De Ferm and Others v Hans Heinrich Ferdinand Otto Von Lieres und Wilkau N.O. and Others (10805/2023) [2023] ZAWCHC 250 (11 October 2023)

80 Reportability
Trusts and Estates

Brief Summary

Estate — Executor's duties — Application for interdict against executor from distributing estate funds — Applicants sought to prevent distribution of proceeds from sale of immovable property bequeathed to beneficiary pending payment of external tax liability — Court found that applicants lacked standing as neither they nor the external tax authority were creditors of the estate — Executor required to distribute estate according to local law and beneficiaries' rights — Application dismissed as it conflicted with executor's fiduciary duties and statutory obligations.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned an opposed urgent application brought in the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town, in what the court described as the “urgent fast lane”. The applicants sought to restrain the distribution of proceeds from the sale of a specific immovable property that had been specially bequeathed under a will, and to secure directions regulating how those proceeds should be dealt with by the executor.


The applicants were Alex de Ferm, Maria de Ferm, Anna de Ferm, and Lucia de Ferm. The first respondent was Hans Heinrich Ferdinand Otto Von Lieres und Wilkau N.O., cited in his capacity as the duly appointed executor of the estate late Ludovicus Anna De Ferm. The second respondent (Dean Williams) was the beneficiary of the bequest in question. The third respondent (Dirk Couturier N.O.) was referred to in the proceedings as the alleged executor of the deceased’s external estate. The fourth respondent was the Master of the High Court (Cape Town). The fifth respondent was Von Lieres, Cooper & Barlow Attorneys, whose trust account featured in the relief sought.


Procedurally, the application was initially framed as seeking anti-dissipation relief (in substance akin to a Mareva-type interdict). It was brought on short notice for interim relief pending a return day. The matter was postponed, and no interim order was sought or granted because the first and second respondents delivered a preliminary answering affidavit and also delivered notices relating to document discovery and security for costs. Over the course of the proceedings the applicants’ case altered materially, and they ultimately accepted that their application did not meet the requirements for an interdict.


In broad terms, the dispute arose from an attempt by the applicants to procure an order compelling (or effectively compelling) the executor of a South African deceased estate to retain and ultimately pay out part of the proceeds of a legacy to meet a foreign inheritance tax exposure, purportedly connected to the legacy received by the second respondent.


Material Facts


A South African deceased estate was being administered by the first respondent under letters of executorship, in accordance with the deceased’s local will and South African succession and estates administration law.


Under the will, the second respondent was the recipient of an “out-and-out” special bequest consisting of a particular immovable property, namely Erf 1681 Camps Bay, situate at 5 Fiskaal Close, Bakoven. That property was sold, yielding proceeds of €435,517.11 (or the South African Rand equivalent), which were referred to in the judgment as “the funds”.


The applicants sought orders aimed at preventing the executor from distributing the funds to the second respondent. They sought directions that the executor should retain the funds in an interest-bearing account (including, as an option, a separate interest-bearing account within the fifth respondent attorneys’ trust account), and that when distribution occurred the executor should be directed to pay an amount directly to the Flemish tax authorities (described in the judgment as “the tax authority”), alternatively to pay the amount to the third respondent so that he could pay it onward to the foreign tax authority on the second respondent’s behalf.


A material feature of the case, as accepted in the judgment, was that the precise amount claimed to be payable to the foreign tax authority was not yet capable of final calculation, because the foreign authority still needed to assess the quantum of the alleged inheritance tax. The applicants expressly conceded this uncertainty.


The court also treated as significant that neither the foreign tax authority nor the applicants were shown to be creditors of the deceased estate, and that the applicants did not allege that they had already paid the foreign inheritance tax (or that they had committed themselves firmly to paying a fixed amount). The application was therefore not presented on the footing that the applicants were seeking reimbursement for a quantified sum already discharged by them.


In addition, the court noted that the estate administration process was still ongoing: the liquidation and distribution account had not yet been drawn up. The court further referred to the circumstances of the estate as being such that reduction of legacies was required, which bore on the uncertainty of what a legatee would finally receive.


The judgment also recorded that it was not disputed that the second respondent would be able to meet any monetary claim that the applicants might later prove against him, which undermined the initial anti-dissipation framing of the application.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions addressed by the court were whether, in the context of a South African deceased estate administration, a court could grant relief directing or constraining an executor so as to secure payment of an alleged foreign inheritance tax said to be connected to a beneficiary’s legacy.


This required the court to determine, as issues of law and the application of law to fact, whether:


The executor had power (or could be compelled) to retain and pay estate funds to a party who was neither a creditor of the estate nor a beneficiary under the will, particularly where the contemplated payment was to a foreign tax authority or to an external estate representative for onward payment.


The South African court had jurisdiction and legal competence to make orders whose effect would be to facilitate the recovery or enforcement of foreign taxes against a local beneficiary, absent a relevant international agreement or enabling legislation.


The applicants had the necessary standing and a legally complete cause of action to obtain the relief, including whether their suggested claim for reimbursement was premature because they had not paid (or firmly committed to paying) a fixed amount.


On the interpretation of the will and South African succession principles, whether the legacy to the second respondent was intended to be received free of burdens or encumbrances, and whether any tax burden could be inferred to attach to the legacy.


The matter also involved evaluative judgments, including whether the form of relief sought could properly be characterised as anti-dissipation or interdictory relief, and whether the relief conflicted with the executor’s statutory and fiduciary obligations.


Court’s Reasoning


The court began by analysing the nature of the relief sought and the applicants’ shifting case. It observed that the application had undergone a “chameleonic change” and that the applicants ultimately accepted their case did not satisfy the requirements for an injunction. The court was not persuaded that any proper basis existed for anti-dissipation relief, particularly because it was not disputed that the second respondent could satisfy any monetary claim the applicants might prove in future.


A substantial part of the reasoning focused on the statutory framework governing deceased estates and the executor’s duties. The court emphasised that the first respondent, as executor, was tasked with winding up and distributing the estate in accordance with the will and South African law, and that the executor’s authority to pay liabilities was regulated by the estates administration process, including the drawing, publication, and lying for inspection of the liquidation and distribution account and the absence of sustained objections. In a solvent estate, the executor must pay creditors once sufficient funds have been realised, but critically, the executor is permitted to pay only those creditors whose claims appear from the liquidation and distribution account once it has lain for inspection and is free from objection. The court held that the executor was not permitted to pay persons who are not creditors of the estate or heirs/legatees under the will.


Applying those principles, the court held that the applicants’ attempt to secure retention and payment of the funds was fundamentally problematic because the intended recipients (the foreign tax authority or an external representative) were not shown to be creditors of the estate. The court also remarked that the application disregarded the interests of other beneficiaries: the other legatees had not been joined, yet they would rely on the executor to administer the estate in a manner consistent with his statutory duties and fiduciary position.


The court then addressed the foreign tax dimension. It considered it doubtful that the second respondent’s alleged liability to the foreign authority provided a basis for relief against the executor in South Africa. The court contrasted foreign inheritance tax with South African estate duty administration, noting that under local estate duty legislation the executor must submit the relevant return to the local tax authority, which then assesses the duty and issues an assessment, and the executor is the person liable for that assessed duty. The court also referenced the existence in local law of mechanisms aimed at mitigating “double” taxation through agreements with other countries, but found that no agreement had been reached regarding the foreign inheritance tax in issue. In the absence of such an agreement, the court found no legal basis upon which the applicants could obtain the order sought against the executor.


The court further reasoned that the applicants’ case was, in practical effect, an attempt to use South African proceedings to procure payment of a foreign government’s tax claim. Relying on South African common-law principle, the court stated that local courts will not entertain claims by foreign governments for taxes due to them, nor enforce foreign judgments for such taxes. It held that international comity did not extend to recognising and enforcing such domestic revenue liabilities of another state through South African courts, and that absent enabling legislation or a treaty, the court had no power to order attachment or payment of assets to enable a foreign state to recover alleged taxes. The court considered this to be a jurisdictional and competence barrier to the relief sought.


Turning to standing and ripeness, the court observed that the foreign tax authorities were not pursuing a claim against the estate or the executor, and that the applicants’ own position was unclear because they did not allege having paid the foreign tax or having committed themselves firmly to pay a fixed, determined amount. The court applied the principle that claims analogous to suretyship or indemnification contexts require that the claimant first discharge the debt before a complete cause of action arises. Until payment (or firm commitment to pay a fixed sum), any claim to reimbursement was, on the court’s analysis, incomplete, not presently enforceable, and not established on the papers.


Finally, the court addressed the will and the nature of the bequest. It identified a core succession law principle that special bequests or legacies are received without restriction or encumbrance unless a contrary intention appears. The bequest to the second respondent was characterised as a special bequest of the immovable property itself, not an undefined share of residue after deduction of external tax. The will was silent on any intention that the second respondent should bear foreign inheritance tax in relation to the legacy. The court accepted the second respondent’s submission that, on a plain reading, the deceased intended the second respondent to receive the property (and by implication the proceeds of sale) free of such encumbrance, and that the presumption that a legatee receives a legacy free from burdens militated against the applicants’ attempt to shift an external tax burden onto the legacy.


Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the application in its entirety, finding that the applicants had not advanced grounds in fact or law entitling them to the relief sought.


The applicants were ordered to pay the costs of the application jointly and severally, including the costs of the urgent interim relief application, on the party-and-party scale, inclusive of the costs of senior counsel where employed, as taxed or agreed.


Cases Cited


Mujuru NO & others v Mujuru & another [2006] JOL 17603 (ZH).


Commissioner for Inland Revenue v McFarland (27 SATC 15).


In Re Delhi Electric Supply & Traction Co Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 1452 (CA).


Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) v Taylor and Another [1955] AC 491 [1955] 1 All ER 292 (HL).


Absa Bank Ltd v Scharrighuisen [2000] 1 All SA 318 (C).


Lutheran Church v Bam 1916 CPD 376.


Sorge v Estate Preuss 1933 CPD 61.


Bell v Swan 1954 (3) SA 543 (W).


Legislation Cited


Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965.


Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955.


Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No 108 of 1996).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were expressly cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the applicants were not entitled to restrain the executor from distributing the proceeds of the specially bequeathed property, nor to obtain directions compelling retention and payment of those proceeds to a foreign tax authority (or to an external representative for onward payment), because such relief conflicted with the executor’s statutory duties and was not supported by any creditor relationship or lawful basis within the estate administration framework.


It held further that, absent enabling legislation or an applicable international agreement, South African courts will not enforce or facilitate the recovery of a foreign state’s tax claims through orders directed at local estate assets or local estate administration, and that the relief sought amounted in substance to such an impermissible enforcement.


The court also held that any claim by the applicants framed as reimbursement for foreign inheritance tax was not shown to be presently enforceable on the papers, because the applicants had not paid (or firmly committed to pay a fixed quantified amount), and the liability relied upon was in any event uncertain at the time.


On the construction of the will and succession principles, the court held that the second respondent’s special bequest was an “out-and-out” legacy intended to be received free of encumbrance, and the will did not support an inference that the second respondent was to bear foreign inheritance tax out of the legacy or its proceeds.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that an executor administers and distributes a deceased estate under South African law and the will, and in doing so is authorised to pay only those liabilities and claims properly recognised in the estate administration process, including creditors whose claims appear in the liquidation and distribution account once the account has lain for inspection and is free from objection. An executor may not be compelled to pay third parties who are not estate creditors, heirs, or legatees under the will.


It reaffirmed the common-law rule that South African courts do not enforce claims by foreign states for taxes owing to them, nor do they enforce foreign judgments for such taxes, and that international comity does not extend to using local court process to attach or direct payment of assets in order to satisfy foreign revenue claims, absent statutory authority or an applicable international agreement.


It applied the principle that a claim for reimbursement or recourse (in the nature of suretyship/indemnity logic) is generally incomplete until the claimant has discharged the relevant debt (or at least firmly committed to pay a fixed amount), meaning that relief premised on a speculative, unquantified future payment obligation is not readily available.


It applied the succession principle that a special legacy is presumed to vest in the legatee free of burdens or encumbrances unless the will indicates a contrary intention, and that the executor must give effect to the testator’s intention as expressed in the will, consistent with the freedom of testation.

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[2023] ZAWCHC 250
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De Ferm and Others v Hans Heinrich Ferdinand Otto Von Lieres und Wilkau N.O. and Others (10805/2023) [2023] ZAWCHC 250 (11 October 2023)

REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
CASE
NO: 10805 / 2023
In
the matter between:
ALEX
DE FERM
First
Applicant
MARIA
DE FERM
Second
Applicant
ANNA
DE FERM
Third
Applicant
LUCIA
DE FERM
Fourth
Applicant
and
HANS
HEINRICH FERDINAND OTTO
VON
LIERES UND WILKAU N.O.
First
Respondent
(In
his capacity as the duly appointed executor of the estate late
Ludovicus Anna De Ferm)
DEAN
WILLIAMS
Second
Respondent
DIRK
COUTURIER N.O.
Third
Respondent
MASTER
OF THE HIGH COURT (CAPE TOWN)
Fourth
Respondent
VON
LIERES, COOPER & BARLOW
ATTORNEYS
Fifth
Respondent
Coram:   Wille,
J
Heard:   14
August 2023
Delivered:   11
October 2023
JUDGMENT
WILLE,
J
Introduction:
[1]
This opposed application was presented to me in the urgent fast
lane.  The applicants sought
an order that the first respondent
be interdicted and restrained from distributing the proceeds of the
sale
[1]
of a specific immovable
property bequeathed to the second respondent.
[2]
[2]
Further, that: (a) the first respondent be directed to retain the
funds in the trust account of
the fifth respondent (in a separate
interest bearing account), alternatively to invest the funds in a
separate interest bearing
account with a reputable financial
institution; (b) when the time arrived for the first respondent to
distribute the funds, the
first respondent be directed to make
payment of the funds (on behalf of the second respondent), directly
to a specified external
tax authority
[3]
,
alternatively, to make payment thereof to the third respondent, on
the basis that he, in turn, shall make payment thereof to the

external tax authority on behalf of the second respondent.
[3]
The initial application was postponed.  It was brought urgently
and on short notice for interim
relief, pending a final decision on
the return day.  No interim order was sought or granted as the
first and second respondents
served a preliminary answering
affidavit, a notice requesting the discovery of specific documents
and a notice asking for security
for the costs of the application.
The applicants initially sought a rule for anti-dissipation
relief.
[4]
Overview:
[4]
In summary, the applicants are seeking payment of the funds on behalf
of an external tax authority.
They are seeking an order
directing the executor of the deceased estate to pay the funds out of
the proceeds of a sale of
an immovable property, which funds form
part of a local deceased estate.  These funds are to be paid on
behalf of the second
respondent, a beneficiary.  The precise
computation of the amount of the funds at this stage is uncertain.
The applicants
concede this.  Put another way, the tax authority
still needs to assess the precise quantum of tax for which it seeks
to hold
the second respondent liable.
[5]
This disputed liability has its genesis in a legacy of the property
made by the applicant’s
late brother in favour of the second
respondent.  The applicants are asking the court to order that
the funds be settled out
of money in the local estate, which the
first respondent is required to deal with under the local will of the
deceased.
[5]
Put another
way, when the time comes for the first respondent to distribute the
proceeds out of the local deceased estate,
the first respondent is to
make payment of the external inheritance tax directly to the tax
authority. Moreover, this payment is
to be made on behalf of the
second respondent (not the estate) and without any consideration for
that which would be reflected
in the estate’s liquidation and
distribution account.
[6]
The applicants accept that this account is yet to be drawn up.
[6]
In the alternative, these funds are requested to be paid to the
third respondent so he can pay the external tax authority,
who is the
alleged executor of the deceased’s external estate.
Consideration:
[7]
In as much as the applicants are claiming this relief in their
capacities, they do not state that
they have disbursed the funds in
question based on what they say is their liability under external tax
law.  This bears further
scrutiny.  In addition, it is
highly questionable if the second respondent is even liable to pay
the funds following our local
legislation.  Moreover, the
original application piloted by the applicants has undergone a
chameleonic change.  The applicants
now belatedly agree that
their application does not satisfy the requirements for an
injunction.
[8]
In summary, the application is now directed against the first
respondent to ensure that the first
respondent (as executor of the
deceased estate to which the second respondent is a beneficiary) does
not pay out the funds to the
second respondent.  Thus, I do not
see any grounds for anti-dissipation relief.  The applicants
first sought anti-dissipation
relief premised on an alleged concern
that the second respondent would not settle any liability which may
ultimately accrue.
The applicants have now distanced themselves
from this claim because it is not disputed that the second respondent
can settle any
monetary claim the applicants may be able to prove
against him in due course.  Passing now to the alleged claims by
the external
tax authority and the applicants.  It seems that
neither the external tax authority nor the applicants are creditors
of the
deceased estate.  Thus, the claim for retention is beset
with difficulties as it would be untenable to order the first
respondent
to retain and then pay out the funds from the estate to
third parties who are not creditors of the estate.
[9]
This position is exacerbated by the fact that the other legatees have
not been cited as parties
to the application and would be relying on
the first respondent to comply with his obligations as the local
executor of the estate
and look after their interests.  This
exhibits scant respect for our local legal system, which requires
executors in the first
respondent's position to recognise the second
respondent's rights in the administration of the deceased estate.
[10]    As
duly appointed executor of the deceased’s estate, the first
respondent, acting under letters of
executorship, is entrusted with
the statutory task of winding up and distributing the local assets in
the deceased's estate according
to his wishes in his local will,
following our local laws.
[11]
Most importantly, the first respondent is authorised and required to
pay the liabilities of the deceased
estate after the account has been
opened for inspection and no objection to it has been lodged.
[7]
Concerning creditors where the estate is solvent, the executor must
pay the creditors as soon as funds sufficient for that
purpose have
been realised out of the estate.  The first respondent is only
permitted to pay creditors of the estate, and
he
is
obliged to pay those creditors whose claims appear from the
liquidation and distribution account drawn up and published once
this
has rested free from objection.  Thus, the first respondent is
not permitted to pay anyone who is not a creditor of the
estate or an
heir or legatee under the will.  Therefore, the money the
applicants wish to have interdicted in terms of the
order they seek
is not money due by the estate to any creditor.
[12]
The guiding principle is that the first respondent occupies a
position of trust (and apart from his fiduciary
duties to all
beneficiaries and local creditors and his local statutory
obligations), his actions should be dictated by considerations
which
will serve best the interests of the beneficiaries.
[8]
The relief contended for by the applicants is in
direct
conflict with these legal obligations.  Moreover, the applicants
do not seek relief for an interdict
pendente
lite,
pending
the determination of some action which has been instituted or which
will be instituted between the parties.
[13]    It
is also unclear why the second respondent would be liable for the
inheritance imposed by an external tax
authority as a matter of law.
The executor is obliged to submit to our local tax authority a return
disclosing the amount
claimed by the person submitting the return to
represent the dutiable amount of the estate together with full
particulars regarding
the deceased's property (as of the date of his
death).
[14]
The local tax authority will assess the duty payable for every estate
liable for the duty and, thereupon,
issue a notice of assessment to
the executor.  The duty payable shall be paid on such date as
may be prescribed in the notice
of assessment issued at the instance
of the local tax authority.  The person liable for the assessed
duty shall be the executor
and, in this case, it is the first
respondent.
[9]
[15]
Most importantly, some provision is made for relief from ‘double’
taxation.
[10]
It
provides that agreements may be entered into with other countries
whereby arrangements are made with a view to the prevention,

mitigation or discontinuance of the levying, under our local laws and
the laws of such other countries, of estate duty in respect
of the
same property or to the rendering of reciprocal assistance in the
administration of, and in the collection of estate duty
under the
laws relating to the estate duty in force in locally and, in such
other external countries.
[16]
No such agreement has been reached regarding inheritance tax with the
external country at play in this matter.
[11]
This at least seems to be a matter of common cause between the
parties.  Thus, there seems to be no legal basis on which
the
applicants can obtain an order against the first respondent.  It
is also doubtful if this court has the requisite jurisdiction
to
entertain the claim by the applicants.  Passing now to the issue
of whether the applicants are vested with the required
standing to
advance any claim on behalf of the external tax authority.
[17]
The external tax authorities do not claim against the deceased estate
or the first respondent as representative
of the deceased estate.
Accordingly, I am doubtful that this court has jurisdiction over the
claim even if it was brought
directly by the external authority,
whether against the first or the second respondent.  I say this
because neither the applicants
nor the external tax authorities have
any claim against the estate.
[18]
The estate duty due by the estate is due in terms of local
legislation and is calculated on the value of
the property in the
estate.  By contrast, the inheritance tax the applicants claim
they will need to pay in due course is
payable by them and can,
according to them, be reclaimed from the second respondent as
legatee, not against the deceased's estate.
Moreover, the
applicants have no pending claim against the second respondent, nor
do they claim to have instituted action
or intend to institute action
against the second respondent to reimburse any such inheritance tax
which may become due and payable.
[19]
From a practical point of view, the application is one in which
payment of what is claimed to be an inheritance
tax due to the
external tax authorities is being claimed from the second respondent,
a local citizen, through this court.  The
applicants purport to
endow on the testator’s implied intention through silence to
the effect that he did not intend for
the applicants to pay their
inheritance tax and that this could be recovered from the proceeds of
the sale of the local immovable
property.
[20]
In
terms of our common law
,
our courts will not entertain a claim by a foreign government for
taxes due to it and will not even enforce a foreign judgment
for such
taxes.
[12]
The
applicants concede that in the absence of any express intention by
the testator in any of his wills it is at best to
be liberally
inferred from the will that the testator wished for his relatives to
pay the tax due to the external authorities.
It seems clear, at
least to me,
that
the applicants cannot claim
payment
of the tax on behalf of the foreign government as they appear to be
doing through this court process.  Put another
way,
the
f
irst
respondent is under no obligation
to
make any payment to the external authorities.
[21]
The first respondent is the executor of a local estate, appointed
under a local will and must comply with
our local laws in
administering and winding up the estate.
There
is no claim by the applicants against the estate.  Their case is
premised on an alleged claim by an external tax authority,
and that
claim is a potential claim against the second respondent and not
against the estate or the executor.
[22]    It
must be so that the international comity does not extend to the
recognition of tax liabilities imposed
by a state on its subjects for
its domestic management and regulation.  Thus, in my view, this
court does not have the power
to order the attachment of assets for
the purposes of enabling a foreign state to recover taxes owed to it
nor, for that matter,
to order the first respondent to pay what is
claimed to be tax allegedly owing to an external tax authority.
[23]
Absent is any legislative provision or some double taxation agreement
permitting this, and in the absence
of such authority, this court has
no jurisdiction to do so.
[13]
Thus, a foreign state may not have a claim for taxes payable to its
fiscus enforced in another state, as this would be equivalent
to
derogation of the another state's territorial supremacy.
[14]
[24]    As
a general proposition, comity and convenience have established usage
among civilised states by which the
final judgments of foreign courts
of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into effect under
specific regulations and
restrictions, which vary in different
countries.  Thus, judgments of courts of foreign countries are
recognised by some other
countries because of comity due from one
nation to another, and to its courts and judgments.  Such
recognition is granted
to judgments rendered by courts of other
nations with due regard to international duty and convenience, on the
one hand, and to
rights of citizens and others under the protection
of its laws, on the other.  I am however enjoined to give effect
to independence
and should not yield to considerations of
convenience.  International agreements can attain convenience,
and in this case,
none entitles the external tax authority or anyone
on their behalf to extract inheritance tax from the second
respondent, who is
not a citizen of that country, through the conduit
of the executor of a local deceased estate which is being
administered by the
first respondent as duly appointed executor to
that estate, under our local laws.
[25]
Equally vague is the applicants' claim for the reimbursement of any
monies expended by them regarding the
inheritance tax for which they
are liable less any sums which the second respondent would be liable
to pay under our local laws
to our local tax authorities.  I say
this because there is no allegation that they have disbursed these
monies or intend to
do so.  Under our laws, a claim of a surety
against a co-surety, for example, for payment of an
aliquot
share
or a claim under an insurance policy for indemnification for
compensation, all possess their specific requirements.
A
surety who has fully discharged a primary debt has a claim against
the principal debtor. Still, the surety must discharge the
debt fully
before proceeding against the principal debtor.
[15]
[26]
Similarly, in this matter, until the applicants have made the
payment, or at least until they have committed
themselves firmly to
doing so, and in a fixed sum, any claim to reimbursement they say
they have (accepting for the moment that
that claim is recognised
under our law) will be incomplete until they have paid that which
they say they need to pay.  Thus,
the second respondent's
obligation to repay might have arisen in some general way.
Still, the performance employing a pecuniary
compensation that the
applicants may wish to claim would not be due or claimable from the
second respondent.
[27]
Put another way, until the applicants have made the payment (or at
least until they have committed themselves
firmly to doing so)
renders their cause of action incomplete.  No money is
accordingly immediately or presently payable to
the applicants by the
second respondent nor claimable by them from the second respondent.
Whatever unspecified claim the
applicants may be suggesting they
could have against the second respondent at some stage in the future
is uncertain and has not
been established on these papers.
[28]
Unmoved, the applicants seek directions that the first respondent
make payment of the external inheritance
tax directly to the external
tax authority on behalf of the second respondent, alternatively, to
the third respondent, on the basis
that the third respondent makes
payment thereof to the external tax authorities on behalf of the
second respondent.  This
is against the canvass of the third
respondent, who initiated the process and in the absence of any
treaty between the countries
regarding the inheritance tax.
[29]
The applicants seek to rely on the external ‘assessment’,
which creates no liability for the
second respondent and is not
enforceable in our law.  Notably, the third respondent did not
provide the second respondent
with an opportunity (relating to his
rights) regarding this external process concerning any rights he may
have had under foreign
law.
The
third respondent made the representations regarding the external
inheritance tax without considering the second respondent’s

position under the deceased’s local will or our local law.
[30]
Moreover, given the circumstances of this estate, where reduction of
legacies is required, and the ultimate
quantification of any
liability is still to be finalised, it must be so that the external
inheritance tax cannot be determined
to any degree of certainty at
this time.  Put another way, the inheritance tax is calculated
on what the legatee receives
in due course, not the property's value
in the will.  Thus, if the claim is one of reimbursement, then
that claim would be
dependent on and only arise when the sum of such
disbursement has been determined.
[31]
Our local succession laws'
core
principle is that specific bequests or legacies are received without
restriction or encumbrance, absent any contrary stipulation.

The special bequest to the second respondent is the immovable
property.  Thus, the second respondent contended that the
intention
of the deceased was that the external inheritance tax was
not intended to be for his account and that he was entitled to
receive
the property free of encumbrance and by the same token,  the
proceeds from the sale of that property free from external
inheritance
tax.  I agree with his submission based on a plain
reading of the will of the deceased.
[32]    I
say this because it is clear from the will that the deceased intended
the second respondent to inherit
the fixed property as opposed to an
undefined share of the residue after the inheritance tax in respect
of the property had been
deducted.  This was an ‘out-and-out’
special bequest made by the deceased to the second respondent.
[33]
As the executor of the estate, the first respondent is duty bound to
give effect to this intention of the
deceased as expressed in his
will.   A presumption applies that the legatees should
obtain the legacy free from the burden
thereon.  The burden must
be discharged from other assets.
[16]
This doctrine is an extension of a fundamental principle of our local
laws of succession, being the freedom of testation.
The
testator is free to deal with his or her property as he or she wishes
and that includes making a bequest to a legatee
free of cost or
encumbrance which means others must bear such costs, being the
residuary heirs.
[34]
The testator’s will is silent about whether the testator
intended for the second respondent or the
applicants to pay the tax
imposed by the external tax authority concerning the bequest of the
local immovable property.  Moreover,
I believe the applicants
have not established any right for the payment of the external
inheritance tax.  The presumption
regarding legacies that a
legatee receives them without any encumbrance militates against any
inference that the deceased wanted
the second respondent to be liable
for the payment of any inheritance tax on the property.
[35]
On a proper
construction of the will,
the
testator disposed of the whole of his external estate by making
specific bequests and did not provide in his will for the inheritance

tax on any of these to be paid by the second respondent.
The
applicants advance that the payment of these external taxes places
them in a perilous position and that they would have to pay
the taxes
out of their own pockets.
[36]
This must be viewed against the canvass that the applicants have each
inherited some two million Euros and
the inheritance tax payable by
them under the second respondent’s legacy would approximately
amount to seventy thousand Euros
each, leaving them with a not
insignificant inheritance.
Conclusion:
[37]
For the reasons set out herein, the applicants have not advanced any
grounds that would entitle them on the
facts and in law to the relief
they seek, and their application must fail.  There is no reason
why costs should not follow
the result.  Thus, the following
order is granted:
1.
That the application is dismissed.
2.
That the applicants (jointly and severally, the one paying the others
to be absolved) shall
be liable for the costs of the application
(which costs are to include the costs of the application for urgent
interim relief)
on the scale as between party and party (inclusive of
the costs of senior counsel where so employed) as taxed or agreed.
E
D WILLE
CAPE
TOWN
[1]
An
amount of €435,517.11
or
the South African Rand equivalent thereof (‘the funds’).
[2]
Erf
1681 Camps Bay, situate at 5 Fiskaal Close, Bakoven (the property).
[3]
The
Flemish tax authorities (the ‘tax authority’).
[4]
In
essence a ‘
Mareva’
injunction.
[5]
This
in terms of the
Administration
of Estates Act, 66 of 1965
, the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 and the
local will of the deceased.
[6]
In
terms of
section 35
(1) of the
Administration of Estates Act, 66 of
1965
.
[7]
Administration
of Estates
Act
66 of 1965
,
section 35(12)(a)
thereof.
[8]
Mujuru
NO & others v Mujuru & another
[2006] JOL 17603 (ZH).
[9]
Section
11(1)(a)(l) of the Estate Duty Act
.
[10]
Section
26 of the Estate Duty Act.
[11]
In
terms of section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No 58 of
1962), read in conjunction with section 231(4) of the Constitution

of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No 108 of 1996), a
convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention

of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income set out in the
schedule to that notice has been promulgated.  This convention

was entered into with the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium and
was approved by Parliament in terms of section 231(2) of the

Constitution, the date of entry into force being 9 October 1998 in
terms of paragraph 1 of Article 28.  Notably, this does
not
deal with estate duty or inheritance tax.
[12]
COT
v McFarland (27 SATC 15).
[13]
In
Re
Delhi Electric Supply & Traction Co Ltd
[1953] 2 All ER 1452 (CA).
[14]
Government
of India, Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) v Taylor and
Another
[1955]
AC 491 [1955] 1 All ER 292 (HL).
[15]
Absa
Bank Ltd v Scharrighuisen
[2000]
1 All SA 318 (C).
[16]
Lutheran
Church v Bam
1916 CPD 376
and Sorge v Estate Preuss
1933
CPD 61
and
Bell
v Swan
1954
(3) SA 543
(W).