Bodies Under Construction CC and Others v Permasolve Investments (Pty) Ltd (19457/2023) [2023] ZAWCHC 326 (20 December 2023)

82 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Spoliation — Alternative power supply — Applicants, gym tenants of the respondent, disconnected from alternative power supply installed by the respondent — Dispute over additional payment for power supply referred to arbitration — Applicants claimed unlawful disconnection constituted spoliation — Court held that the applicants had a quasi-possessory right to the alternative power supply, integral to their use of the premises, and ordered reconnection to the power supply pending arbitration.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an urgent spoliation application in which the applicants sought interim restoration of access to an alternative electricity supply (a generator-based power supply) at leased commercial premises, after the respondent landlord caused the applicants to be disconnected from that supply during load shedding.


The parties were Bodies Under Construction CC, Specialised Weight Endurance and Aerobic Training CC, and Fluidity Wellness CC as applicants (collectively operating a high-end gym business), and Permasolve Investments (Pty) Ltd as respondent (the owner/landlord of premises in a shopping centre).


The matter was heard in the Western Cape Division of the High Court. It proceeded on an urgent basis on 17 November 2023, when the court granted interim relief directing reconnection to the alternative power supply, together with ancillary orders aimed at having the underlying payment dispute resolved by arbitration. The respondent delivered a notice seeking leave to appeal the day after the interim order was granted, and later requested reasons. The reasons for the interim order were delivered on 20 December 2023.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned whether the respondent could, pending arbitration about additional “diesel recovery” or similar charges, unilaterally disconnect the applicants from an alternative electricity supply that had historically been available to them as tenants, and whether that conduct constituted spoliation of a closely connected quasi-possessory right associated with the applicants’ occupation and use of the leased premises.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that the applicants had leased premises from the respondent for the express purpose of operating a gymnasium and related services, and that they had been tenants for more than a decade. The gym was located in a shopping centre, and the respondent had installed a generator that could supply electricity to tenants during load shedding. The generator switched on automatically when the municipal supply was interrupted.


It was also not in dispute that the applicants had used this alternative power supply for many years during load shedding, and that the ability to continue operating during power interruptions was important to their business. The court treated the applicants’ sustained historical use of the alternative supply, and the disruption caused by disconnection, as material to characterising the right asserted for spoliation purposes.


The judgment recorded that the lease agreement did not provide for a separate additional payment for access to the alternative power supply. About two years before the litigation, the parties concluded an addendum in which the applicants agreed to pay an all-inclusive monthly fee for expenses related to leasing the premises, with the effect (as described in the judgment) that the applicants would no longer pay separately for electricity consumed at the premises.


After the addendum, the respondent demanded—described in the judgment as “out of the blue”—that the applicants pay an additional amount towards the costs of the alternative power supply, under threat of disconnection. The applicants did not accept this demand. The parties then agreed that the dispute about whether any additional payment was owed (and the interpretation of the addendum in that regard) would be referred to private arbitration, and steps were taken towards finalising an arbitration agreement and appointing an arbitrator.


A critical factual development, relied upon by the court, was that during the period when arbitration discussions were ongoing, the respondent disconnected the applicants from the alternative power supply, with the practical result that the gym experienced load shedding at the premises. The judgment treated the deprivation as undisputed in the sense that the respondent’s conduct had the effect of preventing the applicants from using the alternative supply.


The applicants brought the urgent spoliation application shortly thereafter, seeking reconnection pending arbitration. The judgment did not determine the merits of the underlying contractual dispute about payment; rather, it focused on whether the respondent’s disconnection amounted to unlawful self-help justifying restoration.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the applicants established the requirements for the mandament van spolie in circumstances where the subject of the alleged spoliation was not physical occupation of the premises itself, but continued access to an alternative electricity supply used during load shedding.


This required the court to determine whether the asserted entitlement to the alternative power supply constituted a form of quasi-possession (an incorporeal interest protected through spoliation where the “use” is closely connected to possession of a tangible thing), or whether it was merely a personal right not protected by spoliation.


The dispute therefore primarily concerned the application of legal principles to facts, namely the classification of the applicants’ historical use of the alternative power supply and whether its disconnection substantially interfered with possession of the leased premises in a manner recognised by spoliation doctrine. It also involved an assessment of whether the respondent’s conduct amounted to unlawful deprivation through self-help, as distinct from the lawful assertion of contractual rights (which the court treated as a matter to be resolved in arbitration).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter through established spoliation doctrine. It emphasised that spoliation is a robust and extraordinary remedy directed at preventing self-help and restoring the status quo ante, and that once the requirements are satisfied a court has limited discretion.


The court identified the two essential allegations required for spoliation: first, that the claimant was in peaceful and undisturbed possession; and second, that the respondent unlawfully deprived the claimant of that possession. While acknowledging that incorporeal rights are not “possessed” in the ordinary sense, the court accepted that South African law recognises spoliation protection in the context of quasi-possession, where the “possession” of the alleged right lies in its actual use, provided that the use is closely connected with possession of a tangible thing.


In applying these principles, the court considered whether the applicants’ use of the alternative power supply was sufficiently incidental to, and closely connected with, their possession and use of the leased premises to qualify as a close-connected quasi-possessory right. It described such a right as one that arises where a person’s relationship to property has developed beyond the transient, and where recognition provides security and stability to someone with a substantial connection to the property.


The judgment treated the applicants’ right to use the alternative electricity supply as historic in nature and critical to the use of the premises for the gym business. On the facts, the court found that without this access the applicants’ possession and use of the premises would be significantly disrupted, particularly given the unpredictability and practical impact of load shedding. The court accepted that the disconnection of the alternative supply amounted to a substantial interference with possession of the premises and therefore fell within the category of quasi-possession protected by spoliation principles, as articulated in the case law to which the court referred.


A further consideration in the court’s reasoning was the respondent’s conduct in disconnecting the applicants despite ongoing arbitration discussions aimed at resolving the underlying dispute about payment for the generator supply. The court considered that the respondent had taken the law into its own hands to enforce a contested levy that had not historically been charged, which aligned with the kind of self-help that spoliation seeks to prevent.


On costs, the court linked the adverse costs order to the conclusion that the respondent acted unlawfully by disconnecting the alternative supply in the context of pending arbitration engagement and a longstanding status quo.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted interim urgent relief. It ordered the respondent to immediately reconnect the premises occupied by the applicants to an alternative power supply so that they could continue occupation and use of the premises. In the event of non-compliance, the court authorised the sheriff to effect reconnection to the alternative electricity supply installed at the property.


The court directed that the parties’ dispute regarding whether the applicants were required to pay for the alternative power supply over and above rental under the addendum would be referred to arbitration. The reconnection relief was made conditional: if the applicants failed to submit the dispute to arbitration within 45 days, the reconnection orders would lapse.


The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings on the party-and-party scale, including the costs of two counsel if retained.


Cases Cited


Shoprite Checkers Ltd v Pangbourne Properties Ltd 1994 (1) SA 616 (W).


Du Randt v Du Randt 1995 (1) SA 501 (O).


Makeshift 1190 (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers 2020 (5) SA 538 (WCC).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.


Rules of Court Cited


No specific Uniform Rules of Court were cited in the judgment. The judgment referred generally to the court’s practice directions in relation to requests for reasons and the filing of the court file.


Held


The court held that the applicants’ longstanding use of the respondent’s alternative power supply during load shedding constituted a closely connected quasi-possessory right incidental to their possession and use of the leased premises, and that the respondent’s unilateral disconnection amounted to an unlawful deprivation for purposes of spoliation.


The court accordingly restored the status quo by ordering reconnection on an urgent interim basis, pending arbitration of the underlying contractual dispute about whether additional payment for the alternative supply was due.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Spoliation is a remedy aimed at preventing self-help and restoring the status quo ante. Once the requirements are met, it operates as a robust remedy and leaves the court with limited discretion as to restoration.


A claimant must allege and establish peaceful and undisturbed possession and unlawful deprivation. The remedy is not concerned with the merits of competing rights to the property or service, which are to be resolved in appropriate proceedings (here, arbitration).


Although incorporeal rights cannot be possessed in the ordinary sense, spoliation protection may extend to quasi-possession where the “possession” consists in the actual use of a right that is closely connected to possession of a tangible thing, such that interference with the use substantially interferes with possession of the thing itself.


Where a historically exercised use (such as access to a service integral to the occupation and use of premises) is critical to the effective enjoyment of the premises, unilateral termination of that use by a landlord may constitute spoliation if it substantially disrupts possession and amounts to unlawful self-help.

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[2023] ZAWCHC 326
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Bodies Under Construction CC and Others v Permasolve Investments (Pty) Ltd (19457/2023) [2023] ZAWCHC 326 (20 December 2023)

FLYNOTES:
.
CIVIL
LAW – Spoliation –
Alternative
power supply

Gym tenants of respondent – Having used electricity from
generator that respondent installed for tenants –
Dispute
over additional amount payable agreed to be referred to
arbitration – Gym disconnected from alternative power
supply
– Close-connected quasi-possessory rights discussed –
To provide security and stability to individuals
who have
developed a substantial connection to a property – Right was
historic in nature and critical to use of premises
– Without
this right, the applicant’s possession would have been
significantly disrupted – Reconnection
ordered.
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION,
CAPE TOWN
Case no. 19457/2023
In
the matter between
BODIES UNDER
CONSTRUCTION CC
First
Applicant
SPECIALISED WEIGHT
ENDURANCE AND AEROBIC TRAINING CC
Second
Applicant
FLUIDITY WELLNESS
CC
Third
Applicant
and
PERMASOLVE
INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
Respondent
Coram:  Wille, J
Heard:  17 November
2023
Order:  17 November
2023
Application for Leave to
Appeal:  18 November 2023
Reasons Requested:
27 November 2023
Reasons
Delivered:  20 December 2023
REASONS
WILLE,
J:
Introduction
[1]
I found myself in the fast lane with this application for
spoliation.  After hearing extensive
arguments in the morning, I
issued an interim injunction in the late afternoon. Strangely, the
following day (a Saturday morning),
the respondent emailed my
registrar a notice requesting leave to appeal.  I can only
interpret this as an adverse reaction
to the injunction I had issued
the previous afternoon.  Or it was an attempt by the respondent
not to abide by the injunction's
terms.
[2]
Belatedly, and more than a week later, the respondent arranged for a
request for reasons to be sent
to my registrar together with the
court file, as required by our practice directions.  This
happened in the last week of term
and is the reason for the delay in
sending this statement of reasons.
[3]
I issued an interim order with some of the following wording: (a)
that the matter is categorised as
a matter of urgency; (b) that the
respondent was directed to immediately reconnect the premises
occupied by the applicants
[1]
,
to an alternative power supply so that the applicants may continue
occupation thereof; (c) if the respondent fails to comply with
the
order the court’s sheriff was authorised to reconnect the
premises occupied by the applicants to an alternative electricity

supply installed at the property so that the applicants may resume
occupation of the premises; (d) that the applicants would refer
to
arbitration the dispute between the parties as to whether the
applicants are required to pay for the alternative power supply
over
and above the rental paid according to the addendum entered into
between the parties ; (e) that if the applicants fail to
submit the
dispute to arbitration as described above within forty-five days of
this order, the reconnection orders would lapse,
and (f) the
respondent would bear the costs of the proceedings on a party and
party scale schedule, including the costs of two
counsel (if
retained).
[4]
Undoubtedly, I granted interim relief pending the outcome of the
arbitration between the applicants
and the respondent.  Accordingly,
it is incomprehensible why the respondent immediately applied for
leave to appeal and then,
belatedly, applied for reasons.  I
must, therefore, conclude that the respondent has yet to take steps
to advance the application
for leave to appeal in terms of this
court's practice directions.
Overview
[5]
The applicants operate an exclusive high-end gym, which they lease
from the respondent.  This gym
is located in a shopping centre.
They have been tenants of the respondent for more than a
decade.  The respondent has
installed a generator that their
tenants can use during load shedding.  The applicants have used
this alternative energy source
for many years when load shedding
occurs.  This generator switches on automatically when the power
supply is interrupted,
so the respondent’s tenants, including
the applicants, are spared load shedding.
[6]
This alternative power supply is necessary so that the applicants can
offer certain specialised fitness
classes to their members.  Load
shedding is financially and reputationally disastrous for the
applicants' business.  Over
the last ten years, the applicants
have never paid the respondent any additional levy or further
financial contribution for using
the alternative power supply.
[7]
The lease agreement does not provide for any additional payments in
this regard.  About two years
ago, an addendum to the lease was
executed in which the applicants agreed to pay the respondent an
all-inclusive monthly fee for
all expenses related to the lease of
the premises.
[8]
Some eighteen months later, and after the addendum to the lease had
been entered into, the respondent
‘out of the blue’
demanded that the applicants pay an additional amount towards the
cost of the alternative power supply
under threat of disconnection.
The applicants did not agree to this.  The parties agreed to
take the dispute to private arbitration.
The dispute centred on
the correct interpretation of the second addendum regarding these
additional costs for the alternative
power supply.
[9]
The applicants claimed that while the respondent negotiated in good
faith by referring the matter to
arbitration, they took the law into
their own hands and disconnected the gym from the alternative power
supply.  The applicants
say the respondent acted in bad faith
and committed an act of ‘spoliation’ that triggered this
emergency motion.  The
applicants sought to be reconnected to
the alternative power supply, which the respondent summarily
cancelled by taking the law
into their own hands.
Context
[10]
The lease states that the applicants leased the premises from the
respondent for the express purpose of a ‘gymnasium
and related
services’.  In the past, the applicants paid for the cost
of the ‘normal’ electricity they used
on the premises,
which was measured by a meter, as the provision of electricity was
facilitated by the respondent as the landlord.
Historically,
the applicants were happy to use the alternative power supply, which
protected them from load shedding.  In
the past, the applicants
never paid anything additional for the use of this alternative power
supply.
[11]
Early last year, the parties entered into the second addendum to the
lease, which, among other things, addressed
all of the applicants’
financial obligations by no longer requiring them to pay separately
for electricity used at the premises.
After that, the
applicants became contractually obligated and agreed to pay a flat
fee for renting the premises from the
respondent, including all
utilities they consumed.  About a year and a half after entering
into this new agreement, the respondent
contacted the applicants and
informed them ‘out of the blue’ that they would now be
asked to pay for the ‘diesel
recovery’ associated with
the alternative power supply.  Understandably, this met with
some resistance from the applicants
as they had entered into an
addendum with the respondent for the payment of an all-inclusive
rental.
[12]
As a result, the respondent’s attorneys wrote to the applicants
to demand this additional specific payment
concerning the cost of the
alternative power supply.  They threatened the applicants with
arbitrary exclusion from the alternative
power supply. The parties'
respective attorneys then drew their swords and sharpened them, and a
plethora of correspondence between
these attorneys ensued.
[13]
The applicant’s attorney (to his credit) warned the
respondent’s attorney of spoliation proceedings
in the event of
the respondent's self-help.  Common sense prevailed temporarily,
and the parties agreed to take their dispute
over the additional
costs of the alternative power supply to arbitration.  Progress
was made, a draft arbitration agreement
was submitted, and the
arbitrator's identity was agreed upon.  The applicants sought a
written undertaking that the premises
would not be disconnected from
the alternative power supply until the underlying dispute was
resolved through the agreed arbitration
process.  In response,
the respondent’s attorneys recorded they had no instructions to
give the assurances sought.  I
suppose it would have been
straightforward for them to get an instruction from the respondent.
[14]
In the meantime, a dreaded power cut occurred, and the applicants
experienced load shedding at the premises, leaving
them cut off from
the alternative power source.  The applicants became aware of
the respondent’s unlawful behaviour
and warned the respondent
that they would file a spoliation application.  The application
was served two days later when it
found me in the fast lane.
Consideration
[15]
The applicants used the alternative power supply before the
respondent disconnected the applicants from it.  The
issue to be
considered is ‘quasi-possession’ for a spoliation claim.
Our constitution does not limit property
to ‘corporeal’
things.  Our jurisprudence also has a history of protecting
quasi-possession by way of spoliation.
It is a truism that a
spoliation claim cannot enforce the specific fulfilment of
quasi-possession.  The use that triggers
this remedy arises from
the close connection between the ‘use’ and the
‘possession’ of a ‘tangible'
thing.
[2]
[16]
A close-connected quasi-possessory right is a legal concept that
recognizes certain rights and protections for
individuals concerning
property.  It is a term often used in legal discussions and
cases where someone has been using a property
for a significant
period of time, and their relationship with the property has
developed beyond a transient or temporary arrangement.
[17]
Recognizing a closely connected quasi-possessory right aims to
provide security and stability to individuals who
have developed a
substantial connection to a property.  These rights can include
the ability to continue using the property
and protection against
eviction.  A closely connected quasi-possessory right
acknowledges that persons who have established
a long-term connection
to a property should be afforded some legal recognition and
protection.  This recognition varies depending
on the specific
circumstances of each case.
[18]
Two allegations must be made to succeed with a spoliation remedy: (a)
that the claimant was in peaceful and undisturbed
possession and (b)
that the defendant unlawfully deprived the claimant of that
possession.  This remedy rightly extends to
the realm of the
‘incorporeal’ because it is a remedy to protect from
self-help.  Thus, in this case, using the
alternative power
supply was undoubtedly incidental to the applicants' quasi-possession
of the premises.  It must be so that
the quasi-possession lies
in the actual use of the alleged right.
[19]
In other words, since the exercise of the right is so closely
connected with the thing, the loss of the right is
tantamount to an
interference with the possession of the thing itself, and thus, the
possession of the alleged right lies in the
use of the right.
By way of illustration, reference may be made to recent case law,
which is very helpful.  This case
concerned the use of a
telephone.  The parties were involved in divorce proceedings.
The husband removed the telephone
from the matrimonial home.
The court ruled that access to the telephone was incidental to
the use of the marital home and
ordered the return of the telephone
through a spoliation order.
[3]
[20]
An analogy for this situation could be a comparison with a dispute
over using a communal kitchen in a block of
flats.  In this
analogy, alternative electricity supply stands for the use of the
kitchen.  The question is whether the
right to use the kitchen
is connected with the possession of the flat or merely a personal
right that the landlord can legally
deny.  Some would argue that
the right to use the kitchen is a common right that falls within the
protection of the dwelling's
possession, similar to cases where the
alleged right to a specific service is recognized as an easement.
[21]
These cases are considered uncontroversial and enjoy the protection
of the law through the spoliation remedy.
In other cases, it is
argued that the right to use the kitchen is purely personal and does
not depend on an easement or similar
right.  These cases do not
fall under the protection of the possession of the dwelling.
Therefore, the landlord may
lawfully deny these rights.
Ultimately, I had to determine the nature of the right to use
the alternative electricity supply
and whether it was a personal
right.
[22]
This case was about the applicants' use (and historical use) of the
respondent's alternative power supply.
This right was historic
in nature.  It was critical to the use of the premises, and
without this right, the applicant’s
possession would have been
significantly disrupted.  It was argued that these particular
facts did not remove the applicants
from the scope of the relevant
final category of possession as eloquently articulated in the case
law in
Makeshift
[4]
.
On this point, I agreed.
[23]
I also say this because spoliation is a remedy to restore the status
quo ante
.  It emphasises that it is a robust and
extraordinary remedy where the court has limited discretion once the
conditions are
met.  After all, the respondent proceeded with
disconnection despite ongoing arbitration discussions, which were
only about
a levy, which has never been levied on the applicants
historically.  In this case, the distinguishing feature
illustrates
that the object of the right arises from the use of the
premises by the applicants and was crucial to them.  Without
this
right, the applicant’s use of the premises would be
significantly disrupted.
[24]
The issue was whether the disconnection of the premises from the
alternative power supply removed the applicants
from the scope of the
final category of quasi-possession as defined in
Makeshift.
The disconnection of the alternative electricity was undoubtedly a
substantial interference with the possession of the premises
by the
applicants.  The applicants’ allegations in this
connection were persuasive, as their fate was tied to the
unpredictable
and ever-changing load-shedding schedule experienced in
this country.  The impact of the respondent’s unlawful
conduct
was significant and the respondent did not engage with this
at all despite having the full opportunity to do so.
Costs
[25]
The spoliation remedy is robust and exceptional if the conditions are
met.  Even though incorporeal rights
cannot be ‘possessed’
in the ordinary sense of the word, they can give rise to rights
equivalent to spoliation in cases
of so-called quasi-possession.  The
deprivation of possession was undisputed in that the respondent
deprived the applicants
of using the alternative power supply. The
costs followed the outcome because the respondent behaved unlawfully
by disconnecting
the premises from the alternative power supply.
It did so despite actively and continuously engaging in discussions
aimed
at referring the underlying dispute to arbitration for swift
resolution (after years of allowing the status
quo ante
to
prevail).
[26]
These are my reasons for the order granted with the attached costs.
E
D WILLE
(Cape
Town)
[1]
Situated at t
he
Point Mall Shopping Centre at 76 Regent Road, Sea Point.
[2]
Shoprite
Checkers Ltd v Pangbourne Properties Ltd
1994 (1) SA 616
(W)
.
[3]
Du
Randt v Du Randt
1995
(
1
)
SA
501
(
O
).
[4]
Makeshift
1190 (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers
2020 (5) SA 538
(WCC).