CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case CCT 174/18 and CCT 178/18
Case CCT 174/18
In the matter between:
GENERAL ALFRED MOYO First Applicant
CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES Second Applicant
and
MINISTER OF POLICE First Respondent
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Second Respondent
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
SOUTH GAUTENG Third Respondent
MINISTER OF JUSTICE
AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Fourth Respondent
THE RIGHT2KNOW CAMPAIGN Amicus Curiae
Case CCT 178/18
In the matter between:
NOKULUNGA PRIMROSE SONTI First Applicant
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS INSTITUTE
OF SOUTH AFRICA Second Applicant
and
MINISTER OF POLICE First Respondent
2
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Second Respondent
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
NORTH WEST PROVINCE Third Respondent
MINISTER OF JUSTICE
AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Fourth Respondent
Neutral citation: Moyo and Another v Minister of Police and Others [2019]
ZACC 40
Coram: Cameron J, Froneman J, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Ledwaba AJ ,
Madlanga J, Mhlantla J, Nicholls AJ and Theron J
Judgment: Ledwaba AJ (unanimous)
Heard on: 19 February 2019
Decided on: 22 October 2019
Summary: Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 — constitutionality of section
1(1)(b) and section 1(2) — provisions are unconstitutional
ORDER
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeal (hearing an appeal from the High Court
of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria):
Under CCT 174/18 General Alfred Moyo and Another v The Minister of Police and
Others:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3
3. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is set aside a nd replaced with the
following:
“It is declared that section 1(1)(b) of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 is
unconstitutional and invalid.”
4. The order of invalidity is retrospective to the extent that it operates in trials
or pending appeals based on contravention of section 1(1)(b) of the
Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 where the right of appeal has not yet been
exhausted.
5. The first respondent (the Minister of Police) is ordered to pay the first and
second applicants’ (General Alfred Moyo and the Centre for Applied Legal
Studies) costs, including the costs of two counsel.
Under CCT 178/18 Nokulunga Primrose Sonti and Another v The Minister of Police
and Others:
1. Condonation is granted.
2. Leave to appeal is granted
3. The appeal is upheld.
4. It is declared that section 1(2) of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 is
unconstitutional and invalid.
5. The order of invalidity is retrospective to the extent that it operates i n trials
or pending appeals where th e onus was based on section 1(2) of the
Intimidation Act 72 of 1982.
6. The first respondent (the Minister of Po lice) is ordered to pay the first and
second applicants’ (Nokulunga Primrose Sonti and the Socio -Economic
Rights Institute of South Africa) costs, including the costs of two counsel.
4
JUDGMENT
LEDWABA AJ (Cameron J, Froneman J, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J,
Mhlantla J, Nicholls AJ and Theron J concurring):
Introduction
[1] This is a consolidated application concerning the constitutionalit y of
sections 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Intimidati on Act (the Act).1 The applicants seek leave
to appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[2] Case CCT 174/18 (the Moyo matter ) and CCT 178/18 (the Sonti matter) have
been consolidated and w ere also heard tog ether in the High Court of South Africa,
Gauteng Division, Pretoria (High Court) and in the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[3] The applicants have filed an application for leave to appeal and an application
to declare section 1(1)(b) of the Act unconstitutional. They also seek confirmation of
the order of the S upreme Court of Appeal declaring section 1(2) of the Act
unconstitutional and invalid.
The parties
[4] The first applicants in each application are r espectively General Alfred
Moyo (Mr Moyo), a community leader of an informal settlement near Germiston and
Ms Nokulunga Primrose Sonti (Ms Sonti), a Member of Parliament.
[5] The second applicants in each application, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies
(CALS) and the Socio -Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI) , are public
1 72 of 1982.
LEDWABA AJ
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interest organisations . The second applicants join the proce edings in the public
interest.
[6] In each application t he first respondent is the Minister of Police and is cited as
the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act. The second respondent is
the National Director of Public Prosecutions and is cited in his capacity as the Head of
the National Prosecuting Authority with the power to direct and control the institution
of criminal proceedings. The third respondent s in each matter are, respectively, the
Director of Publ ic Prosecutions, South Gauteng and the Director of Public
Prosecutions, North West , and are cited in their capacity as the Directors of Public
Prosecutions in each province. The fourth respondent in both matters is the Min ister
of Justice and Correctional Services and is cited in his capacity as the M inister that is
ultimately responsible for the administration of the criminal justice system. Only the
Minister of Police elected to participate in this matter.
[7] The amicus curiae is the Right2Know C ampaign (R2K). R2K is a non-profit
organisation that works to raise public awareness, mobilise communities, and
undertakes research and targeted advocacy campaigning with the aim of ensuring the
free flow of information necessary to meet people’s social, economic and political
needs. R2K was admitted as amicus curiae having shown a direct and substantial
interest in the matter. The Court is indebted to R2K for their submissions.
Factual background
Moyo matter
[8] The events surrounding the Moyo matter took place on 18 October 2012 during
a meeting at the Primrose Police Station, Germiston. Mr Moyo’s organisation, the
Makause Community Development Forum, had sought to o btain permission to march
to the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department in terms of the Regulation of
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Gatherings Act.2 Upon the request to march being denied, Mr Moyo allegedly made
statements and conducted himself in a manner described by the complain ants,
Lieutenant Colonel Nkwashu and the station commander Lieutenant Colonel Shiburi,
as threatening and violent.3
[9] As a result of the above conduct, Mr Moyo was arrested a nd charged with
contravening section 1(1)(b) of the Act. Mr Moyo contended that the charges levelled
against him were intended to frustrate the organisation’s legitimate right to protest and
criticise what he considered to be biased policing policies sanctioned by the
complainants. Mr Moyo further denied that he did or said anything with the intent of
intimidating the complainants.
Sonti matter
[10] Ms Sonti was charged under section s 1(1)(a)(ii) and 1(1)(b)(i) of the Act.
Section 1(2) of the Act relates to the onus of proof for any prosecution brought under
section 1. The charge emanated from telephone calls and text messages of a
threatening nature that the complainant, Ms Nobuhle Zimela, alleged were sent to her
by Ms Sonti on 17 an d 18 December 2012. The allegation was that the
communications were an attempt to compel the complainant to withdraw a criminal
complaint she had laid against Mr Anele Zonke. The text messages and telephone
calls were alleged to contain threats to kill the complainant and burn her house down.
[11] The allegations were , however, denied by Ms Son ti. According to Ms Sonti,
her text messages and telephone calls came as a result of a request made by a relative
of Mr Zonke. Ms Sonti states that she was asked to contact the complainant to find
2 205 of 1993.
3 Moyo v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development [2018] ZASCA 100; 2018 (2) SACR 313 (SCA)
(Supreme Court of Appeal judgment) at para 18. The charge sheet described Mr Moyo’s conduct on the day in
question as follows: he threatened to make sure tha t the complainants were removed, he threatened a repeat of
Marikana, he stated that there will be bloodshed, he pointed fingers at the complainants, he charged towards the
complainants, and he said that the complainants will not last at Primrose Police Station.
LEDWABA AJ
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out the reason behind Mr Zonke’s arrest and whether the dispute between the
complainant and Mr Zonke could not be resolved by the families.
[12] The facts and allegations in which these applications arose have no weight in
determining the constitutionality, or otherwise, of the impugned sections . T hat is
because both Mr Moyo and M s Sonti, opting to first mount their constitutional
challenge, are still awaiting their respective trials. A trial court is the appropriate
forum in which to decide whether their alleged conduct in fact occurred and
constituted a statutory crime . This Court will thus not deal with the validity or
otherwise of the allegations concerning the conduct of Mr Moyo or Ms Sonti.
Litigation history
High Court
[13] The High Court dismissed both applications for declarations of constitutional
invalidity. In the Moyo matter, the C ourt found that the section was constitutionally
permissible as, although it infringed speech falling within section 16(1) of the
Constitution, such an i nfringement was reasonable and justifiable, due in part to the
necessity of criminal sanction for intimidatory conduct. Similarly, in the Sonti matter,
section 1(2) was held as a justifiable infringement of an accused’s fair trial rights, as
without the section it would be near impossible for the State t o secure a competent
conviction.
Supreme Court of Appeal
[14] In the Moyo matter, the majority of the S upreme Court of Appeal found that
section 1(1)(b) pass ed constitutional muster. The C ourt held that the applicants’
submissions ignored fundamental rules r egarding the constitutional approach to the
interpretation of statutes and other well established principles of statutory
interpretation.
LEDWABA AJ
8
[15] The principle was reaffirmed that, wherever possible and without straining the
language of a statutory provision, leg islation should be given an interpretation that
falls within constitutional bounds in preference to one that involves an infringement of
constitutionally protected rights.
[16] The C ourt found that if section 1(1)(b) is properly interpreted, the State is
required to prove the elements of mens rea and unlawfulness. Further, it held that the
section was only concerned with i ntimidatory conduct that induced or would induce a
reasonable fear in another . The upshot being that conduct that was otherwise lawful
in terms of the Cons titution and other legislation was not criminalised by the section.
The offence of intimidation should also not be measured by appealing to the
subjective feelings of the most timorous amongst us. Instead , the section requires an
objective as opposed to subjective determination of the effect of the conduct
complained of.
[17] The applicants’ “subjective fear” argument was dismissed, as it was held to
result in an illogical construction of the section. Properly interpreted, the section
requires proof that the fear was reasonable in both circumstances postulated in the
section.
[18] Finally, it held that there was a “lawfulness defence” to the crime of
intimidation. The defence being that, while expressive acts that intentionally cause
reasonable a nd genuine fear of imminent harm are criminalised, such acts will be
lawful if they enjoy constitutional or statutory protection. So, while a person
engaging in such constitutionally -protected expressive acts might not avoid arrest,
being charged under the Act, or detention, they will nevertheless escape conviction.
[19] On the back of this interpretation, the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal
found that the section could be construed in a manner that was compatible with the
Constitution and that would s erve the valuable purpose of providing a protection in
LEDWABA AJ
9
criminal law agains t intimidatory conduct that is antithetical to an open democratic
society.
[20] On the other hand, the minority held that section 1(1)(b) blurred the line
between true threats and what can be considered “political hyperbole”. In doing so, it
directly infringes on the right to freedom of expression. Such a limitation was held as
unjustifiable and the minority declared the section unconstitutional and invalid.
[21] With regard to section 1(2 ), the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the section
was unconstitutional and that no basis existed upon which the constitutional
infringement could be justified under section 36 of the Constitution.
[22] The majority held that the section infringed the presu mption of innocence as
enshrined in section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution in that it created an evidentiary
burden that was constitutionally objectionable. The Supreme Court of Appeal further
concluded that no purpose would be served by suspending the orde r of invalidity. The
declaration of invalidity was to apply retrospectively to the extent that it affected trials
or appeals where the right of appeal had not yet been exhausted.
[23] The minority differed only to the ext ent that they were of the view that
section 1(2) created a reverse onus and not a mere evidentiary burden.
Condonation, jurisdiction and leave to appeal
[24] In the Sonti matter, condonation is sought for the late filing of the confirmation
application. The application was filed on 13 July 2017. It was accordingly filed one
day out of time. The reasons for this delay are accepted by this Court and, as there is
no prejudice to the respondents, condonation is granted.
[25] This case is concerned with a frontal challenge to the constitutionality of
section 1(1)(b) of the Act . The section aims to criminalise conduct and expressive
acts which violate the rights to dignity, personal freedom and security. The Act is that
LEDWABA AJ
10
part of our legislative scheme which provides a shield against treatment that is c ruel,
inhumane or degrading. 4 Intimidatory conduct that negates these rights has no place
in an open and democratic society that promotes democratic values, social justice and
fundamental human rights.5
[26] The rights to dignity and security must, however, b e balanced with the
competing right to freedom of expression . Robust deba te has rightly been called the
“lifeblood of democracy” .6 The Constitution duly empowers everyone to speak their
mind without fear of undue recrimination.
[27] The above indicates that this matter raises a constitutional issue that this Court
should hear.7
[28] In Savoi, Madlanga J in holding that the Court had jurisdiction in the context of
a constitutional challenge in the abstract, said:
“This does not, however, make it irrelevant that this challenge is brought in the
abstract. Courts generally treat abstract challenges with disfavour. And rightly so.
Will hearsay, similar facts or evidence of previous convictions be led at the
4 Section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution reads:
“Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right not to
be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.”
5 Section 1 of the Constitution reads:
“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following
values:
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms.
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi -party
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.”
6 S v Mamabolo (ETV Intervening) [2001] ZACC 17; 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC); 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC) at fn 48.
7 It is a longstanding principle that if a constitutional issue is raised, this Court will grant leave to appeal if it is
in the interests of justice to do so. See Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission [2018] ZACC
8; 2018 (4) SA 1 (CC); 2018 (7) BCLR 763 (CC) at paras 10-1 and Off-Beat Holiday Club v Sanbonani Holiday
Spa Shareblock Ltd [2017] ZACC 15; 2017 (5) SA 9 (CC); 2017 (7) BCLR 916 (CC) at para 22.
LEDWABA AJ
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applicants’ trial? At this stage we simply do not know. Abstract challenges ask
courts to peer into the future, and in doing so they stretch the limits of judicial
competence. For that reason, the applicants in this case bear a heavy burden – that of
showing that the provisions they seek to impugn are constitutionall y unsound merely
on their face.”8
[29] The question is whether this “heavy burden” rests on the shoulders of the
applicants in the present matter. I think it does. This Court is now required to analyse
the constitutionality of the crime of intimidation with neither the benefit of the context
in which the crime was allegedly committed nor with an understanding of the
interpretive approach that would have been adopted by the trial court. In such judicial
twilight, if we are to be persuaded that the section is unconstitutional, then the
applicants must present argument strong enough to light the path.
[30] With this in mind, the interest s of justice and the need for finality dictate that
the constitutionality or otherwise of section 1(1)(b) of the Act falls to be determined.
[31] In the Sonti matter, the ap plicants seek to confirm the order of the
Supreme Court of Appeal that held section 1(2) as unconstitutional. This Court’s
jurisdiction is therefore engaged in t erms of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution .
Leave to appeal should be granted.
[32] The path to the merits of e ach application is now clear. I shall deal first with
the confirmation application in the Sonti matter. Following which, the constitutional
challenge in the Moyo matter will be addressed.
Confirmation of declaration of constitutional invalidity of section 1(2)
[33] The section reads:
8 Savoi v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] ZACC 5; 2014 (1) SACR 545 (CC) ; 2014 (5) BCLR
606 (CC) at para 13.
LEDWABA AJ
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“In any prosecution for an offence under subsection (1), the onus of proving the
existence of a lawful reason as contemplated in that subsection shall be upon the
accused, unless a statement clearly indicating the existence of such a lawful reason
has been made by or on behalf of the accused before the close of the case fo r the
prosecution.”
[34] The applicants submit that both the majority and minority of the
Supreme Court of Appeal were correct in holding that section 1(2) of the Act is
constitutionally invalid. However, the applicants , agreeing with the minority
judgment, take issue with the majority’s conclusion that section 1(2) creates a mere
evidentiary burden. This, they claim, is inconsistent with the word s used in the A ct
where a full “onus” is placed on an accused to provide a lawful reason for their
conduct. Furthermore, a mere evidentiary burden does not accord with the majority’s
own reasoning that the purpose of the section is to compel the making of incriminating
admissions and to discourage the exercise of one’s right to remain silent.
[35] Before confirming the order, this Court should be satisfied that the impugned
section is indeed inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.
[36] I do not think it necessary to elaborate on the conflicting views between the
majority and minority judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal in detail. It is clear
that section 1(2) absolves the S tate from proving all the elements of the crime created
in section 1 of the Act. This is an obvious and impermissible infringement of the right
to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and the right not to be compelled to give
self-incriminating evidence, as enshrined in section 35(3)(h) and (j) of the
Constitution. For at least the past century our law has recognised that no one can b e
compelled to give evidence incriminating him or herself.9
9 See Rex v Camane 1925 AD 570 at 575 where it was stated that—
“it is an esta blished principle of our law that no one can be compelled to give evidence
incriminating himself. He cannot be forced to do that either before the trial, or during the trial.
The principle comes to us through the English law, and its roots go far back in history.”
LEDWABA AJ
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[37] I cannot agree with the majority of the S upreme Court of Appeal that
section 1(2) creates a mere evidentiary burden. The text of the section refers to “ the
onus of proving the existence of a lawful reason as contemplated in that subse ction
shall be upon the accused” . It is unclear how this can be interpreted in any way other
than creating a reverse onus by absolving the S tate from proving an element of the
crime. In so doing, the section allows for an accused to be convicted in circumstances
where there exists a reasonable doubt as to the unlawfulness of their conduct.10
[38] Unlike in the Supreme Court of Appeal, no justification was given by the State
in this Court for the reverse onus created by section 1(2). It is not for this Court to
speculate whether a reasonable justification exists for a right -infringing provision
when the S tate has conceded that there is none. The confirmation should therefore
succeed. Section 1(2) falls to be declared unconstitutional and invalid.
[39] The order of invalidity should operate immediately and be retrospective to the
extent that it operates on pending trials and on pending appeals where the onus was
based on section 1(2) of the Act.
The constitutional challenge to section 1(1)(b)
[40] Section 1(1) of the Act reads as follows:
“Any person who—
(a) without lawful reason and with intent to compel or induce any person or
persons of a particular nature, class or kind of persons in general to do or to
abstain from doing any act or to assume or to abandon a particular
standpoint—
(i) assaults, injures or causes damage to any person; or
See further S v Singo [2002] ZACC 10; 2002 (2 ) SACR 160 (CC) ; 2002 (8) BCLR 793 (CC) at paras 25 -9;
Osman v Attorney -General, Transvaal [1998] ZACC 14; 1998 (2 ) SA CR 493 (CC); 1998 (11) BCLR 1362
(CC); and S v Zuma [1995] ZACC 1; 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC); 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at para 33.
10 Singo above n 9 at paras 25-31.
LEDWABA AJ
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(ii) in any manner threatens to kill, assault, injure or cause damage to any
person or persons of a particular nature, class or kind; or
(b) acts or conducts himself in such a manner or utt ers or publishes such words
that it has or they have the effect, or that it might reasonably be expected that
the natural and probable consequences thereof would be, that a person
perceiving the act, conduct, utterance or publication—
(i) fears for his own safety or the safety of his property or the security of
his livelihood, or for the safety of any other person or the safety of
the property of any other person or the security of the l ivelihood of
any other person.
(ii) . . . .
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R40 000
or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both such fine and such
imprisonment.”
The key issue
[41] The key issue before us is whether section 1(1)(b) is constitutionally invalid for
unjustifiably criminalising expressive conduct that is protected by sectio n 16(1) of the
Constitution. An evaluation of the interpretive approach undertaken by the majority
of the S upreme Court of Appeal and the submissions raised by the applicants and
amicus curiae are pivotal to this determin ation. Two aspects require careful
consideration.
[42] First, it was common cause bet ween the parties that on a literal reading
section 1(1)(b) appears to be constitutionally invalid , in that it limits the right to
freedom of expression . This is quite clearly correct. Absent any careful interpretive
lens, the section can be read to criminalise any expressive act which induces any fear,
of any kind, for one’s own safety, or the safety of one’s property, the security of one’s
livelihood, or the safety of another . As will be discussed in greater detail below, this
cuts deep into the right to freedom of expression guaranteed in section 16(1) of the
Constitution. It is inconceivable that an infringement of this kind could ever be
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom.
LEDWABA AJ
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[43] This leads to the second aspect. A t the heart of this issue is whether the
interpretive exercise conducted by the majority of the S upreme Court of Appeal is
sustainable. To this end the following questions arise—
(a) was the interpretive exercise undertaken by the majority in the
Supreme Court of Appeal unduly strained, and if so;
(b) is another permissible interpretation available which renders
section 1(1)(b) constitutional?
Interpreting section 1(1)(b)
[44] Our courts have rightfully referred to the framing of section 1(1)(b) as
“tortuous”.11 But that alone is not enough to render the sec tion unconstitutional. On a
plain reading, the section criminalises any person who acts in a manner that has the
effect of causing another to fear for their own safety, or the safety of their property or
livelihood. This , in my view, casts the net of liability too wide as it depends simply
on the experience of fear by another. For example, the act of handing out fliers
advocating for expropriation of land without compensation in a known libertarian
suburb could, all things considered, lead to a charge of intimidation. This is because
such an activity would, in all likelihood, be fear -causing. It is unlikely that such an
infringement on freedom of expression and the adjacent political rights could ever be
justified under a section 36 analysis.
[45] The question then turns to whether the section can nevertheless be interpreted
in a manner that renders it constitutionally compliant , as the majority of the
Supreme Court of Appeal found.
[46] The main thrust of the applicants’ argument is that the interpre tive exercise
conducted by the majority strains the text of section 1(1)(b). The applicants argue that
11 Holbrook v S [1998] 3 All SA 597 (E) at 600.
LEDWABA AJ
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this amounts to an impermissible “reading-in” and they further submit that the section
was “read-down” in a manner that did not accord with the text.
[47] The amicus curiae takes the argument further. They submit th at even if such a
reading-in were permissible, to accept the qualifications provided by the majority of
the Supreme Court of Appeal would exchange the problem of overbreadth for one of
vagueness. M oreover, the reading of numerous qualifications amounts not to
interpreting but legislating, and so implicates the separation of powers doctrine.
[48] I will now briefly deal with the arguments raised by the applicants.
[49] A proper characterisation and analysis of the interpretative exercise undertaken
by the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal is required . The qualifications
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal are as follows—
(a) the Act only applies to intimidatory conduct understood in the context of
the statute;
(b) mens rea is required;
(c) the fear relied upon must be objectively genuine, reasonable and one
based on a fear of imminent harm; and
(d) the conduct must be unlawful.
[50] The question at the heart of this matter is whether these qualification s can be
sourced in the text, context or purpose of section 1(1)(b).
[51] In order to dispense with this issue, the appropriate approach to interpretation,
specifically in light of a constitutional challenge to a provision that create s criminal
liability, needs to be discussed.
LEDWABA AJ
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[52] In Endumeni our jurisprudence on statutory interpretation was made clear. 12
A few points bear repeating. The process of interpretation is not undertaken in a
stepwise fashion , but involves the attribution of meaning to a particular prov ision,
drawing on the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax, in light of the context in which
the phrase appears. The language and context must be considered together. Internal
inconsistency should be avoided so as to render the statute coherent with its purpose .
The interpretive process is objective and not subjective.
[53] In stating the above, Endumeni also re-affirmed that our courts no longer adopt
a slavish adherence to the plain meaning of a particular provision. Further, our courts
do not s eek to uncover the subjective intention of the legislature in the interpretive
process. As eloquently put by the S upreme Court of Appeal: “to characterise the task
of interpretation as a search for such an ephemeral and possibly chimerical meaning is
unrealistic and misleading.”13
[54] Instead, what is sought is the purpose for which the statute was enacted. The
relevant context in which the provision rests is to be understood by identifying the
mischief that the statute seeks to address.
[55] The general approach given in Endumeni is further shaped in the context of a
constitutional challenge. No less than the Bill of Rights serves as an overarching
framework when interpreting any statute in this regard. Section 39(2) of the
Constitution requires of courts that they promote the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights in the interpretive process. This Court has repeatedly stated that if a
provision is open to multiple, plausible, interpre tations, then the one that best
conforms with the Constitution should be preferred.14
12 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13 ; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)
(Endumeni) at para 18.
13 Id at para 21.
14 Investigating Directorate Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd [2000] ZACC
12; 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) ; 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC ) (Hyundai) and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality v Minister of Home Affairs [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) (NCGLE).
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[56] The interpretation of legislation in conformity with the Cons titution, often
called “reading -down”, is to avoid inconsistency between the law and the
Constitution. It is limited to what the text is reasonably capable of meaning. 15 This
method of statutory interpretation must be distinguished from the reading in of
missing words from a statutory provision. “Reading-in” is a constitutional remedy
that may be granted after a court has concluded that a statute is constitutionally
invalid.16
[57] When attempting to i nterpret legislation by “reading-down” a section in order
to bring it into conformity with the Constitution, care should be taken to stay within
the boundaries of a reasonable and plausible construction that does not rewrite the
text. To overstep this mark would be tantamount to the actual “reading-in” of words
into the statute . To do so would be a clear breach of the separation of powers. So
much was said in Abahlali, where an approach that sought to add at least six
qualifications to the text was held to be “an intrusive interpretation” that “ offends
requirements of the rule of law and the separation of powers.”17
[58] The reference to the rule of law is particularly apposite to this matter. That is,
as a consequence of an invasive interpretation and reliance on numerous canons of
statutory interpretation , it may become impossible, notwithstanding legal guidance,
for a person to know how a given provision will operate. This concern is all the more
pressing in cases, s uch as this, where the provision can result in the denial of that
person’s liberty and freedom of expression.
[59] A statutory offence should be sufficiently clear so that the person who is
charged, especially an unrepresented accused, may understand the detai ls of the
15 Hyundai above n 14 at para 24 and Zuma above n 9 at para 18.
16 NCGLE above n 14 at para 24.
17 Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the Province of KZN [2009] ZACC 31 ; 2009 JDR 1027
(CC); 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (Abahlali) at para 123.
LEDWABA AJ
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charge.18 The presumptions that flow from our canons of construction of criminal
statutes which are not apparent on the text should be clarified so that the person who is
charged shall sufficiently be informed and understand that charge against him or her.19
An accused’s right to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail is important.
The details of the charge should be crafted from the statutory offence. If the statutory
offence is not clear, the charge sheet should not be used as a tool to remedy that.
Moreover, in the absence of clarity regarding its requirements, the deterrent value of a
statutory offence would be diluted.
[60] In terms of criminal statutes, a constitutionally compliant interpretation should
protect the affected rights of both the accused and the complainant. A court should
prefer an interpretation that best promotes the liberty of a subject over one which does
not.20
[61] Accordingly, our law recognises certain canons of construction of criminal
statutes. Two are particularly germane to the present case. The first is that there can
be no criminal liability without fault. 21 The second is that any conduct that is subject
to criminal sanction necessarily must be unlawful. 22 It is immediately apparen t that
these two canons of construction deal specifically with the qualifications that the
applicants contend are impermissibly “read-in”. That is the unlawfulness requirement
18 This does not mean that our law requires absolute certainty. As stated by Madlanga J in Savoi above n 8 at
para 20: “What the rule of law requires is reasonable certainty, not absolute or perfect lucidity.”
19 Section 35(3)(a) of the Constitution.
20 Shaik v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development [2003] ZACC 24; 2004 (1) SACR 105 (CC);
2004 (4) BCLR 333 (CC) at para 18; Arse v Minister of Home Affairs [2010] ZASCA 9; 2012 (4) SA 544 (SCA)
at para 10; and R v Sachs 1953 (1) SA 392 (A) at 399-400.
21 S v Coetzee [1997] ZACC 2; 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC); 19 97 (4) BCLR 437 (CC), O’Regan J quoting with
approval S v Arenstein 1967 (3) SA 366 (A) at 381D–E, where the then Appellate Division remarked:
“In view of such general maxims as nulla poena sine culpa [no punishment without law] and
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea [the act is not wrongful unless the mind is guilty] , the
Legislature, in the absence of clear and convincing indications to the co ntrary in the enactment
in question, is presumed to have intended that violations of statutory prohibitions would not be
punishable in the absence of mens rea in some degree or other.”
22 See Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4 ed (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Tow n 2013 ) at 114 -7 and
Snyman Criminal Law 6 ed (Lexis Nexis, Durban 2014) at 95-102.
LEDWABA AJ
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and the mens rea requirement. It will become apparent fro m the discussion that
follows that these canons are not qualifications that ar e “read-in” at all. They instead
flow from the legally permissible manner in which a criminal statute is to be read.
[62] It is in light of the above that the interpretive approach undertaken by the
Supreme Court of Appeal must be tested. To borrow from NCGLE, the process
undertaken “being an interpretive one, is limited to what the text i s reasonably capable
of meaning .”23 It is on this ground that the judgment of the majority of t he
Supreme Court of Appeal must either stand or fall and it is to this which I now turn.
Was the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation unduly strained?
[63] The majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted a common-sense
approach to what “ intimidation” means within the context of a criminal statute. 24
Intimidation in this setting refers to conduct that instils fear of a certain kind, acts that
intend “to discourage, restrain or silence illegally or unscrupulo usly; as by threats of
blackmail”.25
[64] I understand the majority of the S upreme Court of Appeal to have held that by
this definition, intimidation means some kind of incitement to imminent harm or an
inculcation of a reasonable fear for imminent harm. 26 The majority invoked this
purported connection to imminent harm in an attempt to place all intimidation
criminalised under section 1(1)(b) within the ambit of section 16(2) of the
Constitution.27 In other words, intimidation would only ever constitute the inci tement
of imminent violence or hate speech.
23 NCGLE above n 14 at para 24.
24 To intimidate in this context is not to refer, for example, to the experience of a junior advocate appearing
before a judge for the first time.
25 Supreme Court of Appeal judgment above n 3 at para 122.
26 Id at paras 121-4 and 138.
27 Section 16(2) of the Constitution reads:
“The right in subsection (1) does not extend to—
LEDWABA AJ
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[65] This addresses the central issue, namely whether section 1(1)(b) is
constitutionally invalid for unjustifiably infringing upon freedom of expression,
specifically expressive conduct that does not incite imminent violence. On the
Supreme Court of Appeal majority’s understanding of what is meant by intimidation
this problem is avoided. If the section merely criminalises conduct that creates
objectively reasonable fear of imminent violent injury to person, propert y or security
of livelihood, it becomes easier to argue that it does not infringe on the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression or peaceful protest. Incitement of imminent
violence is not protected as free expression and it would be difficult to argue that
conduct creating objectively reasonable fear of imminent violence to person, property
or security of livelihood would qualify as peaceful protest.28 If, however, intimidation
does not carry this broad meaning under the section, and it is held that any intentional
conduct that creates objectively reasonable fear of harm to person, property or security
of livelihood is covered, then it is overbroad because it would criminalise protected
free speech that does not incite imminent violence and probably also peaceful forms
of protest.
[66] But this understanding of intimidation does not equate to the “incitement of
imminent violence” under section 16(2)(b) of the Constitution. This is not the same as
intimidation because (a) intimidation may incite harm that is distinct from violence
(particularly with regard to property); and (b) intimidation may not “incite” any
violence or harm because incitement assumes the participation or presence of a third
party. Instead, intimidation can threaten violence by the intimidator, without inciting
a third party to cause imminent harm.
(a) propaganda for war;
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or
(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that
constitutes incitement to cause harm.”
28 Section 17 of the Constitution reads:
“Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to
present petitions.”
LEDWABA AJ
22
[67] The difficulty with the imminent harm qualification is that it appears neither in
the text nor context of the Act. The mischief that the Act seeks to correct is
intimidatory condu ct. Section 1(1)(b) speaks to intimidatory conduct of a certain
kind. The text merely states that kind to be “fear for one’s safety” or the “ fear for the
safety of one’s property or security of one’s livelihood” . It does not support the
notion that the fear is related to actual harm or that the threat of such harm should be
imminent.
[68] The context of the provision lends even le ss support to the notion of an
“imminent harm” qualification. In the legislative scheme itself, harm seems to be
accounted for in section 1(1)(a). There the specific classes of physical harm of death,
injury or damage are listed. Section 1(A)(1) further deals with acts of violence as they
relate to the general public or a particular po rtion of the population. 29 It is apparent
that the purpose section 1(1)(b) serves is something other than the classes of harm
listed elsewhere in the Act.
[69] In my view, the majority’s definition of intimidation amounts to an unjustified
“reading-in” of meaning that unduly strains the text. The section itself contains no
mention of imminent violence. And if the proper reading of the section does not
29 Section 1(A)(1) reads:
“Any person who with intent to put in fear or to demoralise or to induce the general public, a
particular section of the population or the inhabitants of a particular area in the Republic to do
or to abstain from doing any act, in the Republic or elsewhere—
(a) commits an act of violence or threatens or attempts to do so;
(b) performs any act which is aimed at causing, bringing about, promoting or
contributing towards such act or threat of violence, or attempts, consents or takes any
steps to perform such act;
(c) conspires with any other person to commit, bring about or perform any act or threat
referred to in paragraph (a) or act referred to in paragraph (b), or to aid in the
commission, bringing about or performance thereof; or
(d) incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any other person
to commit, bring about or perform such act or threat,
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine which the court may in its
discretion deem fit or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 25 years or to both such fine
and such imprisonment.”
LEDWABA AJ
23
include incitement of imminent violence, but only covers intentional c onduct that
creates an objectively reasonable fear of harm to person, property or s ecurity of
livelihood, then it would criminalise protected free speech and probably also peaceful
forms of protest.
Justified limitation?
[70] Very little was put up in the pape rs as justification under section 36 of the
Constitution for this limitation of the right s to freedom of expression and protest.
Mention was made of the countervailing right of security of the person,30 but nothing
further.
[71] That makes it unnecessary to de al in an y detail with any of the other
“qualifications” the majority read into the section. Even assuming their correctness
will not cure the constitutional defect.
Remedy
[72] Section 1(1)(b) of the Act falls to be declared constitutionally invalid.
However, section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that a court may make any
order that is just and equitable. The section confers a number of constitutional
30 Section 12 of the Constitution reads:
“(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the
right—
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause;
(b) not to be detained without trial;
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources;
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the
right—
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction;
(b) to security in and control over their body; and
(c) not to be subjected t o medical or scientific experiments without their informed
consent.”
LEDWABA AJ
24
remedies that are available following a declaration of invalidity. 31 Are any available
in the present case? I think not.
Suspension of declaration of invalidity?
[73] In declaring that section 1(1)(b) is unconstitutional and invalid, it is open to this
Court to suspend the dec laration of invalidity so that the legislature may correct the
defect. The majority of the S upreme Court of Appeal would have opted for this route
had they found in the alternative.32
[74] Notwithstanding the importance of regulating the conduct in question, i t is my
view that the suspension of the declaration of invalidity will cause more trouble than it
would solve. The test for whether a declaration of invalidity should be suspended was
authoritatively stated in Mlungwana.33
[75] A declaration of invalidity should be suspended only if—
“(a) the declaration of invalidity would result in a legal lacuna that would create
uncertainty, administrative confusion or potential hardship;
(b) there are multiple ways in which the Legislature could cure the
unconstitutionality of the legislation; and
(c) the right in question will not be undermined by suspending the declaration of
invalidity.”34
31 Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution states that a court—
“may make any order that is just and equitable, including—
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.”
32 Supreme Court of Appeal judgment above n 3 at para 147.
33 S v Mlungwana [2018] ZACC 45; 2019 (1) SACR 429 (CC); 2019 (1) BCLR 88 (CC).
34 Id at para 105.
LEDWABA AJ
25
[76] A factor in support of suspension is that a legal lacuna would result upon a
declaration of invalidity. Apart from the Act, th ere is no other legislative scheme that
criminalises intimidatory behaviour of the kind envisaged in section 1(1)(b) . T his
would, however, not lead to any uncertainty or administrative confusion. In fact, in its
present state, even read in light of the r easonable fear qualification and the
presumptions, section 1(1)(b) is itself a cause of uncertainty and administrative
confusion.35
[77] It is likely, s hould the declaration be suspended , that an accused will simply
apply for a stay of prosecution pending the r e-enactment of section 1(1)(b) by the
Legislature. While in Sanderson this Court has called such relief “radical” , it would
not be unwarranted.36 In the present case, it is impossible to arrive at an interpretation
of section 1(1)(b) that is neither over broad nor hopelessly vague. It is highly possible
then that an accused who is charged after this judgment is handed down might be
convicted of a crime that no longer exists when secti on 1(1)(b) is corrected by the
Legislature. This is surely the kind of “significant prejudice” that was held to be a
suitable reason for granting a stay of prosecution in Sanderson.
[78] It is also apparent, from what has already been said above, that the rights in
question will be undermined if the declaration of invali dity is suspended. Even if
suspension was granted it is difficult to see what order woul d be given. To read -in
“imminent harm” would render the provision nugatory. Any other reading -in would
leave the provision hopelessly vague and so undermine the right to free dom of
expression further.
35 See Holbrook above n 11; S v Cele 2009 (1) SACR 59 (N) and S v Gabatlhole 2004 (2) SACR 270 (NC).
36 Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape [1997] ZACC 18; 1998 (1) SACR 227 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR
1675 (CC) at paras 38-9.
LEDWABA AJ
26
[79] The order of invalidity will t herefore operate immediately on hand -down of
this judgment. The order shall apply retrospectively to any pending matter involving a
charge under section 1(1)(b) of the Act that has not been finalised on appeal.37
Costs
[80] The applicants have both been successful . T here is no reason to depart from
the general rule that costs follow the result. 38 There is also no good reason to depart
from the general rule that the amicus curiae is not entitled to their costs.39
Order
[81] The following orders are made:
Under CCT 174/18 General Alfred Moyo and Another v The Minister of Police and
Others:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is set aside and replaced with the
following:
“It is declared that section 1(1)(b) of the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 is
unconstitutional and invalid.”
4. The order of invalidity is retrospective to the extent that it operates in trials
or pending appeals based on contravention of section 1(1)(b) of the
Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 where the right of appeal has not yet been
exhausted.
37 See S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso [1995] ZACC 11; 1995 (2 ) SACR 748; 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC) at para
32 where O’Regan J stated that:
“As a general principle, therefore, an order of invalidity should have no effect on ca ses which
have been finalised prior to the date of the order of invalidity.”
38 Mlungwana above n 33 at para 111.
39 See Jeebhai v Minister of Home Affairs [2009] ZASCA 35; 2009 (4) SA 662 (SCA) where a party
unreasonably opposed the admission of an amicus curiae and in doing so was mulcted with costs.
LEDWABA AJ
27
5. The first respondent (the Minister of Police) is ordered to pay the first and
second applicants’ (General Alfred Moyo and the Centre for Applied Legal
Studies) costs, including the costs of two counsel.
Under CCT 178/18 Nokulunga Primrose Sonti and Another v The Minister of Police
and Others:
1. Condonation is granted.
2. Leave to appeal is granted.
3. The appeal is upheld.
4. It is declared that section 1(2) of the Intim idation Act 72 of 1982 is
unconstitutional and invalid.
5. The order of invalidity is retrospective to the extent that it operates in trials
or pending appeals where the onus was based on section 1(2) of the
Intimidation Act 72 of 1982.
6. The first respondent ( the Minister of Police ) is ordered to pay the first and
second applicants’ (Nokulung a Primrose Sonti and the Socio -Economic
Rights Institute of South Africa) costs, including the costs of two counsel.
For the Applicants: S Wilson, I De Vos and M Stubbs
instructed by Seri Law Clinic
For the Respondents: P J J De Jager SC and H A Mpshe
instructed by the State Attorney
(Pretoria)
For the Amicus Curiae: M Bishop and Y Ntloko instructed by
the Legal Resources Centre