About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
2018
>>
[2018] ZASCA 102
|
|
Friedshelf 325 (Pty) Limited and Another v Mokwena (652/17) [2018] ZASCA 102 (5 July 2018)
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
No: 652/17
In
the matter between:
FRIEDSHELF
325 (PTY) LIMITED
FIRST
APPELLANT
IAN
RICHARD BAILIE
SECOND APPELLANT
and
SIZANE
BETTY MOKWENA
RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Friedshelf
325 (Pty) Ltd & another v Mokwena
(652/17)
[2018] ZASCA 102
(5 July 2018)
Coram:
Maya
P, Mbha, Van der Merwe and Schippers JJA and Mothle AJA
Heard:
11
and 29 May 2018
Delivered:
5
July 2018
Summary:
Land
reform – labour tenant – person who has a right to reside
on a farm under the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act
3 of 1996 –
‘farm’ defined as a portion of land under the Subdivision
of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 –
subject land in area of
jurisdiction of a municipality – not agricultural land –
respondent not a labour tenant but
an ‘occupier’ as
defined in the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
–
appeal upheld.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Land
Claims Court, Randburg (Ncube AJ sitting as court of first instance):
1
The
appeal is upheld.
2
The
order of the Land Claims Court is set aside and replaced with the
following order:
‘
The
plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.’
JUDGMENT
Schippers
JA (Maya P, Mbha and Van der Merwe JJA and Mothle AJA concurring):
[1]
Two
issues arise in this appeal. The first is whether certain land known
as Portion 50 of the farm Kromdraai 292 JS, Emalahleni,
Mpumalanga
(the subject property), on which the respondent (Ms Mokwena) resides,
constitutes a ‘farm’ as contemplated
in the Land Reform
(Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (the LTA). The second, which has to be
determined only if the first issue is
decided against the appellants,
is whether Ms Mokwena had the right to use cropping and grazing land
on the subject property and
in consideration of such rights provided
her labour to the owner thereof.
[2]
The
basic facts can be shortly stated. Ms Mokwena, who was 71 when the
case was heard in 2016, has been living on the subject property
since
1992. It was previously owned by her former employer, Mr Neil
Francis. It is now in the registered ownership of the first
appellant, Friedshelf 325 (Pty) Ltd. The second appellant, Mr Ian
Bailie, is the sole shareholder and director of the first appellant.
[3]
In
August 2015 Ms Mokwena instituted an action in the Land Claims Court
(LCC). She claimed an order that she be declared a labour
tenant
under the LTA, and that she be awarded that portion of the subject
property that she and her family were using on 2 June
1995. In
support of her claim for labour tenancy, Ms Mokwena alleged the
following in her statement of case. She and her family
lived on the
subject property since 1992. As at 2 June 1995 they resided and
continued to reside on the subject property, exercised
the right to
use a portion thereof for cropping and grazing purposes, and in
consideration of the right to occupy and use the subject
property,
provided labour to its former owner, Mr Francis. Ms Mokwena did
not terminate her labour tenancy by leaving the
farm, appointing a
successor or waiving her rights. Her late father had lived on the
farm Elasfontein, near Arnot, had the right
to crop and graze on it
and in consideration of that right, provided labour to the owner of
that farm. All of these allegations
were denied in the plea.
[4]
The
parties agreed that the question whether Ms Mokwena was a labour
tenant would be decided first, and that her claim for a portion
of
the subject property would be postponed. In the ensuing trial, Ms
Mokwena testified that in 1982 she left Groblersdal in search
of
employment in Witbank, where Mr Francis employed her as a domestic
worker. She looked after his children and did the washing,
ironing
and cooking. She was paid R150 per month and received annual salary
increases.
[5]
The
Francis family left Witbank when Mr Francis bought the subject
property. He told Ms Mokwena that he would be farming on it and
that
the same would apply to her. The Francis family moved to the subject
property in 1992, together with Ms Mokwena, her children,
grandchildren and mother. She continued to receive her monthly salary
and said that she had an oral arrangement with Mr Francis
that she
would look after his children and he would give her a piece of land,
on which she now lives. He built a four-roomed house
for Ms Mokwena
and her family. In terms of their arrangement she was also allowed to
grow crops and keep livestock. She planted
vegetables and maize, and
kept cows and chickens. According to Ms Mokwena, Mr Francis gave her
the piece of land, granted her cropping
and grazing rights and paid
her a salary, in return for the domestic work she did and her labour
in raising Mr Francis’ children.
[6]
Mr
Francis left the subject property in 2002. The first appellant bought
the property at a sale in execution in 2003. Ms Mokwena
and her
family continued living on it. She said that she never worked for Mr
Bailie. He came to her home and told her that the
entire property was
his, as she put it, ‘the land is all … one thing’.
She denied this. In her words,
‘
I
said no, this piece belongs to me, referring to where I was
residing’.
[7]
Ms
Mokwena said that when she left Groblersdal to look for work, her
father was already working on the farm Elasfontein, where he
lived.
Mr Francis was not the registered owner of Elasfontein which Mr
Mokwena worked and ploughed. He was not paid for that work
but was
given a piece of land to plough and a home on that farm. Her father
kept cattle, horses, sheep and chickens, and also planted
crops such
as maize and beans. All of this evidence went unchallenged.
[8]
Mr
Bailie did not testify and the appellants closed their case without
adducing any evidence. But they raised a preliminary point
that the
subject property was not a farm as contemplated in the LTA, on the
basis that it was located within the area of jurisdiction
of the
Emalahleni Local Municipality.
[9]
The
LCC dismissed the preliminary point. It held that the subject
property was ‘agricultural land’ within the meaning
of
that term in the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 (the
Agricultural Land Act), and therefore was a ‘farm’
as
envisaged in the LTA. The court found that had Ms Mokwena not
provided labour to Mr Francis, she would not have been permitted
to
reside, plant crops or graze stock on the subject property. The
contract of labour tenancy was not one concluded between equals
and,
having regard to the combined effect of the substance of the
arrangements entered into between Ms Mokwena and Mr Francis,
Ms
Mokwena was a labour tenant. The appeal against this decision is with
the leave of the LCC.
[10]
I turn
to consider the first issue – whether the subject property is a
‘farm’ as defined in the LTA. Section 1
of the LTA
provides that a labour tenant means a person–
‘
(a)
who is residing or has the right to reside on a farm;
(b)
who
has or has had the right to use cropping or grazing land on the farm,
referred to in paragraph
(a),
… and in consideration of such right provides or has provided
labour to the owner …; and
(c)
whose
parent or grandparent resided on a farm and had the use of cropping
or grazing
land
on such farm or another farm of the owner, and in consideration of
such right provided or provides labour to the owner or lessee
of such
or such other farm’.
[11]
Section
1 of the LTA defines a ‘farm’ as meaning ‘a portion
or portions of agricultural land as defined in the
Subdivision of
Agricultural Land Act’.
The
Agricultural Land Act, in relevant part, defines ‘agricultural
land’ as meaning any land except–
‘
(a)
land situated in the area of jurisdiction of a municipal council,
city council, town
council,
village council, village management board, village management
council, local board,
health
board or health committee … and in the province of the
Transvaal, an area in respect
of
which a local area committee has been established under section 21(1)
of the Transvaal
Board
for the Development of Peri-Urban Areas Ordinance, 1943 (Ordinance 20
of 1943 of
the
Transvaal), but excluding any such land declared by the Minister
after consultation with
the
executive committee concerned and by notice in the
Gazette
to
be agricultural land for the
purposes
of this Act;
…
(f)
land
which the Minister after consultation with the executive committee
concerned and by notice in the
Gazette
excludes from the provisions of this Act:
Provided
that land situated in the area of jurisdiction of a transitional
council as defined in s 1 of the Local Government Transition
Act,
1993 (Act 209 of 1993), which immediately prior to the first election
of the members of such transitional council was classified
as
agricultural land, shall remain classified as such’.
[12]
The
following facts were common cause in the LCC. At the relevant times
and from 1971, the subject property fell within the area
of
jurisdiction of the Witbank Municipality. Immediately prior to the
first election of the members of the Witbank Transitional
Local
Municipality, it was situated within the area of jurisdiction of the
relevant transitional council. The subject property
is currently
situated within the area of jurisdiction of the Emalahleni Local
Municipality. The title deed of the subject property
states that it
shall be used solely for residential and agricultural purposes, ie
the number of buildings shall not exceed one
residence, together with
further buildings and structures required for the purposes of
agriculture. According to its zoning certificate,
the subject
property is zoned ‘AGRICULTURAL (Primary uses: Agricultural
buildings and Dwelling house)’.
[13]
On the
first issue the appellants’ case was straightforward. They
contended that since 1971 the subject property was not agricultural
land because it had been incorporated into the area of jurisdiction
of the former Witbank Municipality. Therefore, it was exempted
from
the definition of ‘agricultural land’ in the Agricultural
Land Act and consequently did not fall within the definition
of a
‘farm’ as contemplated in the LTA.
[14]
The
LCC concluded that the term ‘agricultural land’ in the
Agricultural Land Act should be interpreted ‘to include
land
which is situated within the area of jurisdiction of any municipality
which is used for agricultural purposes or which is
agricultural in
character’. It came to this conclusion apparently on the basis
of a ‘purposive interpretation’
of the word, ‘farm’
as defined in the LTA, and ‘agricultural land’ in the
Agricultural Land Act, having
regard to s 25(6) of the
Constitution;
[1]
the purposes of
the LTA; and s 39(2) of the Constitution.
[2]
[15]
It is
a settled rule of statutory interpretation that words in a statute
must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning and be
construed in
the light of their context. That context is not limited to the
language of the rest of the statute, but includes the
subject matter
of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose and within limits, its
background.
[3]
Put tersely, when
interpreting legislation, what must be considered is the language
used; the context in which the relevant provision
appears; and the
apparent purpose to which it is directed.
[4]
[16]
It is
also settled that s 39(2) of the Constitution requires courts to
‘adopt the interpretation which better promotes the
spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’.
[5]
As in the case of
the interpretation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994
(the Restitution Act), which must be understood
purposively because
it is remedial legislation linked to the Constitution, when
interpreting the LTA, ‘a generous construction
over a merely
textual or legalistic one in order to afford claimants the fullest
possible protection of their constitutional guarantees’
must be
preferred.
[6]
However, while s
39(2) of the Constitution enjoins courts to prefer interpretations of
legislation that fall within constitutional
bounds over those that do
not, it is subject to the proviso ‘that such an interpretation
can be reasonably ascribed to the
section’.
[7]
[17]
The
main purposes of the LTA, according to its long title, are to provide
for the acquisition of land and rights in land by labour
tenants, and
for security of tenure of labour tenants and those occupying or using
land as a result of their association with labour
tenants. The
preamble to the LTA states that it was passed because labour tenancy
in this country is the result of racially discriminatory
laws and
practices that led to the systematic breach of human rights and
denial of access to land; to ensure the protection of
labour tenants
who are persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination so as to
promote their full and equal enjoyment of human
rights and freedoms;
and to ensure that labour tenants are not further prejudiced.
[18]
With
these principles in mind, I turn to the construction of ‘agricultural
land’ as defined in the Agricultural Land
Act. The inevitable
starting point is the language of the provision.
[8]
It states that
agricultural land is any land, except land situated in the area of
jurisdiction of a municipal council and various
other local
authorities and structures. The wording of the definition makes it
clear that there is a distinction between ‘any
land’ on
the one hand, and land situated in the area of jurisdiction of a
municipal council on the other. The former constitutes
agricultural
land, the latter not. The definition expressly excludes land situated
in the area of jurisdiction of a municipality.
It says nothing about
land in ‘any municipality which is
used
for agricultural purposes or which is agricultural in character
’.
[9]
The definition, on
its plain language, is the clearest indication that the legislature
did not intend that municipal land used for
agricultural purposes,
should be regarded as ‘agricultural land’ as defined in
the Agricultural Land Act.
[19]
This
brings me to the proviso to the definition of ‘agricultural
land’. The reason for its inclusion in the definition
was
explained in
Wary
Holdings
as follows:
[10]
‘
The
introduction of the proviso into the definition of “agricultural
land” was dictated by the fact that, in terms of
the Transition
Act, transitional councils were established resulting in the then
existing “agricultural land” falling
within the
jurisdiction of the transitional councils and thereby becoming
municipal land. It was in order to ensure (at least
pro
tempore
)
that “agricultural land” retained its status, despite its
falling within the jurisdiction of a transitional council,
that the
proviso was added to the definition. The corollary thereof ….
is that the intention was that the functional area
of agriculture
continue (at least
pro
tempore
)
to repose in the Minister, including the administration of the
Agricultural Land Act. No doubt it was realised by the legislature
that, despite the establishment of transitional councils, it was
necessary for the existence of “agricultural land”,
and
the Minister’s control and administration thereof in order to
achieve the purpose of the Agricultural Land Act, to continue,
so as
to ensure that “agricultural land”, and its productive
capacity, would not be eradicated as a result of the transition
to
democracy. This fact was recognised by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
terms of its comment that the situation would otherwise
have been
untenable.’
[20]
The
interpretation to be given to the proviso, the Constitutional Court
said,
‘
is
that the duration of the classification of land as “agricultural
land” was not tied to the life of transitional councils,
and
that the reference therein to “land situated within the
jurisdiction of a transitional council” was dictated by
the
factual position which then obtained and which had to be addressed,
and the way that was done was … by pinpointing the
stage from
which land classified as “agricultural land” would remain
so classified.’
[11]
[21]
As
mentioned above, the subject property had been incorporated into the
area of jurisdiction of the Witbank Municipality in 1971.
From that
date it was no longer agricultural land because it fell within the
area of jurisdiction of a municipality. As was said
in
Kotzé
:
[12]
‘
It
was submitted by the first respondent, correctly in my view, that the
language of the Act must be interpreted to mean what it
meant when
the Act was promulgated …. Agricultural land therefore still
exists for the purposes of the relevant Act. It
is all land, except
land that was situated within the area of jurisdiction of the
structures named in section 1 of Act 70 of 1970,
at the last point in
time at which those structures actually still existed. Agricultural
land that was classified as such and was
situated within the area of
jurisdiction of an earlier transitional council in terms of Act 209
of 1993, therefore also remains
agricultural land.
’
(My translation.)
[22]
At the
last point in time of the existence of the former Witbank
Municipality, the subject land was situated within the area of
jurisdiction of that Municipality. As such, it was excluded from the
definition of agricultural land. Immediately prior to the
first
election of the members of the transitional council, the subject land
was situated in the area of jurisdiction of that council,
but it was
not classified as agricultural land.
[23]
Thus,
on the plain wording of the definition of ‘agricultural land’
in the Agricultural Land Act, having regard to its
placement and
purpose in the statutory scheme, the subject property is not a ‘farm’
as envisaged in the LTA.
This
plain wording is supported by the immediate context – the
subject matter of the Agricultural Land Act and its purpose
–
to prevent the fragmentation of agricultural land into small
uneconomic units, in the national interest.
[13]
In order to achieve
that purpose, the legislature restricted the right of landowners to
subdivide agricultural land; and prohibited
the subdivision or sale
of such land without the written consent of the Minister of
Agriculture (the Minister).
[14]
[24]
The
Minister’s wide-ranging powers of regulation and control in
respect of agricultural land, were summarised in
Wary
Holdings
as follows:
[15]
‘
(a)
The Minister may “in [her] discretion” refuse an
application for her consent (s (2)).
(b)
The
Minister also has the discretion to grant an application for her
consent subject to the imposition of conditions, including
conditions
as to the purpose for or manner in which the land may be used (s
(2)
(a)
).
(c)
The Minister has the
power to enforce any condition so imposed (ss (3)).
(d)
The Minister may
also vary or cancel any such condition (ss (4)).
(e)
The Minister may
consider whether or not the land is to be used for agricultural
purposes and, if satisfied that it will not be
so used, she must
consult with the relevant provincial authority before granting her
consent to the application. In such cases
the provincial authority
has the power to determine conditions with regard to the purpose for
or manner in which the land may be
used, and to enforce them, or to
vary or cancel them (ss (2)
(b)
,
(3) and (4)).’
[25]
When
the purpose of the Agricultural Land Act and the extensive powers
granted to the Minister under it are considered, the legislative
intention in the LTA in defining a ‘farm’ as meaning a
portion of agricultural land as defined in the Agricultural
Land Act,
is readily apparent – the security of tenure of labour tenants,
ensuring their protection and safeguarding them
against prejudice.
This is entirely consistent with the purposes of the LTA. The
legislature was aware of the restrictions imposed
on the subdivision
and sale of agricultural land by the Agricultural Land Act, and that
only the Minister has the power to exclude
land from the provisions
of the latter Act, which would give labour tenants greater security
and advance the purposes of the LTA.
[26]
An
interpretation that farm land does not include land in a municipality
used for agricultural purposes, is further supported by
the wider
context of land reform. The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of
1997 (ESTA), which like the LTA has its genesis
in s 25(6) of the
Constitution, expressly grants security of tenure to occupiers of
land designated for agricultural purposes,
within a township. Section
2 of ESTA provides, inter alia:
‘
(1)
… this Act shall apply to all land other than land in a
township established, approved, proclaimed or otherwise recognised
as
such in terms of any law, or encircled by such a township or
townships, but including–
(a)
any
land within such a township which has been designated for
agricultural purposes in terms of any law; and
(b)
any
land within such a township which has been established, approved,
proclaimed or otherwise recognised after 4 February 1997,
in respect
only of a person who was an occupier immediately prior to such
establishment, approval, proclamation or recognition.
(2)
Land in issue in any civil proceedings in terms of this Act shall be
presumed to fall
within the scope of the Act unless the contrary is
proved.’
[27]
The
legislature has thus made specific provision to secure the tenure of
persons occupying land in a township (formerly undeveloped
segregated
urban areas which have been incorporated into municipalities and
towns) designated or used for agricultural purposes.
The LCC’s
interpretation runs counter to the definition of a ‘farm’
in, and the purposes of, the LTA. It also
disregards s 2 of ESTA and
its aims – which include security of land tenure to a
particular category of beneficiary –
an occupier
.
[16]
[28]
An
‘occupier’ is defined in ESTA as,
‘
a
person residing on land which belongs to another person, and who has
on 4 February 1997 or thereafter had consent or another right
in law
to do so, but excluding–
(a)
…
(b)
a
person using or intending to use the land in question mainly for
industrial, mining, commercial or commercial farming purposes,
but
including a person who works the land himself or herself and does not
employ any person who is not a member of his or her family;
and
(c)
a
person who has an income in excess of the prescribed amount.’
[29]
The
exclusions in subsections
(b)
and
(c)
do not apply in this case. On the facts, Ms Mokwena qualifies as an
occupier in terms of ESTA. She has been residing on the subject
property with consent since 1992, and has been working the land
herself. Indeed, counsel for the appellants, in argument before
us,
rightly conceded that Ms Mokwena was an occupier as contemplated in
ESTA. In this regard, he indicated that a settlement proposal
had
been made to Ms Mokwena’s attorneys and the matter was
postponed in order to give the parties an opportunity to attempt
to
resolve it. Subsequently the registrar of this Court was informed
that the parties were unable to settle the matter. By reason
of the
conclusion to which I have come, it is unnecessary to determine the
second issue.
[30]
To sum
up. Having regard to the meaning of ‘farm’ in the LTA,
the context in which the definition appears and its purpose
in the
statutory scheme, it cannot ‘be interpreted to include land
which is situated within the area of jurisdiction of any
municipality
which is used for agricultural purposes or which is agricultural in
character’. On a purposive approach,
in the light of s
39(2) of the Constitution, the LCC’s interpretation cannot
reasonably be ascribed to the definition.
[17]
In this regard the dictum of Schreiner JA in
Bhana
v Dönges
,
[18]
valid nearly 80 years ago, still holds true:
‘
Ultimately,
when the meaning of the language in the context is ascertained, it
must be applied regardless of the consequences and
even despite the
interpreter’s firm belief, not supportable by factors within
the limits of interpretation, that the legislator
had some other
intention.’
[31]
What
remains is the issue of costs. The appellants sought a costs order
against Ms Mokwena. It is beyond question that she sought
to enforce
her right to legally secure tenure enshrined in s 25(6) of the
Constitution, and given effect to in the LTA. That being
so, the
principle that a costs order would hinder the advancement of
constitutional justice applies.
[19]
Further, apart from raising an important constitutional issue, this
appeal relates to the proper interpretation of the LTA that
is
beneficial not only to the parties in this case, but also to all
claimants for legally secure tenure, similarly situated.
[20]
There is accordingly no justification for an order that Ms Mokwena be
directed to pay costs. The parties agreed that each party
would pay
its or her own costs occasioned by the postponement of the appeal on
11 May 2018.
[32]
The
following order is issued:
1
The
appeal is upheld.
2
The
order of the Land Claims Court is set aside and replaced with the
following order:
‘
The
plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.’
_______________________
A Schippers
Judge of Appeal
APPEARANCES
For
Appellant:
J De Beer
(with R Ellis)
Instructed by:
Ian Bailie
Attorneys, Witbank
Honey Attorneys,
Bloemfontein
For
Respondent:
D Whittington
Instructed by:
AY Bhayat Attorneys,
Lonehill
Bezuidenhout Inc,
Bloemfontein
[1]
Section 25(6) of the
Constitution provides:
‘
A
person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.’
[2]
Section 39(2) of the
Constitution reads:
‘
When
interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote
the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’
[3]
Jaga v
Dönges, NO & another;
Bhana
v Dönges NO & another
1950
(4) SA 653
(A) at 664E-H, affirmed in
Bato
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism & others
[2004]
ZACC 15
;
2004 (4) SA 490
(CC) para 89.
[4]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2012] ZASCA 13
;
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) para 18;
AB
& another v Minister of Social Development
[2016] ZACC 43
;
2017 (3) SA 570
(CC)
para 274.
[5]
Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v
Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another
[2008]
ZACC 12
;
2009 (1) SA 337
(CC) para 45.
[6]
Department of Land Affairs &
others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd
[2007]
ZACC 12
;
2007 (6) SA 199
(CC) para 53.
[7]
Investigating Directorate:
Serious Economic Offences & others v Hyundai Motor Distributors
(Pty) Ltd & others In re: Hyundai
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd &
others v Smit NO & others
[2000]
ZACC 12
;
2001 (1) SA 545
(CC) para 23;
University
of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic & others v Minister of Justice
and Correctional Services & others
[2016]
ZACC 32
;
2016 (6) SA 596
(CC) para 135.
[8]
Natal Joint Municipal Pension
Fund
fn 4 para 18.
[9]
Emphasis added.
[10]
Wary Holdings
fn
5 para 56.
[11]
Wary Holdings
fn
5 para 62.
[12]
Kotzé v Minister van
Landbou en andere
2003
(1) SA 445
(T) at 454I-455B. The relevant passage reads:
‘
Namens
die eerste respondent is myns insiens tereg aangevoer dat die
bewoording van die Wet uitgelé moet word om te beteken
wat
dit beteken het toe die Wet gemaak is. … Landbougrond bestaan
gevolglik steeds vir die doeleindes van die betrokke
Wet. Dit is
alle grond, behalwe grond wat geleë was binne die regsgebied
van die strukture wat in art 1 van Wet 70 van 1970
genoem word, op
die laaste tydstip wat daardie strukture inderdaad nog bestaan het.
Landbougrond wat as sodanig geklassifiseer
is en binne die
regsgebied van ‘n vroeëre oorgangsraad in terme van Wet
209 van 1993 geleë is, is dus ook steeds
landbougrond.’
[13]
Wary Holdings
fn
5 para 13, affirming
Geue
& another v Van der Lith & another
2004 (3) SA 333 (SCA).
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Wary Holdings
fn
5 para 13.
[16]
LAWSA
2014
(2 ed) vol 14 para 127.
[17]
Hyundai
fn
7 para 32.
[18]
Footnote 3 at 664F.
[19]
Biowatch Trust v Registrar,
Genetic Resources, & others
[2009]
ZACC14;
2009 (6) SA 232
(CC) paras 16 and 24.
[20]
Barkhuizen v Napier
[2007]
ZACC 5
;
2007 (5) SA 323
(CC) para 90.