CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case CCT 124/20
In the matter between:
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR HEALTH, GAUTENG PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT Applicant
and
PN ON BEHALF OF EN Respondent
and
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR HEALTH, KWAZULU-NATAL
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT First Amicus Curiae
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR HEALTH, NORTHERN CAPE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT Second Amicus Curiae
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR HEALTH, EASTERN CAPE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT Third Amicus Curiae
Neutral citation: Member of the Executive Council for Health , Gauteng Provincial
Government v PN [2021] ZACC 6
Coram: Mogoeng CJ, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, Majiedt J,
Mathopo AJ, Mhlantla J, Theron J, Tshiqi J and Victor AJ
Judgment: Madlanga J (unanimous)
Decided on: 1 April 2021
2
ORDER
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeal (hearing an appeal from the High Court
of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg):
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is set aside.
4. It is declared that the order granted by Moshidi J in the High Court of
South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg (High Court) on
24 April 2017 does not preclude the High Court from considering whether
to develop the common law on whether the applicant, the Member of the
Executive Council for Health, Gauteng, may compensate the respondent,
PN, in a manner other than exclusively in an immediately due lump sum
payment.
5. Each party is to pay her or his own costs in this Court and the
Supreme Court of Appeal.
JUDGMENT
MADLANGA J (Mogoeng CJ, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Majiedt J, Mathopo AJ, Mhlantla J,
Theron J, Tshiqi J and Victor AJ concurring):
Introduction
This is an application for leave to appeal against a judgment of the
Supreme Court of Appeal. That Court upheld an appeal against a decision of the
MADLANGA J
3
High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. At the centre of
the application is the proper interpretation of an order given by Moshidi J in the
High Court. The question is whether an order determining only the question of liability
pursuant to a separation in terms of rule 33(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court and which
is to the effect that the defendant must pay to the plaintiff 100% of the agreed or proven
damages renders the manner of compensation res judicata1 and means that payment or
compensation can only be in one lump sum sounding in money.
Background
The respondent, Ms P N, is the mother of a minor child who is afflicted with
cerebral palsy as a result of injuries sustained at birth at a state healthcare facility in
Johannesburg. The respondent instituted a claim for damages in excess of R32 million
against the applicant, the Member of the Executive Council for Health, Gauteng.
When the matter came before Moshidi J in the High Court, it proceeded a s a
stated case. The Court gave an order in accordance with a draft agreed to by the parties.
The order separated the questions of liability and quantum, with the latter to be
determined at a later stage. The order reads:
“1. The issue of liability is separated from the issue of the determination of the
quantum of the plaintiff's claim in accordance with the provisions of rule 33(4)
of the Uniform Rules of Court.
2. The issue of the determination of the quantum of the plaintiff's claim is
postponed sine die.
3. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 100% (one hundred percent) of her
agreed or proven damages in her representative capacity for an d on behalf of
her minor child.”
1 The principle that a matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court may not be pursued further by the
same parties.
MADLANGA J
4
Subsequent to that, this Court handed down judgment in DZ.2 In that matter this
Court considered the need for the development of two common law rules, the “once and
for all”3 rule and the rule that damages for medical negligence must be pai d in money.
Such development would, first, allow compensation by the provision of physical items
or medical services in the public healthcare sector instead of money (the so-called
public healthcare defence) , or , second, allow for the making of an underta king
“according to which medical services or supplies that cannot be provided in the public
healthcare sector are paid for when they arise in the future ” (the undertaking to pay
defence).4 Although in DZ a case was not made out for the development of the common
law, this Court held that, where “[f]actual evidence to substantiate a carefully pleaded
argument for the development of the common law” is properly adduced and
“sufficiently cogent, it may well carry the day”.5
On the basis of that judgment, the a pplicant in the present matter amended his
plea in the High Court and raised the public healthcare and undertaking to pay defences.
In other words, he sought the development of the common law.
The matter came before Van der Linde J in the High Court for the determination
of quantum. The respondent argued that, since Moshidi J ’s order states that the
applicant is obliged to “pay to” the respondent “100% . . . of her agreed or proven
damages”, the manner of compensation was res judicata. According to the respondent,
this stipulated manner of compensation required payment in one lump sum sounding in
money. It was thus not open to the Court to consider the development of the common
law.
2 MEC for Health and Social Development, Gauteng v DZ obo WZ [2017] ZACC 37; 2018 (1) SA 335 (CC); 2017
(12) BCLR 1528 (CC).
3 According to Corbett JA in Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) at 835C, “[e]xpressed in
relation to delictual claims, the [once and for all] rule is to the effect that in general a plaintiff must claim in one
action all damages, both already sustained and prospective, flowing from one cause of action ”.
4 DZ above n 2 at para 6.
5 Id at para 58.
MADLANGA J
5
Van der Linde J held that the respondent was unduly fixated on the wor ds
“to pay”, and that these words were simply language for an order to compensate the
respondent; the purpose of this part of the order was not to deal with how the respondent
was to be compensated, but rather whether the applicant was at all liable to compensate
the respondent . Therefore, held Van der Linde J, the res judicata point was
misconceived. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned this . It held that
neither party, when agreeing to the draft order granted by Moshidi J, had anything els e
in mind other than that if the respondent proved her damages she would be entitled to
be paid in the ordinary course in one lump sum payment. Similarly, the Court held,
Moshidi J had nothing else in mind when granting the order . No plea for the
development of the common law was before Moshidi J at the time, and neither was this
Court’s judgment in DZ.
The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that the High Court erred in reading
the word “ pay” without regard to th e context and purpose of the phrase in which it
appears, and to the word’s ordinary grammatical meaning. The same word was also
used in the costs order, and clearly meant payment in money in that context. As a result,
if anything else was envisaged by that word in the context of damages, this would have
been expressly stipulated by the parties. The draft order was not a standard one; it had
been carefully and consciously arrived at. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal,
the applicant was acting opportunistically. As a result, held the Supreme Court of
Appeal, the compensation contempl ated by the parties and Moshidi J when the order
was drafted and granted must be enforced.
The Supreme Court of Appeal thus held that both the applicant’s liability and
manner of compensation had been finally adjudicated; compensation had to be in a lump
sum payment. All that was left was t he determination of quantum, i.e. how much that
lump sum should be . The Court confirmed that w hen the quantum is being assessed,
nothing prevents the applicant from proving that the necessary medical services of an
MADLANGA J
6
acceptable standard could be obtained at a lower cost in the public sphere. 6 But this
could only serve to reduce the quantum . It could not be a basis for ordering that the
medical services be rendered in the public sphere , instead of making a payment
sounding in money.
The Supreme Court of Appeal substituted the High Court ’s order with a
declarator that Moshidi J ’s order precludes the Court from ordering the applicant to
render services or provide medical and related items, instead of paying the respondent
an amount of money, or to pay the amount of money in futu re as and when the need
arises.
In this Court
Before us the applicant argues that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation
of Moshidi J’s order effectively precludes the Judge who is to determine the quantum
of damages from developing the common law, something she or he is ordinarily entitled
to do in terms of section 173 of the Constitution. 7 The applicant makes the point that
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order has implications for his healthcare obligations
under section 27 of the Constitution .8 He argues that this Court’s constitutional
jurisdiction9 is engaged on these bases. He adds that this Court’s general jurisdiction is
also engaged, as the correct interpretation of Moshidi J’s order is an arguable point of
law of general public importance which ought to be considered by this Court.10
6 Ngubane v South African Transport Services [1990] ZASCA 148; 1991 (1) SA 756 (AD).
7 Section 173 of the Constitution provides that “[t] he Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the
High Court of South Africa each has the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop
the common law, taking into account the interests of justice”.
8 Section 27 of the Constitution provides:
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to—
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
. . .
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.”
9 Section 167(3)(b)(i) provides that “[t]he Constitutional Court may decide constitutional matters”.
10 Section 167(3)(b)(ii) of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Constitutional Court may decide any other matter,
if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on the grounds that the matter raises an arguable point of law of
MADLANGA J
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The applicant further argues that , when Moshidi J separated the question s of
liability and quantum, he could not – when dealing with liability – legitimately deal
with the manner of compensation. What was , and could properly be, before him was
whether the applicant was liable at all and, if he was, the extent of liability.
Correspondingly then, that is what the order is about: it intends to deal only with the
question whether the applicant is liable to compensate the respondent, and to what
extent; i.e. must it be 100% compensation or should there be an apportionment? The
order did not purport to deal with the questions arising from the applicant’s amended
plea.
The respondent argues that this Court ’s jurisdiction is not engaged . That is so
because the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision was based on a factual and contextual
assessment of the parties ’ intentions at the time Moshidi J’s order was drafted. There
is accordingly no constitutional issue, let alone one of public importance.
Additionally, submits t he respondent, this Court’s judgment in DZ was
academic. It did not consider the wording of an order of the nature of the one granted
by Moshidi J . Also, the term “pay” in the context of delictual damages has always
meant money in a lump sum.11 This is what Moshidi J was aware of when he made the
order. And this is true of the parties as well. When the order to “pay” “damages” was
made, a lump sum sounding in money is what was intended. Th us Moshidi J’s order
disposed of both the issue of liability and the method of payment. The applicant remains
entitled to lead evidence on quantum, but not on the method of compensation.
This Court issued directions calling upon the parties to file written submissions.
They have done so. We have elected to decide this matter without an oral hearing.
general public importance which ought to be considered by that Court ”. The applicant’s argument on general
jurisdiction will be considered more fully below.
11 This is in terms of the once and for all rule, touched on above, which was (and remains) in force at the time of
the order.
MADLANGA J
8
The Members of the Executive Councils for He alth of Kwazulu -Natal,
Northern Cape and Eastern Cape (collectively, the Health MECs) have applied for
admission as amici curiae (friends of the court). Ordinarily an amicus may not seek to
“bolster a sectarian or partisan interest against any of the parties in litigation”. 12 As a
result, a person with a direct or substantial interest should apply to intervene as a party.13
Each Health MEC certainly does have a direct and substantial interest in the matter, and
participation as an intervening party would have been preferable. However, this Court
is entitled to regulate its own process, 14 and may act in accordance with whatever it
considers to be in the interests of justice.
The primary purpose of admitting amici, which is to promote and protect the
public interest,15 should inform this enquiry. This Court in In re Certain Amicus Curiae
Applications further explained that “[t]he role of an amicus is to draw the attention of
the court to relevant matters of law and f act to which attention would not otherwise be
drawn”.16 In this matter, the Health MECs have sought to draw this Court’s attention
to the practical, widespread effects of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation of
Moshidi J’s order. They also offer l egal submissions that may ass ist this Court in the
interpretative exercise. Importantly, they are not here for any individual’s personal
gain, but rather so that they may fulfil their constitutional obligations. In other words,
their involvement is for the public interest and the promotion of the Constitution. Based
on all this, they were admitted as amici curiae as it was in the interests of justice so to
do.
12 National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance [2012] ZACC 18; 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC); 2012 (11)
BCLR 1148 (CC) at para 13.
13 Id.
14 Section 173 of the Constitution.
15 Children's Institute v Presiding Officer of the Children's Court, District of Krugersdorp [2012] ZACC 25; 2013
(2) SA 620 (CC); 2013 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para 26.
16 In re Certain Amicus Curiae Applications: Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign [2002]
ZACC 13; 2002 (5) SA 713 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1023 (CC) at para 5.
MADLANGA J
9
Before considering the application for leave to appeal, I wish to dispose of one
argument. That is the suggestion by the third amicus, the Eastern Cape MEC, that this
Court should itself develop the common law in this matter. As indicated, the role of an
amicus is to “introduce additional, new and relevant perspectives”17 on the issues before
the Court. As such, it is generally “inappropriate for an amicus to try to introduce new
contentions based on fresh evidence”.18 Considering the significant implications of the
development of the common law rules at issue , which – in the context of a matter o f
this nature – may entail the leading of extensive evidentiary material and the
presentation of legal arguments of some magnitude, it is simply not in the interests of
justice for this Court to depart from this general principle. It is also undesirable for this
Court to sit as a court of first and final instance on this complex issue of developing the
common law.19 As a result, this Court will limit its analysis to the case pleaded by the
parties.
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation of Moshidi J’s order has
implications for the power of the High Court to develop the common law. Section 173
of the Constitution empowers t he High Court to develop the common law . The
Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation also implicates the right to a fair hea ring.20
That is so because the applicant is preclude d from leading evidence and presenting
argument on alternative methods of compensation. Finally, this matter implicates the
obligation of the applicant to take reasonable measures progressively to realise the right
of access to healthcare services.21 In DZ Froneman J explained:
17 Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae) [2009] ZACC 23; 2010 (4)
SA 327 (CC); 2009 (12) BCLR 1192 (CC) at para 80.
18 In re Certain Amicus above n 16 at para 5.
19 In S v Bequinot [1996] ZACC 21; 1997 (2) SA 887 (CC); 1996 (12) BCLR 1588 (CC) at para 15 this Court
explained that it “ is placed at a grave disadvantage if it is required to deal with difficult questions of law,
constitutional or otherwise . . . as a court of first instance”.
20 Section 34 of the Constitution provides that “[e] veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved
by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent
and impartial tribunal or forum”.
21 Above n 8.
MADLANGA J
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“The development of the common law, and the potential impact of damages awards in
medical negligence claims against public healthcare authorities on their ability to
discharge their constitutional obligation to provide access to healthcare to everyone,
raise constitutional issues that attract this Court’s jurisdiction.”22
This Court’s constitutional jurisdiction is thus engaged.
Also, for the reasons that follow, this Court’s general jurisdiction is engaged. At
the heart of this matter is the interpretation of a court order, and “interpretation is a
matter of law and not of fact”. 23 The points raised have merit, and are thus arguable .
The public importance of the interpretation has been demonstrated by the Health MECs,
who have all detailed multiple orders formulated in similar or identical wording, and
were arrived at under similar circumstances. The widespread use of comparable orders
means that the interpretation of Moshidi J’s order transcends the narrow interests of the
parties in the application before us .24 It follows as a matter of course that the
interpretation of the order ought to be considered by this Court.
The applicant’s contentions bear reasonable prospects of success. It is in the
interests of justice that leave to appeal be granted.
Interpretation of Moshidi J’s order
This Court has accepted the following test for the interpretation of court orders:
“The starting point is to determine the manifest purpose of the order. In interpreting a
judgment or order, the court’s intention is to be ascertained primarily from the language
of the judgment or order in accordance with the usual well-known rules relating to the
interpretation of documents. As in the case of a document, the judgment or order and
22 DZ above n 2 at para 8.
23 KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd [2009] ZASCA 7; 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA) at para 39.
24 Compare Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd [2015] ZACC 5; 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC); 2015 (5)
BCLR 509 (CC) at paras 25-6.
MADLANGA J
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the court’s reasons for giving it must be read as a whole in order to ascertain its
intention.”25
In accordance with a contextual and purposive reading of the order as a whole,
part of the context is what exactly is at issue when – after the questions of quantum and
liability have been separated – a court determines the latter question . What is at issue
is whether the defendant is liable to compensate the plaintiff and, if so, whether liability
must be 100% or apportioned and, if it must be, to what extent. As a matter of legal
experience, that is what an order of this nature seeks to achieve. That is the legal reality;
that is part of “the material known to t hose responsible for [the document’s]
production”.26 As I say, all this is part of the context that is relevant to the interpretative
exercise. The order need say nothing at all about payment. And yet the effect will be
exactly the same. The order may well say something like: “The defendant is liable for
100% of the plaintiff’s agreed or proved damages .” And, indeed, some orders
determining liability do use wording of this nature or words of similar purport. In
context, there is nothing magical with the use of the word “pay”. Thus contrary to what
the Supreme Court of Appeal held, what I find opportunistic is the respondent’s fixation
with the word “pay”. Van der Linde J was correct in holding that this fixation was at
the expense of a contextual and purposive reading of the order. To hold that the order
disposes of the method of compensation would, in my view, stretch the ordinary
meaning of the words read in their proper context.
In short, the order has nothing to do with “the how”. The focus is on being liable
to compensate.
25 Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v B HP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd [2012] ZASCA 49; 2013 (2) SA
204 (SCA) at para 13, cited with approval by this Court in Eke v Parsons [2015] ZACC 30; 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC);
2015 (11) BCLR 1319 (CC) at para 29.
26 See Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)
at para 18.
MADLANGA J
12
This interpretation commends itself because it better accords with constitutional
values.27 A viable interpretation of any document which promotes constitutional values
must be preferred to one that does not. That principle applies to all documents –
including court orders – because a viable interpretation that – by comparison – is more
consonant with constitutional values better accords with the Constitution’s supremacy
clause. And the supremacy clause applies to court orders.28
The interpretation preferred by the respondent has the effect that the applicant
may not lead evidence to support an argument for the development of the common law,
and the court determining quantum may not consider such a development. This Court
in DZ has already confirmed that the common law may, with the support of “[f]actual
evidence to substantiate a carefully pleaded argument”, be developed by a court to allow
for the public healthcare and und ertaking to pay defences.29 And the fact that the
judgment in DZ had not yet been handed down at the time Moshidi J granted his order
is irrelevant. This is because a development of the common law was always open to
courts under sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution. Also, in terms of
section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution courts deciding constitutional matters are afforded
a wide discretion to gr ant any just and equitable remedy .30 The issues relating to the
mooted development are well -suited for con sideration even under this section.
Moshidi J’s order should not be interpreted to limit these broad powers.
Additionally, an interpretation precluding the applicant from leading evidence to
support a development of the common law implicates his right of access to courts, which
includes the right to have a dispute decided in a fair public hearing. In Barkhuizen this
27 Compare Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZACC 13; 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) ; 2016 (6) BCLR 709 (CC) at
para 89; Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd In re:
Hyundai Motor D istributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit N.O . [2000] ZACC 12; 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) ; 2000 (10) BCLR
1079 (CC) at para 26.
28 Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and
the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”
29 DZ above n 2 at para 58.
30 Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.
MADLANGA J
13
Court explained that the right to seek the assistance of the courts, and the orderly and
fair resolution of disputes “is indeed vital to a s ociety that, like ours, is founded on the
rule of law”. 31 It held that section 34 “not only reflects the foundational values that
underlie our constitutional order, it also constitutes public policy”. 32 Considering the
importance of this right in our legal system, an interpretation of Moshidi J’s order that
promotes the applicant’s right to have his dispute regarding the development of the
common law fairly resolved by the High Court should be preferred.
It is also worth considering the possible implications on the right of “everyone”
to have access to healthcare services 33 and of “every child” to “basic” healthcare
services.34 If the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order is upheld, the applicant is at risk of
being found liable to pay a lump sum of approximately R32 million, and possibly much
more in similar cases. The third amic us points out that these types of claims are
constantly on the increase. The result is that, instead of funding healthcare programmes
and facilities, a large portion of her department’s annual budget is allocated to
medico-legal liabilities. Wessels argues that—
“the most worrying consequence of the excessive medical malpractice litigation against
the state is that it may potentially undermine the department of health’s ability to
provide public healthcare in future. . . . In other words, the problem is that an already
overwhelmed and underfinanced public healthcare sector is exposed to the
ever-increasing amount of malpractice claims.”35
In DZ Froneman J opined that the common law rule that damages must be paid
in one lump sum may be reflective of a pre -constitutional era where individual loss -
bearing was prioritised, and the right of access to healthcare services did not exist. 36
31 Barkhuizen v Napier [2007] ZACC 5; 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) at para 31.
32 Id at para 33.
33 Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.
34 Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution.
35 Wessels “The Expansion of the State’s Liability for Harm Arising from Medical Malpractice: Underlying
Reasons, Deleterious Consequences and Potential Reform” (2019) 1 TSAR 1 at 15.
36 DZ above n 2 at para 45.
MADLANGA J
14
This does not mean the individual interest of the respondent and similarly placed
individuals must be relegated to insignificance. Each must be afforded an appropriate
remedy and compensated fairly for loss suffered. But in that process the applicant –
who is well-placed to assist the High Court in balancing these competing interests – is
entitled to lead evidence on the desirability and practical implications of a development
of the affected common law rules. Since Moshidi J’s order is reasonably capable of an
interpretation that permits the applicant to lead this type of evidence in the High Court,
that interpretation should be preferred.
In sum, the respondent’s interpretation of Moshidi J’s order is at odds with the
right of access to courts and potentially undermines the right of everyone to have access
to healthcare services and of every child to basic healthcare services . It also has the
effect of limiting the power of the court determining quantum to develop the common
law in ac cordance with section 173 of the Constitution . On the other hand, the
applicant’s interpretation better accords with the context and purpose of the order and
– instead of being inconsonant with these constitutional values – it promotes them. This
interpretation is to be preferred. The order must thus be interpreted not to deal with the
manner of payment.
Of course, whether – when determining quantum – the High Court will, in fact,
develop the common law is a matter for it to decide. All that I am deciding is that
Moshidi J’s order should not be read to preclude a consideration of the development.
Costs
On the Biowatch principle, there is no basis for mulcting the respondent in costs
even though she is the losing party.37 Each party must pay her or his own costs in this
Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal.
37 See Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources [2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC); 2009 (10) BCLR
1014 (CC) at paras 22-4.
MADLANGA J
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Order
The following order is made:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is set aside.
4. It is declared that the order granted by Moshidi J in the High Court of
South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg (High Court) on
24 April 2017 does not preclude the High Court from considering whether
to develop the common law on whether the appl icant, the Member of the
Executive Council for Health, Gauteng, may compensate the respondent,
PN, in a manner other than exclusively in an immediately due lump sum
payment.
5. Each party is to pay her or his own costs in this Court and the
Supreme Court of Appeal.
For the Applicant:
For the Respondent:
For the First Amicus Curiae:
For the Second Amicus Curiae:
For the Third Amicus Curiae:
V Soni SC and L Mtukushe instructed
by the State Attorney
N Van der Walt SC and P Uys instructed
by Wim Krynauw Attorneys
A Annandale SC instructed by Norton
Rose Fulbright South Africa
Incorporated
RT Williams SC and S Mahomed
instructed by Robert Charles Attorneys
& Conveyancers
A Dodson SC, A Bodlani and K
Williams instructed by Norton Rose
Fulbright South Africa Incorporated