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[2018] ZASCA 98
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Netshimbupfe and Another v Carthcart and Others (563/2017) [2018] ZASCA 98; [2018] 3 All SA 397 (SCA) (4 June 2018)
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THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
No: 563/2017
In
the matter between:
NETSHIMBUPFE
FUNDZANI ERNEST
FIRST APPELLANT
MEMBERS
OF NETSHIMBUPFE ROYAL FAMILY
SECOND APPELLANT
And
MULAUDZI
VHANGANI CARTHCART
FIRST RESPONDENT
CHAIRPERSON OF THE
HOUSE OF
TRADITIONAL
LEADERS
SECOND RESPONDENT
MEC
COGHSTA, LIMPOPO PROVINCE
THIRD RESPONDENT
THE PREMIER, LIMPOPO
PROVINCE
FOURTH RESPONDENT
NETSHIMBUPFE
MULATEDZI
FIFTH RESPONDENT
Neutral
Citation
:
Netshimbupfe
and
another v Mulaudzi and others
(563/17)
[2018] ZASCA 98
(4 June 2018)
Coram:
Seriti, Dambuza,
Mathopo and Van der Merwe JJA and Mothle AJA
Heard:
21 May 2018
Delivered:
4 June 2018
Summary:
Customary law –
s 12(2) of the Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institutions
Act 6 of 2005 – review of the identification
of traditional
leader – dispute over traditional leadership succession –
premier seized with request for recognition
– whether appeal is
not premature – dispute should be referred to premier –
appeal dismissed with costs.
ORDER
On
appeal from
: The
Gauteng Division of the High Court functioning as the Limpopo
Division of the High Court, Polokwane (Muller, Phatudi and Kganyago
JJ sitting as a full court of appeal):
The
appeal is dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT
Mothle
AJA (Seriti and Mathopo JJA concurring):
[1]
Disputes over traditional leadership are legendary and pre-date the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the
Constitution).
This appeal, with leave of
this Court, was against the decision of the full court of the Gauteng
Division of the High Court functioning
as the Limpopo Division of the
High Court, Polokwane (the full court). It concerned a dispute
between two cousins over succession
to the position of the senior
traditional leadership of the Tshimbupfe Traditional Community, in
Limpopo.
[2]
The nub of the dispute was
that first appellant was identified for
the position of senior traditional leader at a royal family meeting
while the fifth respondent
was identified for the same position at a
meeting of the royal council. Prior to the institution of these
proceedings, the first
appellant and the fifth respondent had
separately approached the
Premier to be recognised as senior
traditional leader. At the time of the hearing of this appeal, the
Premier was therefore still
seized with the separate applications
seeking recognition for the position of senior traditional
leadership.
[3]
The issue before this Court was thus
whether the review application was premature and should have been
left to the Premier to deal
with it in terms of s 12(2) of the
Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institutions Act 6 of 2005 (the
Limpopo Act).
[4]
The
factual matrix from which the dispute arose was common cause. For
some time prior to 1990, the traditional community of Tshimbupfe
was
under the leadership of senior traditional leader, Tshivhase. The
first appellant and the fifth respondent, Tshivhase’s
grandchildren, are the sons of Tshisevhe and Munyadziwa respectively,
two of Tshivhase’s sons.
Consequent
to Tshivhase’s death, Tshisevhe was appointed to succeed him.
The erstwhile government of the Republic of Venda
appointed a
commission
[1]
which, after an
investigation, recommended the removal of Tshisevhe and the
appointment of Munyadziwa as senior traditional leader.
Tshisevhe and
his other half-brother, Tshifiwa Milton Netshimbupfe, separately
launched urgent applications within successive days,
in the then
Supreme Court of Venda, unsuccessfully seeking to interdict the
coronation of Munyadziwa. Neither of the two unsuccessful
applications was appealed to this Court. On 21 December 1991
Munyadziwa was recognised and remained on the throne as senior
traditional
leader until his death in June 2013.
The
two cousins were each separately identified for recognition as senior
traditional leader for the Tshimbupfe Traditional
Community. This
dual identification resulted in a dispute which became the subject of
the review application and eventually this
appeal.
[5]
The first appellant’s first review application was launched In
July 2014, when he unsuccessfully approached the High Court
in an
attempt to overturn, after 23 years, the deposing of his father,
Tshisevhe. The notice of motion in that application had
as an
alternative relief, a prayer that the decision of the royal council
to identify the fifth respondent as successor to Munyadziwa,
was
ultra vires
and stood
to be reviewed and set aside. Mindful of the difficulties inherent in
attempting to overturn the decisions of the then
Supreme Court of
Venda that sealed his father’s fate, the first appellant
abandoned the idea of contesting the deposing of
his father. Instead,
he once again in September 2014, approached the High Court, this time
supported by the royal family as second
applicant, seeking an order
only in terms of the alternative relief. Although the applicants
retained the same founding affidavit
in the July 14 application,
which still dealt with the deposing of Tshisevhe, in September 2014
they focused on the events after
the death of Munyadziwa in June
2013. The application was thus based on the identification of
Munyadziwa’s successor.
[6]
The High Court dismissed the application on the basis that the
identification of the first appellant was not in accordance with
custom. It found and concluded that the first appellant was not the
eldest son of the deceased senior traditional leader and could
therefore not succeed in terms of custom. On appeal, the full court
dismissed the application, having found that the identification
of
the fifth respondent by the royal family in the absence of the Khadzi
and Ndumi was not in accordance with customary law. The
full court
did not declare that the royal council’s identification was
unlawful and invalid. That was in fact the relief
sought by the
appellants. The full court instead held the view that the dispute
should be referred to the Premier to be dealt with
in terms of
s 12(2) of the Limpopo Act. The appellants sought and obtained
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
It is against this
background that this matter came before this Court.
[7]
Chapter 12 the Constitution recognises the institution, status and
role of traditional leadership according to customary law.
Section
211(3) of the Constitution provides:
‘
(3)
The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable,
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically
deals with customary law.’
[8]
Section 212 of the Constitution provides for enactment of national
legislation to provide for a role for traditional leadership
as an
institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. In
2003, Parliament passed national legislation; the
Traditional
Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003
which was amended
by Act 23 of 2009
(
‘the
Framework Act’
).
This
Act was followed by the Limpopo Act. Section 12 of the Limpopo
Act, which mirrors s 11 of the Framework Act, provides
for the
recognition of senior traditional leader, headman or headwoman. In
terms of s 12(1) of the Limpopo Act, there are two stages
involved in
the process of assuming traditional leadership. The first stage is
the identification stage where the royal family
must, whenever a
position is to be filled, identify a person for that leadership role
in terms of customary law and custom. The
second stage is the
recognition stage where the royal family submits the particulars of
the identified person to the Premier of
that province. Subject to
s 12(2), the Premier would effect recognition by publishing the
name of that person by notice in
a Gazette, issue a recognition
certificate and formally notify the provincial and local houses of
traditional leaders of that recognition.
[9]
Section 12(2) does not necessarily deal with a resolution of a
dispute. It deals with situations where there is evidence or
allegations that the identification process in s 12(1)(
a
)
was not done in accordance with customary laws, custom or processes.
It is apposite to refer to the full text:
‘
(2)
Where there is evidence of an allegation that the identification of a
person referred to in subsection (1) (as senior traditional
leader,
headman or headwoman) was not done in accordance with customary law,
custom or processes, the Premier-
(a)
may refer the matter to
the provincial house of traditional leaders and the relevant local
house of traditional leaders for their
recommendations; or
(b)
may refuse to issue a
certificate of recognition; and
(c)
must refer the matter
back to the royal family for reconsideration and resolution where the
certificate of recognition has been
refused.’
[10]
The dispute in this case arose as a result of two institutions of
traditional customary law, the royal family and the royal
council,
each identifying a person for recognition. Ordinarily this dispute
would be resolved in terms of s 21 of the Framework
Act
[2]
.
The Limpopo Act does not have a provision for resolution of disputes
of this kind. However, the dispute in this case emanates
from the
identification process envisaged in s 11 of the Framework Act
and s 12 of the Limpopo Act.
[11]
This dispute raised a number of questions on the facts which, in the
nature of the respondent’s contentions, the answers
thereto
required the application of customary law. First, it was not common
cause in the affidavits as to who constituted the royal
family and
the royal council and who was entitled to attend the meeting when a
senior traditional leader is identified. Section
1 of the Limpopo Act
defines the royal family as ‘the core customary institution or
structure consisting of immediate relatives
of the ruling family
within a traditional community, who have been identified in terms of
custom, and includes, where applicable,
other family members who are
close relatives of the ruling family.’ This definition includes
a broad constituency that make
up the royal family, but did not
assist this case in terms of which particular persons should be
included and who among them would
be entitled to be present when a
traditional leader is identified.
The
provisions of the legislative framework do not make reference to a
royal council
.
Section 1 of both the Framework Act and the Limpopo Act recognises
and defines
traditional
council
and makes
no reference to royal council. It is not clear whether royal council
as cited in these proceedings would be another name
for traditional
council or if it refers to another structure that is different.
[12]
At the hearing of the appeal in this Court, counsel for appellants
raised mainly three points for argument. The first was that
the full
court erred in not making a declaration of unlawfulness and
invalidity and also not providing just and equitable remedy
as part
of its order. Secondly, that by approaching court, the appellants
were giving expression to their Constitutional right
of access to
court which cannot be denied by being referred to the Premier. They
further submitted that appellants exercised a
choice in approaching
the court and not the Premier. Thirdly, that the application is based
on Constitutional legality and not
on the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the PAJA). Section 7(2) of the PAJA provides
for the need to exhaust
internal remedies before approaching a court,
an approach which the appellants argued did not apply to this case. I
now turn to
deal with each of these three arguments.
[13]
With regard to the first argument, we were urged to make a finding of
invalidity and grant just and equitable relieve because
the full
court declined to do so. It is correct that once a court makes a
finding of invalidity, it must provide just and equitable
relief.
After finding that the identification process of the fifth respondent
was not in accordance with customary law, due to
the absence of Ndumi
and Khadzi
,
the full
court seemingly stopped short of making a declaration of invalidity
in the court order.
In
Allpay
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd & others v Chief
Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency &
others
2014 (1) SA 604
(CC) para 56
,
the Constitutional Court held: ‘once a
ground of review under PAJA has been established there is no room for
shying away from
it. Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution
requires the decision to be declared unlawful. The consequences of
the declaration
of unlawfulness must then be dealt with in a just and
equitable order under s 172(1)(B).’ It seems that the
appellants’
contention that the review in this case was not
brought in terms of the PAJA, is contradicted by their reliance on
the review ground
of exercising power
ultra
vires.
This ground of review is not the same
as that of Constitutional legality, as
ultra
vires
as a ground of review for
administrative action is provided for in s 6 of the PAJA.
However one must assume therefore that
Allpay
would be applicable in this case.
[14]
In its judgment, the full court did not provide reasons for not
making a declaration of invalidity and for excluding a just
and
equitable relief from the order. When the full court inquired from
both counsel to explain the consequences of both Khadzi
and Ndumi’s
failure to attend the meeting of the royal council, it was aware of
the importance of the role that these two
persons play in the
selection of a traditional leader in terms of Venda customary law.
The respondents had contended that Khadzi
and Ndumi had refused to
attend the meeting of the royal council, but attended that of the
royal family.
[15]
Section 12(1)(a) of the Limpopo Act provides that it is the royal
family that identifies a person for recognition as traditional
leader. If the full court intended to deal with the merits, which for
reasons appearing below the full court should not have, then
the full
court erred in failing to state any legal basis or rule of customary
law which would support the contention that the presence
of Khadzi
and Ndumi at the royal council meeting would clothe that structure
with powers to identify a person for recognition.
That too would be
problematic even if the royal council and the royal family consisted
of the same members. However the essence
of the respondents’
contention was to put the composition of both royal structures at the
centre of the dispute. The question
was which persons should have
populated each structure and who of these were entitled to be present
when a traditional leader was
identified? The response required a
factual inquiry, whose answer should have been sought from customary
law. The full court did
not deal with these contentions and in
particular this question.
[16]
Section 211(3) of the Constitution obligates the courts to apply
customary law, when it is applicable. The full court
thus erred
in not applying customary law as it was applicable. It should have
referred the matter forthwith to the Premier, without
making any
finding. The Premier has statutory access to the sources of customary
law. It was wrong for the full court to make a
finding which was not
supported by evidence from customary law. There was thus no basis to
grant a declaration of invalidity and
consequently a just and
equitable relief.
[17]
The second and third arguments overlap and will be dealt with
together. There is no provision in the Framework Act and the
Limpopo
Act which denies parties access to court. Section 12(2) of the
Limpopo Act, obligates and empowers the Premier to ensure
that the
parties comply with customary law in identifying a person for
recognition as traditional leader. The procedure that the
Premier
must follow is spelled out in s 12(2)(a) to (c). In terms of
this provision the Premier is empowered to consult institutions
of
customary law. These in the main, would be, in his discretion, the
provincial and local houses of traditional leaders that she
or he can
turn to only for their recommendations. Where he or she refuses to
grant recognition, the Premier is obligated to refer
the matter back
to the royal family for reconsideration. These customary
institutions would ordinarily be the
source of reference for customary law and custom.
[18]
The legislative framework in my view is couched in terms which
expects parties to a dispute which arise out of customary law,
custom
or processes, to first turn to the statutory processes provided in
legislation, before approaching the courts. These statutory
processes
are the route to access the internal system of customary law and its
sources. This view finds support in the Framework
Act and court
precedents. Section 21(1) of the Framework Act, dealing with dispute
and claim resolution, provides that the parties
to the dispute or
claim must seek ‘to resolve the dispute
internally
and in accordance with customs before such dispute or claim may be
referred to the Commission’ (my emphasis). Section 21(2)(a)
of the
same
Act also refers to the house of traditional leaders being obligated
to ‘resolve the dispute or claim in accordance with
its
internal rules and procedures’ (my emphasis).
[19]
In
Emmanuel Segwagwa Mamogale v Premier,
Northwest Province and others, an unreported decision of the High
Court, Bophuthatswana Provincial
Division under case number 227/2006,
Mogoeng JP, as he then was, after examining the meaning of ‘internal
remedy’ with reference to s 21(1)(a) of the Framework
Act,
concluded that the word ‘internal’ is in relation to
‘within the royal family’. At para 19 he wrote:
’On
the contrary, a Premier, who has already pronounced himself on a
matter, cannot be summoned to a meeting of the Royal
Family or of the
tribe for the purpose of attempting to find any internal solution
envisaged by s 21(1)(a). Accordingly, once
the Premier takes a
decision, the dispute loses every semblance of being internal. It
follows that s 7(2) of PAJA does not
apply to this case.’
[20]
The Constitutional Court in
Tshivhulana Royal Faimly v
Netshivhulana
[2016] ZACC 47
;
2017 (6) BCLR 800
(CC) also dealt
with the provisions of s 21 of the Framework Act and accepted
that the Act envisages exhausting of remedies,
internal to customary
law. The Constitutional Court in para 32 held:
‘
[32]
The dispute may be referred from one level to the next only if it is
unresolved. When a definitive
decision is taken at any level, the
aggrieved party does not have any further internal recourse. This is
so because none of the
levels is a review or appeal level. A decision
at any level gives the aggrieved party the right to exit the internal
structure
and approach a court for appropriate relief.’
[21]
The notion that customary institutions must take precedence in the
resolution of disputes concerning customary law, does not
mean that
the jurisdiction of the courts is ousted or a party to such a dispute
is denied access to court to seek appropriate relief.
On the
contrary, the Constitution recognises that parties may approach the
courts and as such, it obligates the courts, in such
instance, to
apply customary law.
[3]
In this instance,
until the Premier has made a decision in terms of s 12(2) of
Limpopo Act, it would be premature for parties
to approach court for
a resolution of the dispute before exhausting the statutory
prescribed dispute resolution mechanism, internal
to customary law,
custom and processes.
[22]
The courts of law are in the first instance obligated to enforce
compliance with the statutory provisions. Where the
Premier
neglects or fails to act in terms of s 12(2) of the Limpopo Act,
it will be open to any party whose rights or interests
are adversely
affected by such neglect or failure, to approach court for relief
either in a form of
mandamus
application or a review on the ground of failure to take a decision
or any other appropriate relief. That is the exit point of
the
internal remedy the Constitutional Court alluded to in
Tshivhulana.
In such instance, the court will intervene. Where however the statute
as in this case, specifically empowers the Premier to execute
specified functions in implementing s 12(2) of the Limpopo Act,
the courts should be slow in conducting parallel processes
of inquiry
with the Premier before he or she takes a decision. The Premier,
though acting as an organ of state in performing executive
functions,
is obligated to ensure compliance with customary law, a system of law
that has its own internal rules, procedures and
processes.
[23]
What distinguished this case from the others that served in this and
other courts was that this case was launched after the
Premier had
been approached for recognition of the person identified in terms of
s 12(1) but has not yet made a definitive
decision. The Premier
has not had an opportunity to use his or her discretion in consulting
the provincial and local houses of
traditional leaders or cause this
dispute to be referred to the royal family as envisaged in s 12(2)(a)
or (b) and (c) of
the Limpopo Act. This review application
effectively invited the High Court, the full court and this Court on
appeal, to encroach,
in breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers, onto the terrain of the exercise of the Premier’s
statutory executive
authority and functions. It is impermissible for
courts to intrude in the domain of other branches of government.
Moseneke DCJ
in
International Trade Administration Commission v
SCAW SA
2012 (4) SA 618
(CC) para 95 wrote:
‘
[95]
Where the Constitution or valid legislation has entrusted specific
powers and functions to a particular
branch of government, courts may
not usurp that power or function by making a decision of their own
preference. That would frustrate
the balance of power implied in the
principle of separation of powers. The primary responsibility of a
court is not to make decisions
reserved for or within the domain of
other branches of government, but rather to ensure that the concerned
branches of government
exercise their authority within the bounds of
the Constitution. This would especially be so where the decision in
issue is policy-laden
as well as polycentric.’
[24]
When the first applicant and the fifth respondent approached the
Premier for recognition, that fact alone raised evidence of
non-compliance with the customary law and custom by one or both of
them in the process of identification. The provisions of s 12(2)
of the Limpopo Act were thus activated. The matter was clearly within
the purview of the Premier’s powers and functions.
For
reasons stated in this judgment, it is my view that both the High
Court and the full court erred in prematurely making
findings on the
merits. These findings and comments usurped the exercise of executive
functions intended for the Premier, in terms
of s 12(2) of the
Limpopo Act. The appellants should have waited until the Premier had
decided, before approaching court.
[25]
The appeal should thus be dismissed and the dispute be referred to
the Premier of the Limpopo province, who should not consider
himself
or herself bound by the findings or comments by the High Court and
full court on the merits of this case, thus far.
[26] In the result the
appeal is dismissed with costs.
____________________
SP
Mothle
Acting
Judge of Appeal
Dambuza
and Van der Merwe JJA
[27]
We have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Mothle AJA. We
agree with his conclusion that the appeal must fail. However,
we
reach that conclusion along a somewhat different route, hence this
judgment.
[28]
The relevant provisions of
s 11
of the
Traditional Leadership and
Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003
are identical to those of the
Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institutions Act 6 of 2005 (the
Limpopo Act) and for convenience
we refer to the latter. Section
12(1) of the Limpopo Act provides, in essence, that the
identification of a senior traditional
leader must be made (i) by the
royal family concerned and (ii) in terms of the applicable customary
law. The appellants contended
that the identification of the fifth
respondent had not been made by the royal family and had not been
made in terms of customary
law because it had taken place in the
absence of the khadzi (a sister of the late Khosi Munyadziwa) and the
ndumi (the younger
brother of the late Khosi).
[29]
The royal family is defined in the Limpopo Act as ‘the core
customary institution or structure consisting of immediate
relatives
of the ruling family within a traditional community, which have been
identified in terms of custom, and includes, where
applicable, other
family members who are close relatives of the ruling family’.
The fifth respondent was identified as the
senior traditional leader
by a structure that is referred to by the respondents as the ‘royal
council’. It appears
from the evidence of the respondents that
the royal council was put in place by Khosi Munyadziwa on 3 February
2013. It consisted
of himself as chairman, a deputy chairman, a
secretary, a deputy secretary, a treasurer and eight additional
members. The full
court did not decide whether the royal council is
the same as the royal family.
[30]
In respect of the absence of the khadzi and the ndumi at the
identification, the full court expressed itself as follows:
‘
[19]
It is common cause between the parties that in terms of the custom of
the Tshimbupfe community a successor
must be identified by the khadzi
and the ndumi. They are members of the royal family. They play an
important role in the identification
of a successor. It is,
inter
alia,
their duty to
be present at a specially convened meeting of the royal family to
identify a successor of a khosi that has passed
on, even where it is
obvious who the successor is. The identification of the successor by
the khadzi and the ndumi is an indispensable
part of the
identification process to be valid. Neither the khadzi nor the ndumi
attended the meeting where the fifth respondent
was identified as the
successor to the deceased khosi. However, they were present at a
meeting where the first applicant was identified
as successor.
.
. . .
[22]
Of course, custom may be proved by a party who is relying on a
particular custom, if the rules of the custom are not readily
ascertainable with sufficient certainty so that judicial notice may
be taken thereof.
In
casu
,
the parties are in agreement that it is the custom that the khadzi
and ndumi must be present at a meeting of the royal family
convened
to identify a successor to a traditional leader. That being the
custom, the identification of the fifth respondent at
a meeting of
the royal family without the khadzi and ndumi being present and
without their identification of the fifth respondent
for whatever
reason, is not in accordance with the custom of the community.’
Thus,
the full court made a firm finding that the identification of the
fifth respondent had not taken place in accordance with
the custom of
the community concerned. For the reasons that follow, the full court
should have refrained from entering into the
merits of the matter.
[31]
As stated, in terms of s 12(1) of the Limpopo Act identification
of a senior traditional leader, headman or a head woman
is a matter
left to the authority of the royal family. Once the relevant royal
family has informed the Premier, the latter must
recognise the person
so identified, as set out in the majority judgment. But the Premier’s
authority to recognise the person
identified by the royal family
under s 12(1) is subject to subsection 12 (2). That section
provides that:
‘
(2)
Where there is evidence or an allegation that the identification of a
person referred to
in subsection (1) was not done in accordance with
customary law, customs or processes, the Premier-
(a)
may
refer the matter to the provincial house of traditional leaders and
the relevant local house of traditional leaders for their
recommendations; or
(b)
may
refuse to issue a certificate of recognition; and
(c)
must
refer the matter back to the royal family for reconsideration and
resolution where the certificate of recognition has been
refused.’
[32]
Therefore the Premier is obliged to recognise the identified person
if there is no evidence or allegation that the person was
identified
other than in terms of customary law. If there is such a problem with
the person’s identification, the Premier
must deal with the
matter as provided in s 12(2)
(a)
or
(b)
and
(c)
.
This is in keeping with the inherent flexibility in the system of
customary law which stresses the importance of the consensus-seeking
procedures of family and clan meetings in dispute resolution.
[33]
This accords with the common law doctrine of ripeness. Cora Hoexter
Administrative Law in South Africa
2 ed (2012) at 585
describes the doctrine in the following terms:
‘
The
idea behind the requirement of ripeness is that the complainant
should not go to court before the offending action or decision
is
final, or at least ripe for adjudication. It is the opposite of the
doctrine of mootness, which prevents a court from deciding
an issue
when it is too late. The doctrine of ripeness holds that there is no
point in wasting the courts’ time with half-formed
decisions
whose shape may yet change, or indeed decisions that have not yet
been made.’
See
also Lawrence Baxter
Administrative
Law
(1984) at
719-720 and
Ferreira
v Levin NO and others
1996
(1) SA 984
(CC) para 199.
[34]
In this case, when the court challenge was brought, the process
provided for under s 12 had not yet been finalised. The
matter
was therefore not ripe for court adjudication. On this narrow basis
we agree with the order proposed in the majority judgment.
_____________________________
N
Dambuza
Judge
of Appeal
_____________________________
C
H G van der Merwe
Judge
of Appeal
APPEARANCES:
For
appellant:
Z Matebese SC
M X
Shibe
Instructed
by:
Sigwavhulimu
Attorneys, Thohoyandou
Bokwa
Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For
respondent: V E Mathivha
Instructed
by:
Mathivha
Attorneys, Thohioyandou
Molefi
Thoabala Attorneys Bloemfontein
[1]
The Mushasha Commission, chaired by Adv. Mushasha.
[2]
Section 21 of the Framework Act deals with resolution of disputes or
claims between institutions of traditional leadership where
customary law is involved.
[3]
Section
211(3) of the Constitution.