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[2015] ZACC 557
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Dyakala v City of Tshwane Metropolitan and Others (J 572/15) [2015] ZACC 557 (23 March 2015)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Not
Reportable
CASE
NO: J 572/15
In
the matter between :
ANDILE
PHILLIP DYAKALA
Applicant
and
CITY
OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
First Respondent
JASON
NGOBENI
N.O
Second Respondent
UMAR
BANDA
N.O
Third Respondent
Heard
: 20 March 2015
Judgment
: 23 March 2015
Summary
: Breach of contract. Specific performance ordered.
JUDGMENT
AC
BASSON, J
[1]
The applicant (Mr Andile Phillip Dyakala) approach ed this Court on
an urgent basis for an order declaring
that
the decision to terminate his contract
of employment was unlawful, invalid
and of no force or effect.
The applicant further sought an order that his dismissal consequent
upon the termination of his contract
be set aside and that he be
reinstated as Financial Officer of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality (hereinafter referred
to as “the respondent”).The
applicant also sought an order declaring that his suspension was
unlawful, in valid and
of no force or effect. The applicant further
sought an order interdicting the respondent from calling upon the
applicant to attend
a disciplinary enquiry which commenced on 18
August 2014 and to interdict the respondent from preventing the
applicant from carrying
out his duties in performing its functions as
Chief Financial Officer. In the alternative, the applicant sought an
order directing
the respondent to reinstate his contract of
employment and to reinstate him to his former position until there
has been due and
proper compliance with the provisions of clause 18.2
of the contract relating to its termination.
[2]
It was common cause that the applicant was employed as the Group
Chief Financial Officer until 9 March 2015 when he was issued
with a
termination notice by the attorneys for the respondent. The applicant
was suspended as far back as 6 August 2014 and was
charged with
having committed various acts of financial misconduct and with having
contravened various items of the Disciplinary
Regulations and the
Disciplinary Code. More in particular, the applicant was charged for
having posted on his Facebook page derogating,
defamatory and/or
unacceptable comments about the City Manager (Mr Ngobeni).
[3]
The disciplinary hearing was convened on 18 August 2014 but postponed
on several occasions. The last sitting of the enquiry
was scheduled
to run on 26 and 27 March and on 1 and 2 April 2015. According to the
applicant he had every reason to believe that
the enquiry would
reconvene on 26 March 2015. By the time the urgent application served
before this Court the respondent had already
called three witnesses
and it was common cause that the third witness was still being
cross-examined.
[4]
On 9 March 2015 the continuation of the disciplinary hearing was,
however, interrupted by a decision to terminate the employment
contract of the applicant in the face of the uncompleted disciplinary
hearing. The termination notice recorded that the dismissal
was based
on “
a
breakdown
of the trust
relationship between
the parties
”.
[5]
In essence the applicant is seeking an order (in the alternative)
reinstating h im to his previous position in order for the
disciplinary enquiry to continue and to allow the chairperson of the
disciplinary hearing to make a decision whether he is guilty
as
charged and if so, whether the termination of his employment contract
is warranted. The respondent submitted that the disciplinary
hearing
“has since been rendered moot” and submitted that urgent
relief cannot be granted in respect of events that
will no longer
occur.
[6]
It is
important to point out that it is not the applicant’s case that
any of his rights
under
the
Labour
Relations
Act
[1]
(“LRA”)
have
been
infringed.
The
applicant
therefore
does
not
rely
for
his
cause
of
action
or
the
relief
he
seeks
on
the
provisions
of the LRA.
The applicant relies solely for his cause of action
on
the
terms
of
his
employment
contract
which
incorporates
certain
section
s
of
the
Municipal
Systems Act
[2]
and the
Regulations promulgated in terms thereof. More
in
particular
the applicant relies on
clause
18 of his
contract of employment and
submitted
that the
respondent breached his contract by terminating the contract
in
violation of this
clause.
This, the
applicant
submitted,
constituted
a
repudiation
of
his
contract.
He has now elected to reject the repudiation
of the
contract and
sue
the
respondent
for
performance
on
the
contract
and
more
specifically,
for
compliance
with
section 18 thereof.
Urgency
of the matter
[7]
At the commencement of the proceedings the respondent raised the
point that this application lacks sufficient grounds for urgency.
The
applicant submitted that the matter is urgent and that urgency arises
firstly from the fact that the applicant’s dignity
is
negatively affected by false reporting in the media which is done at
the instance of the respondent, and secondly, on the basis
of the
financial harm that he is suffering as a result of the unlawful
termination of his contract.
[8]
In
respect of
the
negative
effect
that the
termination
of the
contract has on
the
applicant’s
dignity,
the
Court
was
referred
to
the
matter in
Dince
and
Others
v
MEC,
Education North West
[3]
where
the Court
held
as
follows
in
the
context
of an
alleged
unlawful
suspension:
“
[23]
The important principle enunciated in the
Mhlauli
and
Muller
cases is that the audi alteram partem rule
applies in cases of suspension. It is also important to note that the
court in the
Mhlauli
case held that the correct approach to
adopt in cases of suspension was that enunciated in the
Muller
case and that those cases which held that the audi alteram rule
does not apply were wrongly decided. I align myself with that
approach
and wish to emphasize that the prejudice that an employee
may suffer in a case of suspension is not limited to financial
prejudice
in the case where the suspension is without pay. Suspension
with pay also has substantial
prejudicial
consequences relating to both social and personal
standing of the suspended employee. In my view any suspension with or
without
pay has to bring into question the integrity and dignity of
the suspended person particularly where the
suspension
is based on allegations of dishonesty. And quite often
suspensions attract media attention and thus the standing of the
person
before his or her colleagues and the community is bound to be
negatively affected. It is for this reason in particular that in law
the employer is obliged to afford an employee the opportunity to be
heard before the suspension. The process does not entail affording
an employee an opportunity to show that he or she
is not guilty of the allegations made against him or her. Affording
an employee a hearing is such a simple and informal process that
employers who subscribe to best labour relations practice would
never
have difficulty with it, because what it seeks to achieve is not only
to protect the interests of the employer but also those
of the
employee. The interest of the employee is protected by not only
giving him or her an opportunity to show why he or she should
not be
suspended but also protecting their dignity. It has to be remembered
that at the time of suspension the person is presumed
innocent. His
or her guilt can only be determined at the disciplinary or
pre-dismissal arbitration proceedings.”
[9]
It was further submitted that the dignity of the applicant is
continuously affected by the approach of the respondent which
claimed
that the applicant has been dismissed for financial misconduct in
circumstances where the respondent is aware of the fact
that the
applicant has not been found guilty of any financial misconduct. It
was also submitted that the respondent has not explained
why the
disciplinary process was not completed.
[10]
In
respect
of
the
issue
of
financial
harm,
it
was
submitted
on
behalf
of
the
applicant
with
reference
to
Harley
v Bacarac Trading
39
(Pty) Ltd
[4]
that
financial
hardship
and
loss
of income
can
constitute a ground
for
urgency:
“
In
support of his submission on this point, Mr
Van der Merwe
made
reference to a number of cases, including
SACCAWU v Shoprite
Checkers
(
Pty
)
Limited
[1997] 10 BLLR
1360 (LC) [also reported at [1998]
JOL 1686 (LC)–Ed];
Hultzer
v
Standard Bank
of
South Africa
[1999] 8 BLLR 809
(LC) [also reported at
[1999] JOL 4896
(LC)–Ed] and
University
of
the
Western
Cape
Academic
Staff
Union
and others
v
University of the Western Cape
(1999) 20 ILJ 1300 (LC).
The
principle established in these cases is one that inclines this Court
to avoid granting what amounts to status quo relief in
unfair
dismissal disputes pending a final determination of the dispute by
the appropriate dispute resolution body. None of these
cases, it
seems to me, establishes that financial hardship and loss of income
can never be grounds for urgency. If an applicant
is able to
demonstrate detrimental consequences that may not be capable of being
addressed in due course and if an applicant is
able to demonstrate
that he or she will suffer undue hardship if the court were to refuse
to come to his or her assistance on an
urgent basis, I fail to
appreciate why this Court should not be entitled to exercise a
discretion and grant urgent relief in appropriate
circumstances. Each
case must of course be assessed on its own merits.”
The
Court was
also
referred to the decision
in
HOSPERSA
and another v MEC
for
Health,
Gauteng
Provincial
Government
[5]
where
a
similar
approach
was
followed.
[11]
It was further submitted on behalf of the applicant that proceedings
in due course cannot address the immediate non-payment
of salary
which is a direct consequence of the unlawful decision to terminate
the applicant’s services: Had the respondent
not breach ed
their employment contract the applicant would have still been
employed and accordingly still be earning a salary.
[12]
The respondent submitted that the matter is not urgent due to the
fact that the applicant had not complied with Rule 12.3 of
the
Practice Manual which requires that facts must be set out to justify
the bringing of the application at a time other than 10:00
hours on
Tuesdays or Thursdays. Although it is expected of parties to adhere
to the provisions of the Practice Manual, the Manual
is not intended
to limit judicial discretion. Ultimately it is for the Court to
exercise a discretion as to whether a matter should
be allowed to
proceed on the urgent roll or whether the matter should be struck
from the roll for lack of urgency.
[13]
The
respondent
also
referred
the
Court
to
a
recent
unreported
judgment
by
Fabricius,
J, (Gauteng High Court) in the matter between the
Independent
Police
Investigative
Directorate and Robert McBride v The Minister of Police
[6]
,
where the
Court held
as follows:
“
I
have also had the occasion to write a judgment about the requirements
of interim interdicts in
Afrisake
NPC
v
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality
and
Others
under case number 74192/2013 dated 14 March
2014 (not reported). I also emphasized that the proper question would
be whether an
Applicant in interdictory proceedings required an order
now so as to protect a right which he would otherwise not be able to
protect
at all. One does not require an interdict
pendente
lite
to protect the right which one can in any
event protecting future by, amongst others, litigation in due course.
It is an absolute
minimum requirement that in repairable harm must be
shown to exist before the Court can grant such an interdict, and in
the present
context the Constitutional desirability of such an
interdict weighs heavily on my mind.”
[14]
I have considered whether the matter is urgent and whether the matter
needs the attention of this Court on an expedited manner
in light of
the above submissions. In my view the Court cannot ignore the fact
that the respondent had embarked on a disciplinary
process and that
it had abandoned the process midway by dismissing the applicant on a
ground which forms the subject matter of
one of the charges pending
before the disciplinary hearing (see herein below). The Court also
cannot ignore the press release in
the Pretoria News where the
following is stated:
“
Chief
Financial Officer of the City of Tshwane, Andile Dyakala, has been
fired eight months after being placed on suspension for
alleged
irregularities relating to printing tender…. Following a
lengthy disciplinary process, he received a notice of termination
of
his contract of employment… It was the council’s view
that the employment relationship of trust was key and indispensable
to its operations. This had broken down irretrievably, it stated.”
[15]
This
press
release
does
not
state
that,
at
the
time
of
the
termination
of
the
contract,
the applicant was still being subjected to a disciplinary hearing and
that
he
has been
“fired” whilst
he
had
not
yet been
afforded
an
opportunity
to present
his side to
the disciplinary hearing. It is trite that an
employee
remains innocent
until
proven
guilty.
I
am
persuaded
under
these
circumstances
that
the
applicant’s
dignity has been negatively affected not only by the fact that his
right
to
a
hearing
has been
negated,
but also by the negative reporting in
the media
which
was
done
at
the
instance
of
the
respondent.
It is
precisely
this
type
of
media
reporting that has
persuaded
the Court
in
Dince
[7]
to deal
with an allegation
of unfair
suspension
on an urgent
basis.
I am also
persuaded
that if
this matter
is
not heard
on
an
expedited
basis, the applicant will suffer irreparable harm.
The
disciplinary
hearing has commenced and has commenced at the instance of the
respondent
and
should
be
allowed
to
continue
without
undue
delay.
In
these
circumstances
I am
therefore persuaded
that the
matter is urgent.
Suspension
[16]
In respect of the applicant’s suspension which had already
taken place on 4 July 2014 which is some time ago, I have
no
hesitation to find that this issue is not urgent. In any event the
applicant had already on 1 October 2014 referred the issue
of
suspension to the Bargaining Council. I can find no reason to
interfere with this decision on an urgent basis. Furthermore,
in so
far as I am inclined to order specific performance by reinstating the
applicant to his previous position, such reinstatement
will be on the
same terms and conditions that governed the employment relationship
between the parties at the time of the termination
of the contract.
Since the applicant was on suspension, he is reinstated on those
terms. Should the applicant wish to pursue his
remedies under the
LRA, he is free to do so.
Termination
of the contract
[17]
It is
accepted that the applicant has the right not only to refer a dispute
about
the
fairness
of his
dismissal in
terms of
the LRA to a Bargaining Council but to
approach
this Court
in terms
of his
contract of
service to contest the lawfulness
of
the
termination
thereof.
[8]
In this matter
the
applicant
is
contending
that
the
contract
of
employment
was
unlawfully
terminated.
I have
already
pointed
out
that
the
applicant
is
not
contesting
the
fairness
of
his
dismissal.
It is
also
not
before this
Court
whether
the
applicant
is
guilty
of any acts
of misconduct:
This is
for the
chairperson of the
disciplinary
hearing
to
decide.
Merits
[18]
The applicant has addressed the Court on the merits and has filed
detailed Heads of Arguments in this regard. The respondent,
on the
other hand, has elected to address the Court on the issue of urgency
only and has declined an invitation to address the
Court on the
merits.
[19]
The merits must be decided against the background of the following:
The respondent has decided to terminate the contract of
employment in
circumstances where the disciplinary hearing was still in progress.
In terms of clause 18 of the applicant’s
contract of employment
the contract will terminate in the following circumstances: on
expiry; if the employee gives the employer
two months’ notice
of termination in writing; if the employer terminates the employee’s
appointment for reasons relating
to misconduct, incapacity,
unacceptable performance, or the operational requirements of the
Municipality or for any other reason
recognised by law as sufficient,
on one month’s notice in writing. In terms of clause 18.2 the
employer will be entitled
to terminate the contract for any
sufficient reason recognised by law if the employer had complied with
its disciplinary code and
procedures. The respondent did not disclose
the reason for the termination of the contract in the notice of
termination. In their
answering affidavit it simply stated that the
contract was terminated due to a breakdown of trust. The reason for
the termination
of the contract on the basis of a breakdown of trust
is, however, now explained in the answering affidavit as follows:
“
[T]hat
as a result of the posting of information by the Applicant on his
Facebook page in particular about the fact that I am a
tribalist,
which posting the Applicant does not deny, the relationship of trust
between the First Respondent, myself as its accounting
officer [the
City Manager], and the applicant has irretrievably broken down.”
[20]
I am in agreement with the applicant that it is nonsensical for the
respondent to allege that the applicant’s contract
was not
terminated for misconduct but on account of a breakdown in the trust
relationship. If regard is had to the charge sheet,
one of the
transgressions which is alleged to constitute an act of misconduct,
is the very fact that the applicant had allegedly
made defamatory or
derogatory postings on his Facebook page. If regard is had to the
applicant’s contract of employment it
is clear from clause 18.2
of the contract that, where the reason for terminating the employment
contract include being guilty of
any serious misconduct, the employer
is entitled to terminate the contract after due compliance with its
disciplinary code and
procedures. The applicant therefore has, in my
view, established that he has a contractual entitlement to a
disciplinary hearing.
Insofar as there clearly has been no compliance
with this contractual obligation to hold a disciplinary hearing
before terminating
the contract, the termination of the contract was
unlawful.
[21]
Apart from
the fact that the applicant has a contractual right to a hearing, the
applicant
also has an
entitlement
to a hearing in terms of the Local Government:
Disciplinary
Regulations
for
Senior
Managers,
2010.
[9]
In
terms
of
these
Regulations,
an
employee
has the right to a disciplinary hearing where there are
allegations
of serious misconduct (regulation 5 and 8). In terms of regulation 5
of
the
Regulations
it
is
clear that
it is
mandatory
for the
respondent
to
resolve
to
institute
disciplinary
proceedings
against
a
senior
manager
after
having
considered
any report prepared by an investigator into allegations of misconduct
levelled
against a senior manager. This is in
fact
exactly what had happened in
August
2014
when
the
applicant
was
charged
to
appear
before
a
disciplinary
hearing.
It
is
also
common
cause
that while
the
enquiry
was
still
ongoing
the
respondent’s
attorneys terminated the applicant’s employment.
I
am
in
agreement
that the termination
of the
applicant’s contract therefore also violated
the
regulatory
framework
governing disciplinary procedures
for alleged misconduct which
is binding
on
the
respondents. T
h
e
respondent therefore not
only
breached clause 18 of the contract of employment but also Regulations
5; 8
and
10 of the
Disciplinary
Regulations.
[22]
There is a
third reason why the termination of the contract was unlawful. The
respondent
had made an
election
that the
manner it was going to deal with
the
allegations
against
the
applicant,
including
the
issue
of Facebook
postings
(which
ultimately
was
the
reason
given
for
the
termination
of
the
contract)
would
be
through a
disciplinary
hearing.
I am in
agreement
that having
elected
to do so th
e
respondent
is obliged to continue with that process. The centrality of the
doctrine
of
election
in
our law
has
been
endorsed by
the Constitutional Court in
Equity
Aviation
Services
(Pty)
Ltd
v
Commission For Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration
and Others:
[10]
“
[54]
The principle of the right of election is a fundamental one in our
law. Equity made an election not to ask Mr Mawelele to render
his
services, nor did they offer him alternative employment. When
exercising an election, the law does not allow a party to blow
hot
and cold. A right of election, once exercised, is irrevocable
particularly when the volte face is prejudicial or is unfair
to
another. As long as an employee makes himself or herself available to
perform his or her contractual obligation in terms of
the contract of
employment, he or she is entitled to payment despite the fact that
the employer did not use his or her services.
Mr Mawelele cannot, in
the circumstances, be prejudiced by reason of the manner in which
Equity exercised its election.”
[23]
I am in
agreement
that in
light of
the fact that the respondent chose to follow a
disciplinary
process
to deal
with
the
issues of misconduct against the applicant
(including
the
issue
of the
Facebook
postings
made by the
applicant),
it cannot in
the
middle
of
the
process
abandon
the
process and
seek to exercise
a
contractual
right: It is bound
by the
election which it
has
made. See
in this regard
Ngubeni
v National Youth Development
Agency
and another.
[11]
“
[17]
Even if I am wrong in coming to the conclusion that Ngubeni's
contract of employment entitled him to a fair procedure before
the
termination of his employment on grounds of misconduct, the fact
remains that the NYDA's letter to Ngubeni on 27 July
offered
him a hearing on specific terms. The NYDA could have
said, as envisaged by the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal,
that
Ngubeni be afforded the opportunity to state a case in an informal
manner in response to the allegations against him. This
is what the
code of good practice envisages. Instead, for reasons known only to
it, the NYDA offered Ngubeni a procedure that would
have made any
criminal court proud. Ngubeni accepted those terms, and the enquiry
was commenced on that agreed basis. In these
circumstances, it is not
open to the NYDA unilaterally to change the terms of that agreement,
or as it has in effect done, to renege
on the agreement.
[18]
Having found that clause 10.1 of the employment contract requires the
NYDA to afford Ngubeni a fair disciplinary procedure
prior to
terminating his contract, it remains to consider whether the NYDA's
conduct amounted to a breach of that clause. This
the NYDA cannot
seriously contest - its case is that Ngubeni is not entitled to a
hearing. As I have indicated, it is not disputed
that Ngubeni's
contract was terminated before he presented his version to the chair
of the hearing, either by giving evidence himself
or by calling
witnesses. All the board had before it, assuming it was furnished
with the full record of the incomplete hearing,
was its own version.
It is obvious that there was no fair procedure afforded Ngubeni
before the termination of his contract, and
self-evident that the
NYDA acted in breach of clause 10.1
[19]
Insofar as it may be contended that the remedy of specific
performance is either unavailable or inappropriate, the starting
point is to note that s 77A
(e)
of the BCEA specifically
empowers this court to make such orders. In
Santos
Professional
Football
Club
(Pty)
Ltd
v
Igesund
and
another
2003 (5) SA 73
(C);
(2002) 23 ILJ 2001 (C), the court noted that courts in general should
be 'slow and cautious' in not enforcing contracts, and
that
performance should be refused only where a recognized hardship
to the defaulting party is proved.”
[24]
In the present circumstances the proceedings were interrupted at the
point where the respondent had already led its third witness.
There
is no evidence on record that the applicant had been invited to
address the disciplinary h earing and to put his case or
to make
submissions as to why he should not be found guilty and dismissed. I
am in agreement with the submission that this premature
termination
of the contract constitutes a material and unlawful bridge thereof.
Th
e remedy of specific performance
[25]
The remedy
of specific performance is available to the applicant.
In this
regard
section
77(A) of
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act
[12]
empowers this Court
to make
such an order although it
is
recognised
that the
Court
will
only
grant
such
an
order
where
recognised
hardship
to
the
defaulting
party
is
proved
(Santos
Professional
Football
club
(Pty)
Ltd
v
Igesund
and
Another
2003 (5) SA 73
(C)).
No
such
facts
have
been
placed
before
the
Court
except for an
allegation
that
any
relief
sought
in
the
Notice
of
Motion
is
moot
at
this
stage.
I
can
find
no
persuasive
reason
to
refuse
specific
performance (reinstatement). Furthermore,
the
applicant
was
on
suspension
at the
time
of
termination
of his
contract. His
suspension
may
continue
pending
the
outcome
of the
hearing.
[26]
The applicant is entitled to claim specific performance and he is not
obliged to cancel the contract and claim damages at a
later stage. I
am also persuaded that the balance of convenience favours the
applicant. The applicant will suffer irreparable harm
should the
relief not be granted whereas the respondent will suffer little
inconvenience by simply proceeding with a process it
has already
started.
[27]
I have decided to allow the application with costs. The applicant had
to approach this Court on an urgent basis to defend his
name and is
therefore, in my view, entitled to his costs.
Order
[28]
In the event the following order is made;
28.1
The decision by the First Respondent to terminate the Applicant’s
contract of employment was in breach of his contract.
28.2
The termination of the Applicant’s contract of employment is
set aside and the Applicant is reinstated until there has been
compliance with clause 18.2 of his contract of employment.
28.3
The Respondent to pay the costs including the costs of two counsel.
AC
Basson
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances
For
the Applicant: Advocate T Ngcukaitobi with Advocate R Tulk
Instructed
by: Qina and Sekhabisa Incorporated
For
the Respondent: Advocate ESJ Van Graan SC
Instructed
by: Dyason Incorporated
[1]
Act 66 of
1995.
[2]
Act 32 of
2000.
[3]
(2010
21
ILJ
1193
(LC).
[4]
[2009]
6
BLLR
534
(LC)
at page
536
[5]
[2008] ZALC 45
;
[2008]
9
BLLR
861
(LC).
[6]
Case
number
6588/2015.
[7]
Supra
.
[8]
Nyathi
v
Special Investigating Unit
(2011)
32 ILJ 2991 (LC): “[35] It is further accepted
that
an
employee
has
rights
both
in
terms
of the
common
law
and in
terms
of the
LRA
in
the
event
of
a
premature
termination of
a
fixed-term contract,
or in the
event of
other
dismissals,
and that
the
employee
has a choice whether or not to
pursue
his common-law rights to
enforce
a claim for contractual
damages
in
the
event
of a
termination
of the
contract
or
claim
on
the
basis
of an
unfair
dismissal
because of
a lack of
substantive
and/or procedural fairness. In
this
regard
the
Labour Court
in
Jonker
v
Okhahlamba Municipality
and
others
stated
as
follows:
'A
breach of the common-law contract of employment, insofar it has not
been supplanted by legislation, may also be actionable
under the
Constitution. Remedies for such breaches must be derived from the
LRA itself.... The interface between the Constitution,
labour
legislation and the common law depends on the right claimed and how
it is pleaded.'
[36]
It is therefore for the employee to choose whether or not she
wishes to base her claim on contract or on
the
principles embodied in the LRA and to make out a case for the relief
sought in the pleadings.
[37]
In principle, therefore, an employer has the right contractually to
terminate the contract. Whether the termination will
also be fair is
an entirely different question and not relevant in these
proceedings. Where a contract is terminated unlawfully
it will
usually also constitute an unfair termination. The reverse is,
however, not always true.
[38]
The only remaining question is whether there are facts before this
court to indicate that the respondent is intending to
terminate the
contract unlawfully.” (Footnotes omitted.)
[9]
Published under
Government
Notice 344
in
government
Gazette
34213,
dated 21 April
2011.
Commencement date: 21 April
2011
[10]
(2008)
29
ILJ
2507
(CC).
[11]
(2014)
35
ILJ
1356
(LC).
[12]
Act 75 of
1997