Z.I v W.I and Another (13142/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 95 (9 March 2023)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Co-ownership — Termination of joint ownership — Application for termination of co-ownership of immovable property following divorce — Dispute regarding division of proceeds — Applicant and first respondent purchased property jointly during marriage; applicant claims equal share while first respondent argues for reduced share based on financial contributions — Court to exercise equitable discretion in determining division of proceeds — Held: Applicant entitled to equal share of proceeds despite first respondent's claims of unequal contributions, as both parties made significant contributions to the household and property.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned motion proceedings in the Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town, in which the applicant sought termination of joint ownership of an immovable property by way of the actio communi dividundo. The dispute was not about whether the co-ownership should end, but about how the net proceeds of the sale should be divided between the co-owners.


The parties were former spouses who had purchased the property jointly during their marriage concluded in terms of Islamic law. The first respondent was the former husband and co-owner who continued to reside at the property after the divorce. The second respondent was the Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town, cited in connection with the property’s registration and transfer, but no substantive dispute involving that office was determined in the judgment.


Procedurally, the applicant initiated the application after efforts to secure agreement on a sale and division of proceeds did not succeed. The first respondent opposed the relief only insofar as it concerned the allocation of the proceeds, contending that an equal split would be unfair given his asserted greater financial contributions over time. The court determined the matter on the papers.


The general subject matter was the termination of co-ownership of a family home following divorce, including the court’s equitable discretion as to the method of termination and the division of proceeds where one party alleges substantially greater financial contribution.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that the parties purchased the immovable property jointly in 2005. The purchase occurred during their marriage, and the property served as the family home. The parties had two children. They divorced in 2015, and at the time of divorce they did not reach any agreement regarding the property.


After the divorce, the applicant moved out in early December 2015 and obtained alternative accommodation (she lived at her parents’ property). The first respondent remained in exclusive occupation of the property thereafter. The applicant stated that she could not purchase another property because she remained a registered co-owner and remained liable on the bond registered over the property.


In May 2022, the applicant’s attorney wrote to the first respondent proposing that the property be sold on the open market and that proceeds be divided equally, alternatively that the first respondent purchase the applicant’s half share. The letter was served personally by the sheriff, and there was no response. The application followed due to the lack of engagement and agreement.


A dispute of fact existed on the affidavits regarding the parties’ respective financial contributions during the marriage and thereafter. The first respondent alleged that he had wanted to buy the property in his own name but did not qualify for a bond, and that the parties therefore agreed to buy jointly while he would be responsible for bond payments. He asserted that the applicant contributed “zero” towards the immovable property and contended that she should receive only 20% of the equity. He further alleged that he paid bond instalments and household expenses (including rates, taxes, electricity, and similar charges), supported the family, and spent money on improvements and ongoing maintenance, including an asserted amount of R77 400 and an invoice reflecting expenditure of R57 000 for certain work.


The applicant disputed the contention that she made no contribution. She alleged that she made financial contributions to the household and, at times, to municipal expenses, and that she paid for items including school fees (for one child), groceries, medical expenses, and clothing. She also emphasised non-financial contributions in her role as homemaker, wife, and mother, including structuring her work as part-time so that she could attend to the children’s needs.


The court accepted that disputes regarding who paid what were not determinative of the outcome in the circumstances, and approached the matter on the basis that it could be resolved on affidavit. In evaluating the dispute, the court proceeded on the basis of accepting the first respondent’s version where necessary for purposes of motion proceedings, while noting that even on that version the applicant had contributed financially and otherwise to the common household.


3. Legal Issues


The central question was how the court should exercise its discretion under the actio communi dividundo to terminate co-ownership, specifically whether the net proceeds of sale should be divided equally (as the applicant contended) or unequally in the first respondent’s favour (as he contended, proposing an 80/20 split).


The dispute largely involved the application of legal principles to facts and an equitable/value judgment as to what would be fair in the circumstances of a former marital relationship and long-term joint ownership, rather than a purely legal question about entitlement to partition itself (which was common cause). It also implicated how the court should treat alleged post-divorce expenses, improvements, and exclusive occupation in determining a fair division.


A further issue was whether the factual dispute about contributions required oral evidence or could be determined on the papers; the court treated the matter as capable of determination on affidavit.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court outlined the core principles of co-ownership and termination of joint ownership. Each co-owner holds an undivided share and is generally entitled to use the property reasonably in proportion to that share, as well as to share in profits derived from the property. Co-owners are subject to duties of accounting to each other in appropriate circumstances, with the onus on a co-owner to show release from such duty.


As to termination, the court applied the principle that, as a general rule, no co-owner is obliged to remain in co-ownership against their will, and each is entitled to seek termination through the actio communi dividundo. Where co-owners cannot agree on the method of termination, the court has a wide equitable discretion to make an order that is fair and equitable in all the circumstances, taking into account what is advantageous to the parties and their preferences.


Turning to the parties’ competing contentions about contribution, the court considered the fact that the property was acquired and held during a marriage, not as a purely commercial arrangement capable of being unravelled with mathematical precision. The court reasoned that within a marriage, the parties’ contributions are not limited to easily quantifiable payments towards the bond or expenses; rather, the relationship involves combined financial and non-financial contributions directed at maintaining a household and raising children.


In this context, the court referred to authority recognising that the role of a housewife, mother, and homemaker should not be undervalued merely because it is not measurable in money. While the first respondent contended that he too made emotional and parental contributions, the court did not treat that as undermining the applicant’s point; instead, it accepted that both parties likely made contributions not measurable in money. The essential reasoning was that the court was not presented with a reliable evidentiary basis to translate the parties’ complex marital contributions into a precise unequal division of property proceeds.


The court also attached significance to the first respondent’s inability to explain, on a principled or evidential basis, how his proposed 20% allocation to the applicant was derived. It noted the absence of a counter-application and the lack of detailed proof supporting calculations regarding improvements.


With respect to improvements and expenditure after the divorce, the court held that these did not, on the papers, justify allocating a greater share of the proceeds to the first respondent. A key factual consideration was that the applicant alleged she did not know about the improvements, and there was no evidence that the first respondent informed her in advance of renovations, despite the general expectation that co-owners should communicate before effecting changes to jointly owned property. The court therefore did not treat the alleged improvements as a sufficient basis for an unequal division.


The court further reasoned that the first respondent had enjoyed exclusive use and benefit of the property since December 2015, including being the consumer of municipal services, while the applicant had to obtain alternative accommodation and received no rental from the first respondent. In that context, the court did not accept that payment of the bond and services during exclusive occupation, without more, warranted a larger share for the first respondent.


Weighing these considerations holistically, the court concluded that the most equitable outcome was an equal division of the net proceeds of sale.


On costs, the court acknowledged the general rule that costs follow the result but considered that, notwithstanding the divorce, the matter was akin to a matrimonial dispute that had not previously been determined. On that basis, it exercised its discretion to order that each party pay their own costs.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted relief terminating the parties’ co-ownership and directed a structured process for sale of the property. It ordered that the property be offered for sale on the open market within one month at a reasonable market value, with both parties entitled to market it. If not sold within four months, it was to be sold by public auction to the highest bidder.


The first respondent was ordered to cooperate in the sale process, including providing reasonable access for viewing. Both parties were required to sign all documents and take all steps necessary to conclude the sale and effect transfer; failing compliance by either party, the sheriff was authorised to sign or take steps on that party’s behalf.


The court ordered that the parties receive the net proceeds in equal shares upon registration of transfer. It defined “net proceeds” as the sale price less specified expenses (including estate agent commission or auction fees, compliance certificates, rates clearance, and other necessary sale-related costs). The applicant was authorised to appoint the conveyancer.


Each party was ordered to pay their own costs of the application.


Cases Cited


Pretorius v Botha 1961 (4) SA 722 (T).


Robson v Theron 1978 (1) SA 841 (A).


Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A).


Bezuidenhout v Bezuidenhout 2005 (2) SA 197 (SCA).


Erasmus v Afrikander Proprietary Mines Ltd 1976 (1) SA 950 (W).


Legislation Cited


Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (section 7(3)).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that although the first respondent asserted substantially greater financial contributions towards the bond, expenses, and improvements, the matter arose from joint ownership acquired and held within a marital relationship and could not be unravelled with commercial precision on the evidence presented. Even accepting the first respondent’s version for purposes of motion proceedings, the applicant had contributed financially (albeit less) and otherwise to the common household.


The court held further that alleged improvements and payments made during the first respondent’s post-divorce exclusive occupation did not justify awarding him a greater share of the proceeds, particularly where the applicant had no knowledge of the improvements and where the first respondent had enjoyed sole use of the property without paying rental.


Exercising its equitable discretion under the actio communi dividundo, the court held that the fair and equitable outcome was to terminate co-ownership and order sale of the property with the net proceeds divided equally. The court held that each party should pay their own costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The actio communi dividundo entitles a co-owner, as a general rule, to demand termination of co-ownership, because no co-owner is obliged to remain bound in co-ownership against their will. Where co-owners cannot agree on the method of termination, the court has a wide equitable discretion to fashion a fair and equitable method of termination in light of the circumstances, advantage to the parties, and their preferences.


In disputes concerning joint ownership arising from a domestic relationship rather than a purely commercial transaction, the court approached the apportionment issue on the basis that contributions may include both financial and non-financial elements and may not be capable of precise quantification on affidavit. In considering fairness, the court applied the principle that the traditional role of homemaker and parent should not be undervalued merely because it is not measurable in money.


Where a co-owner in exclusive occupation relies on post-separation payments (bond, rates, services) or alleged improvements to justify a greater share of proceeds, the court considered whether those payments occurred alongside exclusive benefit of occupation, whether the other co-owner had knowledge of and an opportunity to participate in decisions about improvements, and whether a principled evidential basis exists to support an unequal split. On the evidence presented, these considerations supported an equal division.


Costs remained discretionary. Despite the applicant’s success on the merits, the court treated the matter as akin to an unresolved matrimonial dispute and exercised its discretion to order that each party bear their own costs.

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[2023] ZAWCHC 95
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Z.I v W.I and Another (13142/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 95 (9 March 2023)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
number: 13142/2022
In
the matter between:
Z[...]
I[...]
Applicant
and
W[...]
I[...]
First
respondent
THE
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS, CAPE TOWN
Second
respondent
JUDGMENT
DELIVERED ON 9 MARCH 2023
VAN
ZYL AJ:
Introduction
1.
This is an application based on the
actio
communi dividundo
for the termination
of the parties’ joint ownership of the immovable property known
as Erf [...], M[...] P[...], situated
at C[…]C[…],
W[…], M[...] P[...] (“the parties” being the
applicant and the first respondent).
The sole issue in dispute is how
the proceeds of the property are to be divided between them.
2.
The parties purchased the property jointly in 2005
after they were married in terms of Islamic law.  They had two
children.
The property served as the family home until the parties’
divorce in 2015.  At the time of the divorce the parties did
not
discuss what would happen with the property, but the applicant moved
out in early December 2015 to live elsewhere. The first
respondent
continues to reside on the property.
3.
The need for the termination of the parties’
joint ownership is common cause on the papers.  In his answering
affidavit
the first respondent states his case as follows:

I
appreciate that the immovable property has to be sold, or I purchase
the share of the Applicant. I, however, do not feel it is
fair, just
or equitable that the Applicant receives half the equity in the
immovable property upon termination of ownership. I
feel that
considering the she contributed Zero Rand towards the immovable
property and benefited from it since we moved into it,
she is
entitled to 20% of its equity. Not 50% as she claims.”
4.
The applicant contends that the proceeds should be
shared equally between the parties. The first respondent, as appears
from the
quote above, claims the lion’s share of the proceeds,
as he, so he submits, paid (
inter alia
)
the monthly mortgage bond instalments in respect of the property over
the years.
The
principles underlying the termination of co-ownership
5.
There is no
dispute between the parties as to the applicable legal principles.
Where property is owned in joint ownership, each
co-owner has an
undivided share in such property, and a right to share it
(see
the discussion in Badenhorst
et
al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property
[1]
)
.
The various shares need not be equal (although, in the present
matter, they are).
6.
Every
co-owner is entitled to use the joint property reasonably and in
proportion to his or her share, and is entitled to his or
her share
of the profits derived from the property, such as rental received in
respect of it.  Each co-owner is obliged to
account to the
other, and bears the onus of proving that he or she is released from
the duty to account (see
Pretorius
v Botha
[2]
)
.
7.
As a general rule, each co-owner is entitled
to have co-ownership
terminated with the
actio
communi dividundo.
No
co-owner is obliged to remain such against his or her will (see
Robson v Theron
[3]
).
A party claiming the termination of co-ownership must allege and
prove the following:
7.1
The existence of joint ownership.
7.2
A refusal by the other co-owner to agree to a termination of the

joint ownership, an inability to agree on the method of termination,
or an agreement to terminate but a refusal to comply with
the terms
of the agreement.
7.3
Facts upon which the court can exercise its discretion as to how
to
terminate the joint ownership.  Generally, the court will follow
a method that is fair and equitable to all of the parties
(
Pretorius
v Botha
[4]
)
taking into account the particular circumstances of the matter, what
is most advantageous to the parties, and what they prefer
(
Robson
v Theron
[5]
).
8.
According to Silberberg and Schoeman
[6]

there are certain
indications that a court may postpone a partition if it is
uneconomical or otherwise detrimental to the interests
of the
co-owners as a whole, but all such remarks are only
obiter
dicta
and it remains to be
seen whether a court will in fact refuse, at least for the time
being, a co-owner’s demand for partition.
For, if the
co-owners cannot agree on the manner in which the property is to be
divided among them, the court will make such order
as appears to be
fair and equitable in the circumstances.

.
9.
In
Robson v Theron supra
it was held at 857C-D that
the
action may also be used to claim as ancillary relief payment in
respect of the fulfilment of personal obligations relating to
profits
enjoyed or expenses incurred in connection with the joint property.
A court has a wide equitable discretion in making
a division of joint property.
10.
How then should the Court exercise its discretion in the present

case?
The
parties’ contentions as regards their respective contributions
11.
The first respondent explains, by way of
background, that he had initially wished to purchase the property in
his own name.
It was on the market for R180 000,00.  He
did not however qualify on his own for a mortgage bond in that
amount.  He
and the applicant thus agreed that they would
purchase the property jointly, but that the first respondent would be
liable to pay
the bond payments in respect thereof.
12.
It was further agreed informally between the
parties that the property would on their death (or on the first
respondent’s
death – there is a dispute between the
parties in this respect) be bequeathed to their children.  The
agreement was
never formalised and any intention to be bound thereby
appears to have been abandoned by both parties. The children are
currently
18 and 20 years old, respectively.  They do not lay
claim to the property.
13.
As previously mentioned the property served as the
family home and the applicant moved out upon the parties’
divorce in 2015.
The applicant explains that she is currently
residing at her parents’ property. She has not been able to
purchase another
property as she does not qualify for a mortgage bond
because she is still a registered co-owner of the parties’
property
and liable for the bond registered over the property.
14.
In 2016, the applicant was informed by a neighbour
that the property was for sale.  Nothing came thereof, and the
first respondent
denies that the property was ever for sale.
15.
In May 2022 the applicant’s attorney sent a
letter to the first respondent, indicating that the applicant did not
wish to
remain co-owner of the property.  It was suggested that
the property be sold on the open market and the proceeds divided
between
the parties in equal shares.  As an alternative, the
first respondent was invited to purchase the applicant’s
undivided
half-share of the property.  The letter was served by
the Sheriff on the first respondent personally, but no response was
received thereto.
16.
This application was instituted as a result of the
first respondent’s failure to respond to the applicant’s
suggestions.
17.
A dispute of fact has arisen on the papers as
regards the parties’ respective financial contributions towards
the property
over the years.
18.
The first respondent contends in his answering
affidavit that, as he paid for all expenses in relation to the
immovable property,
the applicant should only be awarded 20% share in
the immovable property as he “feels” that it would be
unfair to allocate
more to her.
19.
This, he submits, is because he continued to
support the family, paid the mortgage bond and school fees, “
and
so on

. The applicant would

occasionally

use her money towards purchasing some food and
clothing for the minor children. Most of her income was used to
purchase personal
items for herself. The first respondent says that
none of the applicant’s income was used towards the upkeep and
maintenance
of the immovable property.
20.
When the applicant vacated the property in 2005,
the first respondent continued to pay for all of the expenses in
relation to the
upkeep and maintenance of the property.  He also
continued paying the bond, rates and taxes, electricity and so
forth.
The first respondent alleges that he has spent
R77 400-00 on improvements to the property since 2006. He did
maintenance work
on the property every few months since 2007, at his
cost.  The work included painting the walls, fixing doors, the
installation
of new windows, fixing wall cracks, attending to
plumbing, the replacement of geysers and other appliances, and so
forth. This
retained the value of the property.  He also
attached an invoice dated 13 October 2013 in the sum of R57 000-00
for the
installation of doors and gates, and paving done at, which,
so he says, the applicant did not contribute towards.
21.
The applicant contends that the first respondent’s
argument ignores not only her own financial contributions to their
erstwhile
common household and to the property, but also the
contributions that the applicant made during the course of a
fourteen-year marriage
as a homemaker, wife and mother.  The
applicant points out that she not only made financial contributions
in respect of the
immovable property and the household, but she
contributed on a more personal and emotional level by fulfilling her
role as a mother
to the parties’ children and spouse to the
first respondent.
22.
Those contributions enabled the parties to obtain
a mortgage bond in respect of the immovable property and allowed the
first respondent
to work full-time and earn a salary so as to pay the
mortgage bond instalments in respect of the immovable property.
23.
According to the applicant it is not correct that
the first respondent paid for all expenses in respect of the
property. She indicates
that, in addition to various other financial
contributions that she made to the parties’ household, she also
on occasion
paid for water, electricity, rates and taxes.  She
obtained part-time employment during the course of the parties’
marriage
to ensure that she would be available to see to the
children’s needs, both personal and scholastic. Had it not been
for this,
she would have secured full-time employment, earning a more
substantial salary.
24.
She managed the household on her own.  Apart
from the monthly mortgage bond instalments pertaining to the
immovable property
paid by the first respondent, the applicant paid
for items such as the school fees of the parties’ one daughter,
as well
as groceries, medical expenses and clothing for the children
and herself. If she did not have sufficient funds to meet these
expenses,
she relied on her parents for financial assistance.
Evaluation
25.
I do not think that
the dispute about who paid for what in the course of the marriage is
fatal to the applicant’s case.
This matter is one that
can be determined on the papers. Accepting the first respondent’s
version
[7]
,
it is clear that, by the first respondent’s own acknowledgment,
the applicant contributed financially (albeit in a lesser
way than
the first respondent) and otherwise to the common household.
26.
The Supreme Court
of Appeal has stated in
Bezuidenhout
v Bezuidenhout
,
[8]
in the context of a
redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce 70 of
1979, that the traditional role of a housewife,
mother and homemaker
should not be under-valued because it is not measurable in terms of
money.
[9]
27.
The first respondent states that it cannot be
argued that, because he is a male, he did not contribute emotionally
in other respects
towards the rearing and parenting of the children.
Many mothers and fathers work part-time and full-time and contribute
just as
much towards the upkeep of the home and the rearing of the
children as the other parents. There is nothing on the papers to
suggest
that the first respondent did not assist the children with
their homework and extramural activities, staying up late nights for

them, caring for and guiding them “
just
as much or more

than the
applicant.  As any devoted husband, the first respondent also
would have provided an emotional and parental contribution
toward the
applicant and their children in his role as father and husband.
28.
I have no doubt that that was the case, and I do
not regard the papers as downplaying the first respondent’s
role as husband
and father. His contribution in this respect is, of
course, also not measurable in money.
29.
It has to be borne in mind that the joint
ownership of the property in this matter does not stem from a
commercial transaction,
where the transaction can be unravelled with
mathematical precision with reference to the financial input of each
co-owner.
The property in the present matter was purchased and
owned by the parties in the course of a marriage relationship.
The point
of departure was that both parties would not only make
financial contributions to their joint household and expenses, but
would
also provide a nurturing environment for the well-being of
their marriage and their children.
30.
That the value of each party’s share of the
proceeds cannot be unravelled as in the case of a commercial
transaction is borne
out by the fact that the first respondent is
unable to explain how he arrived at his 20% allocation.  He has
not delivered
a counter-application and has given scant (if any)
proof in support of his calculations regarding improvements done over
the years.
It is virtually impossible to quantify each party’s
combined financial and emotional contributions to the household in
the
circumstances of a marital relationship that lasted fourteen
years, especially in the absence of detailed and sufficient evidence

in that respect.
31.
The fact that the
first respondent made improvements to the property since the parties’
divorce does not, in my view, entitle
him to a greater share of the
proceeds. He alleges that the applicant did not contribute to those
improvements – but that
is because the applicant never knew
that the improvements had been done.  There is no evidence on
record to the effect that
the first respondent informed the applicant
of his intention to do renovations or improvements, such as co-owners
are generally
obliged to do prior to effecting changes to the
property (see, for example,
Erasmus
v Afrikander Proprietary Mines Ltd
[10]
).
The applicant did not have any knowledge of improvements done at the
property prior to the delivery of the answering affidavit.
32.
The same applies to the payment of the bond, rates
and service charges.  The first respondent has had the exclusive
use and
benefit of the property since December 2015, and was the
consumer in relation to the use of the property and the municipal
services
rendered thereat. The applicant had to obtain alternative
accommodation. The applicant highlights that she is currently in a
position
where she is the owner of a half share in an immovable
property which she cannot use or benefit from, whilst the owner of
the other
half of the immovable property has all the benefit.
The first respondent never paid or tendered any form of rental to the

applicant.
Conclusion
33.
On consideration of the matter as a whole, I am of
the view that the most equitable outcome in the particular
circumstances is that
the net proceeds of the sale of the property be
shared by the parties on an equal basis.
Costs
34.
As a general rule, the party who succeeds should
be awarded costs. The applicant’s counsel argued that, in any
event, the
first respondent should pay the costs because of his
failure to attempt a settlement of the matter prior to the
institution of
the application.
35.
The present matter is, however, despite the
parties’ divorce, akin to a matrimonial dispute that had not
previously been determined.
In the circumstances I am of the
view that each party should pay their own costs.
Order
36.
In the premises, it is ordered as follows:
36.1
The parties’ co-ownership of the immovable property known as
Erf [...] M[...] P[...],
situated at C[…] C[…], W[…],
M[...] P[...], (“the property”) is terminated.
36.2
The property shall be offered for sale on the open market within one
month of the date
of this order, at its current reasonable market
value, and both the applicant and the first respondent shall be
entitled to market
the property.
36.3
In the event that the property is not sold within 4 (four) months of
the date of this order,
the property shall be sold by public auction
to the highest bidder.
36.4
The first respondent shall co-operate in the sale of the property as
described in this
order, including, but not limited to, providing
access to the property at all reasonable times to estate agents and
prospective
purchasers for viewing purposes.
36.5
The parties shall sign all such documentation and
take all steps as required in order to conclude the sale agreement
and to effect
transfer of their undivided shares of the property into
the purchaser’s name. In the event that any of the parties fail
to
sign such documentation upon request, the Sheriff of the High
Court in whose jurisdictional are the property is situated shall be

entitled to sign such documentation or take such steps on such
parties’ behalf.
36.6
The parties shall be entitled to payment of the
net proceeds from the sale of the property in equal shares upon
registration of
transfer into the name of the purchaser.
36.7
The net proceeds of the sale of the property shall
be the selling price of the property, less the total of the following
expenses
if incurred, namely:
36.7.1
the commission due to the estate agent who was the
effective cause of the sale, alternatively, should the property be
sold on public
auction, the auction fees payable in respect of the
sale;
36.7.2
the costs of obtaining an entomologist’s and
electrician’s certificate;
36.7.3
the cost of obtaining a plumbing certificate;
36.7.4
the costs of obtaining a rates clearance
certificate;
36.7.5
any other costs necessary in order successfully to
conclude the sale of the property.
36.8
The applicant may appoint the conveyancer who
shall give effect to the transfer of the property.
36.9
Each party shall pay his or her own costs of the application.
P.
S. VAN ZYL
Acting judge of the High Court
Appearances
:
For
the applicant
:
R.
Steyn,
Instructed
by
Bellingan
Muller Hanekom Inc.
For
the first respondent
:
M.
Abduroaf,
Instructed
by
Aniel
Jeaven Attorneys
[1]
5ed,
LexisNexis, at pp 133-136.
[2]
1961 (4) SA
722
(T) at 724F.
[3]
1978 (1) SA
841
(A) at 854G-857E.
[4]
Supra
at 726D-E.
[5]
S
upra
at 855C-E.
[6]
At
p35.
[7]
On
the basis of
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984
(3) SA 623
(A) at 634-635
.
[8]
2005
(2) SA 197 (SCA).
[9]
At
para [28].
[10]
1976
(1) SA 950
(W) at 960C-E.