THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case No: 432/2022
In the matter between:
MYSTIC RIVER INVESTMENTS 45 (PTY) LTD FIRST APPELLANT
KARIM ISSA MAWJI SECOND APPELLANT
and
ZAYEED PARUK INCORPORATED FIRST RESPONDENT
NAUSHAD MAHOMED ISMAIL (GORA) ABDOOLA SECOND RESPONDENT
SHAUKAT ALI MOOSA THIRD RESPONDENT
SALIM MAHOMED MOOSA FOURTH RESPONDENT
GOOLAM HOOSEN MOOSA FIFTH RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Mystic River Investments 45 (Pty) Ltd & Another v Zayeed Paruk
Incorporated & Others (Case no 432/2022) [2023] ZASCA 54 (19
April 2023)
Coram: VAN DER MERWE, SCHIPPERS, GORVEN and MATOJANE JJA and
KATHREE-SETILOANE AJA
Heard: 6 March 2023
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Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal
website and release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down is deemed to be
11h00 on 19 April 2023.
Summary: Practice – application that peregrinus provide security for costs under
rule 47 of Uniform Rules of Court – exercise of true discretion – powers of the appellate
court to interfere strictly circumscribed – court a quo exercised discretion on wrong
principle – court at large to consider application afresh – proper case for provision of
security for costs.
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ORDER
On appeal from: KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg (Vahed
J, sitting as court of first instance):
1 Save to the extent set out below, the appeal is dismissed with costs to be paid
by the second appellant.
2 Paragraph d of the order of the H igh Court is set aside and replaced with the
following:
‘The second applicant is directed to pay the costs of the applications, including
the costs of 14 May 2021.’
JUDGMENT
Van der Merwe and Matojane JJA ( Schippers and Gorven JJA and Kathree -
Setiloane AJA concurring):
Introduction
[1] The first appellant, Mystic River Investments 45 (Pty) Ltd (Mystic River) and the
second appellant, Mr Karim Issa M awji, instituted an application against the
respondents in the KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court, Piete rmaritzburg (the
high court). The first respondent is Zayeed Paruk Incorporated , and the second
respondent is Mr Naushad Mahomed Ismail Abdoola. The third, fourth and fif th
respondents are Mr Shaukat Ali Moosa, Mr Salim Mahomed Moosa and Mr Goolam
Hoosen Moosa, respectively (the Moosa brothers). On the back of allegations that the
respondents had ‘hijacked’ and were ‘looting’ Mystic River, the appellants sought an
order: preventing the respondents from continuing to unlawfully represent and make
decisions purportedly on behalf of, or in the name of Mystic Rive r; ordering the
respondents to return funds belonging to Mystic River, which were misappropriated or
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diverted from it; compelling the respondents to provide full and proper account s in
respect of the affairs of Mystic River; for those accounts to be debated; and for Mystic
River to be paid any amounts due to it pursuant to such statement and debatement of
account.
[2] The respondents served the second appellant with notices in terms of rule 47(1)
of the Uniform Rules of Court, calling upon him to furnish security for costs in the main
application. They contended that he is a peregrinus of the court, has no assets in the
Republic of South Africa (the Republic) and would be unable to pay their costs should
they be successful in the main application. Security for costs was ordered by Vahed
J. The appeal against that order is with the leave of the high court. The first respondent
abides the outcome of the appeal.
Factual background
[3] The second appellant is the sole director of Mystic River. He brought the main
application in his representative capacity and in his personal capacit y. It is common
cause that he is a peregrinus and owns no assets in the Republic. He had a temporary
presence in the United Kingdom (the UK) and stated that he had moved to Portugal in
2018 and intended to reside in Portugal permanently.
[4] Because the second appellant declined to furnish security for costs, the second
to fifth respondents delivered separate applications seeking to stay the main
application and ordering security for costs. The se applications were set down for
hearing on 14 May 2021. However, the parties, by agreement following the suggestion
of Vahed J, elected to forego a hearing on 14 May 2021, permitting the matter to be
decided without oral argument.
[5] On 4 January 2022, the high court handed down judgment ordering the second
appellant to provide security for costs in an amount to be fixed by the registrar. The
appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the applications, including the wasted
costs of the opposed hearing intended for 14 May 2021.
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[6] The primary issue for determination is whether the high court correctly
exercised its discretion by ordering the second appellant to furnish security for costs.
A secondary issue pertains to the order directing the appellants to pay the wasted
costs of 14 May 2021.
The relevant legal principles
[7] We now turn to consider the legal position regarding security for costs. Security
for costs is a discretionary remedy that a court may grant to a defendant who has a
reasonable apprehension that the plaintiff will not be able to pay the costs of litigation
if the plaintiffs claim fails. An incola is not, as a matter of course , entitled to demand
security from a peregrinus claimant. It is at the discretion of the court to make such an
order after an investigation of the circumstances and if equ ity and fairness to both
litigants dictate that such an order be made.1 There is no justification for requiring the
court to exercise its discretion in favour of a peregrinus only sparingly.2
[8] In Shepstone & Wylie & Others v Geyser NO (Shepstone & Wylie ),3 Hefer JA
further explained the applicable test. He said that a court should not fetter its own
discretion, particularly not by adopting an approach which brooks of no departure
except in special circumstances. It must decide each case upon consideration of all
the circumstances without adopting a predisposition either in favour or against granting
security. The court must carry out a balancing exercise. On the one hand , it must
weigh the injustice to the plaintiff if prevented from pursuing a proper claim by an order
for security. Against that, it must weigh the injustice to the defendant if no security is
ordered and at the trial, the plaintiff’s claim fails, and the defendant is unable to recover
the costs incurred in defence of the claim.
[9] In Exploitatie- en Beleggingsmaatschappij Argonauten 11 BV and Another v
Honig,4 this Court referred to a general rule of practice that a peregrinus should provide
security for an incola's costs. However, a reading of the judgment as a whole makes
1 Magida v Minister of Police [1987] 1 All SA 218 (A) at 226 ( Magida); see also Blastrite (Pty) Ltd v
Genpaco Ltd; In re: Genpaco Ltd v Blastrite (Pty) Ltd [2015] ZAWCHC 76; 2016 (2) SA 622 (WCC) para
10 (Blastrite).
2 Ibid Magida at 226; see also Ibid Blastrite para 28.
3Shepstone & Wylie & Others v Geyser NO [1998] 3 All SA 349 (A); 1998 (3) SA 1036 (SCA) at 1045I-
1045C.
4 Fn 3 above paras 18-19.
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it clear that the court did not intend to depart from the settled principles in Magida v
Minister of Police (Magida)5 and Shepstone & Wylie.
[10] The extent of this Court’s power to interfere with the high court exercise of
discretion depends on the nature of the discretion concerned. In Trencon Construction
(Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd and Another,
Khampepe J held that:
‘In order to decipher the standard of interference that an appellate court is justified in applying,
a distinction between two types of discretion emerged in our case law. That distinction is now
deeply rooted in the law governing the relationsh ip between appeal courts and courts of first
instance. Therefore, the proper approach on appeal is for an appellate court to ascertain
whether the discretion exercised by the lower court was a discretion in the true sense or
whether it was a discretion in the loose sense. The importance of the distinction is that either
type of discretion will dictate the standard of interference that an appellate court must apply.’6
[11] In Media Workers Association of South Africa and Others v Press Corporation
of South Africa Ltd (‘Perskor’),7 EM Grosskopf JA explained that the restraint on the
appellate court’s power of interference only applies to discretion in the strict or narrow
sense. He explained that discretion in the strict sense involves a choice between
different but equally permissible alternatives, whilst discretion in the broad sense
means no more than that the court is entitled to have regard to a number of disparate
and incommensurable features in coming to a decision.
[12] The court in Shepstone & Wylie,8 left open the question as to how a discretion
to order security for costs should be classified. This question has since been settled
by t he Constitutional Court in Giddey NO v JC Barnard & Partners (Giddey NO) ,9
where it set out the following guidelines to determine the extent of the appellate court’s
power to substitute its own determination for that of the high court. The court held that:
5 Magida fn 1 above.
6 Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited and
Another [2015] ZACC 22; 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC); 2015 (10) BCLR 1199 (CC) para 83.
7 Media Workers Association of South Africa and Others v Press Corporation of South Africa Ltd
(‘Perskor’) [1992] 2 All SA 453 (A); 1992 (4) SA 791 at 796H-I and 800E-G.
8Shepstone & Wylie & Others v Geyser NO [1998] 3 All SA 349 (A); 1998 (3) SA 1036 (SCA) at 1044-
1045G.
9Giddey NO v JC Barnard & Partners [2006] ZACC 13; 2007 (5) SA 525 (CC); 2007 (2) BCLR 125 (CC)
paras 8 and 30.
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‘…The court of first instance… is best placed to make an assessment of the relevant facts
and correct legal principles, and it would not be appropriate for an appellate court to interfere
with that decision as long as it is judicially made on the basis of the cor rect facts and legal
principles. If the court takes into account irrelevant considerations or bases the exercise of its
discretion on wrong legal principles, its judgment may be overturned on appeal. Beyond that,
however, the decision of the court of first instance will be unassailable.’10
Analysis
[13] In its judgment, the high court fully quoted the relevant passages from Magida
and Shepstone & Wylie. Nevertheless, the high court adopted a predisposition that a
peregrinus is obliged to furnish security for costs when demanded by an incola. The
high court, therefore, did what Shepstone & Wylie said it should not do. In the
circumstances, the high court erred by applying a wrong principle.
[14] Furthermore, the high court appears to have misread the judgment in Blastrite
(Pty) Ltd v Genpaco Ltd; In re: Genpaco Ltd v Blastrite (Pty) Ltd (Blastrite).11 It stated
that Blastrite affirmed the existence of a general, but not inflexible, rule that a
peregrinus must furnish security for costs. This was quite incorrect. In Blastrite, the
court asked whether, in terms of the practice, security for costs was required purely
because the litigant was a peregrinus who owned no immovable property in this
country.12 The court answered the question in the negative , holding that a court had
the discretion to order security and had to take into account the particular
circumstances of the case and consideration of fairness and equity for both parties.13
Following the approach articulated in Magida, the court stated that there was no
justification for the principle that a court should exercise its discretion in favo ur of a
peregrinus only sparingly.14
10 Fn 10 above para 22.
11 Fn 1 above.
12Ibid para 28.
13 Ibid para 28.
14 Ibid para 28.
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[15] Thus, the high court erred in holding that , as a general rule, a peregrinus is
obliged to furnish security for costs . This misdirection justifies interference by this
Court. That being so, this Court is at large to consider the application afresh.
[16] The second applicant submits that it is unreasonable and unnecessary to
require security for costs from him as, first, Mystic River, an incola, has the means to
and thus could effectively cover any adverse costs awarded. Second, he argues that
the application is that of Mystic River, that the application is for its benefit, and that it
should accordingly pay the costs if they arise. Third, he states that his involvement
does not expand the case or create additional costs exposure for the respondents as
they would have to answer essentially the same case as if Mystic River is the sole
litigant, and the relief sought would be identical.
[17] These contentions are unacceptable. The second appellant alleges that a
funding and profit share agreement exists between him in his personal capacity and
entities under his control, on the one hand, and the Moosa brothers , on the other, in
terms of which the second appellant and his entities would be entitled to 50 per cent
profit in respect of the development of any property by Mystic River. On his own
showing, one of the main purposes of the main application is to retain funds in , or
return funds to, Mystic River for the second appellant and the entities under his control
to claim 50 per cent profit in respect of the development of property by Mystic River.
However, t he Moosa brothers claim to be the ultimate shareholders or beneficial
owners of Mystic River. The second appellant did not dispute t his under oath.
Therefore, should the second appellant not be ordered to furnish security for costs and
should the main application fail, the effect might well be that the Moosa brothers would
(through Mystic River ) bear the costs of unsuccessful litigation brought against the
respondents by and for the benefit of the second appellant.
[18] The second appellant states that the respondents may recover their costs from
him in the UK or Portugal as the legal systems in those countries would allow
enforcement of South African cost orders. This implies that he can afford any costs
order that may be ordered. Whilst it would not be impossible for the respondents to
enforce any costs order against the second app ellant abroad, the respondents will
have to incur increased expenses and be subjected to uncertainty and inconvenience,
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which has been found by this Court to be one of the fundamental reasons why a
peregrinus should provide security.15
[19] In the final analysis, the balancing exercise referred to in Shepstone & Wylie
amounts to this. The second appellant does not plead poverty. He does not complain
that an order of security would cause an injustice in the sense that it would prevent
him from pursuing the main application. There is, thus, nothing really on his side of the
scale. But if no security is ordered and there is a cost order against the second
appellant (whether jointly or severally with Mystic River or not), the respondents would
suffer the inconvenience, delay and additional costs involved in enforcing a cost order
in a foreign jurisdiction.
[20] Fairness and equity dictate that the second appellant should be ordered to
provide security for costs as he involved himself in the matter in his personal capacity
so that when the monies due to Mystic River are returned to it, he could claim his 50
per cent share of the profit. He could have simply withdrawn from the matter in order
to defeat the application for security if he was indeed litigating solely for the benefit of
Mystic River. We are satisfied that it is fair and equitable to all the parties involved to
require the second appellant to furnish security for the respondents’ costs in the main
application.
[21] The high court erred in directing that the appellants pay the costs of the
applications to provide security jointly and severally. There was no basis for a costs
order against Mystic River. The second appellant should have been ordered to pay
the costs of these applications. We consider it fair and just that these costs should
include the costs of 14 May 2021. Being the unsuccessful party, the second appellant
should pay the costs of the appeal. The respondents did not ask for the costs of two
counsel on appeal.
[22] In the result, the following order is made:
1 Save to the extent set out below, the appeal is dismissed with costs to be paid
by the second appellant.
15 Op cit fn 3 para 19.
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2 Paragraph d of the order of the High Court is set aside and replaced with the
following:
‘The second applicant is directed to pay the costs of the applications, including
the costs of 14 May 2021.’
__________________________
C H G VAN DER MERWE
JUDGE OF APPEAL
__________________________
K E MATOJANE
JUDGE OF APPEAL
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APPEARANCES
For appellant: M Du Plessis SC
Instructed by: Webber Wentzel, Johannesburg
Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein
For first respondent: M Jooste
Instructed by: Amod's Attorneys, Durban
Matsepes, Bloemfontein.
For second respondent: M C Tucker (with N L Nickel)
Instructed by: Nourse Incorporated, Durban
Matsepes, Bloemfontein.
For third to fifth respondents: I Veerasamy (with E Mizrachi)
Instructed by: Sameera Cassimjee Attorneys, Pietermaritzburg
Honey Incorporated, Bloemfontein.