’s primary business activity is the development of, and investment in
property, in various sectors in classes 36 and 37.
1.3 First Respondent is Wonderland Properties (Pty) Ltd., a company incorporated
in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Act”), with registration number
2024/095469/07, and having its registered address at : 5 Blackwood Drive, Hout
Bay, Western Cape, 7806.
1.4 According to its website, First Respondent offers services in the hospitality
industry which are identical to those offered by the Applicant under one of its
subsidiaries- Views Boutique Hotel & Spa.
1.5 Second Respondent is the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission
(“CIPC), a juristic person established in terms of s 185(1) of the Act. No relief is
sought against it unless it opposes this application.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. During October 2025, Applicant engaged First Respondent via email, to the
email addresses reflected on the registration documents (CAPE@PTY-
ONLINE and p[ …] @worldsapart.co.za), about its objection to First
Respondent’s name. First Respondent, through one of its directors, refused to
deregister its name.
2.2. On 08 June 2026 this Tribunal stamped Applicant’s CTR 142 application for
relief, and on 10 June 2026, served a copy of same on the First Respondent
by email, at the addresses cited in paragraph 2.1 above.
2.3. First Respondent did not file an answer ing affidavit within twenty (20)
business days, following which, on 31 July 2026, Applicant applied for a
default order in terms of Regulation 153 of the Companies Regulations (the
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Regulations).1
2.4. Manamela, Shawn Phooko, a Senior Associate at Applicant’s attorneys ,
deposed to the affidavit in support of the application for default judgment.
3. ISSUES
3.1 Applicant requests the Tribunal to make a finding that First Respondent’s name
does not satisfy the provisions of s 11(2) of the Act. It submits that the inclusion
of the word ‘Wonderland Properties ’ in First Respondent’s name infringes its
registered trademarks.
3.2 Applicant’s representative, Erna Barnard, submits that Applicant claims
common law and statutory rights in the words ‘WONDERLAND PROPERTIES’
given its widespread and extensive use thereof as far back as 1992, and its use
of the ‘WONDERLAND PROPERTIES ’ trademark in various fields , including
hospitality.
3.3 Applicant submits that First Respondent’s name is identical to the Applicant’s
subsidiary’s trademark “WONDERLAND PROPERTIES” and is therefore,
confusingly and deceptively similar to Applicants’ registered trademark.
3.4 Applicant further submits that First Respondent’s activities clearly overlap with
those of the Applicant in relation to services offered.2 This is likely to result in
First Respondent taking unfair advantage of, or be ing detrimental to, the
distinctive character and repute of its well -known trademark and amounts to an
infringement of s34(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
3.5 Applicant also contends that it has not authoris ed the use by First Respondent
of its trademark and that it will suffer prejudice if denied relief, especially as it
does not have control over the quality of the products or services offered by
First Respondent. It submits, further, that members of the public are very likely
1 GN R351 in GG 34239 of 26 April 2011.
2 Evidence in support of this was attached to the application
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to believe that First Respondent was formed for the purpose of rendering
services on behalf of the Applicant , hence its claim that the First Respondents
company name does not comply with the provisions of s11(2)(b) of the Act.
4. APPLICABLE LAW
4.1 Section 11 of the Act provides as follows: “11. Criteria for names of
companies. —
(1) ... .
(2) The name of a company must— (a) not be the same as—
(i) the name of another company, domesticated company, registered external
company, close corporation or co-operative;
...
(b) not be confusingly similar to a name, trademark , mark, word or expression
contemplated in paragraph (a) unless—
(i) in the case of names referred to in paragraph (a) (i), each company
bearing any such similar name is a member of the same group of companies;
…
(c) not falsely imply or suggest, or be such as would reasonably mislead a
person to believe incorrectly, that the company—
(i) is part of, or associated with, any other person or entity;”
4.2 Section 160 of the Act deals with disputes concerning reservation or
registration of company names and enunciates the jurisdiction of the
Companies Tribunal as follows:
(1) A person to whom a notice is delivered in terms of this Act with respect to
an application for reservation of a name, registration of a defensive name,
application to transfer the reservation of a name or the registration of a
defensive name, or the registration of a company’s name, or any other
person with an interest in the name of a company, may apply to the
Companies Tribunal in the prescribed manner and form for a
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determination whether the name, or the reservation, registration or
use of the name, or the transfer of any such reservation or
registration of a name, satisfies the requirements of this Act.
(2) An application in terms of subsection (1) may be made— (a) within three
months after the date of a notice contemplated in subsection (1), if the
applicant received such a notice; or (b) on good cause shown at any time
after the date of the reservation or registration of the name that is the
subject of the application, in any other case.
(3) After considering an application made in terms of subsection (1), and any
submissions by the applicant and any other person with an interest in the
name or proposed name that is the subject of the application, the
Companies Tribunal –:
(a) must make a determination whether that name, or the reservation,
registration or use of the name, or the transfer of the reservation or
registration of the name, satisfies the requirements of this Act; and
(b) may make an administrative order directing-
(i) the Commission to
(aa) reserve a contested name, or register a particular defensive name
that had been contested, for the applicant;
(bb) register a name or amended name that had been contested as the
name of a company;
(cc) cancel the reservation of a name, or the registration of a defensive
name; or
(dd) transfer, or cancel the transfer of, the reservation of a name, or the
registration of a defensive name; or
(ii) a company to choose a new name, and to file a notice of an amendment to
its Memorandum of Incorporation, within a period and on any conditions that
the Tribunal considers just, equitable and expedient in the circumstances,
including a condition exempting the company from the requirement to pay the
prescribed fee for filing the notice of amendment contemplated in this
paragraph.”
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4.3 Companies Regulation 153 of 2011 provides for default orders thus:
(1) If a person served with an initiating document has not filed a response within
the prescribed period, the initiating party may apply to have the order, as applied
for, issued against that person by the Tribunal.
5. EVALUATION
5.1 I am convinced that Applicant has made out a case for the main application to
be considered on a default basis and I proceed to deal with the merits of the
case.
5.2 “Similar” in section 11(2)(b) would be “having a marked resemblance or
likeness” and that the offending name should immediately bring to mind the
well-known trade mark or other name.
3 The test for “confusingly similar” is, as
in the case of passing-off: “...a reasonable likelihood that ordinary members of
the public, or a substantial section thereof, may be confused or deceived into
believing that the goods or merchandise of the former are the goods or
merchandise of the latter or are connected therewith. Whether there is such a
reasonable likelihood of confusion or deception is a question of fact to be
determined in light of the particular circumstances of the case.”
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5.3 “Confusingly similar” in Section 11(2)(b) has to be examined carefully to
determine if this is in fact so in the instant case. In considering case law on
the concept, it must be as alike in a manner that will confuse the “ordinary
reasonable careful man, i.e. not the very careful man nor the very careless
man.”
5 The “reasonable man” has been further qualified: “A rule of long
standing requires that the class of persons who are likely to be the purchasers
of the goods in question must be taken into account in determining whether
3 Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC 2001 (1) SA 844 (SCA
4 Adidas AG & another v Pepkor Retail Limited (187/12) [2013] ZASCA 3 (28 February 2013) para 28;
Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd and Others v Holiday Inns Inc. and Others 1977 (2) SA
916 (A) at 929
916 (A) at 929
5 Link Estates (Pty) Ltd v Rink Estates (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 276 (E) at 280
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there is a likelihood of confusion or deception.”6
5.4 In line with what was stated in Ewing t/a The Buttercup Dairy Company v
Buttercup Margarine Corporation Ltd 1917 (34) RPC at 232 and 238, it
can be concluded that confusion and/or deception may arise from the side- by-
side use of the trade mark and the First Respondent’s name, which can lead
to injury of the Applicant’s business, especially since it has no control
whatsoever over the quality of services rendered by the Respondent. The
doctrine of imperfect recollection has been explained by our courts
7: there is a
probability that a substantial number of people will be at least confused, if not
deceived, given the fact that an individual does not have the two marks before
him, side by side and that memory is often imperfect. In Cowbell AG v ICS
Holdings 2001 (3) SA 941 (SCA) , the court said: "the decision involves a
value judgment and that the ultimate test is whether, on a comparison of the
two marks it can properly be said that there is a reasonable likelihood of
confusion if both marks are to be used together in a normal and fair manner,
in the ordinary course of business."
5.5 It can therefore also be concluded that the word ‘Wonderland Properties ’ in
First Respondent’s name will reasonably mislead the reasonable person to
believe, incorrectly, that there is an as sociation with the Applicant’s
trademark.
5.6 In the case of Polaris Capital (Pty) Ltd v The Registrar of Companies and
Polaris Capital Management Inc. (unreported judgment, Case No.
11607/2005, CPD), the learned judge commented on undesirability in terms of
Section 45 (2) of the 1973 Companies Act:
“It is submitted that by allowing
the close corporation’s name to remain on the register, in addition to causing
deception and confusion, its registration will hinder the registrar’s role in
maintaining and promoting good governance and administration of corporate
entities in the interest of the general public.”
Thus permitting the First
entities in the interest of the general public.”
Thus permitting the First
6 Reckitt & Colman SA (Pty) Ltd v SC Johnson & Son SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 (2) SA 307 (A) at 315F-G
7 Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v United Bank Limited & Another 1991 (4) SA 780 (T) 8011 to
802B
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Respondent to keep the name ‘ WONDERLAND PROPERTIES ’ as its
company name will create confusion and hinder the Registrar from
maintaining and promoting good governance and administration of the
corporate entity in the interest of the general public. It is evident , therefore,
that the First Respondent’s company name falls within the ambit of Section
11(2) as argued on behalf of the Applicant.
5.7 Finally, I am mindful of the order handed down by Mbongwe, J. in the matter
of Comair Ltd v Kulula South Africa 8 wherein it was declared that this
Tribunal is empowered to make an administrative order directing the Registrar
of Companies to change the name of a company to its registration number , if
Respondent fails to change its name within a certain period as ordered.
6. FINDINGS
6.1 I find that the balance of convenience favours the Applicant.
6.2 Applicant has shown that First Respondent has transgressed Sections
11(2)(b) and (c): its name is confusingly similar to Applicant’s and falsely
implies, or could reasonably mislead a person to believe incorrectly, that First
Respondent is part of, or associated with the Applicant. Hence it is entitled to
an order as claimed in terms of Section 160 of the Act. This is made worse by
the fact that both entities trade in the hospitality sector in Greater Cape Town
geographical area.
6.3 The Applicant’s application is granted as set out below.
7. ORDER
7.1 An administrative order is made in terms of Section 160(3)(b)(ii) that First
Respondent change its name to one which does not incorporate the word
‘WONDERLAND PROPERTIES’, within 60 days of receipt of this order, as it is
8 Comair Ltd v Kulula South Africa (Pty) Ltd (unreported) High Court of South Africa, Gauteng
Division, Pretoria, Case Nr: 65895/2019
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in contravention of Sections 11(2)(b)(iii) and (c)(i) of the Act.
7.2 This order must be served on the Respondent s by the Tribunal’s Recording
Officer (Registrar).
7.3 The First Respondent is hereby ordered to, within 60 calendar, file a notice of
amendment of its Memorandum of Incorporation.
7.4 The Second Respondent is directed to change First Respondent’s name to its
registration number (2024/095469/07, if First Respondent fails to change its
name within 60 days of receipt of this order.
7.5 There is no order as to costs against the First Respondent as the matter was
unopposed.
Nomagcisa Cawe: Member of the Companies Tribunal