Ilitha Group Holdings Proprietary Limited v Sunrise Energy Proprietary Limited and Others (19854/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 331 (14 December 2023)

82 Reportability

Brief Summary

Companies — Business rescue proceedings — Application for supervision and appointment of business rescue practitioners — Applicant seeking to place first respondent under supervision due to financial distress — Majority shareholders' resolution for debt restructuring and refinancing plan in place — Issue of consent under Subordination Agreement raised by respondents — Applicant failed to seek prior written consent from debt guarantor before launching proceedings — Court did not find it necessary to decide on the validity of the Subordination Agreement in light of the main matter.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This judgment concerns an application by a minority shareholder to place a company under business rescue in terms of section 131(1) read with section 131(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The applicant sought an order placing the first respondent, Sunrise Energy Proprietary Limited (“Sunrise”), under supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings, together with the interim appointment of two named business rescue practitioners in terms of section 131(5) pending ratification by creditors.


The parties were Ilitha Group Holdings Proprietary Limited as applicant (holding 9% of Sunrise’s issued share capital), Sunrise as first respondent, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission as second respondent, and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited (identified in the judgment as “IDC”, but also referred to as the third respondent) as third respondent. The judgment also dealt with the role of other entities (including Sunrise’s majority shareholder Mining Oil and Gas Proprietary Limited (MOGS) and a debt guarantor Bowwood and Main 254 (Pty) Ltd (Bowwood)), although they were not joined as parties.


Procedurally, the matter before the Court was Part B of the overall application. Part A was launched urgently on 23 November 2022 to obtain directives for expedited hearing. By agreement between the applicant and Sunrise, an order was granted on 6 December 2022 postponing the matter to 18 May 2023 with costs standing over. On 18 May 2023 the IDC applied for leave to intervene and to file an answering affidavit, which application (though opposed) was granted, and the hearing was postponed to 4 September 2023. By the time the matter was argued, key factual developments had occurred, including the termination of a central commercial contract relied on by the applicant.


The dispute’s subject matter was whether Sunrise should be placed into business rescue on the basis that it was financially distressed (as defined in the Act) and/or whether it was otherwise just and equitable for financial reasons to place Sunrise under supervision, coupled with the further requirement that there be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company. The factual context included Sunrise’s operation of an LPG terminal in Saldanha Bay, its debt structure and refinancing discussions, and disputes about a long-term throughput and handling agreement with an LPG aggregator.


Material Facts


Sunrise held a multi-phase, 25-year construction licence granted by NERSA under the Petroleum Pipelines Act 60 of 2003, permitting it to construct and operate an LPG import, handling and storage terminal at Saldanha Bay Port. It also held a Terminal Operators Agreement with Transnet National Ports Authority (“TNPA”), and the terminal was described as the only one of its kind in the Western Cape. It was common cause that Sunrise required significant upfront funding to build the terminal, at an approximate cost of R1.1 billion, funded through shareholder loans and senior debt obtained from the IDC and the Public Investment Corporation (“PIC”).


In 2018 the IDC and PIC granted a moratorium on certain interest and capital payments (the “debt moratorium”), limiting interest payments to 50%. The moratorium was extended until May 2021, and thereafter (on the respondents’ version) continued informally during ongoing restructuring discussions. A central disputed aspect of the case was whether the moratorium was likely to be lifted or had in substance been withdrawn; the applicant relied on that possibility to contend that Sunrise would then be commercially insolvent, while the respondents disputed that characterisation as speculative and asserted ongoing lender support.


On 16 March 2018 Sunrise concluded a 20-year Throughput and Handling Agreement with Vita Gas (Pty) Ltd (the “Vita Gas Agreement”), renewable in five-year increments. By June 2022 Sunrise’s board (including a director associated with the applicant) had resolved to invoke dispute resolution mechanisms against Vita Gas, alleging contraventions of the Petroleum Pipelines Act, the TNPA agreement, and the NERSA licence. This led to arbitration proceedings. Sunrise also lodged a complaint with the Competition Commission, which was referred to the Competition Tribunal on 28 October 2022, with interim relief proceedings brought in January 2023. These processes were pending when the business rescue application was launched.


On 6 September 2022 Sunrise’s majority shareholders passed a resolution to undertake a debt restructuring and refinancing plan. On 28 February 2023 Sunrise’s board authorised signature of refinancing term sheets involving RBH and an entity identified as “JDC” as lenders and Sunrise as borrower, subject to shareholder approval. The debt restructuring plan contemplated replacing senior debt providers and converting part of the IDC’s senior debt into equity, subordination of a further portion, and repayment/replacement of remaining balances over time. The applicant criticised these arrangements, but the respondents contended that subsequent events rendered the earlier plan overtaken and in need of revision.


A decisive subsequent fact (common cause) was that on 15 June 2023, Vita Gas terminated the Vita Gas Agreement without prior notice, and Sunrise accepted the termination (referring to it as repudiation). By 19 June 2023 Sunrise had secured a temporary aggregator, EML Energy, which delivered LPG within ten days. Sunrise communicated that it had concluded a three-month interim arrangement and had begun evaluating proposals for supply beyond September 2023; by the hearing the interim arrangement was expected to continue at least until December 2023. It was not disputed that Sunrise was now generating additional revenue on throughput charges significantly higher than those under the Vita Gas Agreement, and Sunrise indicated (on the evidence) that this produced an additional R9.1 million per month.


The applicant’s founding case linked Sunrise’s alleged financial distress largely to the “suffocating effect” of the Vita Gas Agreement, alleging it was unduly onerous, effectively exclusive, and potentially inconsistent with “open access” features of the NERSA licence and TNPA agreement. The applicant also alleged mismanagement and exclusion from decision-making, including conflicts of interest tied to MOGS representatives and RBH’s role in proposed refinancing, and contended that business rescue would protect and preserve the value of its minority shareholding.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the applicant had established the jurisdictional requirements for court-ordered business rescue under section 131(4) of the Companies Act. This required the Court to determine, first, whether Sunrise was financially distressed as defined in section 128(1)(f), namely whether it appeared reasonably unlikely that Sunrise would be able to pay its debts as they became due within the ensuing six months, or reasonably likely that it would become insolvent within the ensuing six months.


Second, the Court had to consider whether, even absent financial distress, it was otherwise just and equitable to place Sunrise under supervision for financial reasons under section 131(4), and whether there was a reasonable prospect of rescuing Sunrise. In addition, because the matter proceeded on motion, the Court was required to address disputes of fact under the rules applicable to motion proceedings, and to consider whether the applicant had impermissibly sought to advance a materially different case in reply and in written submissions.


A further legal issue raised as a point in limine was whether a 2017 Subordination Agreement contractually barred the applicant from bringing business rescue proceedings without prior written consent of the debt guarantor (Bowwood), but the Court ultimately considered it unnecessary to decide this issue given its conclusions on the merits. The Court nevertheless remarked that an argument advanced by the applicant that the relevant clause was pro non scripto would necessarily affect non-joined parties and would be inappropriate to determine in their absence.


Overall, the dispute primarily concerned the application of legal standards to contested and changing facts, with certain issues turning on factual evaluation of Sunrise’s liquidity and commercial realities over the ensuing six months, and an evaluative judgment about whether business rescue was being sought for a proper statutory purpose or as a strategic lever in shareholder disputes.


Court’s Reasoning


The Court set out the statutory framework in section 131(4) of the Companies Act and the definition of financial distress in section 128(1)(f). It accepted, by reference to authority and commentary cited in the judgment, that the essence of financial distress is typically a liquidity problem, and that factual insolvency (assets being exceeded by liabilities) is not, on its own, conclusive. The Court also noted that the assessment is fact-based and must consider the company’s financial position as a whole, including commercial realities, available funding avenues, asset realisation, creditor support, and related-entity support. The Court further recorded that the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that commercial insolvency is sufficient to amount to financial distress for purposes of section 131(4)(a)(i).


On the evidence, the Court viewed the Vita Gas Agreement as the main driver of the applicant’s case. The applicant’s founding papers connected Sunrise’s alleged factual insolvency and inability to service debt capacity to the alleged onerous and exclusive structure of the Vita Gas Agreement, and the applicant’s proposed “rescue scenarios” all revolved around either changing, supplementing, or suspending that agreement, with the expectation of substantial revenue uplift.


The Court held that, in substance, the very development contemplated by the applicant had occurred: the Vita Gas Agreement was terminated, Sunrise secured EML Energy, and Sunrise’s cashflow position improved by the generation of materially higher throughput income (including the additional monthly revenue asserted in the papers). The Court reasoned that, on the common-cause evidence following termination, there was no evidential basis to conclude that Sunrise would be unable to meet its obligations as they fell due, or would become insolvent, within the immediately ensuing six months. The Court treated the statutory six-month horizon as critical. It concluded that, at the time of hearing, there was accordingly no evidence that Sunrise was financially distressed within the meaning of section 128.


The applicant’s attempt to pivot to other factors (including alleged mismanagement and a continuing oppressive debt structure) did not persuade the Court. The Court emphasised that, even prior to termination of the Vita Gas Agreement, the applicant had conceded in its founding papers that Sunrise could meet operational expenses as they fell due, and that Sunrise continued operating for an extended period after the application was launched. In relation to the alleged imminent lifting of the debt moratorium, the Court regarded the applicant’s assertions as speculative and disputed, noting that the PIC was not joined and that the interpretation urged by the applicant of a July 2022 PIC letter went beyond its express terms. The Court found there was insufficient evidence to conclude that there was no moratorium in place, particularly given that restructuring steps were being pursued after that correspondence.


The Court also addressed the applicant’s efforts, in reply and in later written notes, to introduce new calculations, projections, and a substantially reworked case for factual insolvency and rescue. It held that the applicant was attempting to mount a new case in reply by advancing new submissions and calculations and effectively introducing new evidence and a business rescue plan that was not properly set out in the founding papers. The Court treated this as impermissible and unfair to the respondents, who were required to meet the case as pleaded in the founding affidavit. The Court declined to take those later calculations into account, also noting that some critiques were overtaken by the undisputed fact that Sunrise had to remodel its finances after the Vita Gas termination.


On the “just and equitable” ground, the Court considered the applicant’s extensive allegations of mismanagement, exclusion, and conflicts of interest. It held that, even aside from the fact that these allegations were disputed and not established on the papers, they did not amount—“without more”—to financial reasons warranting business rescue under section 131(4)(a)(iii). The Court characterised the dispute, on the papers, as essentially one where a minority shareholder and its director had lost influence in decision-making and sought to use business rescue to implement their preferred operational approach. The Court noted that the Companies Act contains other remedies for aggrieved minority shareholders or directors, expressly referring to section 163.


The Court further reasoned that it would be inappropriate to grant relief that would require serious adverse findings against individuals and entities not joined as parties (including MOGS representatives and other implicated entities). A similar joinder concern arose in relation to the applicant’s alternative section 163 buy-out relief advanced in reply: it was not in the notice of motion, no amendment was sought, and the majority shareholder was not cited.


On the requirement of a reasonable prospect of rescue, the Court took into account the evidence that the majority shareholders did not support business rescue and would not inject money if business rescue were ordered. The Court treated clause 3.2.14 of the Subordination Agreement as relevant context, given that it limited shareholder voting on a plan that would reduce amounts payable to lenders, and concluded there was very little prospect that shareholders/lenders would approve a plan that reduced lender recoveries and required additional funding. Without creditor/shareholder support, the Court found that the contemplated rescue plan had no reasonable prospect of success.


Finally, the Court weighed severe adverse consequences flowing from business rescue. It was common cause that business rescue would breach the TNPA Terminal Operator Agreement (clause 40), entitling termination of that agreement, which would effectively end Sunrise’s business and allow TNPA to take possession of the terminal. The Court regarded this consequence as particularly weighty where the applicant failed to establish financial distress. It also considered the public-funding dimension, stating that placing Sunrise under supervision would jeopardise recovery of public funds and that the public interest favoured allowing Sunrise to continue engaging aggregators and to address financial challenges through ongoing measures rather than business rescue.


Outcome and Relief


The Court dismissed the relief sought in Part B of the application, refusing to place Sunrise under supervision and refusing to commence business rescue proceedings. The Court also refused the ancillary relief relating to interim appointment of business rescue practitioners.


Costs followed the result. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs occasioned by Sunrise’s attendances in respect of Part A. In respect of Part B, the application was dismissed with costs, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first and third respondents, with Sunrise’s costs to include the costs of two counsel where so employed.


The IDC’s late-filing condonation application was granted without a costs order, and the applicant’s striking-out application directed at Sunrise’s supplementary affidavit was dismissed (the Court found no breach of privilege and no basis to strike the impugned paragraph).


Cases Cited


Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA).


Koen and Another v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC).


ABSA Bank Limited v Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd and another related matter [2013] 3 All SA 146 (GSJ).


Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd (Four Creditors Intervening) 2011 (5) SA 422 (GNP).


Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd and Others v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd (Esterhuizen and Another Intervening) 2017 (3) SA 74 (WCC).


Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC).


Molyneux and Another v Patel and Others (14618/2014) [2014] ZAWCHC 191.


Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (2) SA 279 (T).


My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (1) SA 132 (CC).


Van Zyl and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (3) SA 294 (SCA).


Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A).


Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A).


Du Toit v Azari Wind 2022 (2) SA 510 (WCC).


Legislation Cited


Companies Act 71 of 2008.


Petroleum Pipelines Act 60 of 2003.


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were cited by number in the judgment. The Court applied the general approach applicable to motion proceedings in resolving factual disputes on the papers.


Held


The Court held that the applicant failed to establish that Sunrise was financially distressed as defined in section 128(1)(f) of the Companies Act, particularly given the termination of the Vita Gas Agreement and the improved interim commercial arrangements that undermined the applicant’s asserted six-month distress horizon. The Court held further that the applicant’s allegations concerning possible revocation of the debt moratorium and lender withdrawal were not established on the evidence and remained disputed and speculative on the papers.


The Court held that the “just and equitable” basis advanced by the applicant was, on the papers, largely reflective of shareholder and boardroom conflict and disagreement about corporate strategy, and did not amount to a demonstrated financial basis for business rescue under section 131(4)(a)(iii). The Court also held that serious allegations of mismanagement and conflicts involving non-joined parties could not properly ground the relief sought in their absence, and that the applicant’s attempt to introduce materially new calculations, evidence, and relief in reply was impermissible.


The Court held that the applicant also failed to establish a reasonable prospect of rescuing Sunrise, having regard to the lack of support from majority shareholders/lenders, constraints relevant to lender recoveries, and the severe adverse consequence that business rescue would entitle TNPA to terminate the Terminal Operator Agreement, effectively ending Sunrise’s business.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that the requirements for court-ordered business rescue under section 131(4) are jurisdictional facts that must be established by the applicant on the papers. In motion proceedings, disputes of fact are determined in accordance with established principles: the applicant must make its case in the founding affidavit, and material disputes are generally resolved on the respondent’s version unless that version is so untenable that it can be rejected on the papers.


The Court applied the statutory definition of financial distress in section 128(1)(f), emphasising the forward-looking six-month enquiry. It endorsed the approach that financial distress is assessed with regard to the company’s financial position as a whole and commercial realities, including available resources and creditor support, and that factual insolvency is not, without more, determinative of financial distress. It further accepted that commercial insolvency may constitute financial distress for purposes of section 131(4).


The Court applied the principle that a “reasonable prospect” of rescue requires more than speculative suggestion and must rest on an objectively reasonable factual foundation. The applicant must present such a foundation in the founding papers, and it is impermissible to mount a substantially new case in reply through new evidence, calculations, or a belated business rescue plan.


The Court applied the discretionary principle that even where statutory requirements may be arguable, a court retains a discretion to refuse business rescue relief. Business rescue proceedings must not be used for strategic or ulterior purposes, including as leverage in shareholder disputes, and the Court may consider adverse contractual and public-interest consequences (such as termination rights in key operational agreements and risks to public funds) when exercising that discretion.

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Ilitha Group Holdings Proprietary Limited v Sunrise Energy Proprietary Limited and Others (19854/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 331 (14 December 2023)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
No.:19854/2022
In
the matter between:
ILITHA
GROUP
HOLDINGS
PROPRIETARY
LIMITED
Applicant
(Registration
Number: 2008/[…])
and
SUNRISE
ENERGY
PROPRIETARY
LIMITED
First
Respondent
(Registration
Number: 2005/[…])
(Registered
Address: Off the Mr559
,
Industrial
Area
,
Saldanha
,
Western
Cape
,
7395)
THE
COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
COMMISSION
Second
Respondent
INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
OF
SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
DELIVERED ELECTRONICALLY ON 14 DECEMBER 2023
MANGCU-LOCKWOOD,
J
A.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The
applicant
seeks
an
order
placing
the
first
respondent
("Sunrise")
under
supervision and that business rescue proceedings should commence in
terms of section 131(1
),
read
with
subsection
(4) of the
Companies Act
71
of
2008
(
"the
Act').
An
order is also
sought for interim appointment of two named business rescue
practitioners in terms of section 131(5) of the Act, pending

ratification by Sunrise's creditors.
[2]
This is Part B
of the application brought by the applicant. In terms of Part A which
was launched on 23 November 2022, the applicant
sought urgent
directives for hearing of the matter in the fast lane of the Third
Division. By agreement between the applicant and
Sunrise, a court
order was issued on 6 December 2022 postponing the matter to 18 May
2023, and the costs were to stand over for
later determination.
[3]
On
18
May
2023,
the
third
respondent
("JDC")
applied
for
leave
to
intervene
as a party to
the proceedings and to file an answering affidavit. Although
the
application
was opposed by
the applicant, it was granted, resulting in postponement of the
matter to 4 September 2023. By 4 September 2023,
some significant
events had occurred, resulting in delivery of further pleadings and
submissions.
But first, the
facts.
B.
THE
FACTS
[4]
The applicant
holds 9% of the issued share capital in Sunrise, whilst the IDC holds
31
%
thereof.
The
majority
shareholding
of
60%
is
held
by
the
Mining
Oil
and
Gas
Proprietary Limited (
"MOGS
").
In tum, 51
%
of MOGS'
shareholding is held by Royal Bafokeng Holdings Proprietary Limited
(
"RBH
''),
whilst 9%
thereof is held by the Public Investment Corporation (
"PIC").
[5]
Sunrise
holds
a
multi-phase,
25
year-long
construction
licence
granted
by
the National
Energy Regulator of South Africa
("NERSA
") in
terms of the
Petroleum Pipelines Act 60 of 2003
. In terms of the
licence, it is permitted to construct, operate and manage a
comprehensive Liquified Petroleum Gas
("LPG")
bulk
import, handling and storage facility in the Saldana Bay Port (
"the
Terminal")
whose
purpose is to receive, store and distribute LPG. In addition to the
NERSA construction licence, it holds a Terminal Operators
Agreement
with Transnet National Ports Authority
("TNPA
")
to
construct and operate the LPG Terminal, which is the only one of its
kind in the Western Cape.
[6]
It
is
common
cause
that
Sunrise
required
significant
upfront
capital
and
debt financing
to construct the infrastructure required for the Terminal
,
the costs of
which amounted to approximately R1.1 billion. It was funded for that
endeavour by shareholder loans and senior debt
obtained from the IDC
and the PIC.
[7]
In 2018 the
IDC and the PIC extended an interest and capital payment moratorium
in favour of Sunrise (
"the
debt
moratorium"),
the
effect of which was that the payment of interest on the senior debt
was limited to 50%. The debt moratorium was extended until
May 2021.
[8]
On
16
March
2018
,
Sunrise
concluded
a
Throughput
and
Handling
Agreement
with
an LPG
aggregator known as Vita Gas (Pty) Ltd (
"the
Vita
Gas Agreement").
The
Vita Gas Agreement
was
for
a
total
period
of
20
years,
though
renewable
in
5-year
increments
.
[9]
By June
2022,
the board of
directors of Sunrise
(
"
the
Board
"
),
including
Mr Harmse who is a director of the applicant, had
resolved
to formally
invoke dispute
resolution mechanisms against Vita Gas
,
citing
contravention of the
Petroleum Pipelines Act, the
Terminal Operators
Agreement concluded with the TNPA and the NERSA licence. This led to
arbitration proceedings which were pending
at the time that these
proceedings launched.
[10]
In addition to
the arbitration proceedings
,
Sunrise lodged
a complaint with the Competition Commission against Vita Gas
,
which was
referred, on 28 October 2022
,
for
adjudication to the Competition Tribunal
,
whilst in
January 2023
,
Sunrise also
brought an application for interim relief in that forum. The
Competition Tribunal proceedings were pending when these
proceedings
were launched by the applicant.
[11]
On 6 September
2022
the majority
shareholders
of Sunrise
passed
a
resolution
in terms of
which
a debt
restructuring
and
refinancing
plan
(
"
th
e
debt
restructuring
plan
"
)
was to be
undertaken in respect of Sunrise. Then
,
on 28 February
2023 the Board passed a resolution authorizing Sunrise to sign a
refinancing term sheet between RBH and JDC as lenders
and Sunrise as
borrower
,
and
a term sheet between RBH and Sunrise
,
both term
sheets being subject to shareholder approval.
[12]
In terms of
the debt restructuring plan, MOGS and RBH were to replace Sunrise's
senior debt providers (IDC and the PIC) with RMB
Holdings (Pty) Ltd.
RBH holds a 13
%
equity in RMB
Holdings. A portion
of the IDC's
senior debt of R205 million was to be converted
,
in terms of
the debt restructuring plan
,
to an
additional 9% equity for the IDC. Then
,
R250 million
of the IDC's senior debt will be subordinated
to the new
senior debt to be provided by RMB Holdings
.
The remaining
balance of IDC
'
s
senior debt of R210
million
was to either be repaid by Sunrise to the JDC and
/
or
replaced by RMB Holdings debt after 12 months.
[13]
On
15
June
2023
,
before
hearing
of
this
matter
and
before
hearing
of
the
Competition Tribunal hearing
,
Vita Gas
terminated the Vita Gas Agreement without prior notice
,
and Sunrise
accepted the termination
,
though it
referred to it as repudiation. By 19 June 2023 Sunrise had secured a
temporary aggregator
,
EML Energy to
provide a shipment of LPG which was so delivered within 10 days of
termination of the Vita Gas Agreement.
[14]
These
developments
were
set out in
correspondence addressed to the applicant in which the applicant was
implored to withdraw these proceedings.
In one such
letter, dated 28 June 2023, Sunrise provided the applicant with the
details of the three-month interim arrangement reached
with EML
Energy, and stated that it had also embarked on a process to evaluate
proposals for the use of the Terminal to supply
LPG beyond September
2023. By the time these proceedings were heard the interim
arrangement was to adhere at least until December
2023.
C.
PRELIMINARY
ISSUES
[15]
A number of
preliminary issues arose. First was the IDC
's
condonation
application for the late filing of its answering affidavit, which was
17 court days late. Although the applicant initially
opposed the
application and also sought an order strike out certain matter from
the founding application supporting the condonation
,
the opposition
was withdrawn
,
rendering the
striking application obsolete. The application for condonation was
granted with no order as to costs.
[16]
Next was the
applicant's application to strike certain matter from Sunrise's
supplementary affidavit. Sunrise brought an application
to file a
supplementary affidavit to explain, in essence
,
the fact that
the Vita Gas Agreement had been terminated since the launch
of
these
proceedings
.
There
is
no
dispute
that
the
supplementary
affidavit
was necessary.
However
,
the
applicant persists with the application to strike
,
which is dealt
with later.
[17]
The
respondents
,
and in
particular the JDC, have raised as a point
in
limine
,
a
subordination agreement reached between the parties (
"t
he
Subordination
Agreement")
which they
say prohibits the applicant from launching these proceedings.
[18]
It is common
cause that the Subordination Agreement was concluded in 2017 between
the applicant, Sunrise as Borrower, the IDC, MOGS
and Bowwood and
Main 254 (Pty) Ltd (
"Bowwood
")
as
Debt Guarantor. The purpose was to subordinate the claims held by
Sunrise's shareholders against it in favour of Bowwood.
[19]
Clauses 6.1
and 3.2.13 provide as follows:
"6.1
Each
Shareholder
,
on
its
own
behalf,
hereby
irrevocably
and
unconditionally undertakes in favour of the Lenders that it shall at
no time until the Release Date effect any payment
whatsoever
(whether
in cash or in
kind) or take any other action or step which would contravene or be
inconsistent or in conflict with the undertakings
of
such
Shareholder in
terms of clause 3.
"3
.2.13
No Shareholder
shall enforce any judgment against the Borrower nor make an
application for the liquidation, composition, compromise
,
administration,
commencement of business rescue proceedings or any analogous or
similar
process of the
proposal
of
a scheme of arrangement
in respect of
the Borrower, or collaborate with any other creditors of the Borrower
in the making of such application, without the
prior written consent
of the Debt Guarantor, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld
or delayed.
"
[20]
It
is
common
cause
that
the
applicant
did
not
seek
prior
written
consent
from Bowwood,
the debt guarantor
,
before
launching these proceedings. The respondents state that this
constitutes a material breach of the terms of the Subordination

Agreement, and this application ought to be dismissed for this reason
alone.
[21]
In
the
replying
affidavit
,
the
applicant
states
that
on
15
December
2022,
after
receiving the answering affidavit in which this issue is raised, it
addressed a letter to the IDC's attorneys
,
who it says
are also the legal
representatives
of Bowwood,
requesting
such consent, but had received no response at the time of delivering
the replying affidavit. As a consequence,
the applicant
states
that
the IDC is
estopped
from
raising
the point
in
respond at
all to its correspondence of 15 December 2022. In the further
alternative
,
the applicant
states that it does not concede that clause 3
.
2.12
of the Subordination Agreement precludes it from seeking the relief
it seeks
,
although not
much detail is provided in this regard
.
In yet a
further alternative
,
the applicant
adds that clause 3.2.13 of the subordination agreement is
pro
non scripto
because
the legislature could not have intended the parties to enter into a
contract agreement which is contract contrary to the
statutory
provisions regulating the position of the company and its affected
parties whilst it is in financial distress.
[22]
In light of
the view I take of the main matter
,
I do not
consider it necessary to decide this issue.
However
,
it is
important to point out that
,
the
pro
non scripto
argument
raised in respect of clause 3
.
2.13
would affect all the parties to the subordination agreement,
including Bowwood and MOGS
,
and they have
not been cited as parties to these proceedings
.
Their rights
,
especially
those of Bowwood as debt guarantor
,
would
necessarily be prejudicially affected should such an order be made
because the clause was undoubtedly inserted into the agreement
to
protect its position as against the lenders
,
and as a
result
,
it
would be inappropriate to conclude that the clause be
pro
non scripto
without
it being before the Court.
D.
THE
APPLICATION
[23]
The applicant
brought these proceedings on the basis of financial distress as
defined in
section 128(1)(
f
)(ii)
of the Act
,
and
/
or
just and equitable grounds for placing Sunrise under business rescue
as contemplated in section 131(4)(i) read with
sections 128(1)(f)
and
131
(4)(iii) of the
Companies Act. The
financial distress was
attributed to the onerous effect of the Vita Gas Agreement
;
the potential
for the revocation of the debt moratorium
;
and the
worsening of Sunrise
'
s
financial position over the short term.
[24]
According to
the applicant the Vita Gas Agreement was concluded at the insistence
of MOGS's representatives on the Board
,
who failed to
follow prescribed processes before its approval. The agreement
was unduly
onerous
because
,
amongst
other things
,
it created a
situation in which Vita Gas was effectively the only customer
permitted to use the Terminal, and the result was that
there was no
possibility for revenue growth through contracts with competing
aggregators
,
and it stifled
funding that was initially anticipated when the Terminal commenced
operations. Furthermore
,
the applicant
stated that the agreement possibl
y
contravened
the open access provisions of the NERSA licence and the accompanying
Terminal Operator Agreement.
[25]
As for the
debt moratorium
,
the applicant
avers that it
has simply continued
on an informal
basis since May 2021 but is yet to be formally extended
,
and is in fact
likely to be lifted
.
Without the
debt moratorium
,
says the
applicant
,
Sunrise would
be commercially insolvent
,
although the
applicant admits that
,
with the
moratorium
in
place Sunrise is able to service its operational debts as and when
they fall due and payable. Although the financial statements
of
Sunrise are prepared on a
'
going
concern basis'
,
the applicant
states that is solely dependent on the debt moratorium and continued
support of shareholders
,
which
,
if
discontinued
,
would create
material uncertainty and significant doubt on the company
'
s
ability to continue as a going concern
.
[26]
Regarding the
financial position of Sunrise
,
the applicant
states that Sunrise has been factually insolvent within the
contemplation of section 128(1)(f)(ii) of the Act since
2018
.
In this
regard
,
the
applicant has undertaken an analysis of financial performance for the
period January 2017 to October 2022
,
relying on
annual financial statements and management accounts.
Its conclusion
is that Sunrise has shown a declining gross profit of approximately
67
%,
and
significant losses as a result of finance costs.
Furthermore
,
the senior
debt
has
increased
by
41
%
as
a
result
of
drawdowns
and
capitalization
of
unpaid
interest into the value of debt.
[27]
The just and
equitable grounds relate to alleged poor management and reckless
borrowing which has led Sunrise to a position where
its liabilities
well exceed its assets. The complaints regarding the poor management
are attributed firstly to Sunrise's executive
chairperson, Ms
Albertinah Kekana
,
a
non-executive director and an Executive Director of RBH
;
and secondly
,
MOGS'
representatives on the Board who similarly lack effectiveness
.
The applicant
claims that there are conflicts of interest between MOGS
'
representatives
and Sunrise on the one hand
;
and between
the interests of Sunrise and RBH
,
being the
party that will provide refinancing in terms of the debt
restructuring plan
,
and may likely
use that position to its benefit and to the detriment of the
applicant.
[28]
The complaints
regarding poor management are coupled
,
in large
measure
,
with
allegations that many management decisions
,
including the
agreement to enter into the Vita Gas Agreement
,
were taken
despite vociferous protest by
,
and to the
exclusion of, the applicant and Mr Harmse. In this regard
,
the applicant
alleges that MOGS' commercial teams and Board members deliberately
and intentionally hid all activities and documents
and intentionally
excluded the applicant from meetings related to the Vita Gas
Agreement. A further just and equitable ground relied
upon for the
business rescue is that it will allow the applicant's shareholding to
be maintained and its investment protected and
the further reduction
in its share value curtailed if not reversed.
[29]
In support for
its case that there are reasonable prospects for rescue of Sunrise
,
the applicant
set out three possible scenarios in its founding affidavit. In the
first scenario the Vita Gas Agreement would be
left unchanged
;
in the second
,
an aggregator
additional to Vita Gas would be introduced to operate the Terminal;
and in the third
,
the Vita Gas
Agreement would be entirely suspended and new aggregators
,
not including
Vita Gas would be introduced.
In essence
,
the
applicant's solution was the suspension of the Vita Gas Agreement
with a simultaneous replacement of Vita Gas with alternate

aggregators for an interim period of 6 months and a further two
years.
E.
THE
RESPONDENTS'
CASE
[30]
Apart from the
point
in
limin
e
based on
the subordination agreement
,
the
respondents state that
,
since the Vita
Gas Agreement was the main basis for the applicant's application and
has subsequently been terminated
,
the
application should fall away. In any event
,
Sunrise states
that it had already taken steps to deal with the very concerns raised
by the applicant in these proceedings regarding
the Vita Gas
Agreement
,
through the
litigation already referred to
,
and that
business rescue is not the appropriate mechanism to address those
concerns but is rather likely to aggravate them.
[31]
Sunrise also
denies that the processes used to secure customers was flawed at the
time of concluding the Vita Gas Agreement
,
or that the
applicant was excluded
,
deliberately
or intentionally
,
from
discussions with Vita Gas in relation to the agreement
,
or that the
Vita Gas Agreement was concluded outside the parameters of the
Board's mandate. It explains that the Vita Gas Agreement
was
concluded at a time when it was under considerable pressure to
commence its operations and generate income from the Terminal
,
after having
incurred considerable debt
,
in the region
of R1 billion
,
to build it.
Thus
,
apart
from causing the demise of Sunrise
,
business
rescue will result in wasteful expenditure
.
It was only a
few years after concluding the Vita Gas Agreement that the problems
relating to it became apparent.
[32]
As regards the
alleged financial distress
,
the
respondents state that the applicant has failed to establish it.
They point to
the applicant's founding affidavit in which it is admitted that
Sunrise is able to pay its operational expenses as
and when they fall
due
,
stating
that this is not an indication of financial distress but rather shows
the opposite. Sunrise has also attached its management
accounts for
December 2022 which indicate a year-to-date cumulative EBITDA of
R62.9 million and cash balance of R24
.
6
million
,
showing that
it is not financially distressed.
[33]
Sunrise
further points to the latest annual financial statements for the year
ended 31 December 2021 in which it is stated that
its status as a
going concern is dependent on the conclusion of debt restructuring as
well as the continued support of its shareholders.
In this
regard
,
it
confirmed in the answering affidavit that firstly, its debt
restructuring was underway
,
and set out an
overview of the debt restructuring plan. However
,
since the
cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement
,
Sunrise
explains in its supplementary affidavit that it subsequently
initiated a comprehensive review of its financial models to
assess
the impact of the termination on its immediate liquidity and
financial performance
,
and to
determine strategies to mitigate any adverse effects
,
and continues
to do so
.
[34]
As regards the debt
moratorium
,
the
respondents
dispute the
applicant's claim that it may be lifted
,
stating that
it persists to date
,
and there has
been no indication or intimation by either PIC or the IDC (
"
th
e
lenders
"
)
that
they intend
to revoke
it.
In fact
,
according to
the respondents
,
both lenders
have expressed their continued support for Sunrise
'
s
continued operation. And
,
according to
them
,
the
debt moratorium has continued while the parties are in debt
restructuring discussions
,
with term
sheets already signed.
It is
otherwise denied that the first respondent is commercially insolvent
and the first respondent states that there is no reason
to believe
that this will change in the next 6 months.
[35]
Furthermore
,
the
respondents state that the applicant has failed to formulate a
business rescue plan which provides for sufficient post-commencement

finance following the suspension
or
cancellation
of the Vita
Gas Agreement
,
which was the
main subject of a business rescue plan suggested
by the
applicant. In this regard
,
the IDC points
to clause
3.2
.
14
of the Subordination Agreement which provides that the shareholders
of Sunrise shall not vote to approve or oppose a proposed
business
rescue plan if such a vote would reduce the amounts payable to
Sunrise
'
s
lenders
.
The IDC points
out that all indications are that a business rescue plan would
require the
shareholders of Sunrise
,
which are also
its senior lenders
,
to finance it.
In other
words
,
that
a business rescue plan would reduce the amounts
payable to
Sunrise's senior lenders.
There is
therefore
no
prospect
,
says
the
IDC,
that Sunrise's shareholders
would
agree to the
proposed
business plan
and without such approval, the business rescue plan has no reasonable
prospect of success.
[36]
Sunrise also
states that the applicant has, through the launching of these
proceedings, attempted to cause negative financial consequences
for
it, and in particular to engineer a situation in which its principal
or future funders withdraw their support.
One such
example is the perfection of a general notarial bond by Bowwood
against Sunrise which followed the launching of these proceedings.

Bowwood had guaranteed Sunrise's obligations to the IDC and PIC, and
in turn, Sunrise had caused a general notarial bond to be
registered
in favour of Bowwood over its movable assets. Within two weeks of the
institution of these proceedings
,
Bowwood
instituted an urgent application to perfect the bond and to ensure
that Bowwood is secured in the event that Sunrise is
placed in
business rescue.
As a result,
the assets of Sunrise have been placed under judicial attachment
pursuant to a perfection order although Sunrise continues
to have
full use and utility of its movable assets
.
[37]
The
respondents deny the conflicts of interest alleged by the applicant,
stating that the IDC and MOGS would be in no better position
than the
applicant should Sunrise be unable to carry on business. Rather, the
respondents state that the application has been brought
in bad faith
by an aggrieved 9% minority shareholder, whose shareholders' loan is
in any event subordinated. And, according to
Sunrise, the applicant
is aggrieved because it does not agree with the decisions taken by
its majority Board and shareholders,
and only seeks to force its will
on the majority to the detriment of Sunrise.
[38]
Sunrise also
points to the higher consequences to be faced by it should it enter
into business rescue
,
which include
possible cancellation of the Terminal Operator Agreement or
substantial loss of income followed by the cancellation
of that
agreement.
Without the
Terminal Operator Agreement
,
the first
respondent states that it cannot operate the Terminal and that would
be the end of its business.
F.
THE
APPLICABLE
LAW
[39]
Section
131(4)
of
the
Companies
Act
provides
that
a
court
may
make
an
order placing
a company under supervision and commencing business rescue
proceedings if it is satisfied that:
"
(i)
the company is
financially distressed
;
(ii)
the company
has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation under or
in terms of a public regulation
,
or contract
,
with respect
to employment-related matters; or
(iii)
it
is
otherwise
just and equitable to
do so for financial reasons
,
and there is a
reasonable prospect for rescuing the company
;"
[40]
ln
terms
of
section
128(1)(f)
of
the
Companies
Act
,
'financially
distressed'
,
m reference to
a particular company at any particular time
,
means that:
"
(i)
it appears to
be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of
its debts as they become due and payable within
the immediately
ensuing six months
;
or
(ii)
it appears to
be reasonably likely that the company will become insolvent within
the immediately ensuing six months
'
.
[41]
It
has been stated
[1]
that the
essence of financial distress is a liquidity problem or an inability
to
meet
current
debts
and
liabilities
;
and
that
balance
sheet
insolvency
,
in
the
sense of a deficiency of assets to liabilities
,
is
logically
not
conclusive by itself of financial distress.
The
second
leg
of
the
definition
of
'financially
distressed'
is
less
certain.
The
term
'insolvent'
is not defined
and
could
mean either commercial
insolvency
(i.e
.,
an
inability
to
pay
debts
as
they
are
due)
or
factual
insolvency
(a
situation
in
which
a
company's
liabilities
exceeds
its
assets). The authorities
suggest
that
factual insolvency alone is not necessarily conclusive of financial
distress.
[2]
[42]
Whether
a company is in financial distress is a question of fact to be
determined from a consideration of the company's financial
position
as a whole, having regard to commercial realities. Regard should be
had not only to the cash resources immediately available
to the
company, but also to resources which the company may realize by
borrowing funds or selling assets or by
financial
support
from a related entity
-
or,
in the case of a state- owned company, from the government
shareholder
.
Agreements
with creditors for an extension
of
their terms of trade may also be taken into account.
'
[3]
[43]
Circumstances
that are taken into account include whether the debt of creditors is
or can be subordinated, whether creditors are
willing to extend their
credit and whether there is additional funding available, externally
(debt) or internally (share capital).
’’
[4]
[44]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal has held
[5]
that a company which is commercially insolvent, though factually
solvent
(
or
in other words, unable to pay debts which are due, despite its assets
exceeding its liabilities), is in financial distress for
the purpose
of
s 131(4)(a)(i).
[45]
A
reasonable prospect of rescuing the company has been interpreted to
be a lesser requirement than reasonable probability
,
but
more than a mere
prima
facie
case,
an arguable possibility or a mere suggestion
.
It
must be a prospect (expectation) based on a
ground
or grounds that are objectively reasonable.
[6]
Mere
speculative suggestions will not suffice. An applicant must place
before the court a factual foundation for the existence of
a
reasonable prospect that the desired object can be achieved.
[7]
[46]
The
onus to satisfy the requirements for busJness rescue rests on the
applicant
,
who
must discharge it in accordance with the rules of motion proceedings
in its founding papers.
[8]
In the
event of factual disputes
,
the
application can only be decided on the respondent's version of the
disputed facts
,
unless
that version is so far-fetched or clearly untenable that it can
justifiably be rejected merely on the papers.
[9]
[47]
Even
if the requirements of
section 131(4)
of the
Companies Act are
considered to have been satisfied
,
the
court retains a discretion to refuse to grant an order to place the
company under supervision.
[10]
Business
rescue proceedings must not be used for strategic or ulterior
purposes
.
[11]
G.
DISCUSSION
[48]
There is no
doubt
,
when
reading the papers
,
that the main
basis for this application was what was referred to by the applicant
as the suffocating effect of the Vita Gas Agreement.
According to the
founding affidavit
,
the reasons
for the factual insolvency of Sunrise are linked to the Vita Gas
Agreement
,
and
according to the replying affidavit
,
the Vita Gas
Agreement and the operation of Sunrise by MOGS and the Board is in
fact
,
the
root problem for Sunrise
'
s
financial position.
[49]
And a business
rescue practitioner
,
according to
the applicant
,
would be
entitled to suspend the Vita Gas Agreement in terms of section
136(2)(a) of the Act
,
and
renegotiate an alternative agreement with either Vita Gas or
alternative aggregators
,
which would
allow for multiple aggregators to utilize the Terminal
,
based on
market-related fees
,
sufficient to
meet all of Sunrise
'
s
debt commitments
.
This would
allow Sunrise to increase its revenue substantially thus allowing it
to operate on a commercially
v
iable
basis
,
free
from the exclusivity and oppressive fee structure contained in the
Vita Gas Agreement. This
,
according to
the applicant
,
could have the
effect of immediately increasing Sunrise
'
s
revenue by at least 30 to 45%.
[50]
As it turned
out
,
that
is what happened. As the applicant was advised in letters dated June
2023
,
not
only had the agreement been summarily terminated by Vita Gas
,
but Sunrise
was now generating an additional R9.1 million per month in terms of
the interim contract with EML Energy
,
and this was
to endure at least until the end of December 2023
.
None of this
is disputed by the applicant. Nor was it disputed that EML Energy now
delivers LPG on throughput charges which are
significantly higher
than those which were paid by Vita Gas. It will be remembered that
this is one of the items the applicant
sought as a better alternative
to the Vita Gas Agreement.
[51]
Thus
,
to the extent
that the Vita Gas Agreement was affecting Sunrise
'
s
debt capacity and ability to service its debts
,
this new
arrangement was to have a positive impact, similar in extent to
,
if not more
than
,
what
the applicant predicted would be the case if the agreement
were to be
terminated. In other words
,
for the
immediately ensuing six months following cancellation of the Vita Gas
Agreement
,
there is no
basis for the applicant
'
s
contention that Sunrise will not be in a position to meet its
financial obligations as and when they arise or that it will become

insolvent in the next six months as a result of not being able to
make payments to its senior lenders. There is no evidence before
this
Court to establish that
,
following the
termination of the Vita Gas Agreement
,
Sunrise will
not be able to meet its financial obligations as and when they arise
in the immediately ensuing 6 months.
If anything
,
the common
cause evidence relating alone from the cashflow position following
cancellation of the agreement
,
Sunrise is
even further away from being susceptible to business rescue.
[52]
In terms of
section 128
of the
Companies Act a
company is not financially
distressed if it is likely to be able to pay all of its debts as they
become due and payable within
the immediately ensuing 6 months or if
it is not likely to become insolvent within the immediately ensuing 6
months.
As
at the time of hearing this matter
,
there was
accordingly no evidence to suggest that the company was in financial
distress as defined in
section 128
of the
Companies Act.
>
[53]
At best for
the applicant on this score
,
the
cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement brought about a fresh review
of the financial performance of Sunrise. Of this it was
advised in
one of the letters dated June 2023
,
that
,
following the
cancellation
,
Sunrise had
initiated a comprehensive review of its financial models to assess
the impact of the tem1ination on its immediate liquidity
and
financial performance
,
and to
determine strategies to mitigate any adverse effects. It would be
inappropriate and premature in those circumstances to grant
the
relief sought by the applicant.
[54]
However
,
the applicant
now states that the cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement was merely
the first step contemplated by the business
rescue application and
was not the aim of the application which was to rescue a company in
financial distress
.
It states that
the cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement has not cured the
underlying causes for the financial distress caused
by the
mismanagement of Sunrise. While the alleged mismanagement is
discussed below
,
there is no
getting away from the fact that
,
upon a reading
of the founding papers
,
the Vita Gas
Agreement was the central basis for the application
.
The result of
that approach was all three scenarios proferred by the applicant as
reasonable prospects for business rescue entailed
some consideration
of the role of Vita Gas Agreement.
[55]
But
,
even before
termination of the Vita Gas Agreement
,
the applicant
had conceded in its founding papers that Sunrise was able to meet its
debts as and when they became due and payable.
And the facts
supported that concession because Sunrise continued to operate as it
had done after the urgent launching of these
proceedings on 23
November 2022
,
until the
hearing resumed some
I0 months
later on 4 September 2023
.
[56]
Another
concession made by the applicant when the proceedings were launched
was that Sunrise was not commercially insolvent. However
,
this was said
to be attributed only to the debt moratorium and the support of the
shareholders, both of which could be imminently
revoked
.
However
,
the
respondents dispute both assertions as unfounded speculation.
[57]
Regarding the
support of the Sunrise lenders and shareholders
,
it is not
gainsaid that Sunrise continues
,
even after the
cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement, to enjoy the support of its
majority shareholders and lenders
,
and that they
do not agree that it should be placed into business rescue. Needless
to say
,
this
is evidenced by the fact that the JDC has joined these proceedings as
a party and continues to oppose the relief sought by
the applicant.
[58]
I take note of
the perfection of Bowwood
'
s
notorial bond in terms of a court order dated 8 December 2022. It is
clear from the contents of that application - which was handed
up in
Court - that these business rescue proceedings were a precipitating
factor for the launching of those proceedings. This is
expressly
stated in the founding affidavit in which Bowwood explained that the
business rescue application had rendered its position
against the
applicant precarious and that it needed to secure its financial
position that was protected by the notarial bond
.
This was also
as a result of the possible domino effect of other litigation against
Sunrise
,
resulting
again from the launching of these proceedings
.
The fact that
these proceedings precipitated the launching of that application is
also explained by its urgent nature and timing
which was within less
than a week after the parties in this case agreed to postpone the
matter to May 2023.
[59]
Although there
is mention made in Bowwood
'
s
application of the applicant's outstanding debt to the IDC and the
PIC
,
the
founding affidavit only made mention of a demand made by the PIC for
payment of the outstanding debt in June and October 2018.
There is no
evidence of a similar demand by the JDC. There is also no evidence of
what occurred between October 2018 and November
2022 when the
applicant launched these proceedings
,
or between
October 2018 and December 2022 when Bowwood launched its application.
The respondents did not file answering papers in
Bowwood
'
s
application in response to those allegations
,
which
,
significantly
,
were contained
in Part A of those proceedings. In any event
,
it is relevant
that
,
despite
the alleged demand by the PIC for payment of the debt in 2018
,
both the JDC
and the PIC have actively continued to support the business of
Sunrise since then
,
and the JDC
opposes the current proceedings
.
I am
accordingly
not persuaded
that the
launching of those proceedings
establishes
financial
distress or factual insolvency
,
or that it is
sufficient basis to order the relief sought by the applicant.
[60]
As regards the
alleged re
v
ocation
of the debt moratorium
,
the issue
continues to be in dispute between the parties
,
with the
respondents explaining that the
status
quo
,
which
involves the continuation of an informal moratorium
,
continues to
prevail. In its replying affidavit to the IDC's answering affidavit
,
the applicant
attached a letter dated 21 July 2022 from
the PIC to the
CEO of Sunrise
,
in which it is
stated
that
Sunrise
'
s
request for a moratorium
,
and for
facilities for phase two expansion of the Terminal was declined. The
applicant states that the PIC
,
as principal
lender has effectively foreclosed on Sunrise and withdrawn its
support
,
and
that the meaning of the letter is that the PIC requires that the
amounts loaned to Sunrise be repaid.
[61]
Given that the
PIC is not party to these proceedings
,
the extensive
meaning of the letter given by the applicant
,
namely that
the PIC required that the amounts loaned to Sunrise be repaid
,
is not
established by the letter and the facts do not support such a
construction
.
Those are not
the express terms of the letter. However
,
it cannot be
denied that in terms of the letter Sunrise
'
s
request for a moratorium
was declined.
Nor
,
however
,
is the
respondents
'
version that
the moratorium continues to apply
,
though on an
informal basis.
[62]
I do not
consider the respondents
'
version to be
far-fetched
in
this regard in light of the fact that on 6 September 2022
,
a few months
after the date of the letter refusing the extend the moratorium
,
the majority
shareholders made an in-principle decision to approve the debt
restructuring proposal in respect of Sunrise. Rather
than an
indication of foreclosure and revocation, this indicates the
contrary. Furthermore, on the applicant's own version
,
it is the debt
moratorium that enabled Sunrise to continue meeting its financial
obligations to date
,
and to pay its
operational debts as and when they arose. There is simply not enough
evidence on this issue to conclude it in favour
of the applicant
-
that there is
no longer a debt moratorium in place. Not only is it disputed by one
of the major shareholders
,
the IDC
,
but the PIC is
not a party to these proceedings to explain its stance.
[63]
Another issue
that is vociferously criticized by the applicant in its replying
affidavits concerns the debt restructuring plan.
The criticisms in
this regard are many and varied
.
The
respondents point out
,
however
,
that following
the cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement
,
the debt
restructuring plan embarked upon in September 2022 had to be
significantly augmented
,
and a
comprehensive review and remodelling of Sunrise
'
s
finances was embarked upon. As I have indicated
,
this was
communicated to the applicant
i
n
the letters of June 2023. As a result
,
the debt
restructuring plan is no longer relevant. It is accordingly not
necessary to dwell on the applicant's extensive criticism
of it.
However
,
the
applicant has
,
in its
replying papers proposed an alternative restructuring plan
.
The
respondents point out that the applicant's plan assumes that the IDC
and PIC will write off R252 million of their senior debt
,
and that R260
million of their debt will be subordinated
.
There is no
evidence of support for such a plan from either lender.
[64]
Then
,
in its
replying affidavit to the IDC the applicant has undertaken a
financial analysis to show that Sunrise remains factually insolvent

despite the cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement.
This is said
to be due to the oppressive debt position which remains firmly in
place as well as the applicant's exclusion from providing
input in
decision making. In this regard
,
the applicant
has set out its projected cash flow of Sunrise for the period 2023 to
2032 which it says have been extracted from
Sunrise
'
s
audit and risk committee report dated 30 June 2023
,
and which it
says shows that Sunrise cannot service existing debt levels until
2032
.
[65]
There are also
calculations allegedly comparing the net present value of discounted
future cash flows according to the respondents
'
business
rescue plan versus the discounted future cash flows according to
Sunrise
'
s
restructuring plan
.
The
calculations in this regard resumed by mean
s
of a written
note handed up during oral reply by counsel.
Upon enquiry
from the Court regarding whethe
r
the
calculations were based on evidence contained
in
the
papers
,
the
applicant's
counsel
promised
to
clarify
the
issue
and
to
provide references in
writing. Even at that stage the respondents objected to the
calculations
,
which they
said arose for the first time during the reply by means of a written
note
.
[66]
Nevertheless
,
the Court
granted the applicant opportunity to clarify the issue. When the
written clarity was delivered on 8 September 2023
,
the
respondents complained
that it not
only introduced
new arguments
,
but also
sought to make further allegations which are not supported by the
record. There were also complaints that the applicant
sought to rely
on annexures or portions contained therein
,
which were not
previously referred to. The applicant again sought to reply to the
respondents
'
submissions
,
which
opportunity was granted
,
and further
note in reply was delivered on 11 October 2023.
[67]
I
have considered all of the applicant's submissions in this regard
,
which
are not necessary to outline in detail
,
and
it is clear that the applicant is now seeking to mount a new case for
its allegations of factual insolvency
,
relying
on new submissions and calculations
,
and
seeking to introduce new evidence
,
including
by submitting a business rescue plan in reply
,
something
it failed to do in its founding papers and which the respondents had
pointed out from the answering affidavits. This is
manifestly
impermissible and is unfair to the respondents who were called to
meet the case based on the founding papers of the
applicant.
[12]
[68]
I
do observe that in effect, the applicant seeks to deal with the fact
the Vita Gas Agreement
,
upon
which it initially relied for these proceedings
,
has
fallen away
.
In
this regard
the
applicant
states
that it is entitled
to
'
refocus
its approach
'
after
the termination of the Vita Gas Agreement
,
the
termination of the moratoriums and the perfection of the notarial
bond by Bowwood
.
As
the respondents point out
,
the
applicant did not deliver an affidavit to deal with some of these
events
,
and
when it did
,
it
was in replying affidavits to
the
IDC's answering affidavit. It is clear from the many submissions
that, in effect, the applicant sought to belatedly make its
case in
the written submissions, which, as I have said, is impermissible.
One
of the reasons for the impermissibility is that the calculations
involve comparison and analysis of information contained in
annexures
which were not expressly identified or relied upon in the
affidavits
.
[13]
This
is admitted in the applicant's replying note of 11 October 2023.
[69]
But in any
event, insofar as these calculations seek to criticize the debt
restructuring plan mentioned in the answering affidavit,
they are not
helpful as they have been overtaken by undisputed events
,
namely that
the cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement has required a
comprehensive
review of the
financial affairs of Sunrise.
[70]
Lastly on this
issue, when regard is had to the tenor and extent of the applicant's
criticisms against the respondents' debt restructuring
plan which
includes alternative ideas for the financing of the Phase 2
development, it becomes evident that this is once more an
aspect
which is not appropriate for this Court to determine by way of
business rescue proceedings
,
and is better
suited for discussion and resolution at Board or shareholder level.
For all these reasons, I do not deem it appropriate
to take the
calculations into account.
[71]
I now tum to
deal with the just and equitable grounds relied upon by the
applicant. In this regard, the applicant's papers are replete
with
allegations of not only mismanagement
,
but Mr
Harmse's alienation by the management of Sunrise, which includes
MOGS' representatives. The allegations are extensive and
include
allegations of failure to communicate with, and to provide documents
to Mr Harmse regarding important issues, including
the decision to
enter into the Vita Gas Agreement. There are also allegations
regarding conflicts of interest, to which I have
already made
reference.
[72]
Apart from the
fact that these allegations are disputed and not established on the
evidence
,
I
am not satisfied
,
without more
,
that they
amount to financial reasons for business rescue as contemplated in
section 131(4)(a)(iii).
Rather
,
the overall
picture which emerges from the papers is that
,
since the
majority shareholders became involved with the business of Sunrise
,
the applicant
and specifically Mr Harmse has had very little influence in the
decision-making
,
and does not
always agree with the decisions taken. I do not consider it
appropriate to order business rescue for the purposes of
resolving
shareholders' and directors
'
conflicts and
disagreement regarding the direction that the company should take. As
the respondents state
,
the
Companies
Act provides
remedies for a minority shareholder or disaffected
director who is truly aggrieved by decisions of the majority
shareholders or
the rest of the Board
,
including
section 163 of the Act.
[73]
Rather
,
it is clear
that the application was brought in order to bring about the
applicant's wishes on how Sunrise should be operated
.
Even in the
replying affidavit the applicant states that
,
in contrast to
Sunrise
'
s
debt restructuring plan it (the applicant) has
"
sugg
e
st
e
d
through the busin
e
ss
r
e
scu
e,
a n
e
at
m
e
chanism
to address the Vita Gas Agr
ee
m
e
nt
in a mann
e
r
that will g
e
nerat
e
ad
e
quat
e
incom
e
by th
e
Terminal
organicall
y".
In
addition
,
funding requir
e
d
for
th
e
expansion
of
th
e
Terminal
could
be
sourced on
a
far mor
e
commercial
and less draconian basis than that curr
e
ntl
y
offered
by RMB".
There
are many other instances displaying the applicant's similar attitude
in this regard. In effect
,
the impression
gained from reading the applicant's papers is that the business
rescue proceedings are being used to execute the
applicant's
preferred method of operating the business
,
rather than
the plan adopted by the majority
.
[74]
It
is one of the well-trodden fundamental principles of company law
that
,
by
becoming a shareholder in a company
,
a
person undertakes to be bound by the decisions of the prescribed
majority
of shareholders
,
if
those decisions on the affairs of the company are arrived at in
accordance with the law
,
even
where they adversely affect his or her own rights as a
shareholder.
[14]
That
principle of the supremacy of the majority is essential to the proper
functioning of companies. The applicant, being a 9%
minority
shareholder and Mr Harmse a single director on the company's Board of
directors, are required to abide by those principles.
It has not been
shown that the interests of the applicant as a shareholder can only
be safeguarded through a formal business rescue
process in the
circumstances of this case.
[75]
I
also take into account that the allegations of mismanagement and
conflicts of interest involving MOGS representatives require
the
Court to reach serious adverse findings against individuals and
entities which are not joined as parties to these proceedings
and
which
have
not been granted opportunity to address the allegations directly made
against them. The fact that they may have knowledge of
these
proceedings but did not intervene is not sufficient, in the
circumstances of this case, to entitle this Court to deal with
the
issues and serious allegations raised by the applicant.
[15]
They clearly have a direct and substantial interest in the issues
alleged about them. I consider it inappropriate to grant the
order on
these grounds.
[76]
The same
applies in respect of the applicant's alternative relief, which is
sought in reply, for an order in terms of
section 163
of the
Companies Act forcing
Sunrise or its majority shareholder to buy out
its shares. The majority shareholder is not cited as a party in these
proceedings
.
Nor was this
the basis on which the applicant approached
this Court
.
Furthermore
,
no
amendment
was
sought
to
include
such
relief,
and
the
relief
sought
in terms of
the notice of motion remains relief in terms of
section 131(4)
of the
Companies Act.
[77
]
As regards the
prospects of business rescue
,
I take into
account the fact that the majority shareholders have made it clear
that they will not inject any money into Sunrise
should an order be
granted for its business rescue
,
and none of
the majority shareholders support business rescue. It is in this
respect that clause 3.2.14 of the subordination agreement
is
relevant
,
and
it provides that the shareholders of Sunrise shall not vote to
approve a proposed business rescue plan if such a vote would
reduce
the amounts payable to Sunrise
'
s
lenders. Even on the applicant
'
s
version
,
the
evidence indicates that a business rescue plan would entail
significant reduction of the amounts payable to Sunrise
'
s
senior lenders
,
and that its
senior lenders would be required to expend more money to finance it.
There is very little prospect of Sunrise's shareholders
agreeing to
any such proposed business plan
,
and without
such approval
,
the business
rescue plan has no reasonable prospects of success
.
[78]
Furthermore
,
it is common
cause that placing Sunrise under supervision would constitute a
breach of the Terminal Operator Agreement concluded
between it and
the TNPA. That is in terms of clause 40 of the Terminal Operator
Agreement which entitles the TNPA to terminate
the agreement if
Sunrise is placed under business rescue
.
It is also not
in dispute that that would automatically bring an end to the business
of Sunrise and entitle the TNPA to take possession
of the Terminal.
This 1s a severe consequence
,
especially in
circumstances where the applicant has failed to establish the
financial distress relied upon.
[79]
There is also
to consider the common cause fact that Sunrise has
,
to a large
extent been funded by public funds
,
which would be
placed in jeopardy if it were placed under supervision and the
prospect of recovery of the funds would likely diminish.
Based on the
evidence
,
it
is in the interest of the public to allow Sunrise to continue to
engage additional aggregators
,
and to devise
and implement a plan to resolve any financial difficulties
encountered which it has already started to do.
[80]
I also observe
that
,
insofar
as the application relied upon the Vita Gas Agreement
,
the lodging of
these proceedings was in any event superfluous because the applicant
relies on similar arguments as those raised
in the arbitration and
Competition Tribunal matters. This is evident from the Board's
resolution which summarized the alleged contraventions
by Vita Gas as
the contraventions of the provisions of the NERSA licence and of the
Terminal Operator Agreement
,
and the
applicant relies on those arguments in these proceedings. Both of
those sets of litigation were pending when these proceedings
were
launched
,
which shows
Sunrise was already dealing with the complaints relating to the Vita
Gas Agreement. The applicant and Mr Harmse were
also party to those
proceedings, and were also party to the Board's resolution
,
in which
receipt oflegal advice forming the legal basis for the launching of
both sets of litigation was noted.
[81]
Although the
applicant is not precluded from relying on the same arguments
regarding the Vita Gas Agreement here
,
it does
indicate that
,
a few months
before the launching of the proceedings
,
the applicant
was of the view that the issues relating to Vita Gas could be
resolved by taking the steps approved by the Board.
There is no
discernible explanation from the papers for why the applicant deemed
business rescue the more appropriate route to
follow a mere few
months after the Board's resolution at the time that the applicant
chose to approach this Court.
[82]
What Mr Harmse
does state is that
,
as a precursor
to these proceedings he addressed a letter to the Board stating that
the Vita Gas Agreement must be addressed urgently
as that is the key
to Sunrise
'
s
survival from its terrible financial position.
He states that
the letter was discussed at a special meeting of the Board where he
was accused of breaching his fiduciary duties
and he was excused from
the meeting for more than 45 minutes for discussion on the matter to
ensue.
It
was soon after that date that he brought these proceedings
,
once it became
clear that the only manner in which to address the Vita Gas Agreement
was through an application
for
supervision
proceedings
.
This shows
clearly
,
in
my view, that
the reason Mr Harmse approached
this Court
is that he
lost a debate in the boardroom.
[83]
It is now
convenient to deal with the applicant's application to strike certain
matter from Sunrise's supplementary affidavit.
H.
THE
APPLICATION TO STRIKE
[84]
The
applicant
seeks
an
order
that
paragraph
21
of
Sunrise's
supplementary
answering affidavit be struck with costs on a scale between attorney
and client.
In
the said paragraph,
Sunrise
refers
to a
'without
prejudice'
letter
sent
by
the applicant's
attorneys on
29 June 2023, in response
to a letter
from Sunrise's attorneys in which
the applicant
was requested
to withdraw
this application and tender costs.
[85]
In paragraph
21 of the supplementary answering affidavit, Sunrise states that the
'without
prejudice'
letter of 29 June 2023 did not amount to a genuine attempt to settle
the dispute between the parties, and continues that:
"It
has
become
evident
that
[the applicant] is attempting to use the business rescue application
as leverage in a misguided attempt to
extract
a
favorable settlement for itself."
This is
the subject of the striking out application.
[86]
The applicant
objects to what it terms
"an
inappropriate
conclusion"
at
paragraph 21, which it says also constitutes a breach of the
applicant's privilege.
In support of
its objection the applicant states that the averments are nonsensical
and counterintuitive because, if it has no prospects
of success in
the business rescue application then there is no leverage to speak of
- it can only have leverage if the business
rescue has merit, in
which case the applicant states the Sunrise effectively admits that
the applicant's application has merit.
Secondly, the
applicant states that this is not the type of matter where an amount
of money is being sought that can be settled
by one party putting
pressure on the other to pay.
The
applicant
points
out
that
it
is
a
shareholder
of
Sunrise
and
wants
to ensure
that
its investment
is maximized
rather than eroded
.
[87]
I have found
no merit in the striking application
,
and in
particular
,
in
the allegation that the applicant
'
s
privilege has been breached.
Sunrise has
not attached the 'without prejudice
'
letter
referred to in its supplementary affidavit. Neither has it divulged
the contents of the letter or of the settlement offer
referred to.
It has not
been established how the applicant is prejudiced by the averments
made in the paragraph
,
although I
accept that they are disputed
.
To my mind
,
they are
similar in nature to the allegation that the applicant and Mr Harmse
seek to exact their preferences upon the majority
shareholders by
launching and continuing with this litigation. I have found no cogent
basis for the application to strike paragraph
21.
[88]
For all these
reasons
,
I
have found no basis to grant the relief sought by the applicant or to
exercise a discretion to come to its aid.
The
requirements for supervision and business rescue have not been
established.
I.
COSTS
[89]
There is no
reason why costs should not follow the result. From its inception,
the application had little merit as it failed to
satisfy any
requirements for business rescue in terms of the Act. And the
prospects of success were significantly reduced after
the
cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement
,
which was the
main basis on which the applicant brought these proceedings.
[90]
While the
applicant did not file a supplementary affidavit dealing with the
cancellation of the Vita Gas Agreement
,
it delivered
the submissions containing the belated calculations and arguments
that I have discussed
,
which I have
also concluded were impermissible. Although
the Court
granted
the
applicant
'
s
counsel
opportunity
to clarify
its
calculations by providing references, the submissions went beyond
providing references
,
venturing into
new, detailed mathematical arguments. It is no wonder that the
respondents complain that they have had to incur unnecessary
costs of
having to consider the belated calculations, which were in any event
irrelevant
,
and to file
further submissions references.
[91]
As regards
Part A of the proceedings, no grounds for urgency were established.
The Vita Gas Agreement
,
which was
initially at the heart of the applicant's complaint, has been in
existence and operation since 16 March 2018. At the time
of launching
these proceedings
,
concerns
regarding the Vita Gas Agreement were the subject of pending
arbitration proceedings and proceedings before the Competition

Tribunal. As for the involvement of MOGS
's
representatives
in Sunrise, that has been the position since January 2016.
And the
alleged factual insolvency of Sunrise commenced, according to the
applicant, in 2018.
[92]
Given
these timeframes, I would have expected the applicant to provide
reasons for why business rescue was required so urgently
in November
2022. No such reasons were provided
.
Although
business rescue applications may enjoy some measure of urgency, there
is no reason why this matter could
not
have been launched and placed on the semi-urgent roll,
with
permission
of
the
(Acting)
Judge
President,
per
the
usual
practice
in
this
Division.
[16]
J.
ORDER
[93]
In all the
circumstances
,
the following
order is granted:
a.
The applicant
is to pay the costs occasioned by the first respondent's attendances
in respect of Part A
.
b.
The relief
sought in Part B is dismissed with costs.
c.
In respect of
Part B
,
the
applicant is ordered to pay the costs of first and third respondents
,
the costs of
first respondent to include costs of two counsel
,
where so
employed
.
N.
MANGCU-LOCKWOOD
Judge
of the High Court
[1]
C
a
ss
im
e
t
al
,
C
o
nt
e
mp
or
a
ry
Co
mpan
y
La
w,
3rd
Edition
,
2021
,
p1185
.
[2]
Ca
ss
im
supra
,
p
1186
;
Aee
also
Delport
e
t
al
,
H
e
no
c
h
s
b
e
r
g
on
th
e
Compani
es
A
c
t
7
1
of
200
8,
November
2022
-
SI
30
,
p
459.
[3]
Ca
ss
im
supra,
p
1185
.
[4]
H
e
no
c
hsb
e
rg
s
upra,
page
458 - 458(1
)
.
[5]
Oakd
e
n
e
Squar
e
Prop
e
rti
e
s
(Pt
y)
Ltd
and
Oth
e
r
s
v
Farm
Bothasfont
e
in
(K
y
alami)
(Pt
y)
Ltd
and Oth
e
rs
2013
(4)
SA
539 (SCA) para [7].
[6]
O
a
kd
e
n
e
s
upr
a
para
[29].
[7]
Oakd
e
n
e
para
s
[30)-(31)
;
K
oe
n
and
A
n
o
th
er
v
W
e
d
gewoo
d
Villa
ge
G
o
lf
& C
o
unt
ry
E
s
tat
e
(
Pt
y)
Ltd
and Oth
e
rs
2012
(2)
SA 378
(WCC) para [17]
;
A
BSA
Bank Limit
e
d
v N
e
wcit
y
Group
(
Pt
y)
Ltd
and anoth
e
r
r
e
lat
e
d
matt
e
r
[2013]
3 All SA 146
(GSJ) para 20.3
.
[8]
Oakd
e
n
e
para
[29]
.
[9]
O
a
kd
e
n
e
s
upra
para
[3]
.
[10]
S
w
a
r
t
v
B
e
a
g
l
es
Run
In
ves
tm
e
nt
s
25 (
Pt
y)
Ltd
(
F
o
ur
C
r
e
dit
o
r
s
Int
e
rv
e
nin
g)
2
011
(5)
SA 422
(GNP) para [37]
;
T
y
r
e
C
o
rp
o
ration
Cap
e
T
ow
n
(
Pt
y)
Ltd
and Oth
e
r
s
v
GT
Lo
g
i
s
ti
cs
(
Pt
y)
Ltd
(
E
s
t
e
rhui
ze
n
and
A
noth
e
r
Int
e
rv
e
nin
g)
2017
(3)
SA 74
(WCC) para [76]
.
[11]
C
ass
im
s
upra
,
p
1205-6
;
S
o
uth
e
rn
Pala
ce
In
ves
tm
e
nt
s
2
65
(
Pt
y)
Ltd
v
Midni
g
ht
Storm In
ves
tm
e
nt
s
3
8
6
Ltd
2012
(2)
SA 423
(WCC) para [3]
;
Mol
y
n
e
ux
a
nd
A
n
o
th
e
r
v
Pat
e
l
a
nd
Oth
e
r
s
(14618
/
2014)
[2014] ZA
WCHC
191
para
[25]
;
ABSA
Bank Limit
e
d
v
Newc
it
y
Group
supra
para
[28]
.
[12]
S
w
i
ss
b
o
r
o
u
g
h
Di
a
m
o
n
d
M
in
es
P
ty
Ltd
&
o
th
e
r
s
v
G
ove
rnm
e
nt
of
th
e
R
e
publ
ic
o
f
S
o
uth
A
f
r
ica
1999
(2) SA 279
(
T
)
at
323H -
3
24C
;
My
Vote
C
o
unt
s
N
PC
v
Sp
ea
k
e
r
of
t
h
e
N
ation
a
l
Asse
mbl
y
2016
(1) SA 13
2
(
CC)
at
para 177
.
[13]
Van
Z
y
l
&
others
v
Gov
e
rnm
en
t
of
th
e
R
e
publi
c
of
South
Africa
&
others
2008
(3)
SA 294 (SCA) para 40.
[14]
Samm
e
t
v
Pr
es
id
e
nt
B
rand
Gold
Mining Co
Ltd
1969
(3)
SA 629
(A) 678H
.
[15]
See
A
mal
ga
mat
e
d
Engin
ee
rin
g
Union
v
Minist
er
of
Labour
1949
(3)
SA 637
(A).
[16]
See
,
for
example
,
Du
T
o
it
v
Azari
Wind
2022
(2)
SA 51O
(WCC) para [23] at p 515F.