Municipality of Mossel Bay v Steenkamp N.O and Another (33/2023) [2023] ZAWCHC 315 (1 December 2023)

80 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Administrative Law — Tender — Self-review — Municipality seeks to review its decision to allocate a tender for a housing project, claiming it contracted with the wrong entity — Successful bidder, Stone Trade Trust, issued summons for specific performance or damages — Municipality's review application dismissed due to unreasonable delay and failure to establish that the tender process violated constitutional procurement provisions — Award found to be fair, transparent, equitable, competitive, and cost-effective.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was an application by an орган of state, the Municipality of Mossel Bay (the applicant), to review and set aside its own tender award decision taken in February 2009. The review was brought as a constitutional legality review rather than under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), on the basis that the Municipality alleged non-compliance with the procurement requirements in section 217 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.


The respondents were Jan Kasper Gerhardus Steenkamp N.O. and Stephanus Johannes Steenkamp N.O., cited in their capacities as trustees of the Stone Trade Trust (“the Trust”), the entity that had been treated as the successful tenderer and which, in separate pending action proceedings, claimed contractual rights flowing from the tender award.


The procedural history was central to the context of the review. The tender dispute had long-running consequences: after the tender award, a dissatisfied tenderer (ASLA Devco (Pty) Ltd) launched urgent review proceedings in 2009, which were redirected into an internal appeal and then arbitration, ultimately settling on a basis that the Trust and ASLA would share the award. Separately, in 2011, the Trust instituted action proceedings (pending under case number 21583/2011) seeking specific performance against the Municipality to enforce the tender-related contract, alternatively damages exceeding R64 million for alleged loss of profits. The Municipality only launched the present review application on 21 December 2022, shortly before the action trial was due to commence in February 2023, approximately 13 years after the original tender award decision.


The general subject matter of the dispute concerned public procurement and whether the Municipality’s award of a development tender for three mid-income housing projects complied with the constitutional procurement standard in section 217, against the background of a late self-review brought to resist contractual enforcement and/or damages claims.


2. Material Facts


The Trust was formed in 2002 as a family trust engaged in construction, trading over time under the name “Stone Trade Trust Construction”. At the relevant times its trustees were the two respondents. The Municipality initiated a procurement process in October 2007 by issuing an Expression of Interest for the development of municipal land for mid-income housing on three sites, and later (15 May 2008) issued a Call for Proposal to shortlisted firms. Five tenderers ultimately submitted proposals, including entities described as “Stone Trade Trust” and “ASLA Devco (Pty) Ltd”.


On 31 July 2008, a tender was submitted in the name “Stone Trade Trust Construction” (referred to in the judgment as STTC in line with the tender documentation’s usage). In that tender document, STTC disclosed that for the project it would participate in a 50/50 joint venture with Mbobs and Mbobs Building and Civil Construction (Pty) Ltd (“Mbobs”), a BEE-aligned partner. The tender documentation indicated that the joint venture would be housed in a separate company, Marblesharp 122 (Pty) Ltd (“Marblesharp”). The tender was evaluated by the Municipality’s committees using a points system (including a 90/10 approach, with preferential procurement forming part of the scoring).


The Municipality’s evaluation process resulted in the Trust scoring 80.60 points and ASLA 79.40 points. The Bid Adjudication Committee approved the recommendation, and on 5 February 2009 the Municipality communicated acceptance by letter addressed to “Messrs Stone Trade Trust Construction”, stating that acceptance was subject to negotiation and signature of a Land Availability Agreement. It was not disputed that the tender award was made in that period and communicated accordingly; what was disputed in the Municipality’s later case was the legal characterisation of which entity was the contracting party and whether the tender was awarded consistently with section 217.


ASLA’s dissatisfaction led to urgent review proceedings in March 2009. Those proceedings were converted into an internal appeal and then arbitration, eventually settling on the basis that the Trust and ASLA would share the award. The Trust did not implement the development immediately, and the papers referred to issues surrounding conclusion of the land availability agreement, with allegations that the Municipality frustrated the process. The Trust then instituted action proceedings in October 2011 claiming enforcement or damages, and that action was eventually set down for trial in February 2023.


The Municipality’s founding papers in the present review contended that it later realised there was uncertainty in the tender documentation as to whether the bidder and/or successful party was the Trust, ST Trade Construction (Pty) Ltd (“ST Trade”), or Marblesharp, and that points (including preferential procurement points) may have been awarded on an incorrect basis. It further asserted, in speculative terms, that the Trust was “dormant, insolvent and incapacitated” to execute the tender, and that ST Trade had just been registered. The Trust’s answering papers disputed this narrative and asserted that the tender documentation clearly conveyed that the Trust was the tenderer, while performance would be through a disclosed joint venture structure with a BEE partner housed in Marblesharp. The Trust relied on the fact that the Municipality had been informed of the empowerment partnership intention already at the Expression of Interest stage, and that the tender included the joint venture agreement and tax clearance information reflecting the Trust’s standing and trading name.


On the evidence before the court, the Municipality did not allege that it had been misled, and it did not advance a case of misrepresentation or fronting. The thrust of its case remained that it had, allegedly and belatedly, come to suspect that it had “contracted with the wrong entity,” and that this rendered the award unconstitutional under section 217.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned the consequences of an admittedly unreasonable delay in bringing a municipal self-review, and whether the Municipality nevertheless demonstrated that the tender award was clearly unlawful and therefore required to be set aside under constitutional principles.


More specifically, the court was required to determine whether the Municipality had established, on the facts presented in the affidavits, a breach of section 217 of the Constitution in that the procurement process and outcome were not fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective, particularly due to alleged uncertainty about the identity of the tenderer/contracting entity and the allocation of preferential procurement points.


The dispute was primarily one of application of law to fact within a constitutional review framework. The court also had to make an evaluative assessment of whether the Municipality’s allegations rose above speculation to the level of conclusive unlawfulness on undisputed facts, as contemplated in the Constitutional Court jurisprudence dealing with delayed self-reviews.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that delay was dispositive only up to a point. The Municipality’s deponent said nothing about delay in the founding affidavit, and in argument the Municipality accepted that the delay in launching the review was manifestly unreasonable. The court nevertheless held that this did not end the enquiry. Relying on the Constitutional Court’s approach, particularly in Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality v Asla Construction (Pty) Ltd 2019 (4) SA 331 (CC) and its reliance on State Information Technology Agency SOC v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 23 (CC), the court treated the governing principle as requiring that a court must still consider legality and, if the contract is shown to be clearly unlawful on undisputed facts, the court would be obliged to declare it invalid and set it aside in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.


The court also confirmed the doctrinal route for a state self-review. Following Gijima, PAJA did not apply to the Municipality’s attempt to review its own conduct; the matter proceeded as a legality review, grounded in constitutional accountability and the state’s duty to rectify unlawful decisions. The judgment referred to the explanation in the minority judgment in Buffalo City emphasising the constitutional foundations for self-review (including the importance of open and accountable government and, specifically for procurement, section 217).


Turning to the merits, the court treated the Municipality as bearing the burden of establishing a clear breach of section 217. The Municipality’s core contention was that it had “unknowingly ended up contracting with the wrong entity,” and that the tender documentation was confusing as between the Trust, ST Trade, and Marblesharp. The court regarded this as an unusual contention for a municipality to raise at such a late stage, particularly given the institutional safeguards, internal processes, and access to legal advice available to an орган of state in procurement matters.


Crucially, the court found the Municipality’s stance to be speculative and assumption-based rather than grounded in clear and unequivocal facts. The founding affidavit repeatedly framed the alleged unlawfulness in terms of uncertainty and possibility, rather than demonstrating that the award in fact contravened the constitutional procurement standard. The court noted that the Municipality did not allege that it had been deceived, and there was no pleaded case of misrepresentation or fronting.


In evaluating the tender documentation and the surrounding circumstances as presented on affidavit, the court accepted that the Trust had disclosed the intended joint venture and shareholding arrangements with Mbobs, and that the Municipality’s evaluators—municipal officials and external advisers—had scrutinised the material without raising any concern at the time about the proposed structure. The judgment emphasised that the documentation reflected that the Trust was the tendering entity, and that it had communicated to the Municipality that performance would be through a joint venture housed in Marblesharp. The court treated the Municipality’s later professed confusion, including by its legal head, as inconsistent with the contemporaneous evaluation and the historical knowledge evident from the earlier ASLA litigation.


The court also considered, in response to argument, whether section 217 could be interpreted as preventing a successful bidder from arranging its corporate affairs for operational purposes, such as using a subsidiary or a project vehicle to perform contractual obligations. The judgment recorded that counsel for the Municipality could point to no authority establishing such a prohibition, and the court did not accept that the procurement framework, on the facts shown, was necessarily undermined by the disclosed joint venture structure.


On this basis, the court concluded that the Municipality had not shown that the contract “falls foul” of section 217 such that it must be set aside. The court found that the procurement outcome was fair, transparent, equitable, competitive and evidently cost-effective, and therefore the legality review could not succeed even though the delay was unreasonable.


As to costs, the court considered the Trust’s request for punitive costs in light of the alleged cynical nature of the late review. Without expressly framing the Municipality’s conduct as mala fide in the costs reasoning, the court invoked the principle from In re Alluvial Creek Ltd 1929 CPD 532 that punitive costs may be justified where proceedings are vexatious in effect because they put the other side to unnecessary trouble and expense, even without necessarily attributing improper motive. The court held that this was an appropriate case for such an order.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the Municipality’s application to review and set aside the 2009 tender award decision.


The Municipality was ordered to pay the costs of the respondents, in their representative capacities as trustees of the Stone Trade Trust, on the attorney-and-client scale.


Cases Cited


Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality v Asla Construction (Pty) Ltd 2019 (4) SA 331 (CC).


State Information Technology Agency SOC v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 23 (CC).


Esorfranki Pipelines (Pty) Ltd and another v Mopani District Municipality and others [2014] 2 All SA 493 (SCA).


In re Alluvial Creek Ltd 1929 CPD 532.


Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and another v Harrison and another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC).


Boost Sports Africa (Pty) Ltd v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd 2015 (5) SA 38 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 217.


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 172(1)(a).


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 237.


Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that although the Municipality’s delay in bringing a self-review was manifestly unreasonable and unexplained on the papers, the court was still required to consider whether the tender award was clearly unlawful under the constitutional principle of legality.


The court held further that the Municipality failed to establish conclusively, on the evidence presented, that the tender award breached section 217 of the Constitution. The Municipality’s case rested on speculative assertions of uncertainty about the contracting entity and the allocation of points, without a demonstrated misrepresentation, fronting, or other clear procurement unlawfulness. On the facts as presented, the tender process and outcome were found to have been fair, transparent, equitable, competitive, and cost-effective.


The review was dismissed, and punitive costs on the attorney-and-client scale were awarded against the Municipality.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A state organ seeking to review its own procurement decision does so through the principle of legality rather than PAJA, consistent with the Constitutional Court’s approach to self-review in public procurement matters.


An unreasonable delay by a state organ in instituting a self-review does not necessarily end the enquiry: a court must still consider legality and, where a contract is shown on undisputed facts to be clearly unlawful, the court is obliged to declare invalidity and set the decision aside under section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.


In a legality review challenging procurement under section 217 of the Constitution, the applicant орган of state bears the burden of establishing a clear breach of the constitutional procurement standard. Mere assertions framed as uncertainty or possibility, without clear factual unlawfulness, do not justify setting aside an award.


Punitive costs on the attorney-and-client scale may be awarded where litigation is vexatious in effect, in that it unnecessarily puts the opposing party to trouble and expense, even if vexatious intent is not definitively established.

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[2023] ZAWCHC 315
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Municipality of Mossel Bay v Steenkamp N.O and Another (33/2023) [2023] ZAWCHC 315 (1 December 2023)

FLYNOTES:
ADMINISTRATIVE – Tender –
Self-review

Delays
in housing project – Successful bidder issuing summons and
seeking specific performance or damages – At
late stage,
municipality seeking to review its decision to allocate tender –
Contending that it contracted with wrong
entity –
Municipality was informed of joint venture and shareholding
arrangements with BEE compliant company –
Municipality not
establishing that contract falls foul of provisions of section 217
and that it must thus be set aside –
It was fair,
transparent, equitable, competitive and evidently cost-effective –
Application dismissed – Constitution,
s 217.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION,
CAPE TOWN
REPORTABLE
CASE NO: 33/2023
In
the matter between:
THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MOSSEL BAY
Applicant
And
JAN
KASPER GERHARDUS STEENKAMP NO
First
Respondent
STEPHANUS
JOHANNES STEENKAMP NO
Second
Respondent
Bench:
P.A.L. Gamble, J
Heard:
17 & 18 August 2023
Delivered:
1 December 2023
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives via email and release to SAFLII. The
date
and time for hand-down is deemed to be 12h30 on Friday 1 December
2023.
JUDGMENT
GAMBLE, J:
INTRODUCTION
1.
The applicant (the Municipality) seeks to review
its own decision taken in February 2009 in which it allocated a
tender for the
building of 3 middle-income housing projects to its
preferred bidder. The matter has a long history but the points for
determination
in this review are fairly crisp.
2.
The review has its genesis in action proceedings
which are pending in this court under case no 21583/2011 in which the
successful
tenderer (cited in those proceedings as the Stone Trade
Trust) has sought specific performance from the Municipality to
enforce
the contract which was allocated to it, alternatively a claim
for damages in excess of R64m for its alleged loss of profits.
3.
On 21 December 2022, and as the parties were
preparing to go trial on 13 February 2023, the Municipality put a
spanner in the works
as it sought to review the tender allocation
which it had made some 13 years earlier. It goes without saying that,
in addition
to the merits of the application which is brought as a
legality review, there is the question of unreasonable delay in
filing the
review.
BACKGROUND
FACTS
4.
The
papers show that the Stone Trade Trust (Master’s Reference IT
902/2002) was formed in 2002 as a family trust engaged in
the
construction industry, predominantly in the Eastern Cape: the Trust’s
principal place of business is in Jeffreys Bay.
At all material times
its trustees were the first and second respondents herein, Messrs.
J.K.G and S.J.Steenkamp
[1]
, and
over the years it appears to have traded generally under the name
“Stone Trade Trust Construction”.
5.
In October 2007 the Municipality issued a public
document termed an “Expression of Interest” announcing
its intention
to develop municipal land for mid-income housing on
three designated sites in its area of jurisdiction. After considering
the response
thereto, the Municipality shortlisted 7 firms as
potential parties to be considered for the project. Thereafter, and
on 15 May
2008, the Municipality issued a so-called “Call for
Proposal” document to the seven firms which had been
shortlisted.
Of the seven, two firms declined to tender. The five
firms which subsequently submitted tenders included two entities
described
in the relevant documentation as “Stone Trade Trust”
and “ASLA Devco (Pty) Ltd” (ASLA).
6.
On 31 July 2008 a tender for the project was
submitted on behalf of an entity described as “Stone Trade
Trust Construction”.
Where relevant I shall refer to this
entity by the acronym “STTC” (which the Trust’s
agents utilized from time
to time) but otherwise I shall refer to the
Stone Trade Trust simply as “the Trust”. The tender was a
voluminous document
containing a plethora of information relating to,
inter alia, the nature of the work for which it tendered and the
costings in
relation thereto. In its tender document STTC disclosed
that, for the purposes of the project, it was a 50% shareholder in a
joint
venture (JV) with a company called Mbobs and Mbobs Building and
Civil Construction (Pty) Ltd (Mbobs). Details of that JV were
included
in the tender document which reflected that it was intended
to be housed in a separate entity known as Marblesharp 122 (Pty) Ltd

(Marblesharp).
7.
In October and November 2008 the Municipality’s
Pre-Evaluation Committee (PEC) met on several occasions to consider
the various
tenders. The PEC comprised municipal officials and
representatives of the accounting firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the
proposals
before it were evaluated according to a points scoring
system with the individual components comprising an aggregate of 100
points.
The PEC evidently applied the Municipality’s Supply
Chain Policy utilizing the so-called 90/10 principle with 10%
allocated
to the “Preferential Procurement Element” and
90% to the content of the proposal.
8.
At a meeting on 26 November 2008 the product of
the PEC’s work was discussed by the Municipality’s
Evaluation Committee
(EC) and a recommendation was made to the
Municipality’s Bid Adjudication Committee (BAC) that the tender
be awarded . This
was based on the fact that the Trust was awarded
80.60 points and ASLA 79.40 points. The other three tenderers were
allocated significantly
smaller aggregates. Consequently, the Trust
was recommended as the preferred tenderer in the following terms.

The
tender for the Development of Land for Mid-Income Housing on three
sites be awarded to Stone Trade Trust [Marble Sharp 122 (Pty)]
(sic)
subject to the following conditions:
1. That a Joint Project
Committee be established between the developer and municipal
officials to oversee the financial management
of this project.
2. That a Contract lawyer
be appointed to frame the contract agreements between the
Municipality and the developer.”
9.
The BAC considered the proposal from the EC at a
meeting on 4 December 2008 and approved it. Confirmation of the award
was contained
in a letter of 5 February 2009 addressed to STTC under
the hand of the Municipality’s erstwhile Acting Municipal
Manager,
Mr. C. du Plessis. That letter stipulated that the
acceptance of the tender was subject to the negotiation and signature
of a so-called
“Land Availability Agreement”.
10.
ASLA was unhappy with the outcome of the tender
process and on 10 March 2009 it launched urgent review proceedings to
set aside
the award thereof. I shall refer to this as “the ASLA
review”. During the course of that litigation the court
directed
that the ASLA review should be dealt with by way of an
internal appeal under the Municipality’s Supply Chain
Management Policy.
Pursuant thereto the Trust, ASLA and the
Municipality agreed to convert the internal appeal into arbitration
proceedings and those
proceedings were ultimately settled on the
basis that the Trust and ASLA would share the award of the tender.
11.
It is not entirely clear from the papers why the
Trust did not immediately proceed to implement its development rights
but it would
appear that there were issues around the conclusion of
the land availability agreement: there are allegations that the
Municipality
frustrated this process. Be that as it may, in October
2011 the Trust issued summons against the Municipality for an order
for
specific performance, alternatively damages, as aforesaid. That
action meandered its way through the corridors of the court until
it
was eventually set down for trial on 13 February 2023.
12.
The Municipality says in this review that during
the final phases of trial preparation its legal representatives
advised it that
they held the view that the tender had been
irregularly awarded to the Trust and that a legality review was
mandated under the
Constitution, 1996, hence its decision to launch
this application at a very advanced stage of proceedings. At the
hearing of this
matter, the Municipality was represented by Advs.
R.S. van Riet SC and S.A. Jordaan SC while Adv. P. de B. Vivier SC
appeared on
behalf of the Trust. The Court is indebted to counsel for
their comprehensive heads of argument which have facilitated the
preparation
of this judgment.
DELAY
13.
The founding affidavit in this review was deposed
to by the Municipality’s Senior Manager, Legal Services, Mr.
Pieter Daniel
Prins (Prins), who says that he has been in the employ
of the Municipality since 2007 and thus has personal knowledge of the
facts
pertaining to the matter.
14.
In
this affidavit there is not a whisper about delay. Indeed, Mr. van
Riet readily accepted in argument that the delay in launching
these
proceedings was manifestly unreasonable and that there was nothing
further to be said on that score. The Municipality is
thus in the
same position as its local authority counterpart in
Buffalo
City
[2]
.
That case holds that it is not the end of the matter: even though
there is an admittedly unreasonable delay, the Court is still

required to look at the legality of the contract awarded by the
Municipality. As Theron J for the majority of the Constitutional

Court, following
Gijima
[3]
,
observed in
Buffalo
City
-

[101]
However, this is not the end of the enquiry. On the authority of
Gijima
,
this court must, having established that the… contract was
clearly unlawful on undisputed facts, declare it invalid in
terms of
the provisions of s172(1)(a) [of the Constitution, 1996] and set it
aside. The unlawfulness of the… contract cannot
be ignored and
this court is obliged, as it did in
Gijima,
to
set aside a contract it knows to be unlawful. Even on a restrictive
interpretation of the
Gijima
principle,
bearing in mind the need to hold the state to the procedural
requirements of review, as explained above, I can see no
reason to
depart from it in this matter.”
15.
In the circumstances, the focus of this judgment
shifts to the question whether the award of the contract must be set
aside because
it is indisputably unlawful. In that regard, the
Municipality contends that its own conduct was in breach of the
procurement provisions
of s217 of the Constitution which are to the
following effect.

217.
Procurement
(1) When an organ of
state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or
any other institution identified in national
legislation, contracts
for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system
which is fair, equitable, transparent,
competitive and
cost-effective.
(2) Subsection (1) does
not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that
subsection from implementing a procurement
policy providing for –
(a) categories of
preference in the allocation of contract; and
(b) the protection or
advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination.
(3) National legislation
must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to in
subsection (2) must be implemented.”
LEGALITY
REVIEW
16.
In
accordance with the decision in
Gijima
,
the provisions of PAJA
[4]
do not
apply in situations where a state entity seeks to review its own
conduct on the basis that it is not in compliance with
the law. The
road to review in such circumstances is now exclusively located
through the principle of legality. As the minority
judgment of
Cameron and Froneman JJ in
Buffalo
City
makes
plain, there has not been judicial or academic unanimity in the
adoption of legality reviews as the appropriate mechanism
for a
self-review such as this, but it is nevertheless the mandated
approach, and for good reason.

[114]
Common law judicial review - the predecessor and part-ancestor of
constitutional legality review - did not provide for self-review
by
state organs. The constitutional era claims that capacity for state
organs. This is because its commitment to open, responsive
and
accountable government not only permits state self-review but places
a duty on state officials to rectify unlawful decisions.
[115] Constitutional
legality review also finds rich grounding in ss1(c), 41(1)(b),195
and, as far as public procurement is concerned,
s 217 of the
Constitution. In its objective, state, self-review should therefore
promote open, responsive and accountable government.
In this, its
underlying concern is consonant with that of the fundamental right to
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative
action that
the Constitution affords to everyone. What legality review does, in
sketching out a distinctive path, is to recognize
the distinctive
roles of those entitled to exact constitutional rights and the organs
of government whose duty it is to obey and
fulfill those rights. It
is far from the only reasonable and logical conclusion that PAJA,
which seeks to give legislative content
to the right to just
administrative action, must necessarily afford the exclusive or
indeed the most appropriate partway for state
self-review”
(Internal references omitted)
THE
MUNICIPALITY’S ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH S217
17.
Mr. van Riet conceded in argument that the
Municipality bore the onus of establishing a clear case for the
breach of s 217. Counsel
accepted that if it failed to do so the
Municipality was not entitled to have the tender set aside. The core
submission advanced
on behalf of the Municipality is that it
unknowingly ended up contracting with the wrong entity, or so it
surmises. It claims now
that, while the letter of the Acting
Municipal Manager of 5 February 2009 confirming allocation of the
tender was addressed to
“Messrs. Stone Trade Trust
Construction”, it surmises that the JV was the main contractor
for the purposes of performing
the contract and that it did not in
actual fact purport to contract with that entity. On the face of it
this is a strange allegation
for a contracting party to make,
particularly one which is an organ of local government which enjoys
the protection of an array
of legislative and regulatory instruments
when it does business, and which has lawyers available to it –
both in-house and
external – for legal advice when it embarks
on that course.
18.
So then, how did the Municipality get it so wrong?
Importantly, it does not allege that it was misled by the Trust, nor
are there
allegations of misrepresentation or “fronting”.
Rather, the narrative proceeds something like this. On a proper
construction
of the tender documents submitted to it, the
Municipality says that it realizes now that it was uncertain at the
time whether the
tenderer in actual fact was –
(i)
the Trust; or
(ii)
ST Trade Construction (Pty) Ltd (ST Trade); or
(iii)
Marblesharp.
The Municipality alleges
that its confusion arises from the various corporate descriptions
utilised by the Trust in the tender documentation
and it is fearful
that it might be classified as a constitutional delinquent under s217
for wrongly awarding the tender to the
Trust. It thus asks this Court
to come to its rescue because it now considers that the tender was
de
facto
granted to Marblesharp. And so, in the midst of a trial
where the lawfulness of the tender proceedings has not been directly
challenged,
it is attempting to reverse its way out of a cul-de-sac,
relying on, inter alia, s237 of the Constitution which requires that


All
constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and without
delay”.
THE
FOUNDING AFFIDAVIT
19.
After referring to the provisions of s217 and the
import thereof, Prins contends in the founding affidavit that the
following facts
are relevant to the determination of this matter.

16.1
The tender was, ostensibly, submitted in the name of the Stone Trade
Trust (the Respondent), who, in pending Supreme Court
(sic)
proceedings against the Municipality claims to have been the duly
appointed tenderer and only bidder;
16.2 The acceptance of
the Tender, however, was communicated to ‘Messrs. Stone Trade
Trust Construction’, which name
could possibly also be a
reference to ST Trade Construction Pty Ltd, an associated (yet
legally separate) company and member of
the Joint Venture referred
hereunder (sic), to whom extensive reference was made in the Tender;
16.3 In the tender
documentation the abbreviation STTC was interchangeably used to refer
to the Trust and to ST Trade Construction
(Pty) Limited. Sometimes it
cannot be said to whom it referred to (sic);
16.4 In fact the
application for the tender was however, made on the basis that it
would be,
not
the trust, but a joint venture entity known as
Marblesharp 122 Pty Ltd who would perform and execute the tender and
receive the
proceeds generated thereby;
16.5 Marblesharp was a
company of which the two (equal) shareholders where the said ST Trade
Construction Pty Ltd and Mobbs &
Mobbs (sic) Building and Civil
Construction Pty Ltd;
16.6 The tender was
motivated and worded on the basis that it would be executed by the
joint venture and qualification points were
awarded on that basis
both in relation to preferential procurement and competency of the
developer (a total of 12 points.(sic)
The Tenderer “won”
the Tender by 1.2 points only;
16.7 The Trust
(Respondent) was at the relevant time, essentially dormant, insolvent
and incapacitated to execute the tender itself.
ST Trade Construction
(Pty) Ltd had just been registered.”
It will be immediately
noted that the Municipality’s stance regarding the party with
whom it contracted was speculative and
based on assumption rather
than clear and equivocal.
20.
Prins goes on to aver that, based on these facts,
the provisions of s217 were breached in the following respects.

17.1
On a proper construction of the tender in question it is uncertain
whether the bidder was the Trust, ST Trade Construction
Pty Ltd or
Marblesharp 122 (Pty) Ltd;
17.2 It is uncertain
whether the tender was awarded to the Trust or ST Trade Construction
(Pty) Ltd;
17.3 The Trust could and
should not have “earned “the 12 points referred to above;
17.4 ST Trade
Construction (Pty) Ltd could and should not have earned the
preferential procurement points or the title of the other
10 points;
17.5 Neither of the two
entities should or legally could accordingly, have been awarded the
tender;
17.6 Neither of these two
entities was earmarked to execute the tender. It was Marblesharp 122
Pty Ltd;
17.7 Neither of these two
entities were financially or otherwise competent to duly perform the
obligations arising from the tender;
17.8 Neither of these two
entities were properly authorized by resolution, to tender, as
required by the tender documentation. (In
this regard: (a) - the
Resolution relating to the Trust (Respondent) was: not legally valid
and - in any event did not authorize
the submission of the tender;
(b) - No resolution at all authorized a tender on the half of ST
Trade Construction in respect of
the proposed development.”
THE
TRUST’S OPPOSITION
21.
In the answering affidavit the Trust claims that
the stance adopted by the Municipality is cynical and singularly
lacking in good
faith. It suggests that the real purpose of the
review is to stall the trial action, given that the Municipality has
known since
at least the days of the ASLA review what the Trust’s
case is, and in particular how the relationship between the Trust and

the JV was established and how it was intended to function.
22.
The second respondent (Steenkamp Jnr) says in the
answering affidavit that the Trust began operating a family
construction business
in 2002 and that its business grew rapidly on
account of its good reputation in the market place. As the business
grew, and as
it became involved in larger projects, Steenkamp Jnr
says the Trust received advice from, inter alia, its bankers that the
Trust’s
construction business should be transferred into a
corporate structure. This evidently took place in 2008 when ST Trade
was incorporated.
23.
But before this restructuring could be
implemented, says Steenkamp Jnr, the Trust took the first step in the
tender process when
it submitted its Expression of Interest document
to the Municipality. That was in November 2007 when the business was
still conducted
through the vehicle of the Trust which used the
trading name Stone Trade Trust Construction and, as I have said, was
sometimes
abbreviated with the acronym STTC.
24.
Steenkamp Jnr goes on to say that the Trust
expressed interest in the project with the intention of participating
with a Black empowerment
(BEE) partner. The Municipality was told in
section 9 of the Expression of Interest document dated 1 November
2007 that the Trust
had previously entered into Black empowerment
partnerships in other construction projects and intended doing
likewise in Mossel
Bay.
25.
When the Trust submitted its tender document on 31
July 2008 it included, as Annexure GH thereto, a signed copy of the
JV agreement
which had been concluded with Mbobs on 9 July 2008. That
document declares that the parties to the JV were ST Trade (having
been
incorporated on 7 January 2008 under registration number
2008/000142/07) and which is described in the JV as “Contractor
1”, and Mbobs as “Contractor 2”. The JV states in
unequivocal terms that it is to be housed in Marblesharp, which
was
incorporated on 23 April 2008. Also annexed to the tender was a tax
clearance from the South African Revenue Service reflecting
the good
standing of the Stone Trade Trust whose trading name was reflected
therein as Stone Trade Trust Construction
26.
What is clear from all of the relevant tender
documentation filed with the Municipality is that the Trust was the
entity which tendered
for the contract. In so doing it told the
Municipality that the contract would be performed by a JV in which ST
Trade Ltd held
an equal shareholding with a fully BEE compliant
company – Mbobs – and which would be housed in
Marblesharp.
27.
These
documents passed through a host of hands and were scrutinized by
several officials evaluating the various tenders on behalf
of the
Municipality. These would have been officials very alive to the
spectre of “fronting” which is anathema to the
provisions
of s217
[5]
. Included in those
officials was Prins, the Municipality’s legal head. And yet,
none of them had any difficulty in understanding
the proposed
structure of the tender, the execution of the works or with which
entities they were dealing. The claim now by the
very same Prins that
there was uncertainty as to whom the tender was awarded is both
astonishing and absurd. The tender was awarded
to the Trust and
everybody knew that – both at the time of the award of the
tender and later during the ASLA review.
28.
Counsel for the Municipality queried why the
tender document was lodged by the Trust while ST Trade was described
in the JV as “Contractor
1”. That of course is a question
which might have been asked by the Municipality at the evaluation
stage, if it was confused
or concerned about what the relationship
was between the Trust and the JV. But it did not do so –
obviously it did not require
clarity on the point.
29.
In that regard, it is important to note that in
the bid document the Trust expressly informed the Municipality that
it would be
“roping in” a BEE partner and that the
construction work would be performed by the JV through the vehicle of
Marblesharp.
Further, the customary scoring of BEE points in the
tender process was based on Mbobs’ shareholding in Marblesharp.
Everything
appears to have been above board and none of the
Municipality’s sub-committees found fault with the bid.
30.
As demonstrated in para 8 above, the decision of
the Municipality’s Council in awarding the tender was that it
should go to

Stone Trade Trust
[Marblesharp 122 (Pty)]”
. The
incomplete reference to Marblesharp in parentheses indicates
unequivocally that the Municipality recognized that entity’s

association with the Trust in relation to the tender but that the
party to whom the tender was granted was the Trust.
31.
Clearly, it did not bother the municipal officials
how the Trust structured its affairs through the use of an eponymous
company
as “Contractor 1” in establishing the JV with
Mbobs. In argument, the Court asked Mr. van Riet whether there was
any
authority on the interpretation of s217 which established that,
in a situation where an entity had been awarded a contract by an

organ of state, it was precluded by that section of the Constitution
from rearranging its corporate affairs or structure for purposes
of
its own business efficiency in such a way that, for example, a wholly
owned subsidiary was established to perform part (or all)
of its
obligations under the contract. Counsel was not aware of any such
authority at the time and has not drawn anything to the
Court’s
attention subsequent to the hearing notwithstanding an invitation to
do so.
CONCLUSION
32.
On the evidence presented in the affidavits in
this matter, I am unable to find that the Municipality has
established conclusively
that the contract in question falls foul of
the provisions of s217 and that it must thus be set aside. It was
fair, Transparent,
equitable, competitive and evidently
cost-effective. It follows that the review must fail.
33.
As
regards costs, Mr. Vivier urged the Court to grant the Trust a
punitive costs order in light of the cynical and mala fide way
in
which it has approached the court to save its bacon in the damages
claim. In my view, there is certainly merit in what counsel
submitted
but I consider that there is a more appropriate way to grant such a
costs order. In the oft quoted decision of
Alluvial
Creek
[6]
almost a century ago in this Division Gardiner JP held as follows.

An
order is asked for that he pay the costs as between attorney and
client. Now sometimes such an order is given because of something
in
the conduct of a party which the Court considers should be punished,
malice, misleading the Court and things like that, but
I think the
order may also be granted without any reflection upon the party where
the proceedings are vexatious, and by vexatious
I mean where they
have the effect of being vexatious, although the intent may not have
been that they should be vexatious. There
are people who enter into
litigation with the most upright purpose and the most firm belief in
the justice of their cause, and
yet whose proceedings may be regarded
as vexatious when they put the other side to unnecessary trouble and
expense which the other
side ought not to bear. That I think is the
position in the present case.”
ORDER
OF COURT
Accordingly
it is ordered that:
A.
The application for review is dismissed.
B.
The applicant is to pay the costs of the first and
second respondent, in their representative capacity as trustees of
the Stone
Trade Trust, on the scale as between attorney and client.
GAMBLE,
J
APPEARANCES
For
the Applicant:
Mr.
RS Van Riet SC
Mr.
SA Jordaan SC
Instructed
by Herbie Oosthuizen & Associates.
Mossel
Bay
c/o
Bossr Inc
Cape
Town
For
the Respondents:
Mr.
PB De Vivier SC
Instructed
by Rossouw Attorneys
Jeffreys
Bay.
[1]
The
first respondent,
Mr
J.K.G Steenkamp, the father of Mr. S.J. Steenkamp, evidently died in
2020.
[2]
Buffalo City
Metropolitan Municipality v Asla Construction (Pty) Ltd
2019 (4) SA 331
(CC) at
[100]
[3]
State Information
Technology Agency SOC v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd
2018 (2) SA 23 (CC)
[4]
Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000
[5]
Esorfranki Pipelines
(Pty) Ltd and another v Mopani District Municipality and others
[2014] 2 All SA 493
(SCA) at [26]
[6]
In re
Alluvial
Creek Ltd
1929
CPD 532
at 535, followed in, inter alia,
Camps
Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and another v
Harrison and another
2011
(4) SA 42
(CC) at 76 and Boost
Sports
Africa (Pty) Ltd v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd
2015 (5) SA 38
(SCA) at
[27]