Ribbon Dancer Investments CC v Moosa (21019/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 75 (17 April 2023)

80 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Costs — Costs de bonis propriis — Conduct of attorney in adjournment application — Attorney's request for adjournment based on meritless joinder application and fruitless opposition to main application — Lack of respect for court and colleagues hampering administration of justice — Attorney ordered to pay costs of other parties de bonis propriis for wasted costs occasioned by adjournment.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The judgment concerned an application in the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town, in which Ribbon Dancer Investments CC sought, in substance, to give effect to an eviction order granted by the Wynberg Magistrates’ Court against Mohammed Shahaan Moosa, despite an appeal noted by Moosa. The application was framed as one for execution pending appeal in terms of section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, and is referred to in the judgment as the “main application”.


The litigation unfolded against a broader insolvency and property-transfer background. Moosa had been sequestrated, trustees administered his insolvent estate, and the property he occupied was sold and transferred to Ribbon Dancer Investments CC. After transfer, eviction proceedings were instituted in the magistrates’ court and culminated in an eviction order. Moosa thereafter instructed his attorney, Mr Verton Moodley, to note an appeal against the eviction order, which then triggered the applicant’s section 18(3) approach.


Procedurally, the main application was first set down on the urgent roll on 15 December 2022, where it was adjourned by agreement to 25 January 2023. On 25 January 2023, Moosa sought a postponement, premised on an intended joinder application (and an intended application to set aside the sale of the property). The postponement was granted, and the presiding judge directed that Moodley be given notice to show cause why a de bonis propriis costs order should not be granted in respect of wasted costs occasioned by the adjournment. When the matter later reconvened, the joinder application was withdrawn and opposition to the main application was conceded as fruitless. The judgment therefore focused principally on costs, including whether Moodley should be mulcted in costs personally for the wasted costs of the adjournment and whether Moosa’s overall conduct warranted punitive costs.


2. Material Facts


The court accepted as background facts that Moosa became subject to judgment debt enforcement and insolvency proceedings over time. A creditor obtained default judgment against him in April 2019; sequestration proceedings commenced in June 2020; after a failed settlement attempt, Moosa’s estate was finally sequestrated on 17 March 2021.


During the administration of the insolvent estate, Ribbon Dancer Investments CC offered to purchase the immovable property occupied by Moosa. Moosa attempted to interdict transfer, but that interdict was later set aside, and the property was transferred into the applicant’s name on 6 December 2021. Moosa refused to vacate notwithstanding demand, resulting in eviction proceedings being instituted in the Wynberg Magistrates’ Court on 23 February 2022. An eviction order was granted on 25 August 2022.


After the eviction order, Moodley (who had placed himself on record for Moosa after pleadings had closed) sent the judgment to Moosa and only on 9 September 2022 received instructions to note an appeal. The appeal was noted and reasons were requested in November 2022. On 9 December 2022, the applicant launched the main application for immediate execution in terms of section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act, directed at execution of the eviction order notwithstanding the appeal.


The chronology relevant to the costs enquiry centred on the events surrounding 25 January 2023. The application was set down for that date by agreement (after the 15 December 2022 postponement). On 24 January 2023 at 16h48, Moodley caused an unissued version of a joinder application to be served by email on the other parties, supported by an unsigned draft affidavit. The notice of motion purported to require the proposed respondents to indicate an intention to oppose within three hours of service and to file answering affidavits within ten hours thereafter, with the matter to be heard at 10h00 on 25 January 2023.


The court recorded as uncontested (and relied upon) that Moodley did not alert the proposed respondents beforehand to expect an urgent joinder application; did not otherwise ensure they were aware of the email timeously; did not answer or return telephone calls on the morning of 25 January 2023; did not attend court and did not arrange for another attorney to attend; did not brief counsel timeously (or at all in anticipation of the 10h00 hearing); and did not communicate that the joinder would be enrolled simultaneously with the main application before the High Court. These factual features were treated as materially relevant to whether his conduct warranted personal costs.


Moosa did not file a confirmatory affidavit supporting the postponement application. When the matter later resumed, new counsel appeared for Moosa and conceded that there was little merit in the joinder application; it was withdrawn. It was also conceded that opposition to the main application was fruitless and no argument was advanced against the relief sought by the applicant. The remaining live dispute for decision was therefore the appropriate costs consequences, including whether Moodley’s conduct justified a personal costs order and whether Moosa’s conduct justified punitive costs.


3. Legal Issues


The central question determined by the court was a costs question, specifically whether the circumstances justified an order that Mr Verton Moodley pay the wasted costs occasioned by the adjournment of 25 January 2023 de bonis propriis, or whether costs should instead (or additionally) be visited upon Moosa, including on a punitive scale.


This enquiry required the court to apply established legal standards governing when a legal practitioner may be held personally liable for costs. The dispute was thus primarily concerned with the application of law to facts, namely whether Moodley’s procedural conduct and manner of litigating crossed the threshold for personal liability, and whether Moosa’s conduct warranted a punitive costs order. It also involved an evaluative judgment in the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs.


A further issue disposed of in the order was the status of Moosa’s notice of appeal against the magistrates’ court eviction order, which the applicant sought to have declared a nullity (an amendment to the notice of motion that, in context, became unopposed).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the footing that, once the joinder application had been withdrawn and opposition to the main application had been conceded as fruitless, the substantive merits had largely fallen away and the primary question was the proper costs response to the litigation conduct displayed.


In addressing personal costs, the court first reiterated that an attorney must advance the client’s interests, even where that may harm an opponent, but this duty is qualified by the requirement that the attorney act properly. The court relied on Road Accident Fund v Shabangu and Another 2005 (1) SA 265 (SCA) and the passage quoted from Ross v Caunter [1980] 1 CH 297, emphasising that the duty to the client is paramount only subject to the conduct being proper.


The court then set out the general standard that a de bonis propriis costs order against a legal representative is reserved for exceptional circumstances and typically involves a substantial deviation from the standards expected of legal practitioners. In this regard it referred to Multi-Links Telecommunications v Africa Prepaid Services Nigeria Ltd; Telkom SA Soc Limited and Another v Blue Label Telecoms Limited and others [2013] 4 All SA 346 (GNP), which lists types of practitioner misconduct that commonly justify personal costs, including obstruction of justice, irresponsible or grossly negligent conduct, reckless litigation, misleading the court, gross incompetence, and lack of care.


However, the court also stressed that the discretion to award costs de bonis propriis is not confined to only the most egregious categories of misconduct. It referred to Rautenbach v Symington 1995 (4) SA 583 (O) for the proposition that special circumstances may justify such an order. The court further invoked Khan v Mzovoyo Investments (Pty) Ltd 1991 (3) SA 47 (TK) as an example where personal costs were awarded due to an attorney’s slack and unconcerned handling of a client’s case being found unreasonable. In addition, the court cited Motshegoa v Motshegoa and Another (995/98) [2000] ZANWHC 6 (11 May 2000) for the warning that there is a line between pursuing a client’s case and abusing process, with personal consequences for practitioners who cross it.


Applying these principles to the facts found material, the court rejected Moodley’s attempt to characterise himself as merely acting on instructions. Although Moosa was responsible for instructing an ill-conceived joinder application aimed at delaying eviction, the court held that Moodley, as a legal practitioner and officer of the court, retained responsibility for the manner in which he processed and pursued the joinder and the postponement. The court considered that many of the problematic procedural features could not fairly be attributed to the client, including the timing and manner of service, the unrealistic time periods stipulated in the notice of motion, and the failure to communicate properly with opponents and the court.


A significant part of the court’s evaluative conclusion turned on professional obligations towards other practitioners and the administration of justice. Relying on Grundler N.O. and Another v Zulu and Another (D8029/2021) [2023] ZAKZDHC 7 (20 February 2023), the court stated that practitioners must respect colleagues and must assist—at minimum not hinder—the administration of justice. It held that the explanation that Moodley received funds late or lacked timeous instructions did not detract from those obligations. On the facts, the late, procedurally irregular joinder attempt and the manner in which the adjournment was sought were found to demonstrate a lack of respect for colleagues, a measure of disrespect for the court, and interference with the administration of justice. Those considerations were held to justify a de bonis propriis order in relation to the wasted costs of the adjournment of 25 January 2023.


Turning to the remaining costs (beyond the adjournment-related wasted costs), the court evaluated the overall conduct apparent from the papers and concluded that the main application and the joinder application functioned as delaying tactics to avoid eviction. The court regarded Moosa’s conduct as vexatious in this respect and considered that it warranted a punitive costs order. The court accordingly directed that Moosa pay costs on the attorney-and-client scale, subject to the carve-out that the wasted costs of the adjournment would instead be borne personally by Moodley.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court declared that Moosa’s notice of appeal lodged in the Wynberg Magistrates’ Court under case number 3086/22 and dated 1 November 2022 was a nullity. The joinder application was dismissed.


On costs, the court ordered Moosa to pay the costs of the applicant and of the first and second respondents on an attorney and client scale, except for the wasted costs occasioned by the adjournment on 25 January 2023. Those wasted costs were ordered to be paid by Mr Verton Moodley of Verton Moodley & Associates Inc de bonis propriis.


Cases Cited


Road Accident Fund v Shabangu and Another 2005 (1) SA 265 (SCA).


Ross v Caunter [1980] 1 CH 297.


Multi-Links Telecommunications v Africa Prepaid Services Nigeria Ltd; Telkom SA Soc Limited and Another v Blue Label Telecoms Limited and others [2013] 4 All SA 346 (GNP).


Motshegoa v Motshegoa and Another (995/98) [2000] ZANWHC 6 (11 May 2000).


Rautenbach v Symington 1995 (4) SA 583 (O).


Khan v Mzovoyo Investments (Pty) Ltd 1991 (3) SA 47 (TK).


Grundler N.O. and Another v Zulu and Another (D8029/2021) [2023] ZAKZDHC 7 (20 February 2023).


Legislation Cited


Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, section 18(3).


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were expressly cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the notice of appeal against the magistrates’ court eviction order was a nullity and that the joinder application was to be dismissed. It further held that Moosa’s conduct warranted costs on a punitive scale (attorney and client), but that the wasted costs occasioned by the adjournment of 25 January 2023 were attributable, in a manner justifying sanction, to the conduct of Moosa’s attorney. Those wasted costs were therefore ordered to be paid by Moodley personally de bonis propriis.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A legal practitioner’s duty to advance a client’s interests is paramount only to the extent that it is exercised properly, and does not excuse conduct that amounts to an abuse of process or undermines the administration of justice.


A de bonis propriis costs order against a legal representative is an exceptional remedy, generally justified where there is a substantial deviation from professional standards, including conduct that obstructs the interests of justice, is irresponsible or grossly negligent, reckless, misleading, incompetent, or displays a lack of care.


The discretion to award personal costs is not limited to only the most extreme misconduct; special circumstances may justify a de bonis propriis order where the practitioner’s handling of litigation is unreasonable and materially prejudices proper case management and fairness to other parties.


Legal practitioners, as officers of the court, owe duties of respect and professional courtesy to colleagues and must assist (or at least not hinder) the administration of justice; failures in communication, preparedness, attendance, and procedural propriety may attract personal cost consequences where they hamper the court’s functioning and unfairly burden other litigants.

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[2023] ZAWCHC 75
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Ribbon Dancer Investments CC v Moosa (21019/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 75 (17 April 2023)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
FLYNOTES:
COSTS DE BONIS
PROPRIIS
PROFESSION
– Conduct – Costs de bonis propriis – Manner in
which attorney applied for adjournment –
Meritless joinder
application and fruitless opposition to main application –
Lack of respect for colleagues and court
– Hampered
administration of justice – Attorney to pay costs of other
parties de bonis propriis in respect of
wasted costs occasioned by
adjournment.
IN
THE HIGH OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
Number: 21019/2022
In
the matter between:
RIBBON
DANCER INVESTMENTS CC
Applicant
and
MOHAMMED
SHAHAAN MOOSA
Respondent
In
re:-
MOHAMMED
SHAHAAN MOOSA
Applicant
and
JAN
MEYER
First Respondent
THOMAS
VAN ZYL N.O.
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
17 APRIL 2023
FRANCIS,
J
[1]
An application was lodged by Ribbon Dancer Investments CC (“the
applicant”)
in which it sought
inter alia
the execution
of an order granted by the Wynberg Magistrates Court evicting
Mohammed Shahaan Moosa (“Moosa”) from the
immovable
property situated at […] L[...] R[...] Lane, Constantia,
Western Cape (“the property”), notwithstanding
an appeal
against the eviction order lodged by Moosa. This application is
referred to hereinafter as “the main application”.
[2]
This litigation has a long history. One of Moosa’s creditors
obtained default
judgement against him during April 2019. Moosa was
unable to settle the judgment debt and the creditor initiated
sequestration
proceedings during June 2020.  Following a failed
settlement agreement, Moosa’s estate was placed under final
sequestration
on 17 March 2021.
[3]
On 14 June 2021, the applicant offered to purchase the property from
the
trustees of Moosa’s insolvent estate. Moosa attempted to
interdict the transfer of this property but the interdict was
eventually
set aside and the property transferred into the
applicant’s name on 6 December 2021.
[4]
Despite demand, Moosa refused to vacate the property and the
applicant
instituted eviction proceedings in the Wynberg Magistrates
Court on 23 February 2022. After pleadings had closed, Mr Verton
Moodley
(“Moodley”) of Verton Moodley & Associates
Inc placed himself on record as Moosa’s attorney. The eviction

order was granted on 25 August 2022.
[5]
Moodley sent a copy of the judgment to Moosa and heard nothing from
him
until 9 September 2022 when Moosa gave Moodley instructions to
note an appeal against the eviction order.
[6]
Moodley noted the appeal and requested reasons for the judgment in
November
2022. More than a month later, on 9 December 2022, the
applicant lodged the main application for the immediate execution of
the
eviction order in terms of section 18(3) of the Superior Courts
Act 10 of 2013 (“the Act”).
[7]
The main application was set down on the urgent roll on 15 December
2022. By agreement
between the parties, the application was adjourned
to 25 January 2023 for hearing before this court.
[8]
An application was made to amend the notice of motion in the main
application for
a declaration that the notice of appeal delivered by
Moosa was a nullity. Given the subsequent turn of events in this
matter –
as explained further on in this judgment - this
amendment was not opposed and, to the extent necessary, is granted.
[9]
On 25 January 2023, Moosa sought an adjournment of the main
application. Moodley deposed
to the affidavit in support of the
application to postpone the main application, and a copy of an
unsigned version of the joinder
application was served by email on
the parties at 16h48 on 24 January 2023
[10]
The application for the postponement was motivated on the basis that
Moosa intended to launch
an application to join Jan Meyer (“the
first respondent”) and Thomas Van Zyl NO (“the second
respondent”)
to the proceedings in the main application (“the
joinder application”). The first respondent acted as the
attorney
of a creditor who applied to sequestrate Moosa. The second
respondent was appointed as trustee to Moosa’s insolvent estate

and sold and transferred the property to the applicant during the
course of the administration of the insolvent estate.  In

addition, as part of the postponement application, Moosa indicated
that he intended to bring an application to set aside the sale
of the
property to the applicant. He tended costs on a party-party scale.
[11]
After hearing argument, the adjournment was granted and the parties
agreed on a timetable for
the further conduct of proceedings. I also
made an order that Moodley should be given notice to show cause why a
de bonis propriis
costs order should not be granted in respect
of the wasted costs occasioned by the adjournment
.
[12]
When this matter reconvened, Moosa was represented by Mr K Naidoo who
conceded, quite correctly
so, there was not much merit in the joinder
application and this application was withdrawn. Similarly, it was
conceded that the
opposition to the main application was fruitless
and no argument was proffered against the order sought by the
applicant.
[13]
The only issue that remains to be dealt with is the issue of costs.
This court has to determine
whether Moodley should be ordered to pay
the costs of the adjournment on 25 January 2023
de bonis propriis
or whether an award of costs on a punitive scale should be made
against Moosa in respect of all the costs of, and incidental to,
this
matter.
[14]
As indicated, Moodley deposed to an affidavit requesting this court
to adjourn the
main application on 25 January 2023. In his affidavit,
Moodley states the following:

By agreement
between the parties, the main application was postponed inter alia
for hearing on even date. My office was re-opened
on the 10
th
January 2023, after having delivered the answering affidavit, even
whilst I was on holiday, the time periods were complied with.
Upon
re-opening office, and in preparation for the hearing of this matter,
I was instructed that a joinder application and a set
aside
application be launched, subsequent to telephonic instructions
received from client. It was made clear to my client that
the same
could only be prepared and launched after having been placed in
funds. My client has been through extreme financial difficulty
and
has depended on third parties for assistance, and in this instance,
his assistance had only come through at the very last minute,
he only
managed to obtain this assistance, because he is at risk of losing
his home”.
[15]
Moosa did not file a confirmatory affidavit in support of the
application for postponement.
[16]
On the issue of costs, the applicant submitted that costs should be
awarded against
Moodley in his personal capacity. Ms Bosch, who
appeared for the applicant, argued that Moodley assisted Moosa in
breaching orders
of the court, in manufacturing delays, and in
instituting frivolous proceedings with no merit and which were aimed
solely at preventing
Moosa from having to vacate the property. It was
further argued that the dilatory conduct of Moodley that is worthy of
sanction
included the fact that a request for the Magistrate’s
reasons for judgment was not filed timeously, that the appeal was not

noted or filed timeously, that Moodley failed to timeously provide
security for costs, and that no applications were filed to condone

Moosa’s non-compliance with the rules of court.
[17]
Counsel for the first respondent argued that costs should be awarded
against Moodley
in his personal capacity due to his conduct and the
manner in which he had brought the joinder application. The following
uncontested
facts were relied on by the first respondent:
[17.1]
Moodley represented Moosa throughout the proceedings
relating to the
main application. He was aware on 15 December 2022 that the main
application was postponed to 25 January 2023 for
further hearing.
[17.2]
Moosas’s answering affidavit in the main
application was served
on 23 December 2023 in which he stated under oath that he had already
given Moodley instructions to bring
the joinder application.
[17.3]
Moodley caused an unissued version of the joinder
application,
supported by an unsigned (draft) affidavit to be served via e-mail on
the first respondent’s office at 16h48
on 24 January 2023.
[17.4]
The notice of motion for the joinder application
indicated that the
application would be heard on 25 January 2022 at 10h00, and called
upon the first and second respondents to
notify Moodley’s firm
within three hours of the service of the notice if they intended
opposing the joinder application and
to file answering affidavits
within 10 hours after giving their notice of intention to oppose.
[17.5]
Moodley did not inform any of the parties prior
to sending the e-mail
purporting to effect service of the joinder application to expect the
application or alert them that this
application was forthcoming.
[17.6]
Moodley did not alert the first respondent by
any other means that
the e-mail in question had been sent, and the first respondent was
thus unaware until the morning of 25 January
2023 that relief would
be sought on an urgent basis against him at 10h00 that morning.
[17.7]
Moodley did not answer the first respondent’s
telephone calls
on the morning of 25 January 2023, and nor did he return those
telephone calls or respond to the first respondent’s
e-mail
sent at 09h20 on 25 January 2023.
[17.8]
Moodley did not attend court on 25 January 2023,
and nor did he
arrange for a correspondent attorney to attend in his stead.
[17.9]
Moodley did not brief counsel in anticipation
of the hearing on both
the joinder application and main application on 25 January 2023, and
nor did he inform this court that he
had attempted to ascertain the
availability of counsel for the envisaged hearing.
[17.10]
Moodley did not brief counsel in good time to appear on
Moosa’s
behalf at 10h00 on 25 January 2023, i.e. the time the parties were
informed in the notice of motion that the application
for joinder
would be brought.
[17.11]
Moodley did not inform the respondents that this Court
was seized
with the main application and that the joinder application would also
be brought before this Court as well.
[18]
The factual matrix outlined by the first respondent applies equally
to the second
respondent. Counsel for the second respondent aligned
himself with the submissions proffered by counsel for the first
respondent.
He, further, emphasised the meritless nature of the
joinder application and the lack of urgency in launching the said
application.
[19]
Save for informing this court that he had consulted with Moosa on the
morning of
24 January 2023, Moodley has provided almost no detail
concerning the procedural and time-related events relevant to the
hearing
of 25 January 2023. He seeks to rely on the timing of the
receipt of instructions from Moosa. In this regard, Moosa filed a
replying
affidavit to the joinder application in which he purports to
exonerate Moodley from any wrongdoing and takes the blame for the
timing of the joinder application. Whilst Moosa is no doubt
responsible for having given instructions to launch an ill-conceived

application that was clearly vexatious and aimed at delaying his
eviction, Moodley, a legal practitioner and  officer of this

court, cannot escape responsibility for his role in this matter.
[20]
Moodley was not merely a creature of instruction, as he sought to
argue. Indeed, many of the
problematic issues identified in the
procedural time-line outlined by the first respondent’s counsel
cannot in fairness be
attributed to Moosa. Moodley was responsible
for stipulating the times in the notice of motion relating to the
joinder application
and for the service of this application. He
failed to inform the first and second respondents during office hours
to expect the
application. He failed to advise them that the matter
would be heard before this Court simultaneously with the main
application.
He failed to instruct counsel timeously. He failed to
appear in court or to instruct another attorney to do so on his
behalf, and
he failed to respond to the many telephonic and e-mail
inquiries from his colleagues on the morning of 25 January 2023.
[21]
One must accept that an attorney is duty bound to advance the
interest of his client, even where
such a course could cause harm to
the opposite party (see,
Road Accident Fund v Shabangu and
Another
2005 (1) SA 265
(SCA)
at para [11]). In the
Road Accident Fund
case, the court cited with approval
the judgment of Sir Robert Megarry V-C in
Ross v Caunter
[1980]
1 CH 297
at 322 B-C where it was stated that:

In broad terms,
a solicitor’s duty to his client is to do for him all that he
properly can, with, of course, proper care and
attention. Subject to
giving due weight to the adverb “properly”, that duty is
a paramount duty. The solicitor owes
no such duty to those who are
not his clients. He is no guardian of their interests. What he does
for his client may be hostile
and injurious to their interests; and
sometimes the greater the injuries the better he will have served his
client. The duty owed
by a solicitor to a third party is entirely
different. There is no trace of a wide and general duty to do all
that properly can
be done for him.

[22]
In addition, a
de bonis propriis
award of costs against a
legal representative of a party to the litigation is made in
exceptional circumstances and generally where
there is a substantial
deviation from the standard expected of legal practitioners.
Dishonestly, obstruction of the interests of
justice, irresponsible
and grossly negligent conduct, litigating in a reckless manner,
misleading the court, gross incompetence,
and a lack of care are all
examples of conduct that would ordinarily merit a sanction of a
personal costs order (see,
Multi-Links Telecommunications v
Africa Prepaid Services Nigeria Ltd
;
Telkom SA Soc
Limited and Another v Blue Label Telecoms Limited and others
[2013]
4 All SA 346
(GNP)
at para [34] and [35].
[23]
However, as Mogoeng J (as he then was) stated in
Motshegoa v
Motshegoa and Another
(995/98)
[2000] ZANWHC 6
(11 May
2000)
at p19:

Practitioners
must know that there is a line which divides the pursuit of a
client’s genuine course and an abuse of process
which they dare
cross at the risk of personally attracting the wrath of the court.

[24]
The court’s discretion to grant a cost
de bonis propriis
award is not only confined to the type of egregious conduct
mentioned in paragraph [22] above. The court’s discretion to
make
an award costs
de bonis propriis
includes cases where
special circumstances or considerations justify such an order (see,
Rautenbach v Symington
1995 (4) SA 583
(O)
).
Thus, for example, in
Khan v Mzovoyo Investments (Pty) Ltd
1991
(3) SA 47
(TK)
the court granted costs
de bonis propriis
against an attorney whose slack and apparent unconcerned handling of
his client’s case was adjudged by the court to have
been
unreasonable.
[25]
Moodley is a legal practitioner and an officer of this court. As
such, he has a duty to respect
his colleagues and is obliged to
assist in the administration of justice or, at the very least, not in
any way hinder it (see,
Grundler N.O. and Another v Zulu and
Another
(D8029/2021) [2023] ZAKZDHC 7 (20 February 2023)).
The fact that Moodley may have received funds late or that he was not
instructed
timeously does not detract from his obligations, as a
legal practitioner, towards his colleagues and to this court.
The
manner in which Moodley processed the joinder application
and applied for the adjournment illustrates his lack of respect for
his
colleagues, displayed a measure of disrespect for this court, and
hampered the administration of justice. In the circumstances,
I am of
the view that a costs
de bonis propriis
order in respect of
the adjournment is justified.
[26]
In so far as the remainder of the costs are concerned, it is evident
from the papers that the
main application was nothing more than a
ruse to delay the inevitable eviction of Moosa from the property. So,
too, was the ill-conceived
joinder application. Thus, it is difficult
not to conclude that Moosa’s vexatious conduct warrants a
punitive costs order.
ORDER
[27]
In the result, the following order is made:
[27.1]
The notice of appeal lodged by Mohammed Shahaan
Moosa under case
number 3086/22 in the Magistrates’ Court for the district of
Wynberg and dated 1 November 2022, is declared
to be a nullity.
[27.2]
The application to join the first and second
respondents is
dismissed.
[27.3]
Mohammed Shahaan Moosa is directed to pay the
costs of the applicant
and of the first and second respondents on an attorney and client
scale, save for those costs mentioned
in para 27.4 below.
[27.4]
Mr Verton Moodley of Verton Moodley & Associates
Inc is directed
to pay the costs of the applicant and the first and second
respondents
de
bonis propriis
in respect of the wasted
costs occasioned by the adjournment on 25 January 2023.
FRANCIS, J
In the High Court
of South Africa
(Western Cape
Division, Cape Town)
[REPORTABLE]
Case Number:
21019/2022
In the matter between:
RIBBON DANCER
INVESTMENTS CC

Applicant
and
MOHAMMED SHAHAAN
MOOSA

Respondent
In re:-
MOHAMMED SHAHAAN
MOOSA

Applicant
and
JAN
MEYER

First Respondent
THOMAS VAN ZYL N.O.

Second Respondent
Coram:

Francis, J
Date
of Hearing:
1
March 2023
Date
of Judgment:
17
April 2023
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv
Sune Bosch
sbosch@capebar.co.za
Attorneys
for the Applicant:
L
Truter &  Associates Inc (Ms L Truter)
lo-ammi@truterattorneys.co.za
Attorneys
for Respondent:
Verton
Moodley & Associates Inc
(Mr
Verton Moodley
Counsel
for Mr Verton Moodley:
Adv
Kuvashkir Naidoo
knaidoo@advnaidoo.co.za
Counsel
for the First Respondent in the
joinder
application (Mr Meyer):
Adv
Bronwyn Wharton
wharton@capebar.co.za
Counsel for the
Second Respondent in the
joinder application
(Mr Van Zyl):
Adv Deneys van
Reenen
deneysvanreenen@gmail.com