REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 2025-124189
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
1.REPORTABLE: NO
2.OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3.REVISED: NO
24 AUGUST 2026 JUDGE F. DIPPENAAR
In the matter between:
GERMISTON PHASE 2 HOUSING COMPANY (PTY) LIMITED APPLICANT
(REGISTRATION NUMBER: 2000/007937/07)
t/a EKURHULENI HOUSING COMPANY
and
LEDWABA, I.L & THOSE IDENTIFIED IN
ANNEXURE “A” OF THE NOTICE OF MOTION 1ST TO 120TH RESPONDENTS
ANY FURTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF THE
UNITS IDENTIFIED IN ANNEXURE “A” TO
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THE NOTICE OF MOTION 121ST RESPONDENTS
MASHABA, C & THOSE IDENTIFIED IN
ANNEXURE “B” TO THE NOTICE OF MOTION 122ND TO 434TH RESPONDENTS
ANY FURTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF THE
UNITS IDENTIFIED IN ANNEXURE “B” TO THE
NOTICE OF MOTION 435TH RESPONDENT
THE UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF THE OF THE
UNITS IDENTIFIED IN ANNEXURE “C” TO THE
NOTICE OF MOTION 436TH RESPONDENTS
EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY 437TH RESPONDENT
QULUBA, YANDISA 438TH RESPONDENT
MOLOI, MATHUSO 439TH RESPONDENT
RACHUENE, THEMBI 440TH RESPONDENT
ZUNGU, LINDIWE 441ST RESPONDENT
A PERSON KNOWN AS GOVAN 442ND RESPONDENT
MAKWELA, DERRICK 443RD RESPONDENT
MANYAMA, ORPHAN 444TH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
legal representatives by e-mail and uploading it onto the electronic platform.
The date and time for hand -down is deemed to be 10h00 on the 24th of
AUGUST 2026.
DIPPENAAR J:
[1] This application concerns s 5(1) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 1998 (PIE) and interim eviction of the respondents. The
applicant, Germiston Phase 2 Housing Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Ekurhuleni Housing
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Company (EHCO) is a social housing institution established in terms of the Social
Housing Act 16 of 2008, duly accredited by the Social Housing Regulatory Authority
(SHRA). It is the owner and/or person in charge of four social housing developments in
the Germiston Area, known as Pharoe Park, Airport Park, Chris Hani Village and the
Delville Facility (Delville). The intention behind social housing is to provide safe, decent
low-cost housing to low-income individuals who are capable of affording rent, but are not
the poorest of the proof for whom RDP housing was conceived. It forms part of the State’s
constitutional obligations under s 26(1) and 26 (2) of the Constitution to take reasonable
legislative and other measures to achieve progressive realisation of the right of access to
adequate housing. The present application thus has a broader public interest context.
The present application concerns the Delville Projects, styled Old Delville and New
Delville, which comprises of some 360 units. The applicant is the registered owner of the
property and manages the Delville facility. Where convenient EHCO will be referred to by
name or as the applicant.
[2] The respondents are occupiers of Old Delville and New Delv ille. The respondent
occupiers of the property are categorised into three categories, listed on annexures A, B
and C respectively. They comprise the New Delville occupiers, the Old Delville occupiers
and any further occupiers listed on Annexure B and unknown persons installed by the
occupiers of the units listed in annexure C.
[3] The application is opposed by certain of the respondents, legally represented by
their attorney, Mr Silamulela. A list of those 128 respondents is attached to the answering
papers as AA128, although only 119 of those respondents provided any form of
confirmatory affidavit.
[4] At the hearing it transpired that the s 5(2) notice was not served on all the
respondents as required by s 5(2). Although those respondents have to date not opposed
respondents as required by s 5(2). Although those respondents have to date not opposed
the proceedings, the application must be postponed against them for lack of compliance
with the procedural requirements. A list of those respondents is attached to the applicant’s
proposed draft order as annexure D. Service in accordance with the procedural
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requirements was properly affected on the remaining respondents with both the
application and s 5(2) notice duly served.
[5] The 437th respondent, the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, was represented
by counsel at the hearing to address any queries from the court. It did not file any papers
in the present application.
[6] In sum and for context, EHCO’s case is that it has been the victim of widespread
rental boycotts, accompanied by occasional violence to the extent that it has lost control
of the Pharoe Park, Airport Park and Delville developments during March 2025, as well
as a substantial section of Chris Hani Village. Across the developments EHCO is
collectively owed some R 232 mi llion, as a result of which it face s collapse and the
wholesale loss of control of the social housing projects.
[7] EHCO embarked on a campaign to recover control of the developments. Eviction
orders have already been granted in this Divi sion in respect of Pharoe Park and Airport
Park. According to EHCO the litigation is interrelated and aimed at addressing the rent
boycotts, building highjacks and coordinated resistance to lawful management, which
were not isolated phenomena confi ned to a single complex , but rather formed part of a
broader organised campaign involving escalating interference and intimidation directed
at undermining EHCO’s control of its properties and its ability to fulfil its statutory mandate.
[8] The represented respondents chose not to address this case in detail in the
applicant’s supplementary founding affidavit, instead contending that it was irrelevant.
Those facts thus stand uncontroverted before this court. Although each case is to be
determined on its own merits, it cannot be concluded that that the contents of the
applicant’s supplementary affidavit are irrelevant to the current proceedings , as
contended. The affidavit paints a picture of a concerted effort by the so -called PAD 1
contended. The affidavit paints a picture of a concerted effort by the so -called PAD 1
committee to make the property ungovernable, to enforce a rental boycott and to take
1 Committee of Pharoe Park, Delville and Airport Park Complexes.
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over the occupation of the properties. A tenant’s committee (PAD) was established at the
Delville, Pharoe Park and Airport Park facilities comprising residents at the various
developments. The residents of the social housing facilities, under the leadership of PAD
began interfering with the rights and obligations of the applicant, ultimately resulting in an
urgent interdict being granted by Wepener J on 11 October 2022. That order remains
extant and prohibited the very conduct complained of by the applicant in the present
proceedings. Despite the represented respondents contending that the PAD committee
was disbanded evidence was produced confirming that PAD was still functioning long
after its alleged disbandment. It was not meaningfully disputed that since March 202 5,
the Delville facilities are fully under the control of PAD and the occupiers.
[9] The applicant’s papers particularise various instances of violence and intimidation,
which remained undeterred by an additional security presence put on the premises during
March 2025. The applicant’s case is that it lost control of the Delville Projects during
March 2025. Security personnel and contractors have been denied access to the property
and various incidences of obstruction and resistance from the occ upiers, culminating in
attempts during June 2025 to steal or damage biometrical scanners and illegally
reconnecting electricity.
[10] The applicant delivered termination notices to all the occupiers dated 20 June
2025, in which they were inter alia invited to engage with the applicant. The occupiers did
not do so. By August 2025, and as a result of an extended rental boycott, the arrears at
Dellville amounted to R 55 329 067. By February 2026, that amount had increased to
R91 495 955.99. The applicant is currently deprived of access and illegal ‘tenants’ who
do not qualify for social housing have been installed on the property without the
applicant’s consent.
applicant’s consent.
[11] The application had been launched on 28 July 2025 and enrolled for hearing on 9
September 2025. On that date the application was removed from the roll as it became
opposed by the represented respondents. It was allocated for hearing as a special motion
during August 2026.
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[12] Against this backdrop I turn to t he present application which concerns interim
eviction proceedings under s 5 of the PIE Act. In relevant part, it provides:
‘5 Urgent proceedings for eviction
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4, the owner or person in charge of land may
institute urgent proceedings for the eviction of an unlawful occupier of that land pending the
outcome of proceedings for a final order, and the court may grant such an order if it is satisfied
that-
(a) there is a real and imminent danger of substantial injury or damage to any person or
property if the unlawful occupier is not forthwith evicted from the land;
(b) the likely hardship to the owner or any other affected person if an order for eviction is not
granted, exceeds the likely hardship to the unlawful occupier against whom the order is
sought, if an order for eviction is granted; and
(c) there is no other effective remedy available.
[13] It was undisputed that the applicant is the owner of the relevant property and that
all lease agreements concluded with the occupiers were terminated during June 2025.
From the consolidated age analysis and a computation of the occupiers’ arrears, it is clear
that the arrears are substantial in certain instances amounting to amounts in excess of
three hundred thousand rands. From the undisputed facts, the inference that the
occupiers failed to pay the rentals due and the applicant was entitled to cancel the lease
agreements, is irresistible. It further lends credence to the applicant’s version of a rental
boycott. It has thus been established that the occupiers are unlawful occupiers for the
purposes of PIE.
[14] As stated, some of the respondents are legally represented. Others are not. None
of the unrepresented respondents delivered papers or participated in the proceedings.
The represented respondents, who are listed in annexure A128 of the answering affidavit
The represented respondents, who are listed in annexure A128 of the answering affidavit
sought to raise various factual disputes. In summary, they challenged compliance with all
the requirements of s 5 of the PIE Act . In their answering papers they raise issues such
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as who the highjackers of the property are and whether the property was destroyed and
contended that an alternative remedy was available.
[15] The test to determine whether a bona fide factual dispute exists on application
papers was stated thus by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Wightman:2
“Recognising that the truth almost always lies beyond mere linguistic determination the courts
have said that an applicant who seeks final relief on motion must in the event of conflict, accept
the version set up by his opponent unless the latter’s allegat ions are, in the opinion of the
court, not such as to raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact or are so far-fetched or
clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers: Plascon -
Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E -635C. See
also the analysis by Davis J in Ripoll -Dausa v Middleton NO 2005 (3) SA 141 (C) at 151A -
153C with which I respectfully agree. (I do not overlook that a reference to evidence in
circumstances discussed in the authorities may be appropriate.)
A real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the court is satisfied that
the party who purports to raise the dispute has in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously
addressed the fact said to be disputed. There will of course be instances where a bare denial
meets the requirement because there is no other way open to the disputing party and nothing
more can therefore be expected of him. But even that may not be sufficient if the fact averred
lies purely within the knowledge of the ave rring party and no basis is laid for disputing the
veracity or accuracy of the averment. When the facts averred are such that the disputing party
must necessarily possess knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer (or
countervailing evidence) if they be not true or accurate but, instead of doing so, rests his case
on a bare or ambiguous denial the court will generally have difficulty in finding that the test is
satisfied. I say ‘generally’ because factual averments seldom stand apart from a broader
matrix of circumstances all of which needs to be borne in mind when arriving at a decision. A
litigant may not necessarily recognise or understand the nuances of a bare or general denial
as against a real attempt to grapple with all relevant factual allega tions made by the other
party. But when he signs the answering affidavit, he commits himself to its contents,
inadequate as they may be, and will only in exceptional circumstances be permitted to
2 Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) paras 11 and 12.
Page 8
disavow them. There is thus a serious duty imposed upon a legal adviser who settles an
answering affidavit to ascertain and engage with facts which his client disputes and to reflect
such disputes fully and accurately in the answering affidavit. If that does not happen it should
come as no surprise that the court takes a robust view of the matter.’
[16] Those principles are apposite to the present case. Upon analysis, the issues raised
in the answering affidavit amounted to no more than bald denials and technical objections
to facts put up by the applicant that were not truly in dispute. The material facts put up by
the applicant were not meaningfully engaged by the represented respondents. Supporting
evidence in the form of amongst others, an incident report by the applicant’s security
contractor dated March 2025 and an occupancy audit report by Wakaba and partners Inc,
confirmed by confirmatory affidavits, were put up by the applicant. Applying the relevant
principles, I am not persuaded that there are any material disputes of fact on the papers
as alleged by the represented respondents . As pointed out by counsel for the applicant,
the following observation in Wightman is apposite to the present facts:
‘It seems clear that the respondents adopted or were advised to adopt an attitude to …their
answering affidavit) of placing an obstacle in the path of the appellant[applicant] at every step
of the way irrespective of whether there were valid reasons for doing so. Whatever the tactical
value of that approach, the effect was to water the force of the general denial down to a state
of insipidity into which reality, bona fides and the genuineness of the denial all disappear.’
[17] The main grounds of opposition advanced by the represented respondents were:
(a) the applicant has failed to satisfy the test for urgency; (b) the applicant has failed to
show that it is in danger of suffering imminent harm and thus fails to mee t a peremptory
show that it is in danger of suffering imminent harm and thus fails to mee t a peremptory
requirement of s 5(1); (c) the applicant has an alternative remedy in terms of s 4 of the
PIE Act.
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[18] The statutory requirements for urgency are set out in s 5 (1) of the Act. 3 It is
stringent and even more stringent than catered for in r 6(12)(a). 4 Considering the
undisputed facts, I am satisfied that the applicant has met those stringent requirements.
Given the broader factual context, the urgency was not self-created and the applicant was
entitled to call for a court’s urgent attention. As matters turned out, more than a year has
passed since the application was launched during July 2026. All parties have had more
than a reasonable opportunity to file affidavits and place their versions before court.
[19] It was not meaningfully disputed that the respondents’ conduct has placed the
provision of social housing by the applicant at great peril. The rent boycott and excessive
arrear rentals has resulted in great financial harm, the refusal of further grants by the
Municipality and has placed the very existence of the applicant at peril. Despite the
represented respondents’ protestations to the contrary, they provided no countervailing
evidence to the applicant’s contention that no further grants would be made available
from the Government’s coffers. According to the Municipality’s 2023/2024 annual report,
published on 31 January 2025, the applicant had achieved nil percent of its operat ional
and development targets across its portfolio due to poor rental collection. The grants are
performance based. It is also undisputed that the applicant is heavily reliant on rental
income to comply with its obligations.
[20] There is also harm to the general public interest as deserving beneficiaries of
social housing are being prejudiced by the unlawful actions of the occupiers. It is not
cogently disputed that many of the individual flats have been highjacked by individuals
who have no contractual or other entitlement to occupy them.
[21] None of the employees, security personnel or contractors engaged by the
[21] None of the employees, security personnel or contractors engaged by the
applicant are able to attend the property without fear of physical harm. The evidence
3 HL Hall Properties (Pty) Ltd v Alliance Church and Others [2025] 2 All SA 451 (MM) para 5 and the
authorities in note 3.
4 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Centre on Housing
Rights and Evictions and Another, Amici Curiae) 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) para 90.
Page 10
particularises incidents of threats, harassment, intimidation and violence on various
occasions. In addition there was an attempted illegal electricity connection at the property
on 3 August 2025 and an attempt to access the main switchboard on 10 August 2025 to
reconnect electricity illegally. By way of example, o n the latter occasion, firearms were
discharged, the guardroom and a table were set alight and the applicant’s security
personnel were forced to withdraw until the South African Police Serv ice intervened. A
security guard was struck with a brick and required hospitalization. The interdict granted
by Wepener J has had no effect and its terms have been ignored. The various violent
incidents described by the applicant stand uncontroverted on the papers.
[22] The bald contention by the represented respondents that the applicant has failed
to meet the threshold of imminent harm does not bear scrutiny. The harm and the ongoing
risk thereof were relief not granted appears manifest. The submission that there is no
harm because the property has not been destroyed, lacks substance. It is the loss of
control of the applicants’ asset , being the Delville facility which is relevant. The fact that
the property may not be at risk of destruction is irrelevant. The assumption of control of
the property by PAD and the unlawful occupiers and the collection of rent by anyone other
than the applicant is unlawful and in contravention of s 3(1) of PIE.
[23] The represented respondents have further not controverted the applicant’s
evidence of manifest financial har m and that it is on the brink of collapse. It stands
uncontroverted on the papers that approximately 88% of the occupiers are participating
in the rental boycott at Delville. Were a collapse to occur, it would not only cause harm to
the applicant and its employees and service providers, but also to the broader public
interest and eligible beneficiaries to the social housing scheme.
interest and eligible beneficiaries to the social housing scheme.
[24] In their confirmatory affidavits, a few of the represented re spondents sought to
provide proof of payments. These were woefully inadequate and did not establish that
those respondents were not in arrears, in many instances, the represented respondents
simply pu t up no proof of payments. The bald denial of the extensive arrears in the
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circumstances does not pass muster. Of significance is that it is not meaningfully disputed
that the majority of the respondents are employed and thus able to afford rental.
[25] The represented respondents, despite bearing the onus to prove the payments for
which they contend, did not establish more than at best a few historical payments. This
falls woefully short of discharging the burden resting upon them.5
[26] Considering the figures involved, the respondents have not made any rental
payments for extensive periods of time, resulting in substantial arrears, and savings on
the part of such respondents who have enjoyed the benefits without expending any funds
in re spect of rentals. The represented respondents’ bald contentions of the applicant
being an ‘errant landlord’ are not substantiated by cogent primary fact s and do not pass
muster.
[27] Ultimately, the case put up by the represented respondents falls woefully short of
illustrating any material likely hardship on their part. As the occupiers have retained the
rental amounts they should have paid to the applicant, whether or not they pay rent to
PAD, they can afford rental based on the funds retained. They do not stand to suffer any
prejudice.6 According to the Wakaba report, most of the occupiers are employed and thus
earn an income. Where, as here, the occupiers can afford to pay rental but elect not to
do so, instead perpetuating a rental boycott, it amounts to self -help.7 On the other hand,
the applicant’s case has illustrated that the likely hardship it stands to suffer exceeds the
likely hardship of the respondents. To mitigate any hardship the respondents may suffer,
they will be afforded until the 15th of October 2026 to procure alternative accommodation,
thus affording them well in excess of a month to do so.
5 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 1998 (1) SA 811
SCA at 823; Pillay v Krishna and Another 1946 AD 946 at 958.
SCA at 823; Pillay v Krishna and Another 1946 AD 946 at 958.
6 HL Hall Properties (Pty) Ltd v Alliance Church and Others [2025] 2 All SA 451 (MM) para 27.
7 Teaca Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v John Banza and Others (2017/36741) [2018] ZAGPJHC 72
(February 2018) paras 25, 33 and 38-39.
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[28] I am fortified in these conclusions by the findings made by Vally J in Sentsho and
Others v Germiston Phase 2 Housing Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Ekurhuleni Housing
Company and Another 8, concerning reconsideration proceedings in relation to an interim
eviction order granted in favour of the applicant pertaining to the Airport Park
Development. The applicant’s evidence was undisputed that the same conditions
pertained in those proceedings. I am in res pectful agreement with Vally J’s findings and
conclusions drawn in relation to the compliance with the s 5 requirements. Although each
case is to be determined on its own merits, the undisputed facts in the present
proceedings are the same or at least materially similar and justify the same conclusions.
[29] On a conspectus of the facts, I am satisfied that the applicant has established that
there is a real and imminent danger of substantial injury or damage to person s and the
Delville property if the unlawful occupiers are not forthwith evicted as required by s 5(1)(a)
of PIE. I am further satisfied that the applicant has established that it’s likely hardship and
that of any other affected person if an order is not granted exceeds the likely hardship to
the unlawful occupiers if an order is granted as envisaged by s 5(1)(b) of PIE.
[30] The represented respondents’ contention that the applicant has an alternative
remedy in terms of s 4 of the PIE Act, lacks merit. That contention has already been
debunked in the judgment of Vally J in Sentsho:9
‘Finally the represented respondents suggest that the applicant has an alternative remedy in
terms of s 4 of the PIE Act. That remedy is catered for in Part C of the application. The
applicant still intends to pursue that remedy. Section 5 of the Pie Act is a special remedy that
is separate from the one catered for in s 4. The latter cannot be an alternative to t he former.
It would mean that the remedy allowed for in terms of s 5 can never avail a party as that party
is granted a remedy in terms of s 4. This simply cannot be a logical interpretation of the two
sections read together. the legislature granted a party suffering harm as a result of unlawful
occupation of its property two separate and distinct remedies to stop the harm. Each remedy
8 Sentsho and Others v Germiston Phase 2 Housing Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Ekurhuleni Housing Company
and Another (2025/137575) [2026] ZAGPJHC 166 (19 February 2026).
9 Ibid, para 16.
Page 13
has its own requirements and whichever one the party elects to pursue it does so on the basis
that it is burdened with the duty to meet the requirements set out in the relevant section in
order to succeed’.
[31] I am satisfied that the applicant has no other alternative rem edy. The interdictory
relief granted by Wepener J in 2020 has not had any deterrent effect on the unlawful
conduct of the respondents. That interdict stands and it would serve no purpose to obtain
further interdictory relief. Given the conduct of the respondents, it is also in my view most
unlikely that any contempt proceedings would have the desired effect, irrespective of the
procedural burdens which would face the applicant to seek to enforce them.
[32] It follows that the applicant is entitled to the interim relief sought. I conclude that
the applicant is entitled to the relief sought against the respondents in respect of whom
the service requirements of s 5 (2) have been complied with. As properly pointed out by
applicant’s counsel at the commencement of the hearing, service of the s 5(2) notice
reflecting the hearing date of this application was not effected on certain of the
unrepresented resp ondents. It matters not that they have not thus far opposed the
proceedings. Service is a procedural requirement and must be complied with. It follows
that the application, insofar as it pertains to that category of respondents, must be
postponed sine die so that proper service can be affected. A list of such respondents is
attached to the order for ease of identification.
[33] In relation to the issue of costs, although it was argued that costs follow the result,
the interests of justice in my view dictate that the costs should at this juncture be reserved.
The issue is to be dealt with together with Part C of the application, in which a final eviction
order is sought.
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[34] In the result, I grant an order in terms of the draft order attached hereto marked X,
initialed and dated for identification purposes, together with its annexures, marked A, B ,
C, D, E and F respectively.
_______________________________
EF DIPPENAAR J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG JOHANNESBURG
HEARING
DATE OF HEARING : 11 AUGUST 2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 24 AUGUST 2026
APPEARANCES
APPLICANT’S COUNSEL : Mr C Van der Merwe
APPLICANT’S ATTORNEYS : VERMAAK MARSHALL
WELLBELOVED INC.
LEGALLY REPRESENTED10
RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL : Mr F Silamulela
LEGALLY REPRESENTED
RESPONDENTS’ ATTORNEYS : SHUMANI.F. SILAMULELA ATTORNEYS
437TH RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL : Mr EN Sithole
ATTORNEY FOR THE 437TH
RESPONDENT : MOTSOENENG BILL ATTORNEYS INC.
10 As per annex A128 of the answering papers.