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[2023] ZAWCHC 74
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Makhubela v Stellenbosch District Municipality (20830/22) [2023] ZAWCHC 74 (17 April 2023)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
CASE NO: 20830/22
In the matter between
RASHID
MAKHUBELA
APPLICANT
AND
STELLENBOSCH
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY
RESPONDENT
Heard: 14
April 2023
JUDGMENT
ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE T APPEAL
THULARE J
[1] This is an opposed
application for leave to appeal against the decision wherein the
court granted an order mandating the respondent
to grant unrestricted
and uninterrupted access for the principal, parents, care-givers and
medical personnel which included traditional
healers and
herbs-persons to initiates then underway at Idas Valley in
Stellenbosch. The grounds of appeal are dealt with in this
judgment.
[2] The issue is whether
leave should be granted.
[3] The first ground
related to the attestation of the respondent’s answering
affidavit. The respondent said the issue was
not raised, and if it
was, it could have been rectified by calling the commissioner of
oaths to testify on the issue. Firstly,
the judgment clearly dealt
with the contents of the statement made on behalf of the respondent,
and in my view, no prejudice was
suffered as the matter did not end,
as it could have, in that there was technically in law no answer from
the respondent. It is
necessary to note that before the court was an
application procedure where courts decide the cases upon the record
presented and
after considering the written and oral arguments
presented to it. Ordinarily, unless the court exercise its discretion
in the interests
of justice, witnesses do not appear before the
court. In fact parties need not even be present before the court
during the hearing
of the matter. A lackadaisical attitude towards
court papers, especially an answering affidavit, may be acceptable to
the respondent,
but that does not mean that it is acceptable to the
court and the court is well within its duty to record its
displeasure.
[4] Secondly, this was a
mandament van spolie and the law in relation thereto was set out and
applied. The court provided full reasons
for its decision, including
its rejection of the respondent’s denial that the applicant and
others were in possession of
the property and that they were
unlawfully deprived of such possession and the denial that the
applicant was a principal. Speculative
irrelevant opinions that found
an answering affidavit, in my view, can be rejected out of hand,
without recourse to oral evidence.
They amount to uncreditworthy
denials that a court is justified in rejecting them merely on the
papers [
Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA
326
(SCA) at para 55].
[5] Thirdly, the matter
before the court did not deal with admission of initiates to an
initiation school and child protection.
It dealt specifically, from
the applicant’s point of departure as I understood it, with
issues of access to initiates, their
training, monitoring, evaluation
and assessment. These, in my view, went beyond an initiate who was a
child. The question of who
should be allowed for such access,
training, monitoring and evaluation was central. It seemed to me that
some of the definitions
in the Act were more inclined towards the
admission to the school as well as child protection, and not access
to initiates, their
training, monitoring, evaluation and assessment.
The definition of ‘customary guardian’ is a classic
example in the
Act. It defines ‘customary guardian’ as
meaning any person other than a parent or legal guardian who, in
terms of the
customs of a particular community, accepted parental
responsibility for a child, including the responsibilities referred
to in
section 18 of the Children’s Act. The arm of the
definitions in the Customary Initiation Act did not stretch far
enough to
reach the parents, family members and care-givers as well
as medical personnel as understood by Africans in the context of an
initiation
school.
[6] Lastly, there is
nothing in my analysis, including my views on the conduct of the
Acting Municipal Manager, Ms de Beer, which
went beyond the facts as
I understood them. It is simply dishonest for the Stellenbosch
Municipality to claim to show
Ubuntu
in its papers
,
and
for it to support De Beer to be a commanding official of armed forces
that annihilate
ntu
from its jurisdiction. It is unfortunate
that the Municipality did not recognize that its quest to obliterate
the initiation of
young African men, a cultural practice of Blacks,
amounts to a betrayal of dividends which Blacks thought a democratic
and constitutional
South Africa was going to bring about, to wit,
restoration of their dignity. Respect for another and their dignity
are material
conditions for a common good.
[7] I am not of the
opinion that the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success.
For these reasons I make the following order:
The application is
dismissed with costs.
DM THULARE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT