Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality v Chairperson, North West Provincial Executive Committee and Others (CCT 186/14) [2014] ZACC 31; 2015 (1) BCLR 72 (CC) (18 November 2014)

80 Reportability
Constitutional Law

Brief Summary

Constitutional Law — Provincial intervention in local government — Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality challenged the dissolution of its council by the North West Provincial Executive, seeking a temporary interdict against the administrator's interference and a review of the dissolution decision. The High Court dismissed the interdict application, finding no irreparable harm to the Municipality or its councillors, and emphasizing the urgency lay in ensuring basic service delivery to the community rather than restoring the council. The Constitutional Court upheld the High Court's decision, denying direct access and leave to appeal, affirming that the Municipality's failure to provide services justified provincial intervention and that the interests of the affected communities were paramount.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This judgment concerns an application in the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal against the refusal of interim interdictory relief by the North West High Court, Mahikeng, together with an application for direct access so that the underlying review of a provincial intervention could be determined by the Constitutional Court in the first instance.


The applicant was the Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality. The principal respondents were the Chairperson of the North West Provincial Executive Committee, the Premier of the North West Province, the MEC for Local Government and Human Settlements (North West), the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, the Speaker of the North West Provincial Legislature, the appointed administrator (Mr Khulu Nair N.O.), and the Independent Electoral Commission.


The procedural history was that the North West Provincial Executive Council purportedly acted under section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution to dissolve the Municipal Council and appoint an administrator. The Municipality then approached the High Court in two parts: Part A sought a temporary interdict and suspension of the dissolution decision pending determination of Part B, which sought the review and setting aside of the dissolution decision. The High Court dismissed the interim interdict application, while the review remained pending. The Municipality then sought (a) a direct appeal to the Constitutional Court against the refusal of interim relief, and (b) direct access for the review itself.


The general subject matter concerned the constitutional and statutory framework for provincial intervention in local government, the standards for interim interdictory relief in constitutional litigation, and the urgency said to arise from alleged disruption to basic municipal services (including water and sanitation) in the Municipality’s area.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that on 3 September 2014 the North West Provincial Executive Council purported to dissolve the Municipality in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution and appointed Mr Nair as administrator.


The Municipality’s application in the High Court sought, on an interim basis, to prevent the administrator from “interfering” in the Municipality’s affairs and to suspend the dissolution decision pending a review. The Municipality’s central complaint (as recorded in the High Court judgment and reflected in the Constitutional Court’s summary) was that, as a municipality whose councillors had been elected, it was entitled to remain in office and not be replaced by an administrator, and that the dissolution decision had “infuriated” certain officials whose resistance allegedly caused instability and prejudiced municipal functioning.


The Municipality alleged that the intervention had a prejudicial impact on municipal operations and, more importantly, on the community, resulting in a failure to provide water services to certain communities. It contended that in early October water and sanitation services came to a standstill, and that staff providing emergency, water, and sanitation services were locked out of municipal premises, to the detriment of service delivery.


After the Constitutional Court issued directions calling for affidavits on whether there had been cessation or interruption of basic municipal services and related questions, the parties’ responses showed agreement that there had been widespread and continuing disruption of basic services to people and communities in the municipal area.


The Municipality attributed the service delivery breakdown in part to uncertainty about who was lawfully in charge, and described community unrest and damage to infrastructure associated with non-provision of services. The administrator stated that some communities had lacked water for years despite funding, referred to additional quality and sanitation problems, and explained that an emergency plan had been implemented and that virtually all affected areas had been reconnected, contributing to relative calm in protests. The administrator also identified resistance by some municipal employees, the need for disciplinary steps, and that the Municipal Council had resolved to resist implementation of the intervention, with employees resisting taking instructions from the administrator.


The Minister largely confirmed the administrator’s account as to the basis for intervention, the disruption that occurred, and steps towards restoring normality, while underscoring the administrator’s authority in restoring basic services.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether it was in the interests of justice for the Constitutional Court to grant leave to appeal against the High Court’s refusal of a temporary interdict, and whether the Court should grant direct access for the underlying review of the dissolution decision under section 167(6)(a) of the Constitution.


These questions primarily concerned the application of legal standards to facts, including the evaluation of urgency, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience in interim interdict proceedings, as well as the Constitutional Court’s discretionary assessment of whether direct appeal and direct access serve the interests of justice.


A further issue, arising from the Court’s own directions, concerned the practical and constitutional implications of alleged interruptions in basic municipal services, including water and sanitation, and whether any further order was warranted to secure service delivery while the review remained pending.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Court located the dispute within the constitutional architecture governing local government and provincial oversight. It noted that municipalities are the primary interface of government with communities and that, where a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation, section 139(1) permits provincial intervention, including dissolution and appointment of an administrator in exceptional circumstances.


On the interim relief and appeal, the Court emphasised that the Municipality sought to justify direct appeal and direct access on the basis of urgency, but the Court characterised the relevant urgency differently. In the Court’s assessment, urgency lay in ensuring the immediate provision of basic services (sanitation, water, and other services) to affected communities, rather than in restoring municipal councillors to office or protecting the institutional position of the Municipality pending the review.


A key difficulty identified by the Court was that the persons who would suffer the most acute prejudice from service disruption—the residents and communities—were not parties to the litigation. The Court observed that the Municipality had been dissolved because of an alleged failure to fulfil executive obligations to those very residents. On this footing, the Court held that the High Court could not be faulted for concluding that the balance of convenience did not favour an order that would have the effect of continuing, or risking continuation of, a situation alleged to involve dire service-delivery consequences.


In considering the interim interdict requirements and the interests-of-justice enquiry for leave to appeal, the Court endorsed the High Court’s reliance on National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Trolling Alliance and Others. It highlighted that the High Court found the Municipality (as distinct from individual councillors) suffered no harm, let alone irreparable harm, and that the allegation of councillors’ loss of salary was not a sufficient basis to establish irreparable harm. The Court further reasoned that neither the Municipality nor the councillors faced an urgency affecting their interests because, if the review ultimately succeeded, they could be reinstated.


For these reasons, aligned with the interests-of-justice considerations referenced in OUTA, the Court concluded that leave to appeal against the refusal of the interim interdict should be refused.


The Court applied similar reasoning to the request for direct access on the review. It held that the urgency asserted did not relate to the Municipality’s interests in a manner warranting the Constitutional Court’s immediate intervention, and that the section 139 dispute was one that should ordinarily “run its course” in the High Court. The Court therefore found direct access not to be in the interests of justice.


At the same time, the Court acknowledged it could not ignore the plight of residents affected by the disruption of basic services. It referred to its broad just and equitable remedial jurisdiction, which is not necessarily dependent on a finding of constitutional invalidity. It reiterated that the obligation to provide basic municipal services is sourced in the Constitution and legislation, and relied on Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others for the proposition that sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution, read with sections 4(2)(f) and 73 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, impose an obligation on municipalities to provide basic services to inhabitants irrespective of contractual relationships. It also referred to section 7(2) of the Constitution, and noted that removal of access to water, sanitation, electricity, and emergency services due to a management dispute may implicate residents’ fundamental rights, including the right of access to sufficient water in section 27(1).


After receiving the directed affidavits, the Court accepted that there had been widespread disruption, but it considered the practical effect of dismissing the leave-to-appeal application. The Court reasoned that dismissal meant that, pending the finalisation of the review, the lawfulness of the administrator’s intervention in restoring services was “beyond question” for present purposes, thereby strengthening the administrator’s authority to act and making any further order from the Constitutional Court superfluous. The Court indicated that if further interference occurred, the administrator could seek appropriate relief in the High Court, and similarly if there were complaints about alleged failure by the administrator to perform responsibilities.


On costs, the Court exercised a value judgment based on the consequences for residents, holding that an adverse costs order against the Municipality would place an additional financial burden on residents, and therefore made no costs order.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Constitutional Court granted the Minister’s application for condonation for the late filing of his affidavit.


The Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against the High Court’s refusal of the temporary interdict.


The Court also dismissed the application for direct access for the review to be heard by the Constitutional Court.


The Court made no order as to costs.


Cases Cited


National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Trolling Alliance and Others [2012] ZACC 18; 2012 (6) SA 223; 2012 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC).


Campus Law Clinic, University of KwaZulu-Natal v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another [2006] ZACC 5; 2006 (6) SA 103 (CC); 2006 (6) BCLR 669 (CC).


Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs and Others [2004] ZACC 19; 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC); 2005 (4) BCLR 347 (CC).


Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality [2004] ZACC 9; 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC); 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC).


Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another [2003] ZACC 2; 2003 (4) SA 266 (CC); 2004 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).


Zulu and Others v eThekwini Municipality and Others [2014] ZACC 17; 2014 (4) SA 590 (CC); 2014 (8) BCLR 971 (CC).


Minister of Safety and Security v Van Der Merwe and Others [2011] ZACC 19; 2011 (5) SA 61 (CC); 2011 (9) BCLR 961 (CC).


Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC); 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC).


Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (4) SA 55; 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC).


Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC).


Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).


Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others [2009] ZACC 33; 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (sections 7(2), 27, 139(1)(c), 152, 153, 167(6)(a)).


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (sections 4(2)(f) and 73).


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were cited by number in the judgment; the Court referred generally to section 167(6) of the Constitution, which contemplates that national legislation or the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow direct access when it is in the interests of justice and with leave of the Court.


Held


The Court held that the Municipality failed to demonstrate that it was in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal against the High Court’s refusal of interim interdictory relief. The Court found that the alleged urgency and prejudice relied upon by the Municipality did not establish irreparable harm to the Municipality or councillors, and that the real urgency related to the provision of basic services to residents who were not parties to the proceedings.


The Court further held that it was not in the interests of justice to grant direct access for determination of the review of the section 139 dissolution decision, and that the review should proceed in the High Court in the ordinary course.


The Court also held that, given the effect of dismissing leave to appeal, the administrator’s authority to intervene and restore services stood pending the review, rendering any further Constitutional Court order at that stage unnecessary. Condonation for the Minister’s late filing was granted, and no costs order was made to avoid burdening residents.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The Court applied the principle that leave to appeal and direct access under section 167(6) depend on whether it is in the interests of justice, a discretionary enquiry that includes consideration of urgency, the nature of prejudice alleged, and whether ordinary processes should be followed.


In evaluating interim interdictory relief in constitutional litigation, the Court proceeded from the approach articulated in National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Trolling Alliance and Others, including the requirements of irreparable harm and the balance of convenience, and the broader interests-of-justice considerations relevant to appellate interference with interim orders.


The judgment reaffirmed that obligations to provide basic municipal services arise from the objectives and duties of local government in sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution, reinforced by sections 4(2)(f) and 73 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, and that municipalities owe these obligations to inhabitants irrespective of contractual relationships, consistent with Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others.


The Court underscored the constitutional duty in section 7(2) that the state must respect, protect, promote, and fulfil rights in the Bill of Rights, and recognised that the interruption of previously existing access to essentials such as water and sanitation due to governance disputes may implicate fundamental rights, including section 27(1).


The Court acknowledged its broad just and equitable remedial jurisdiction, but indicated that where the dismissal of interim relief applications clarifies the administrator’s authority pending a review and where practical steps are underway, additional orders may be unnecessary, with further disputes appropriately managed through the ordinary supervisory and remedial mechanisms of the High Court.

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[2014] ZACC 31
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Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality v Chairperson, North West Provincial Executive Committee and Others (CCT 186/14) [2014] ZACC 31; 2015 (1) BCLR 72 (CC) (18 November 2014)

Links to summary

CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
CCT 186/14
In
the matter between:
NGAKA
MODIRI MOLEMA DISTRICT
MUNICIPALITY
...............................................
Applicant
and
CHAIRPERSON,
NORTH WEST PROVINCIAL
EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE
........................................................................................
First
Respondent
PREMIER,
NORTH WEST
PROVINCE
................................................................
Second
Respondent
MEMBER
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL,
DEPARTMENT
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, NORTH WEST
PROVINCE
....................................................................................................................
Third
Respondent
MINISTER,
COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE
AND
TRADITIONAL
AFFAIRS
...............................................................................
Fourth
Respondent
CHAIRPERSON,
NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF
PROVINCES
............................................................................................................
Fifth
Respondent
SPEAKER,
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE
OF
THE NORTH WEST
PROVINCE
........................................................................
Sixth
Respondent
KHULU
NAIR
N.O
...................................................................................................
Seventh
Respondent
INDEPENDENT
ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
....................................................
Eighth
Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Ngaka Modiri Molema
District Municipality v Chairperson, North West Provincial Executive
Committee and Others
[2014] ZACC 31
Coram:
Mogoeng CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Cameron J, Froneman J,
Khampepe J, Leeuw AJ, Madlanga J, Nkabinde J, Tshiqi AJ, Van der
Westhuizen
J and Zondo J
Decided
on:
18 November 2014
Summary:
Section 167(6) of the Constitution —
direct appeal and access — urgency in ensuring the immediate
provision of basic
sanitation, water and other services
Section
139(1) of the Constitution — provincial intervention in local
government — no need for Court to intervene —
urgent
interim needs of community met by administrator’s powers
following refusal of temporary interdict order
Sections
152 and 153 of the Constitution — sections 4(2)(f) and 73 of
the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act —
basic municipal
services
Section
27(1) of the Constitution — right of access to water
ORDER
On
appeal from the North West High Court, Mahikeng (Hendricks AJP) and
in the application for direct access:
1.
The fourth respondent’s application
for condonation is granted.
2.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed.
3.
The application for direct access is
dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THE
COURT:
[1]
Municipalities
are the face of government to the communities they are supposed to
serve.  If they fail in their executive obligation
to provide
services to the people, and if exceptional circumstances warrant it,
the Constitution provides that the Provincial Executive
may step in
to dissolve the Municipal Council and appoint an administrator.
[1]
That situation provides the background to this application.
[2]
The
North West Provincial Executive Council (Province),
[2]
purportedly acting in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution,
dissolved the applicant (Municipality) on 3 September
2014 and
appointed the seventh respondent, Mr Nair, as administrator.  The
Municipality then approached the North West High
Court, Mahikeng
(High Court) for two kinds of relief.
[3]
In Part A of its notice of motion, the Municipality sought
temporary relief to prevent the administrator from interfering
in the
Municipality’s affairs and for a suspension of the decision to
dissolve it
(temporary
interdict application), pending finalisation of the relief sought in
Part B.  In Part B, the Municipality sought
the review and
setting aside of the decision to dissolve it (review application).
[3]
The
High Court dismissed the temporary interdict application.  The
review application is still pending in the High Court.  The

Municipality seeks leave to appeal directly to this Court against the
refusal to grant the temporary interdict application and
also for
direct access in terms of section 167(6)(a) of the Constitution for
the review application to be heard by this Court.
[4]
[4]
The Municipality seeks to justify this
direct appeal and access to this Court on the ground of urgency.
Urgency there is indeed,
but it lies in ensuring the immediate
provision of basic sanitation, water and other services to the
affected communities and not
in restoring the status of municipal
councillors to the position from which they complain they have been
unjustly removed.
[5]
The nub of the Municipality’s
complaint was summarised thus in the High Court judgment:

[A]s
a municipality, [it] is entitled to remain in office and not be
dissolved or replaced by an administrator because the councillors

were elected by the communities.  Furthermore, the decision to
dissolve the council had infuriated a number of officials who

resisted the implementation of the intervention of the North West
Provincial Government.  The conduct of these officials,
so it is
alleged, caused turmoil and instability in the [Municipality’s]
administrations and seriously prejudic[ed] the [Municipality]
in the
execution of its function and powers.  If the interim relief is
granted, so it was further contended, the resistance
to the
enforcement of the decision will also be addressed.”
[5]
[6]
In
the founding papers in this Court the Municipality makes allegations
that rights, in particular, the right of access to water,
have been
infringed or threatened.
[6]
For example, the Municipality alleged that the intervention by the
Province has had “an extremely prejudicial impact
upon the
[Municipality] . . . . more importantly the community which it
serves, resulting . . . in a failure to provide water services
to
certain communities within the municipal area”.  In
motivating the granting of leave to appeal and direct access,
the
Municipality points to the “prominence which the municipal
service delivery (and in some instances, the lack thereof)
is
currently receiving”.
[7]
The
Municipality further points out that in early October the municipal
services of water and sanitation came to a standstill and
that these
services were not provided to the affected communities.  This is
because staff members conducting emergency services
and water and
sanitation services were locked out of the Municipality’s
premises to the “detriment of service delivery
and the
community.”  The High Court did refer to the argument that
“the local community residents in the municipality
area . . .
will suffer irreparable harm and prejudice”, but found no
plausible reason why the Municipality would
not obtain substantial
redress for its own concerns in due course.
[7]
[8]
Relying
on this Court’s decision in
OUTA
,
[8]
the High Court dismissed the temporary interdict application.  It
found that the Municipality, as distinct from individual
councillors,
suffered no harm, let alone irreparable harm.
[9]
It noted that it was not sufficient to allege in the replying
affidavit that councillors will suffer harm because “of
loss of
earnings in salaries”.
[10]
[9]
This reveals a fundamental flaw in the
Municipality’s application for leave to appeal against the
refusal by the High Court
of the temporary interdict application.  It
needs to be stressed that the potential prejudice and urgency lie not
in the harm
suffered by the Municipality or the municipal
councillors, but in the continued disruption of basic essential
services to the people
and communities the Municipality is supposed
to serve.  The people who may suffer the real harm are not party
to these proceedings.
It is because of the alleged failure in
its executive obligation to them that the Municipality was dissolved.
[10]
For
this and the other reasons relating to the interests of justice
referred to in
OUTA
[11]
the application for leave to appeal against the refusal of the
temporary interdict application must fail.  Neither the
Municipality
nor the municipal councillors will suffer irreparable
harm.  If the review application is successful they may be
re instated.
There is no urgency affecting their
interests.  The potential urgency lies in ensuring the delivery
of basic services
to the people and communities.  In light of
the allegation that it was the Municipality itself that failed to
ensure the provision
of these services in the first place, the High
Court can hardly be faulted for finding that the balance of
convenience did not
favour a continuation of that allegedly dire
situation.
[11]
For
largely the same reasons it is not in the interests of justice for
this Court to grant direct access to determine the review

application.
[12]
The
urgency does not relate to the interests of the Municipality and the
determination of the section 139 constitutional
dispute is one that
ordinarily would not call for this Court’s immediate
intervention.  It must run its course in the
High Court.
[12]
However
this Court may not ignore the plight of those people who are not
parties to the court proceedings and whose interests lie
at the heart
of the matter, namely the people and communities who reside within
the area of jurisdiction of the Municipality.  We
have a wide
just and equitable remedial jurisdiction that is not necessarily
dependent on a finding of constitutional impropriety.
[13]
[13]
The
obligations borne by local government to provide basic municipal
services are sourced in both the Constitution and legislation.
In
Joseph
[14]
this Court held that sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution, which
set out the objectives of local government, read together
with
sections 4(2)(f) and 73 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems
Act,
[15]
impose an obligation
on every municipality to provide basic municipal services to their
inhabitants irrespective of whether they
have a contractual
relationship with the municipality or not.
[16]
[14]
In
terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution, the state must respect,
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.
At
the very minimum, the state must refrain from interfering with
existing rights.
[17]
It
is clear that where access to water, sanitation, electricity and fire
and emergency services once existed but is then
taken away due to a
dispute within or relating to the management of a municipality, there
may be a violation of fundamental rights
of the inhabitants.
[15]
On 22 October 2014 we issued the following
directions:

The
applicant and the respondents are directed to file affidavits not
exceeding 20 pages, on or before Monday, 27 October 2014,
on the
following matters—
a)
whether there has been any cessation or
interruption in the provision of basic municipal services to the
communities within the
area of the Ngaka Modiri Molema District
Municipality;
b)
if the answer to a) is yes, what has been
the cause; extent and geographic reach; duration; and the period over
which the cessation
or interruption has occurred;
c)
in the circumstances of this case, who,
under the Constitution or any law, is obligated to provide said basic
municipal services;
and
d)
if basic municipal services are not
presently being provided, why this Court should not order the
individuals or officials responsible
in terms of the law for
providing them to do so forthwith.”
[16]
The respective responses to these
directions are instructive.  There is agreement that there has
been widespread and continuing
disruption of basic services to people
and communities.  In response to the Court’s directions,
the Municipality states
that there is uncertainty pertaining to who
is lawfully in charge of its operation.  Further, “a
significant and notable
increase in problems have been experienced in
the municipal area . . . pertaining to the rendering of the municipal
services”.
Because of the non-provision of these
services, the Municipality further alleges that people have rioted by
burning tyres and blocking
roads, throwing rocks into non functioning
boreholes and destroying non-functioning infrastructure.
[17]
The administrator, Mr Nair, states that
some communities in the Dinokana, Madibogo and Setlagole villages
have not had water for
years, even though the district received
funding for water and sanitation.  He adds that there were
further problems, in respect
of the quality of the water and
sanitation services, that led the national government to issue a
warning about the drinking of
water in the Municipality.  The
administrator also asserts the communities have protested due to the
interruption in services.
[18]
The administrator explains further that an
emergency plan is in place aimed at restoring services and that
“virtually all
areas affected by the disruption in services had
been reconnected.  This also explains why there has been
relative calm in
community protests”.  He identifies the
employees who are important in providing the services and states that
he does
“not intend to exclude [him]self in the list of people
who may be ordered to continue with the provision of services to the

communities”.  He states that he does not have a
difficulty with any order by the Court compelling the provision of

services and that an order of this kind will assist him in the
discharge of his responsibilities as administrator.  At the
end
of the affidavit he states:

However,
when the Court considers whether to grant any order I ask that
cognisance be taken of the facts on the ground as described
in the
[Joint Operations Centre] report attached hereto as well as the plan
which I have instituted, which is also attached hereto.
In this
regard I ask that a balance be struck between the supervision by this
Court and the steps which are already being taken
to address the
breakdown in the services”.
[19]
The fourth respondent (Minister) responded
late to the directions and seeks condonation.  The explanation
given is reasonable.
Condonation must be granted.
[20]
The Minister’s affidavit in the main
confirms the administrator’s version insofar as the reason for
intervention to
restore basic services, the disruption in the process
and the return to normality are concerned.  The Minister
underscores
the administrator’s authority to act in restoring
basic services.
[21]
Despite this, the Municipality makes the
assertion that “a court order directing the individuals and
officials to perform
the services will not necessarily resolve the
service delivery problems” because the breakdown in services is
“the
direct result of the unlawful usurping of the powers and
functions of the municipal administration”.  It reiterates
that what is needed is an order directing the administrator not to
usurp and exercise those powers and functions.
[22]
This
reaction harks back to the original grounds the temporary interdict
application was founded on, namely that officials were
“infuriated”
by the dissolution decision and their conduct “caused turmoil
and instability” in the administration.
[18]
That this reprehensible conduct is continuing is apparent from
the administrator’s affidavit.  He records that
there has
been resistance by some employees that necessitated disciplinary
measures to “normalise the situation”.
He states
that, “[t]o a large extent, as at the time of the filing of
this affidavit, the situation at the [M]unicipality
has returned to
normality, although there are still areas of disruption”.
It is common cause that the Municipal Council
has resolved to resist
any attempt to implement the decision and that the employees of the
Municipality who have returned to work
resist taking instructions
from the administrator.
[23]
The effect of dismissal of the application
for leave to appeal against the refusal of the temporary interdict
application by this
Court is that, pending the finalisation of the
review application, the lawfulness of the administrator’s
intervention in
restoring services is beyond question.  That
effectively provides the administrator with the legal authority that
will assist
him in the discharge of his responsibilities, rendering
any further order this Court might issue now superfluous.  If
any
further interference occurs after the order of this Court, the
remedy for the administrator would be to approach the High Court
for
relief.  And the same goes for complaints about any alleged
failure in performance by him of his responsibilities.
[24]
In view of the fact that an adverse costs
order against the Municipality will place an additional financial
burden on residents,
no costs order will be made.
Order
[25]
The following order is made:
1.
The fourth respondent’s application
for condonation is granted.
2.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed.
3.
The application for direct access is dismissed.
For
the Applicant: Lizel Venter Attorneys.
For
the Second, Third and Seventh Respondents: Hogan Lovells (South
Africa) incorporated as Routledge Modise Inc.
For
the Fourth Respondent: State Attorney.
[1]
Section
139(1) reads in relevant parts:

When
a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in
terms of the Constitution or legislation, the relevant
provincial
executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure
fulfilment of that obligation, including—
. .
.
(c)
dissolving the Municipal Council and appointing an administrator
until a newly elected Municipal Council has been declared
elected,
if exceptional circumstances warrant such a step.”
[2]
Represented
by the first, second and third respondents.
[3]
The
Municipality did so at the instance of the suspended municipal
manager.
[4]
Section
167(6) reads in relevant parts:

National
legislation or the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a
person, when it is in the interests of justice and
with leave of the
Constitutional Court—
(a)
to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional Court”.
[5]
Ngaka
Modiri Molema District Municipality v Chairperson of the North West
Provincial Executive Committee and Others
,
unreported judgment of the North West High Court, Mahikeng, Case No
M390/2014 (High Court judgment) at para 8.
[6]
Section
27 reads:

(1)
Everyone has the right to have access to—
(a)
health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b)
sufficient food and water; and
(c)
social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves
and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.
(2)
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive

realisation of each of these rights.”
See
also
Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Municipality and Others
[2009]
ZACC 33
;
2010 (4) BCLR 312
(CC)
at paras
47-50.
[7]
High
Court judgment above n 5 at paras 15-6.
[8]
National
Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Trolling Alliance and
Others
[2012] ZACC 18
;
2012 (6) SA 223
;
2012 (11) BCLR 1148
(CC) (
OUTA
)
at paras 45-7.
[9]
High
Court judgment above n 5 at para 11.
[10]
Id
at para 12.
[11]
OUTA
above n 8 at paras 22-9.
[12]
See
section 167(6)(a) of the Constitution quoted above at n 4.  For
a conspectus of relevant considerations, see
Campus
Law Clinic, University of KwaZulu-Natal v Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd and Another
[2006] ZACC 5
;
2006 (6) SA 103
(CC);
2006 (6) BCLR 669
(CC) at para
26;
Zondi
v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs and Others
[2004]
ZACC 19
;
2005 (3) SA 589
(CC);
2005 (4) BCLR 347
(CC) at paras
12 21;
Mkontwana
v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality
[2004] ZACC 9
;
2005 (1) SA 530
(CC);
2005 (2) BCLR 150
(CC) at paras
9 16; and
Satchwell
v President of the Republic of South Africa
and
Another
[2003]
ZACC 2
;
2003 (4) SA 266
(CC);
2004 (1) BCLR 1
(CC) at para 6.
[13]
Zulu
and Others v eThekwini Municipality and Others
[2014] ZACC 17
;
2014 (4) SA 590
(CC);
2014 (8) BCLR 971
(CC) at para
62;
Minister
of Safety and Security v Van Der Merwe and Others
[2011] ZACC 19
;
2011 (5) SA 61
(CC);
2011 (9) BCLR 961
(CC) at para
59; and
Head
of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v
Hoërskool Ermelo and Another
[2009] ZACC 32
;
2010 (2) SA 415
(CC);
2010 (3) BCLR 177
(CC) at
paras 95-7.
[14]
Joseph
and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others
[2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (4) SA 55; 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC).
[15]
32
of 2000.
[16]
Joseph
above n 14 at paras 35-40.
[17]
See
Minister
of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2)
[2002] ZACC 15
;
2002 (5) SA 721
(CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)
at para 46 and
Government
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others
[2000] ZACC 19
;
2001 (1) SA 46
(CC);
2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) at
para 34.
[18]
See
[5].