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[2026] ZAGPPHC 864
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Lebea v Road Accident Fund (12772/2022) [2026] ZAGPPHC 864 (28 July 2026)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE NO: 12772/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE 28/07/2026
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
LEBEA
JEFFREY
LUCAN
.......................................
..
PLAINTIFF
ID
NUMBER: 9[...]
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
.....................................................................
..
DEFENDANT
LINK
NUMBER: 579 0599
JUDGMENT
CORAM:
ZITHA, AJ
Heard
on:
29
th
April 2026
Delivered:
28
th
July 2026
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is a delictual claim for damages as a result of a motor
vehicle collision which occurred on the 15
th
of October
2020 at R510 (Thabazimbi Road) near Thabazimbi. A motor vehicle
accident occurred when a tractor with unkown registration
details
(hereinafter referred to as the insured vehicle) driven at the time
by the plaintiff had brake failure and as a result
the plaintiff
avoided collision with other vehicles and the tractor lost control
and overturned. The accident occurred during the
plaintiff’s
course and scope of his employment with Quality Plant Hire CC
(hereinafter referred to as the insured owner).
The matter appeared
before Court by a way of Default Judgment application on the 29
th
of April 2026. The Plaintiff was a driver at the time of the
collision.
PARTIES
[2].
The plaintiff is
LEBEA JEFFREY LUCAN
an adult male, born on
the 02
nd
June 1992 and who is currently 34 (thirty four
years of age). At the time of the collision, the plaintiff was
twenty-eight (28)
years old.
[3].
The defendant is the
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
, a juristic person
established in terms of section 2(1) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56
of 1996 ("
the Act
") with full legal personality and
of address 3[...] I[...] Street, Menlo Park, Pretoria, Gauteng.
COMMON CAUSE
[4].
It is common cause that the Plaintiff was a driver
when he had a brake failure of the tractor. The date, place and time
of the collision
is not in dispute.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
[5].
The only aspect in dispute is the negligence on
the part of the insured owner of the tractor. The was an application
in terms of
Rule 33(4) of uniform rules, in terms of which the
plaintiff seeked to separate merits from quantum. Such an application
was granted.
EVIDENCE BEFORE
COURT
[6].
The Plaintiff made an application in terms of rule
38(2) and same was granted. The plaintiff relied on the following
documents:
6.1.
The section 19(f) affidavit.
6.2.
The accident report.
6.3.
The plaintiff based his claim for damages as a result of the
negligence of the owner of
the tractor to maintain the tractor in
road worthy condition
[7].
The plaintiff thereafter closed it’s case.
[8].
Defendant did not call any witnesses to testify.
The Defendant had already been barred on
the
09
th
July 2024, and there was no application before the court to uplift
the bar.
SUBMISSIONS ON
BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF
[9].
The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the
plaintiff succeeded in establishing, on balance of probabilities,
that the insured
owner was negligent to maintain the tractor.
The Plaintiff’s
counsel further submitted that there were no contradictions in the
accident report and the Plaintiff’s
testimony in whole. The
plaintiff’s version should be accepted.
It was further submitted
on behalf of the plaintiff, that in the event that the court finds
that the accident was due to the sole
negligence of the insured owner
that the defendant should be held liable hundred percent (100%) in
favour of the plaintiff’s
agreed and/or proven damages. I hold
a same view which I will elaborate later on.
THE LAW
In order to succeed in
her claim, Legal Framework and Evaluation of Evidence
[10]
Section
17 (1) of the Act reads:
17.
Liability of Fund and
agents-(1) the fund or an agent shall-
b).
be obliged to compensate any person (the third party) for any loss or
damage which the third party has suffered as a result
of any bodily
injury to himself or herself or the death of or any bodily injury to
any other person, caused by or arising from
the driving of a motor
vehicle by any person at any place within the Republic, if the injury
or death is
due to the
negligence or other wrongful act of the driver or of the owner of the
motor
vehicle
or of his or her employee in
the performance of the employee’s duties as employee
.”
[my emphasis].
[11
]
Section 18 (2) reads:
18.
Liability limited in certain cases. –
(2)
Without derogating from any
liability of the Fund or an agent to pay costs awarded against it or
such agent in any legal proceedings,
where the loss or damage
contemplated in section 17 is suffered as a result of bodily injury
to or death of any person who, at
the time of the occurrence which
caused that injury or death, was being conveyed in or on the motor
vehicle concerned and who was
an employee of the driver or owner of
that motor vehicle and the third party is entitled to compensation
under the Compensation
for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act,
1993 (Act No. 130 of 1993), in respect of such injury or death -….”
[12]
Section 19 provides as follows:
“
19.
Liability excluded in certain cases
The
Fund or an agent shall not be obliged to compensate any person in
terms of section 17 for any loss or damage-
(a)
For which neither the driver nor
the owner of the motor vehicle concerned would have been liable but
for section 21.
[13]
It is
important to note that to determine whether an injured party has a
valid claim against the
Fund, one must consider
the provisions of Section 18. If the injured party was injured in the
course and scope of their employment,
they are entitled to claim
compensation under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and
Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (“COIDA”).
If the injury
occurred during the course of employment in a motor vehicle accident,
the claim must be made through COIDA, and the
Fund’s liability
is limited to any balance not covered by COIDA. In other words, the
Fund is only responsible for the remaining
amount after the COIDA
claim.
[14]
In
this case, I must also determine whether the plaintiff’s claim
falls within the scope of section
17 of the Act, specifically assessing whether the plaintiff’s
injuries resulted from a motor vehicle accident caused by the
wrongful and negligent actions of the insured owner.
[15]
Wells
and Another v Shield Insurance Co. Ltd and Others
[1]
Corbett
J stated the following in relation to section 17:
“
The
section lays down two prerequisites of liability upon the part of a
registered insurance company for damages suffered by a third
party as
a result of bodily injury.
These
are (i) that the injury was caused by or arose out of the driving of
the insured motor vehicle and (ii) that the injury was
due to the
negligence or other unlawful act of the driver of the insured
vehicle, or the owner or his servant.
There
are thus two separate enquiries, a fact which is sometimes lost sight
of because in most cases the injury is caused by the
negligent
driving of the insured driving vehicle.”
[16]
In the unreported decision of
Maatla
v Road Accident Fund
[2]
the
court found that the twofold enquiry referred to in
Wells
supra
,
had to be answered in the affirmative, namely, that the injuries
arose out of a motor vehicle collision and secondly that the
owner of
the vehicle
in
terms
of
the
common
cause
facts
was
negligent.
Accordingly,
the
court
concluded that the defendant should be held accountable for the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff.
[17]
In
order to succeed in her claim, the plaintiff had to establish on a
balance of probabilities that her injury arose out of
the
negligent driving of a motor vehicle and that there is some
connection between the driving and her injury.
[3]
In the present case, the plaintiff will only succeed if he satisfies
the Court on a preponderance of probabilities that his version
is
true and accurate and therefore acceptable. It is trite that the
estimate of the credibility of a witness will be inextricably
bound
up with a consideration of the probabilities of the case.
[4]
Explaining
what the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities entails,
learned author Schwikkard states as follows:
[5]
‘
In
civil cases the burden of proof is discharged as a matter of
probability. The standard is often expressed as requiring proof
on a
“balance of probabilities” but that should not be
understood as requiring that the probabilities should do no
more than
favour one party in preference to the other. What is required is that
the probabilities in the case be such that, on
a preponderance, it is
probable that the particular state of affairs existed.’
[18]
And,
i
n
Stacey
v Kent
,
[6]
Kroon
J
wrote:
‘
The
inquiry after the case remains whether the plaintiff has, on a
balance of probabilities, discharged the onus of establishing
that
the collision was caused by negligence attributable to the
defendant.’
In the discussion that
follows I apply these principles of the law to the facts of the
plaintiff’s application for the determination
of the negligence
of the owner of the tractor.
[19]
In Ntsala and Others v Mutual and Federal
Insurance Co Ltd 1996(2) SA 184(T), the honourable Judge Els. Stated
the following:-
“
The
onus rests on the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the
defendant’s driver”.
EVALUATION
/APPLICATION OF THE FACTS TO THE LAW
[20]
Despite the fact that RAF’s
defense was not properly placed before the court and or properly
pleaded, this Court must be satisfied,
on the facts presented by the
plaintiff through his evidence that on a preponderance of
probabilities, (a) he suffered bodily injury;
(b) arising out of the
negligent driving of a motor vehicle, (c) the insured owner failed to
keep and maintain the tractor in a
road worthy condition.
[21]
The starting point is that the plaintiff was a
single witness. Section 16 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25
of 1965 provides
that judgment may be given in any civil proceedings
on the evidence of any single competent and credible witness. In
other words,
only credible evidence shall be sufficient to enable a
Court to give a default judgment.
[22]
There
is of course no rule of thumb or formula to apply in determining the
credibility of a single witness. The trial court
will weigh the
evidence of the single witness and consider its merits and demerits,
and having done so, decide whether it is trustworthy
and whether it
is satisfied that the truth has been told despite the shortcomings or
defects or contradictions in the witness’s
evidence.
[7]
[23]
The essence of the plaintiff’s testimony is
that the tractor had a brake failure and as result he lost control
and overturned.
[24]
It bears emphasizing that the plaintiff’s
evidence must be based on facts and nothing else, and certainly not
conjecture.
There is direct evidence of the accident and how the
alleged accident happened.
[25]
I am asked to make a finding, from the
aforegoing evidence, that the accident took place; and to draw an
inference of negligence
on the part of the insured owner,
[26]
As
is trite, there must be positive proven facts from which such
inferences can be made. If there are none, the method of inference
fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture.
[8]
[27]
On the plaintiff’s version, it follows that
the plaintiff is the one who must be taken as having possessed
knowledge of facts
regarding how the accident happened. His evidence
was, therefore, crucial. There was an affidavit deposed to by
the Plaintiff
that formed part of the unchallenged evidence. Such
evidence remains admissible. What therefore remains is circumstantial
evidence
from which it must be inferred that the plaintiff’s
injury arose from the alleged driving of the motor vehicle; and if
so,
whether the unknown owner was solely negligent.
[28]
The
cardinal rule of inferential reasoning is that the inference that is
sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved
facts; if
it is not, then the inference cannot be drawn.
[9]
The inference sought to be drawn must, furthermore, be
the ‘more natural, or plausible, conclusion from amongst
several conceivable ones’ when measured against the
probabilities.
[10]
As held in
Ocean
Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch
‘plausible’ in this context means ‘acceptable,
credible, suitable’.
[11]
[29]
In order for this Court to infer that a motor
vehicle accident occurred out of which the injury of the plaintiff
arose, and that
the accident was caused by the sole negligence of the
owner, it must be satisfied that the facts that have been set forth
by the
plaintiff reflect the probability of what took place on 15
th
of October 2020 at the time and place that he alleges that the
tractor overturned.
Single Witness
[30]
The
plaintiff's testimony is pivotal as it provides the primary account
of the circumstances surrounding the accident. While the
court
recognizes the importance of the plaintiff’s perspective, it is
essential to note that he stands as a single witness,
and his version
of events is uncorroborated by any additional evidence or testimony
from other witnesses.
[31]
It is
well established that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to
demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that
the injuries
sustained were a direct result of the negligence of the insured
party.
[32]
Notably, the
defendant did not call any witnesses to dispute or challenge the
plaintiff’s account of events. This lack of
counter-evidence
leaves the plaintiff’s version unchallenged, offering the court
no alternative perspective to consider.
The defendant’s failure
to present evidence contradicting the plaintiff'’ claims can be
seen as an implicit acceptance
of them. Although the burden of proof
rests with the plaintiff, the defendant’s omission to provide
any conflicting evidence
has a significant impact on the overall
evidentiary landscape of this case.
[33]
The court
acknowledges the unique situation of relying on the testimony of a
single witness, but the plaintiff’s evidence
remains
unchallenged and is therefore accepted as it is the only version
before the court. Beyond his accepted testimony, no further
facts or
circumstances were presented to either corroborate or contradict his
account.
[35]
A key issue
before the court is whether the Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated
that the Defendant was negligent at the time
of the accident. For the
defendant to deny liability, it must establish that the plaintiff
acted in a manner that fell below the
standard of care expected of a
reasonably competent driver. This necessitates evidence showing that
the plaintiff’s actions
directly contributed to the accident
and the resulting injuries.
[36]
After
reviewing the evidence presented in this case, the court finds that
the defendant has not provided any substantial evidence
before the
court to support a claim of negligence against the plaintiff. The
defendant did not call any witnesses to testify about
the
circumstances of the accident or offer expert opinions on driving
standards and practices. Additionally, no documentation or
other
forms of evidence were presented that would indicate any wrongdoing
or lapse in judgment on the part of the plaintiff at
the time of the
accident.
[37]
In the
absence of such evidence, the court cannot conclude that the
plaintiff was negligent. The plaintiff’s testimony,
which
stands unchallenged by the defendant, provides a clear account of the
events leading up to the accident. There is no basis
for the court to
infer negligence when the party alleging it has failed to produce any
such evidence.
[38]
The crux of
this case lies in the failure of the vehicle’s braking system,
which the plaintiff contends was due to the owner’s
lack of
maintenance and failure to keep the vehicle in good working
condition. The evidence presented before the court indicates
that the
plaintiff was operating the vehicle when the brakes failed, leading
to a loss of control and, ultimately, the accident.
The plaintiff
provided credible testimony regarding the accident, describing the
circumstances leading up to the brake failure
and the subsequent
crash, as per the accident report and the section 19(f) affidavit.
[39]
In assessing
the defendant’s liability, the court must determine whether the
owner of the vehicle exercised reasonable care
in maintaining the
vehicle. It is well-established that vehicle owners have a duty to
ensure that their vehicles are safe and roadworthy.
This duty
includes regular inspections and maintenance of critical safety
features, such as the braking system. The failure to
perform such
maintenance may constitute negligence.
[40]
In this case,
the evidence shows that the braking system was faulty at the time of
the accident. No adequate maintenance records
were presented by the
defendant to demonstrate that proper care had been taken to ensure
the vehicle was in good working order.
The absence of documentation
reflecting regular servicing of the vehicle or any corrective
measures taken to address known issues
further supports the claim of
negligence.
[41]
Consequently,
the court concludes that the owner of the vehicle, failed to meet the
required standard of care in maintaining the
vehicle in a safe and
operable condition. The brake failure clearly indicates negligence,
as it directly contributed to the accident
and the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
[42]
In
conclusion, the court determines that the accident resulted from the
negligence of the vehicle owner for failing to maintain
the vehicle
in proper driving condition, particularly due to the malfunction of
the braking system.
[43]
I am satisfied that the plaintiff has
met the burden of proof to establish that the defendant is
100% liable for the damages he sustained in the aforementioned motor
vehicle collision.
[44]
From plaintiff’s own testimony the court is
satisfied that on a balance of probabilities he has discharged the
onus placed
on him. The court is satisfied that; on a balance of
probabilities the Plaintiff has discharged the onus of showing that
the insured
owner was negligent
[45]
Taking all the evidence into consideration as well
as case law referred to above the court is satisfied that the
Defendant should
be held liable Hundred percent (100%) of the
plaintiff’s agreed and /or proven damages.
ORDER
[46]
Accordingly, I make the following order:
a) The defendant is held
liable Hundred percent (100%) of the plaintiff’s proven and/or
agreed damages.
b) The Defendant is
directed to pay the costs of the trial.
c) Separation in terms of
Rule 33(4) is granted.
d) The application in
terms of Rule 38(2) is granted.
e) The trial quantum
aspect of the trial is postponed sine die.
ZITHA. AJ
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division
Pretoria
Appearances:
On
behalf of the plaintiff:
Adv. M Sithole
Instructed by:
A Ndlovu Attorneys INC.
On
behalf of the defendant:
No appearance
[1]
Wells
and Another v Shield Insurance Co. Ltd and Others
1965
(2) SA 865
(C)
at 867.
[2]
Maatla
v Road Accident Fund (11690/11) [2015] ZAGPPHC 129
(6
March 2015) at para {15].
[3]
Kemp
v Santam Insurance Co Ltd
1975(2) SA 329 (C) at 330F;
Van
Wyk v Lewis
1924 AD 438
at 444.
[4]
National
Employers’ General Insurance Co Ltd v Jagers
[1984] 4 All SA 622
(E), at 624-5.
[5]
Schwikkard
PJ (
et
al
),
Principles of Evidence, 4th Ed, 2016, page 627, at 32.7.
[6]
1995
(3) SA 344
(ECD)
at 352I-J.
[7]
S v
Sauls
1981
(3) SA 172
(A) at 180E–G.
[8]
S
v Essack & another
1974 (1) SA 1
(A) at 16C-E, quoting with approval
Caswell
v Powell Duffryn Associates Collieries Ltd
[1939] 3 All ER 722
at 733.
[9]
R
v Blom
1939 AD 188
at 202-203.
[10]
SA
Post Office v Delacy and Another
2009 (5) SA 255
(SCA) at para 35;
Cooper
and Another v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd
(474/97)
[1999] ZASCA 97
(1 December 1999) para 7;
Govan
v Skidmore
1952 (1) SA 732
(N) at 734C-E.
[11]
1963
(4) SA 147
(A) at 159B-D.