AG v YG (3932/2016) [2023] ZAWCHC 147 (15 June 2023)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Divorce — Maintenance — Entitlement to personal maintenance — Plaintiff seeking maintenance until death or remarriage — Court determining plaintiff's ability to meet reasonable monthly needs from own resources — Plaintiff's failure to provide objective evidence of legal fees and medical expenses — Court excluding disputed legal fees and adjusting dental expenses, resulting in identifiable net assets for plaintiff. The plaintiff, AG, initiated divorce proceedings against the defendant, YG, in March 2016, with the trial commencing in October 2022. The parties, both in poor health and residing in Israel, sought resolution on issues including the plaintiff's entitlement to maintenance, the defendant's obligation under their antenuptial contract, and the ownership of funds held in trust. The legal issue revolved around the plaintiff's claim for personal maintenance and the determination of her financial resources. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to substantiate her claims for legal fees and medical expenses, leading to the exclusion of those amounts from her net assets, which were ultimately calculated to be R6,561,284.09.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a highly acrimonious divorce action in the High Court of South Africa, Western Cape Division, Cape Town. The proceedings concerned the dissolution of a marriage concluded out of community of property with the accrual system excluded by antenuptial contract, and the determination of various consequential financial disputes following the parties’ permanent separation.


The parties were AG (plaintiff/wife) and YG (defendant/husband). Both parties were elderly and in poor health at the time of trial. The plaintiff testified with the assistance of a Hebrew interpreter, while the defendant testified from Israel via audio-visual link. Expert evidence was led by accountant experts for both sides, and additional expert reports (forensic IT and actuarial) were admitted by agreement.


The divorce action was instituted on 7 March 2016. After interlocutory proceedings and postponements, the trial commenced on 18 October 2022 and evidence was heard over 13 days, with supplementary calculations and schedules delivered later. Although the parties had already obtained a religious divorce in Israel in February 2020, the South African proceedings continued to determine the civil divorce and remaining disputes. By the time of trial, the parties narrowed the disputes by a statement of agreed issues, and were aligned that a decree of divorce should be granted.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned (i) whether the plaintiff was entitled to personal maintenance (including medical cover/expenses) until death or remarriage, (ii) whether the defendant had discharged an obligation under the antenuptial contract to pay the plaintiff US$40 000, (iii) who was entitled to US$100 000 held in trust (previously in escrow), and (iv) the appropriate costs order.


2. Material Facts


The parties met in 2002 in Tel Aviv. The plaintiff then lived in Israel and was self-employed as a cosmetician; the defendant was a non-practising medical doctor and businessman. The defendant persuaded the plaintiff to move to South Africa with her younger daughter, and the parties married on 18 September 2003 in Johannesburg. The marriage was out of community of property, with the accrual system expressly excluded. Clause VIII of the antenuptial contract recorded that, “in consideration of the intended marriage”, the defendant gave the plaintiff an amount equivalent to US$40 000. The contract was drafted by the defendant’s attorney and signed the day before the marriage; the plaintiff’s English was minimal and the defendant translated the terms to her.


The parties separated permanently in March 2016. They were divorced in the Religious Court of Israel on 18 February 2020, and pursuant to the ketuvah the plaintiff was awarded 360 000 Israeli shekels, which the defendant ultimately paid. After separation, the plaintiff moved between South Africa and Israel but was primarily resident from about December 2020 with her daughter S and S’s husband in Herzliya, Israel, and they supported her financially apart from her personal expenditure and medical costs. The defendant, who was terminally ill, also resided in Israel for medical treatment.


The court treated the parties’ financial positions as materially relevant to the maintenance claim. It accepted that the defendant’s minimum net assets were R24 148 181.67 (undisputed at trial in the sense relevant to ability to pay). The plaintiff’s net assets were initially assessed by the experts at approximately R5.5–R5.7 million, with a dispute concerning a Wells Fargo cheque account balance (equivalent to US$11 762). The plaintiff offered shifting explanations as to whether US$10 000 in that account belonged to her other daughter (SH) or to herself; she produced no objective proof and SH did not testify. The court rejected the plaintiff’s evidence on this point and included the full amount in her assets.


The court also considered liabilities used to calculate the plaintiff’s net assets. Two liabilities had been included by agreement between the experts for practicality: alleged legal fees of R750 000 and future/unpaid dental expenses of R354 702.32. Under cross-examination and after the court afforded an opportunity to produce supporting documents, the plaintiff failed to produce legal fee invoices, and the dental amount was shown to be R280 600 rather than the higher figure. The court excluded the R750 000 legal fees liability and adjusted the dental liability to R280 600, resulting in identifiable net assets for the plaintiff of R6 561 284.09 before accounting for the disputed US dollar amounts.


The defendant’s expert attempted, on the eve of trial, to substantially increase the plaintiff’s net assets by treating certain share trading and forex movements and “unknown loans or transfers” as potential assets based on bank statement analysis. However, the expert conceded these were only potential assets, lacking verification of ownership, opening/closing balances, and sources of deposits. The court accepted evidence by the plaintiff and her daughter S that the share and forex activity on the plaintiff’s Israeli bank account related to S’s trading, facilitated because S was a co-signatory and her husband could not hold an Israeli account; and it accepted that a written “Family Loan Agreement” recorded that the plaintiff loaned 1.2 million shekels to S for trading. On this basis, the court disregarded upward adjustments for the share portfolio and forex transactions as duplications of funds received from the sale of property and the Religious Court award.


Separately, the court identified substantial unexplained transactions through the plaintiff’s South African bank account, including significant outflows and inflows without adequate explanation, and noted an inference that there may have been undisclosed resources, although these could not be quantified on the evidence.


As to the US$40 000 antenuptial contract obligation, the court regarded as undisputed that money was a central issue in the marriage, that the plaintiff complained she had been misled into signing an accrual-excluding contract, and that there was no evidence the US$40 000 was ever paid. The defendant’s contention that the obligation had been discharged through an oral arrangement involving ownership proportions in a later Netanya apartment was raised only during cross-examination, was denied by the plaintiff, and was inconsistent with the later property being registered jointly.


As to the US$100 000, it was common cause that the plaintiff owned immovable property in Tiberius, Israel; she sold it in 2008 and transferred US$100 000 of the proceeds to a Swiss bank account held by the defendant. The plaintiff admitted that during later marital conflict she devised a scheme in 2014/2015 to deceive the defendant into paying the sum to her under the pretext of a loan to her daughter SH. The defendant transferred US$84 000 to SH from his Swiss account, and the plaintiff transferred US$16 000 to SH from funds paid by the defendant into her Israeli bank account; SH then transferred the monies to a Wells Fargo savings account. That US$100 000 became the subject of separate litigation, was placed in escrow, and ultimately was held in trust by the plaintiff’s attorneys at the time of this trial.


3. Legal Issues


The court was required to determine four central questions.


First, it had to decide whether the plaintiff had established an entitlement to personal maintenance, including medical cover and/or medical expenses, until death or remarriage. This was primarily an issue of the application of legal principles governing spousal maintenance to the facts concerning the plaintiff’s resources and reasonable needs, coupled with evaluative findings on credibility and sufficiency of proof.


Second, the court had to determine whether the defendant had discharged his contractual obligation under the antenuptial contract to give the plaintiff US$40 000. This turned largely on factual findings and the evaluation of competing versions regarding an alleged later oral arrangement, and on whether payment (or discharge by substitution) was proved.


Third, the court had to determine the rightful ownership of US$100 000 held in trust, in circumstances where the plaintiff admitted deception in how the funds came to be transferred back into her sphere of control. This required the court to decide, on the evidence, whether the defendant had shown that the plaintiff was otherwise repaid or not entitled to the amount, and what order would practically resolve the dispute on the established facts.


Fourth, the court had to decide an appropriate costs order, which involved an evaluative assessment of partial success and the parties’ relative financial positions.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On the question of the plaintiff’s resources (which was foundational to the maintenance enquiry), the court relied substantially on the accountant experts’ work, finding both experts credible and helpful, and characterising their differences as methodological rather than a matter of integrity. The court nevertheless made its own factual findings where expert calculations depended on unsupported assumptions. It included the Wells Fargo cheque account amount in the plaintiff’s assets because the plaintiff gave contradictory versions, produced no objective proof that the funds belonged to her daughter SH, and SH did not testify. The court treated the absence of substantiation as sufficient to reject the plaintiff’s shifting evidence on ownership.


In relation to alleged liabilities reducing the plaintiff’s net assets, the court emphasised that, despite the experts’ pragmatic acceptance of figures without documents, the plaintiff bore the burden of proving liabilities once the figures were properly put in issue. The court applied the approach to repudiation of expert agreements discussed in Bee v Road Accident Fund 2018 (4) SA 366 (SCA), noting that repudiation must be clear and timeous and that, in this case, the risks of disruption identified in Bee did not materialise. The court afforded the plaintiff an opportunity during cross-examination to produce documentary support for the claimed legal fees and dental expenses; the plaintiff did not produce invoices for legal fees and the dental amount was shown to be lower. As a result, the court excluded the legal fees liability entirely and reduced the dental liability, thereby increasing the plaintiff’s identifiable net assets.


The court also evaluated the defendant expert’s late-stage attempt to treat share and forex transactions reflected in the plaintiff’s Israeli account as “potential assets”. While acknowledging the analysis of account movements, the court accepted that the expert could not identify ownership of the shares, sources of receipts, or confirm balances, and that duplications were possible. The court preferred the evidence of the plaintiff and her daughter S that S had conducted the trading through the account (with assistance from her husband), that the plaintiff had no knowledge of trading, and that the major deposits into the account corresponded to identifiable sources (Netanya property proceeds and the Religious Court award). The court found the defendant’s contrary suggestions vague and unsubstantiated, and thus disregarded the upward adjustments for shares and forex as duplications rather than independent assets.


Although the court noted unexplained substantial movements in the plaintiff’s South African bank account and considered it difficult to resist an inference of undisclosed accounts or resources, it also held that undisclosed amounts could not be quantified on the evidence. The relevance of this finding was that it undermined the plaintiff’s stance that she lacked resources, and supported the conclusion that she had access to funds with which she could meet significant expenses without reducing her declared capital base.


Turning to the US$40 000 antenuptial obligation, the court identified several undisputed contextual facts: the centrality of money in the marriage; the plaintiff’s complaint about being misled regarding the contract; and the absence of evidence of payment. The court placed weight on a detailed “Financial Agreement” drafted by a friend in December 2014 during marital discord, in which the defendant’s assets were valued and the plaintiff was notionally “awarded” 50% of net assets, yet the document made no mention of the US$40 000 clause or any set-off. The court regarded this omission, given the agreement’s financial detail, as significant. The court further considered that the defendant’s version of discharge—an alleged later oral agreement that the plaintiff’s 26% interest in a later Netanya apartment constituted payment—was raised belatedly and was inconsistent with the property in fact being registered jointly. Given the defendant’s business acumen and meticulous handling of finances, the court rejected his version and concluded that the obligation had not been discharged; accordingly the plaintiff was entitled to payment of US$40 000.


Regarding the US$100 000, the court accepted that the plaintiff had originally transferred this sum (proceeds of her Tiberius property) to the defendant’s Swiss account, and that she later used deception to induce the defendant to transfer the funds to her daughter SH, from where they moved into a Wells Fargo account and later into escrow and trust. While the defendant argued that the plaintiff should not benefit because the funds were obtained by fraud, the court focused on the practical evidentiary position: there was no persuasive evidence that the plaintiff had been repaid US$84 000 (or otherwise compensated for the total US$100 000) in another manner. The defendant could only speculate that payments had been made years earlier to SH or into the plaintiff’s South African bank account. The court reasoned that even if it were to hold that the plaintiff should not benefit from her fraud, this would not eliminate the defendant’s obligation to pay the US$100 000 from another source, given the lack of evidence of repayment. The court therefore treated the most practical resolution, on the record before it, as an order that the plaintiff was entitled to retain the US$100 000 held in trust.


On maintenance, the court reasoned that spousal maintenance depended on whether the plaintiff proved she could not meet her reasonable monthly needs from her own resources, and that her resources had to be identified first. Having determined that the plaintiff’s identifiable net assets increased materially once the US$40 000 and US$100 000 were accounted for (treated collectively as US$140 000), the court added this sum to her revised net estate, raising it to approximately R9 million on the exchange rate used by the experts. The court then assessed what income could reasonably be derived from capital, preferring an Israeli interest rate (an average 1.25% per annum) rather than a South African rate, because the plaintiff lived in Israel, was not a South African taxpayer, and most assets were not located in South Africa. The court added the plaintiff’s Israeli pension to this interest-based income.


Critically, the court held that the plaintiff’s maintenance claim failed because she did not prove her reasonable monthly needs. She produced no supporting documentation for her schedule of needs, and her evidence was generalised and based partly on what friends said. The court highlighted that the plaintiff had been asked repeatedly since 2017, via rule 35(3) notices, to substantiate her claimed needs, and she still did not do so at trial. In the absence of proof, the court used the defendant’s credible evidence of his own monthly living costs in Israel as a comparative benchmark, and then made a generous allowance in the plaintiff’s favour. Even on that approach, the court concluded that any plausible shortfall could be met from the plaintiff’s liquid or near-liquid capital resources. The court also accepted the defendant’s evidence about the Israeli healthcare system, including compulsory medical aid at nominal cost and substantial coverage, and held that the plaintiff’s medical and related claims were unsubstantiated and, in any event, reasonably capable of being met from her own resources. On this basis the claim for personal maintenance (including medical cover/expenses) was dismissed.


On costs, the court observed that each party achieved partial success. However, in view of the disparity in their identifiable net assets, the court considered it appropriate that each party bear their own costs, while allowing the plaintiff to retain contributions already paid towards her costs.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted a decree of divorce.


The court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff US$40 000 within 60 calendar days.


The court ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to retain, as her sole property, the US$100 000 held in trust by her attorneys.


The court dismissed the remainder of the plaintiff’s claims, including her claim for personal maintenance (and associated medical cover/expenses).


As to costs, the court ordered that, save for contributions already paid by the defendant towards the plaintiff’s costs (which she could keep), each party must pay their own costs, including reserved costs.


Cases Cited


Bee v Road Accident Fund 2018 (4) SA 366 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 43(6).


Uniform Rule 35(3).


Held


The plaintiff did not establish an entitlement to personal maintenance because she failed to prove her reasonable monthly needs with any substantiating material, and the court found that, given her identifiable capital base (including the disputed US dollar sums) and pension, she could meet any reasonable shortfall from her own resources.


The defendant failed to prove discharge of the antenuptial contract obligation to give the plaintiff US$40 000; the court rejected the defendant’s belated and unsubstantiated version that the obligation was satisfied through a later alleged oral agreement linked to a Netanya property purchase.


Despite the plaintiff’s admitted deception in how the US$100 000 came to be transferred back into her sphere of control, the court found no persuasive evidence that the defendant had otherwise repaid the plaintiff the amount, and held that the practical resolution on the evidence was that the plaintiff was entitled to retain the US$100 000 held in trust.


The court considered both parties partially successful but, having regard to the disparity in their financial positions and the circumstances, ordered each party to pay their own costs (subject to the plaintiff retaining prior contributions paid towards her costs).


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A claim for personal maintenance in divorce proceedings requires proof that the claimant spouse cannot meet reasonable monthly needs from their own resources. The assessment requires identification of the claimant’s available resources (including capital assets and income) and a factual determination of reasonable needs, which must be proved on evidence rather than left to conjecture.


Where expert calculations incorporate liabilities or assumptions, and those components are timeously and clearly placed in dispute, the party asserting the liability bears the burden to provide substantiation. The trial court may permit repudiation of previously uncontentious matters, guided by the principle that repudiation should not cause unfair disruption, as discussed in Bee v Road Accident Fund 2018 (4) SA 366 (SCA).


In determining whether a contractual obligation recorded in an antenuptial contract has been discharged, the court evaluates whether payment (or an agreed substitution/set-off) is proved on the evidence. A party’s belated version, particularly if inconsistent with contemporaneous documentation and established conduct, may be rejected on credibility and probability.


In resolving disputes over funds held in escrow or trust, the court may adopt a practical remedy where the evidentiary record does not support an alternative repayment history or set-off, even where the surrounding conduct includes admitted deception, provided the order reflects what the court can determine on the evidence before it.

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[2023] ZAWCHC 147
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AG v YG (3932/2016) [2023] ZAWCHC 147 (15 June 2023)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case No: 3932/2016
In
the matter between:
AG
Plaintiff
and
YG
Defendant
Coram:
Justice J Cloete
Heard:
18 – 20, 24, 26, 27 and 31 October 2022; 2,
3 and 7 – 10 November 2022; 18 and 19 April 2023;
supplementary calculations
and schedules provided on 4 May 2023
Delivered
electronically:
15 June 2023
JUDGMENT
CLOETE
J
:
Introduction
[1]
This highly acrimonious divorce action
commenced with the plaintiff (wife) instituting proceedings against
the defendant (husband)
on 7 March 2016. After a number of
interlocutory applications and various postponements the trial
finally commenced on 18 October
2022, and evidence was led over
13 days.
[2]
The plaintiff was present in court to
testify through a Hebrew interpreter. The defendant testified via
audio-visual link from Israel,
as did the plaintiff’s daughter,
S, from a previous marriage. The defendant’s accountant expert
testified partly via
audio-visual link from Richards Bay and
personally in court.
[3]
Given the somewhat outdated pleadings and
the evidence led during the trial, the parties’ legal
representatives ultimately
prepared a statement of agreed issues for
determination (one of these is whether a decree of divorce should be
granted, but the
parties are
ad idem
that such an order is appropriate).
[4]
In a nutshell the remaining issues for
determination are: (a) the plaintiff’s entitlement, if
any, to personal maintenance
(including payment of medical cover
and/or medical expenses) until her death or remarriage, whichever
occurs first (there is no
dispute that if maintenance is awarded it
should be for such a period); (b) whether the defendant has
discharged his obligation
in terms of the antenuptial contract to pay
the plaintiff $40 000 USD; (c) who is the rightful owner of
a sum of $100 000
USD previously held in escrow in a Wells Fargo
bank account and currently held in trust by the plaintiff’s
attorneys; and
(d) costs (it being agreed that those pertaining
to the plaintiff’s most recent application to compel discovery,
launched
on 21 September 2022, will be costs in the cause of the
divorce action).
[5]
The analysis of the evidence will thus only
deal with these issues. Further, given that the plaintiff will only
be entitled to personal
maintenance if she proves that she is unable
to meet her reasonable monthly needs from her own resources, I will
deal with this
issue after determining what those resources
appropriately comprise.
[6]
As stated, both parties testified. Each
adduced the evidence of their respective accountant experts, namely
Mr David Black
(appointed by the plaintiff) and Mr Clayton
Ellis (appointed by the defendant). The plaintiff’s daughter S
testified
on limited issues on her behalf. In addition the reports of
Mr Adrie Stander, a forensic IT specialist, and Mr Nilen
Kambaran, an actuary (both of whom were appointed by the plaintiff)
were admitted as evidence by agreement.
Undisputed
contextual facts
[7]
At the time of the trial the plaintiff was
71 years old. This is her third marriage. The defendant is 74 years
old and this is seemingly
also his third marriage. Both parties are
in extremely poor health and no longer work in any capacity.
[8]
The parties met in 2002 at a party in Tel
Aviv, Israel where the plaintiff was residing permanently at the
time. She was self-employed
as a cosmetician. The defendant was a
non-practicing medical doctor and a businessman. They became
romantically involved and he
persuaded her to move to South Africa
with her younger daughter S in about August 2003.
[9]
They
were married to each other on 18 September 2003 at Johannesburg,
South Africa, out of community of property by antenuptial
contract
with the express exclusion of the accrual system provided for in
Chapter 1 of the Matrimonial Property Act.
[1]
The defendant was domiciled in South Africa at the time.
[10]
Clause VIII of the antenuptial contract
provides that ‘
[i]n consideration
of the said intended marriage
[the
defendant]
gives
[the
plaintiff]
an amount equivalent to US
$40 000’
. The antenuptial
contract was drafted by the defendant’s attorney and signed at
his offices on 17 September 2003, i.e. the
day before the
marriage. The plaintiff’s command of the English language was
minimal at the time and the defendant translated
the terms of the
antenuptial contract to her before it was signed.
[11]
No
children were born of the marriage although the parties have 8
children between them from previous marriages and/or relationships.

The parties separated permanently in March 2016. They were divorced
in the Religious Court of Israel on 18 February 2020.
Arising
from their Ketuvah
[2]
the
plaintiff was awarded 360 000 Israeli shekels which the
defendant ultimately paid.
[12]
Since their separation the plaintiff has
moved between South Africa and Israel, but has been primarily
resident with S and the latter’s
husband, D, in Herzliya (about
40km outside Tel Aviv) since about December 2020, when she returned
to Israel for heart surgery
which took place in March/April 2021. The
couple have supported her financially during this period apart from
paying her personal
expenditure such as clothing and toiletries and
her medical costs.
[13]
The defendant is terminally ill. He too is
residing in Israel, in a suburb of Tel Aviv, namely Givatayim. The
main reason he returned
to Israel is for medical treatment.
The parties’
respective financial resources apart from the disputed $140 000
USD
[14]
Both Black and Ellis put in an enormous
amount of effort and, despite various criticisms levelled at them
during cross-examination
and subsequent argument, it is my view that
they understood their duty to be objective, were credible and
reliable, and were of
great assistance to the court. Their areas of
difference in truth related to their respective approaches to certain
assets and
liabilities, a fact which both fairly acknowledged and
left to the court to decide which approach should be preferred.
[15]
The agreed or undisputed value of the
defendant’s minimum net assets is R24 148 181.67.
Although the experts did
not completely agree on what portion
constitutes liquid or near liquid assets, nothing turns on this since
the defendant did not
place his ability to afford maintenance or to
“meet” the $140 000 USD in issue.
[16]
In their joint minute signed at the
commencement of the trial (on 18 October 2022), Black valued the
plaintiff’s net
assets at R5 528 985.77 and Ellis
(save for what follows hereunder) at R5 737 182.37. The
difference of R208 196.60
is an amount held in a Wells Fargo
cheque account in the plaintiff’s name. Black excluded this
amount because he was informed
that the plaintiff’s other
daughter SH, who resides in the USA, is the owner of these funds and
holds a general power of
attorney over that account. According to
Black, his opinion that it should be excluded was reinforced by his
instruction that the
plaintiff is not registered as a taxpayer in the
USA. Black was not provided with a copy of this power of attorney or
any other
objective proof of who in truth owns the funds, and SH
elected not to testify.
[17]
The sum of R208 196.60 at the date
adopted by the experts converted to $11 762 USD. The plaintiff’s
evidence initially
was that, of this sum, $10 000 USD belonged
to SH and the balance of $1 762 USD to her. She then proceeded
to give two
diametrically opposed versions. While conceding that SH
has her own bank account in the USA, the plaintiff first testified
that:
(a) SH ‘
put’
the $10 000 USD into the plaintiff’s account for the
plaintiff’s use during her visits to the USA or to buy air

tickets, although SH is still the owner; and then (b) it is the
plaintiff’s own money for her use on these visits.
[18]
She conceded that no objective evidence was
produced by her to support any of these three versions. In these
circumstances her evidence
on this score may fairly be rejected
without more, and the sum of R208 196.60 thus falls to be
included in her net assets
in accordance with Ellis’
calculation of R5 737 182.37.
[19]
The experts identified two liabilities in
arriving at the plaintiff’s total net assets, consisting of
legal fees of R750 000
incurred since November 2020, and future
or unpaid dental expenses in South Africa of R354 702.32. The
experts were
ad idem
that they accepted these figures without any supporting documents for
sake of practicality in the face of the looming trial.
[20]
The plaintiff was cross-examined on these
liabilities. It was subsequently conclusively demonstrated that she
was unable to provide
any objective evidence in respect of her legal
fees of R750 000 and indeed she candidly conceded that this
figure had been
provided by her attorneys, who it is noted declined
shortly before the commencement of the trial to provide details when
asked
by the defendant’s attorney. The plaintiff’s future
or unpaid dental expenses were also conclusively demonstrated to
be,
not R354 702.32, but R280 600.
[21]
In
order to place what was conclusively demonstrated in proper context,
I was mindful of what the Supreme Court of Appeal stated
in
Bee
v Road Accident Fund
.
[3]
It was for this reason that during cross-examination of the
plaintiff, and despite the experts’ agreement on these two
liabilities
at face value, I gave the plaintiff the opportunity to
produce supporting documentation in the form of legal fee invoices
(redacted
in respect of attendances if necessary) and a quotation for
her future or unpaid dental treatment. The plaintiff failed to
provide
the fee invoices and the quotation supplied for future or
unpaid dental treatment was R280 600.
[22]
In respect of the alleged legal fees
liability of R750 000 the following is also relevant. Not only
were no invoices provided
for the period since November 2020, but it
is common cause that in December 2020 the defendant paid another
contribution towards
the plaintiff’s legal costs in the sum of
R350 000 in terms of an order made under uniform rule 43(6).
[23]
While
it stands to reason that the plaintiff would have incurred legal fees
subsequent to November 2020, the fact of the matter
is that she bore
the onus of proving this liability in the face of a timeous
repudiation of the experts’ acceptance at face
value. She
singularly failed to do so and it is not for this court to speculate
on what that liability might be. Insofar as the
matter of timeous
repudiation is concerned, the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Bee
expressly stated that:
[4]

The
limits on repudiation, particularly its timing, are matters for the
trial court. The important point for present purposes is
that
repudiation must occur clearly and timeously. The reason for
insisting on timeous repudiation is obvious. If the repudiation
only
occurs during the course of the trial, it might lead to a
postponement to allow facts which were previously uncontentious
to be
further investigated. It might be necessary for a party to recall
witnesses, including his or her expert. Whether a trial
court would
allow this disruption would depend on the circumstances…’
[24]
In the present matter none of the risks
highlighted by the Supreme Court of Appeal eventuated. Moreover, the
invoice in respect
of the plaintiff’s future or unpaid dental
treatment was handed in without objection. In these circumstances the
liability
in respect of legal fees of R750 000 falls to be
excluded, and the liability in respect of future or unpaid dental
treatment
to be adjusted from R354 702.32 to R280 600,
leaving the plaintiff with identifiable net assets of R6 561 284.09.
[25]
On
the eve of the trial Ellis adjusted his net asset value calculation
of the plaintiff’s estate upwards from R5 737 182.37

to R16 289 562.38. This adjustment, according to Ellis, was
attributable to: (a) a share portfolio of R1 368 125.24;

(b) unknown loans or transfers of R2 380 953.15; and
(c) forex transactions of R6 852 230.51.
[5]
Ellis made the overall upward adjustment by analysing the available
statements of the plaintiff’s Hapoalim bank account in
Israel
over the periods July 2015 to May 2020 and September 2020 to July
2022; and transfers in and out of the plaintiff’s
First
National Bank and Wells Fargo accounts that could not be traced to
other bank accounts.
[26]
During his testimony Ellis however made
clear that these had been identified only as
potential
assets, since they were exclusively based on movements on the
accounts; he did not know who owned the shares which appeared to
have
been bought and sold; he had no opening or closing balances for
verification purposes; and he did not know the source(s) of
deposits
and receipts. He fairly acknowledged, as was Black’s opinion,
that these were possible duplications and that he
would willingly
revise his opinion if verification and corroborative evidence to the
contrary were to be provided.
[27]
The share and forex transactions only
pertain to the Hapoalim account. Despite attempts on behalf of the
defendant to suggest the
contrary, I am persuaded that the evidence
of both the plaintiff and/or S was honest, credible and reliable on
this score, and
was supported in part by the statements themselves as
well as a certain agreement to which I refer below.
[28]
According to their testimony S started
working in 2014 and became a co-signatory on the Hapoalim account in
either 2014 or 2015.
She had started dating her husband D in 2013 and
an opportunity arose for her to make money by trading in shares and
forex. Since
D had experience in this field she decided to take up
that opportunity, under his guidance, and traded through that
account. Both
she and D have continued to trade since that date. D is
not an Israeli citizen and cannot hold his own separate Israeli bank
account.
[29]
On 30 June 2021, 1 million shekels were
paid into the account, being the major portion of the plaintiff’s
half share of the
proceeds of an immovable property registered
jointly in the names of herself and the defendant in Netanya, Israel.
On 12 July 2021,
S used the bulk of this amount to purchase foreign
currency of 989 419.75 shekels.
[30]
On 22 July 2021, 362 931 shekels were
paid into that account pursuant to the Religious Court order in the
plaintiff’s
favour; and on 3 August 2021 the balance of
the plaintiff’s share of the Netanya sale proceeds of 290 000
shekels
were deposited therein. A number of share and forex
transactions followed both of these deposits as well. Both the
plaintiff and
S testified that around that time the plaintiff agreed
to loan the sum of 1.2 million shekels to S for the purpose of
trading.
[31]
In the face of the pending divorce trial
the plaintiff was advised by her attorneys to reduce the terms of the
oral loan agreement
to writing. On 1 September 2022 the plaintiff and
S signed a ‘
Family Loan Agreement’
recording the terms of the earlier oral loan agreement concluded on
1 July 2021. The capital of the loan is reflected therein
as 1.2
million shekels. The loan term expires on 1 July 2023 and the
capital attracts interest at the rate of 1.25% per annum
which is a
comparable rate to that charged by Israeli banks. Also included in
the written recordal of the loan is a provision that
the plaintiff is
entitled to repayments of 25% of the capital during the loan period
each 3 months upon request.
[32]
Again, the evidence of both the plaintiff
and S was that the plaintiff has no knowledge of how to conduct
transactions of this nature,
and that it was S and/or D on her behalf
who made all of them. The suggestion by the defendant to the contrary
was both vague and
unsubstantiated.
[33]
It is accordingly my view that the upward
adjustments made by Ellis in respect of the share portfolio of
R1 368 125.24
and forex transactions of R6 852 230.51
are duplications of the funds received by the plaintiff from the
proceeds of
the sale of the Netanya property and the Religious Court
order, and should thus be disregarded.
[34]
The plaintiff initially testified that she
is the sole holder of the FNB account ending with 9047, and that all
transactions were
conducted under her sole control. Ellis highlighted
certain questionable ones on that account. I refer only to the more
substantial
amounts.
[35]
On 5 October 2020, an app payment was made
to ‘
Jacob’
of R200 000. On 24 December 2020 a transfer of R100 000
was made to ‘
investment…
saving’
. On 28 October 2021
a further transfer of R270 000 was made to ‘
investment…
my’
; and on 24 March 2022,
R300 000 was transferred to an FNB Premier Select account with a
different account number ending
8717. The statements in respect of
the latter account were never provided by the plaintiff.
[36]
Over the same period credit transfers were
made into the 9047 account of R102 616.55 from account 8717 on
30 September
2021; R165 000 from ‘
Metain
P’
on 28 October 2021;
R294 000 from an unknown source on 23 March 2022; and
R110 000, again from an unknown source,
on 7 April 2022.
[37]
At a previous stage the divorce trial was
due to commence towards the end of November 2020. However the
plaintiff could not recall
why “Jacob” was paid R200 000
just over a month earlier on 5 October 2020. She was also unable
to recall
transferring R100 000 to an investment on 24 December
2020. She speculated that the R165 000 credit into her account

on 28 October 2021 might have been the proceeds of the sale of
her motor vehicle. She could also not recall the transfers
out of
that account of R270 000 on 28 October 2021 and R300 000
on 24 March 2022.
[38]
When pressed for an explanation in
cross-examination the plaintiff, out of the blue, claimed that ‘
it
went to the friend who has got the power of attorney on the account.
It went into his account and he then returned the money
to me…’
.
She reluctantly identified this friend as one Jacob B ‘
the
person that I rented from
[in Cape
Town]’
.
She thereafter tried to explain away all of the transactions as
having been carried out by Jacob alone as ‘
something
that Jacob must have done’
.
[39]
This was the first time that Jacob featured
in the trial and no evidence was produced to substantiate the
plaintiff’s claim
that he held a power of attorney over the
account. Moreover, although it is common cause that Jacob lives in
South Africa, the
plaintiff did not call him as a witness to support
her version. Consequently between October 2020 and April 2022 –
and only
in respect of the more substantial amounts – R870 000
flowed out of the FNB 9047 account and R671 616 flowed in,
all
without any proper explanation.
[40]
It is thus difficult to resist the
inference that the plaintiff has another account(s) which she elected
not to disclose, but given
the lack of detail any undisclosed amounts
in credit cannot be quantified on the evidence before the court. What
is relevant is
that the plaintiff seemingly has access to substantial
undisclosed resources with which to pay a considerable portion of her
legal
costs without negatively impacting on the valuation of her
total net assets.
[41]
For this reason I also touch briefly on the
plaintiff’s other Wells Fargo (High Yield Savings) account. In
his 2022 report
Ellis noted inter alia that on 6 September 2018,
$80 526 USD was deposited into that account, followed on
12 September
2018 by a transfer of $100 000 USD to ‘
Legacy
Bank of Flo’
(presumably Florida
in the USA). Although these transactions were marked as queries in
Ellis’ report the plaintiff failed
to deal with them. These
transactions might relate to the dispute pertaining to the $100 000
USD (which I deal with below)
but on the evidence this is pure
speculation.
[42]
What is worth noting is that after
withdrawing $100 000 USD the credit balance in the savings
account of $12 477.37 USD
was transferred to the plaintiff’s
Wells Fargo cheque account and the savings account then closed. The
cheque account is
the same one in respect of which one of the
plaintiff’s versions was that $10 000 USD in that account
belongs to SH.
Whether the
defendant has discharged his obligation in terms of the antenuptial
contract to pay the plaintiff $40 000 USD
[43]
Central to the determination of this issue
are the following undisputed facts. First, both parties throughout
the marriage considered
money to be of prime importance. Second, the
plaintiff complained she was hoodwinked by the defendant into signing
an antenuptial
contract  excluding the accrual. Third, there is
no evidence that $40 000 USD was ever paid in terms to the
plaintiff
by the defendant.
[44]
Fourth, at one of the low points in the
marriage when the plaintiff made clear to the defendant that she
would leave him unless
provided with proper financial security the
parties, with the assistance of a friend (“AB”) entered
into an agreement
on 10 December 2014. Its terms were reduced to
writing by AB.
[45]
What is clear from this document –
headed ‘
Financial Agreement’
– is that the defendant’s considerable assets (including,
according to him, loan accounts held by the plaintiff in
name only)
were individually valued, and the plaintiff was “awarded”
50% of the total net assets which included an
apartment in Netanya,
Israel. Significantly, despite the meticulous detail in the
agreement, no mention whatsoever was made of
any portion of the
plaintiff’s 50% “award” being in lieu of the
$40 000 USD donation.
[46]
Fifth, and in any event, the defendant
reneged on that agreement within a few days of its conclusion. Sixth,
and apparently not
once before the plaintiff was cross-examined did
the defendant provide a version of how his obligation to pay the
$40 000
USD was purportedly discharged. It was only then that
according to him the parties subsequently orally agreed that 26% of a
later
apartment purchased in Netanya would constitute payment, with
the defendant to own the remaining 74%.
[47]
The plaintiff emphatically denied this,
maintaining ‘
there was never any
issue about the $40 000 USD. I had told him that he must take my
portion of the money from what had accrued
between us which I
understood to be, you know, common accrual’.
Finally, a further factor militating against the defendant’s
belated version is that the later Netanya apartment was in fact

registered jointly in the parties’ names, although the reason
was disputed.
[48]
Given the defendant’s undoubted
business acumen and meticulous manner in which he dealt with his
financial affairs throughout
the marriage, there is little doubt in
my mind that the defendant’s version on this score must be
rejected. It follows that
the plaintiff is entitled to payment of the
sum of $40 000 USD.
The rightful owner
of the $100 000 USD
[49]
It is common cause that when the parties
married in 2003 the plaintiff owned an immovable property in
Tiberius, Israel, and that
in 2008 she sold that property and
transferred $100 000 USD of the proceeds to a Swiss bank account
held by the defendant.
[50]
During her evidence the plaintiff did not
attempt to conceal the fact that in 2014/2015, when the parties were
arguing over money,
she successfully contrived a scheme to deceive
the defendant into paying that sum to her under the pretext of a loan
to SH in the
USA. The defendant transferred $84 000 USD from his
Swiss account to SH, with the plaintiff transferring $16 000 USD
to SH from funds paid by the defendant into her Hapoalim account. The
plaintiff opened (it seems) the Wells Fargo savings account
and SH
then transferred the monies to that account.
[51]
It is this $100 000 USD that became
the subject of separate litigation and which was placed in escrow
before being transferred
to the trust account of the plaintiff’s
attorneys. Although I accept the defendant’s version that when
he deposed to
his answering affidavit in the first rule 43
application on 31 October 2016 he was not aware of the fraud, he
himself reflected,
as one of the plaintiff’s assets, the sum of
$100 000 USD ‘
in her bank
account in the USA’
.
[52]
While it was argued on behalf of the
defendant that, given the fraud, the plaintiff should not be
permitted to benefit, the fact
of the matter is that there is no
persuasive evidence before the court to indicate that the plaintiff
was repaid $84 000 USD
of the total of $100 000 USD by the
defendant in any other manner. He was only able to speculate that she
herself had transferred
$30 000 USD to SH and $70 000 USD
to her Absa bank account in South Africa around 2010 or 2011.
Accordingly, even if
I were to find that the plaintiff should not
benefit from her fraud, this would not relieve the defendant of his
obligation to
pay $100 000 USD to her from another source. In my
view the only practical way of resolving this is to order that the
plaintiff
is entitled to the $100 000 USD currently held in
trust by her attorneys.
The plaintiff’s
entitlement or otherwise to personal maintenance
[53]
Given
my findings the sum of $140 000 USD must be added to the
plaintiff’s revised net estate, increasing her identifiable
net
asset base from R6 561 284.09 by R2 478 000 to
R9 039 284.09 using the same conversion rate of
17.7 rands
to the US dollar adopted by the experts in their joint minute.
[6]
For convenience I will round this off at R9 million.
[54]
Although Ellis suggested that a South
African interest rate of 9.15% per annum should be used to calculate
what the plaintiff could
earn on her capital, I agree with Black that
this would be artificial, since the plaintiff now resides permanently
in Israel; is
not registered as a South African taxpayer; and the
bulk of her assets are not located here. Black suggested, and I
agree, that
the appropriate rate to apply is that of the Bank of
Israel at an average of 1.25% per annum.
[55]
In simple terms this equates to R112 500
per annum or R9 375 per month. To this must be added the
plaintiff’s
Israeli pension of R11 000.70, i.e. a
total of R20 375 per month. Importantly however this calculation
presupposes
that the plaintiff is entitled to preserve her entire
capital base (save obviously for inflationary erosion), and that is
not the
legal position.
[56]
The plaintiff was born on 5 May 1951
and is thus currently 72 years old. In his actuarial reports Kambaran
stated that he used
the Pensioner Annuitant (90) – 1 table for
females to ‘
estimate the mortality
experience’
of the plaintiff,
although this table was not placed before the court. However (and
this is all the court can do in the circumstances)
assuming that
despite her poor health the plaintiff lives for another 20 years, she
will have access to considerable liquid and
near liquid assets to top
up what is reasonably required for her maintenance needs.
[57]
With regard to those needs the plaintiff
failed dismally in proving what they were. Not a shred of supporting
documentary evidence
was produced by her to any expert, or the court
during her testimony. The plaintiff’s schedule of her monthly
maintenance
“requirements” totalled 24 540 shekels
(if renting) or 24 924.13 shekels (if buying a property in which
to
live). However she was only able to give generalised testimony,
the upshot of which was ‘
some of
them are expenses I have had and some of them I asked friends…’
.
This was despite the plaintiff having been asked on no less than six
previous occasions since 2017 (in the form of rule 35(3)
notices from
the defendant) to substantiate what she claims she needs.
[58]
I accept of course that the plaintiff has
monthly maintenance needs, but it cannot be expected of the court to
divine what they
might reasonably be. The best I can do is rely on
the evidence of the defendant (which was in my view credible) about
his own monthly
expenditure for comparative purposes. According to
him it totals about 8 300 shekels per month for rental in a
middle class
suburb of Tel Aviv, utilities, internet, food, groceries
and transport (but excluding medical costs).
[59]
I will assume, generously, in the
plaintiff’s favour that this should be rounded up to 10 000
shekels per month to cater
for other expenses such as clothing,
cosmetics and toiletries, entertainment and holidays. Applying the
exchange rate adopted by
the experts of 5.10 shekels to the South
African rand, this translates to R51 000 per month, leaving the
plaintiff with a
potential shortfall – again generously –
of R30 625 per month (i.e. her pension plus interest income
of R20 375
less R51 000). There is no doubt that the
plaintiff will be able to fund such a shortfall (if it indeed exists)
from her mostly
liquid or near liquid capital.
[60]
The plaintiff failed to give any persuasive
evidence to refute that of the defendant in relation to the cost and
quality of healthcare
in Israel. He testified that medical aid in
Israel is compulsory (irrespective of age, status or state of health)
and is government
controlled. It costs a nominal amount (150 to 200
shekels per month) and covers hospitalisation, medication, doctors
visits, x-rays,
radiation and similar treatment, in other words the
needs of an ordinary individual.
[61]
The defendant’s undisputed evidence
was that medical care in Israel is of a high standard, and
notwithstanding his own medical
condition the majority of his costs
are covered by the medical aid. In his words ‘
the
basket is vast’
although certain
specific procedures he has had to undergo (a biopsy and PET scan)
which were not covered cost him in total 5 000
shekels. Every
medical aid covers 50% of dental treatment in selected dental
clinics, although if one chooses a private clinic
then treatment is
not covered.
[62]
This puts into proper perspective the
plaintiff’s entirely unsubstantiated claims for medical
insurance, medication, ‘
other’
medical expenses and dental treatment totalling 1 650 shekels
per month. In this regard it is noted that, although advanced
as a
separate claim, these costs were included in her total maintenance
“requirements” of around 24 500 shekels
per month.
[63]
Moreover the plaintiff has already had
extensive dental treatment in South Africa and the actual cost
thereof has been taken into
account in arriving at her revised net
asset value. Again, I have no doubt that she is able to pay for her
reasonable medical and
similar treatment in Israel from her own
resources.
Costs
[64]
Each party has been partially successful,
but given the undisputed disparity in value of their identifiable
respective net assets,
the appropriate order to make is that set out
hereunder.
[65]
The following order is made:
1.
A decree of divorce is granted;
2.
The defendant shall pay to the
plaintiff the sum of $40 000 USD (FORTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS)
within 60 (sixty) calendar days
from date hereof;
3.
The plaintiff shall retain the sum
of $100 000 USD (ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND US DOLLARS) currently held
in trust by her attorneys
of record as her sole property;
4.
The balance of the plaintiff’s
claims are dismissed; and
5.
Save for the contributions paid by
the defendant towards the plaintiff’s costs, which she may
retain, each party shall pay
their own costs, including any reserved
costs orders.
J
I CLOETE
For
applicant
: Adv M Holderness
Instructed
by
: Abrahams & Gross Inc., J Smuts,
H Kotze
For
respondent
: Adv P Torrington
Instructed
by
: MacDonald Attorneys, M MacDonald
[1]
No
88 of 1984.
[2]
A
religious marriage certificate in terms of which the defendant had
to pay certain money to the plaintiff.
[3]
2018
(4) SA 366
(SCA) at paras [64] to [69].
[4]
At
para [69].
[5]
There
is an unaccounted for amount of R48 928.89 – according to
the experts the figure is R159 267.71. Nothing
turns on this.
[6]
Black
subsequently used an exchange rate of 18.10 rands to the US dollar
in his addendum dated 3 May 2023, but for sake of
consistency I
will apply the exchange rate adopted in the experts’ joint
minute.