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[2014] ZACC 31
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Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality v Chairperson, North West Provincial Executive Committee and Others (CCT 186/14) [2014] ZACC 31; 2015 (1) BCLR 72 (CC) (18 November 2014)
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CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
CCT 186/14
In
the matter between:
NGAKA
MODIRI MOLEMA DISTRICT
MUNICIPALITY
...............................................
Applicant
and
CHAIRPERSON,
NORTH WEST PROVINCIAL
EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE
........................................................................................
First
Respondent
PREMIER,
NORTH WEST
PROVINCE
................................................................
Second
Respondent
MEMBER
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL,
DEPARTMENT
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, NORTH WEST
PROVINCE
....................................................................................................................
Third
Respondent
MINISTER,
COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE
AND
TRADITIONAL
AFFAIRS
...............................................................................
Fourth
Respondent
CHAIRPERSON,
NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF
PROVINCES
............................................................................................................
Fifth
Respondent
SPEAKER,
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE
OF
THE NORTH WEST
PROVINCE
........................................................................
Sixth
Respondent
KHULU
NAIR
N.O
...................................................................................................
Seventh
Respondent
INDEPENDENT
ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
....................................................
Eighth
Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Ngaka Modiri Molema
District Municipality v Chairperson, North West Provincial Executive
Committee and Others
[2014] ZACC 31
Coram:
Mogoeng CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Cameron J, Froneman J,
Khampepe J, Leeuw AJ, Madlanga J, Nkabinde J, Tshiqi AJ, Van der
Westhuizen
J and Zondo J
Decided
on:
18 November 2014
Summary:
Section 167(6) of the Constitution —
direct appeal and access — urgency in ensuring the immediate
provision of basic
sanitation, water and other services
Section
139(1) of the Constitution — provincial intervention in local
government — no need for Court to intervene —
urgent
interim needs of community met by administrator’s powers
following refusal of temporary interdict order
Sections
152 and 153 of the Constitution — sections 4(2)(f) and 73 of
the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act —
basic municipal
services
Section
27(1) of the Constitution — right of access to water
ORDER
On
appeal from the North West High Court, Mahikeng (Hendricks AJP) and
in the application for direct access:
1.
The fourth respondent’s application
for condonation is granted.
2.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed.
3.
The application for direct access is
dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THE
COURT:
[1]
Municipalities
are the face of government to the communities they are supposed to
serve. If they fail in their executive obligation
to provide
services to the people, and if exceptional circumstances warrant it,
the Constitution provides that the Provincial Executive
may step in
to dissolve the Municipal Council and appoint an administrator.
[1]
That situation provides the background to this application.
[2]
The
North West Provincial Executive Council (Province),
[2]
purportedly acting in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution,
dissolved the applicant (Municipality) on 3 September
2014 and
appointed the seventh respondent, Mr Nair, as administrator. The
Municipality then approached the North West High
Court, Mahikeng
(High Court) for two kinds of relief.
[3]
In Part A of its notice of motion, the Municipality sought
temporary relief to prevent the administrator from interfering
in the
Municipality’s affairs and for a suspension of the decision to
dissolve it
(temporary
interdict application), pending finalisation of the relief sought in
Part B. In Part B, the Municipality sought
the review and
setting aside of the decision to dissolve it (review application).
[3]
The
High Court dismissed the temporary interdict application. The
review application is still pending in the High Court. The
Municipality seeks leave to appeal directly to this Court against the
refusal to grant the temporary interdict application and
also for
direct access in terms of section 167(6)(a) of the Constitution for
the review application to be heard by this Court.
[4]
[4]
The Municipality seeks to justify this
direct appeal and access to this Court on the ground of urgency.
Urgency there is indeed,
but it lies in ensuring the immediate
provision of basic sanitation, water and other services to the
affected communities and not
in restoring the status of municipal
councillors to the position from which they complain they have been
unjustly removed.
[5]
The nub of the Municipality’s
complaint was summarised thus in the High Court judgment:
“
[A]s
a municipality, [it] is entitled to remain in office and not be
dissolved or replaced by an administrator because the councillors
were elected by the communities. Furthermore, the decision to
dissolve the council had infuriated a number of officials who
resisted the implementation of the intervention of the North West
Provincial Government. The conduct of these officials,
so it is
alleged, caused turmoil and instability in the [Municipality’s]
administrations and seriously prejudic[ed] the [Municipality]
in the
execution of its function and powers. If the interim relief is
granted, so it was further contended, the resistance
to the
enforcement of the decision will also be addressed.”
[5]
[6]
In
the founding papers in this Court the Municipality makes allegations
that rights, in particular, the right of access to water,
have been
infringed or threatened.
[6]
For example, the Municipality alleged that the intervention by the
Province has had “an extremely prejudicial impact
upon the
[Municipality] . . . . more importantly the community which it
serves, resulting . . . in a failure to provide water services
to
certain communities within the municipal area”. In
motivating the granting of leave to appeal and direct access,
the
Municipality points to the “prominence which the municipal
service delivery (and in some instances, the lack thereof)
is
currently receiving”.
[7]
The
Municipality further points out that in early October the municipal
services of water and sanitation came to a standstill and
that these
services were not provided to the affected communities. This is
because staff members conducting emergency services
and water and
sanitation services were locked out of the Municipality’s
premises to the “detriment of service delivery
and the
community.” The High Court did refer to the argument that
“the local community residents in the municipality
area . . .
will suffer irreparable harm and prejudice”, but found no
plausible reason why the Municipality would
not obtain substantial
redress for its own concerns in due course.
[7]
[8]
Relying
on this Court’s decision in
OUTA
,
[8]
the High Court dismissed the temporary interdict application. It
found that the Municipality, as distinct from individual
councillors,
suffered no harm, let alone irreparable harm.
[9]
It noted that it was not sufficient to allege in the replying
affidavit that councillors will suffer harm because “of
loss of
earnings in salaries”.
[10]
[9]
This reveals a fundamental flaw in the
Municipality’s application for leave to appeal against the
refusal by the High Court
of the temporary interdict application. It
needs to be stressed that the potential prejudice and urgency lie not
in the harm
suffered by the Municipality or the municipal
councillors, but in the continued disruption of basic essential
services to the people
and communities the Municipality is supposed
to serve. The people who may suffer the real harm are not party
to these proceedings.
It is because of the alleged failure in
its executive obligation to them that the Municipality was dissolved.
[10]
For
this and the other reasons relating to the interests of justice
referred to in
OUTA
[11]
the application for leave to appeal against the refusal of the
temporary interdict application must fail. Neither the
Municipality
nor the municipal councillors will suffer irreparable
harm. If the review application is successful they may be
re instated.
There is no urgency affecting their
interests. The potential urgency lies in ensuring the delivery
of basic services
to the people and communities. In light of
the allegation that it was the Municipality itself that failed to
ensure the provision
of these services in the first place, the High
Court can hardly be faulted for finding that the balance of
convenience did not
favour a continuation of that allegedly dire
situation.
[11]
For
largely the same reasons it is not in the interests of justice for
this Court to grant direct access to determine the review
application.
[12]
The
urgency does not relate to the interests of the Municipality and the
determination of the section 139 constitutional
dispute is one that
ordinarily would not call for this Court’s immediate
intervention. It must run its course in the
High Court.
[12]
However
this Court may not ignore the plight of those people who are not
parties to the court proceedings and whose interests lie
at the heart
of the matter, namely the people and communities who reside within
the area of jurisdiction of the Municipality. We
have a wide
just and equitable remedial jurisdiction that is not necessarily
dependent on a finding of constitutional impropriety.
[13]
[13]
The
obligations borne by local government to provide basic municipal
services are sourced in both the Constitution and legislation.
In
Joseph
[14]
this Court held that sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution, which
set out the objectives of local government, read together
with
sections 4(2)(f) and 73 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems
Act,
[15]
impose an obligation
on every municipality to provide basic municipal services to their
inhabitants irrespective of whether they
have a contractual
relationship with the municipality or not.
[16]
[14]
In
terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution, the state must respect,
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.
At
the very minimum, the state must refrain from interfering with
existing rights.
[17]
It
is clear that where access to water, sanitation, electricity and fire
and emergency services once existed but is then
taken away due to a
dispute within or relating to the management of a municipality, there
may be a violation of fundamental rights
of the inhabitants.
[15]
On 22 October 2014 we issued the following
directions:
“
The
applicant and the respondents are directed to file affidavits not
exceeding 20 pages, on or before Monday, 27 October 2014,
on the
following matters—
a)
whether there has been any cessation or
interruption in the provision of basic municipal services to the
communities within the
area of the Ngaka Modiri Molema District
Municipality;
b)
if the answer to a) is yes, what has been
the cause; extent and geographic reach; duration; and the period over
which the cessation
or interruption has occurred;
c)
in the circumstances of this case, who,
under the Constitution or any law, is obligated to provide said basic
municipal services;
and
d)
if basic municipal services are not
presently being provided, why this Court should not order the
individuals or officials responsible
in terms of the law for
providing them to do so forthwith.”
[16]
The respective responses to these
directions are instructive. There is agreement that there has
been widespread and continuing
disruption of basic services to people
and communities. In response to the Court’s directions,
the Municipality states
that there is uncertainty pertaining to who
is lawfully in charge of its operation. Further, “a
significant and notable
increase in problems have been experienced in
the municipal area . . . pertaining to the rendering of the municipal
services”.
Because of the non-provision of these
services, the Municipality further alleges that people have rioted by
burning tyres and blocking
roads, throwing rocks into non functioning
boreholes and destroying non-functioning infrastructure.
[17]
The administrator, Mr Nair, states that
some communities in the Dinokana, Madibogo and Setlagole villages
have not had water for
years, even though the district received
funding for water and sanitation. He adds that there were
further problems, in respect
of the quality of the water and
sanitation services, that led the national government to issue a
warning about the drinking of
water in the Municipality. The
administrator also asserts the communities have protested due to the
interruption in services.
[18]
The administrator explains further that an
emergency plan is in place aimed at restoring services and that
“virtually all
areas affected by the disruption in services had
been reconnected. This also explains why there has been
relative calm in
community protests”. He identifies the
employees who are important in providing the services and states that
he does
“not intend to exclude [him]self in the list of people
who may be ordered to continue with the provision of services to the
communities”. He states that he does not have a
difficulty with any order by the Court compelling the provision of
services and that an order of this kind will assist him in the
discharge of his responsibilities as administrator. At the
end
of the affidavit he states:
“
However,
when the Court considers whether to grant any order I ask that
cognisance be taken of the facts on the ground as described
in the
[Joint Operations Centre] report attached hereto as well as the plan
which I have instituted, which is also attached hereto.
In this
regard I ask that a balance be struck between the supervision by this
Court and the steps which are already being taken
to address the
breakdown in the services”.
[19]
The fourth respondent (Minister) responded
late to the directions and seeks condonation. The explanation
given is reasonable.
Condonation must be granted.
[20]
The Minister’s affidavit in the main
confirms the administrator’s version insofar as the reason for
intervention to
restore basic services, the disruption in the process
and the return to normality are concerned. The Minister
underscores
the administrator’s authority to act in restoring
basic services.
[21]
Despite this, the Municipality makes the
assertion that “a court order directing the individuals and
officials to perform
the services will not necessarily resolve the
service delivery problems” because the breakdown in services is
“the
direct result of the unlawful usurping of the powers and
functions of the municipal administration”. It reiterates
that what is needed is an order directing the administrator not to
usurp and exercise those powers and functions.
[22]
This
reaction harks back to the original grounds the temporary interdict
application was founded on, namely that officials were
“infuriated”
by the dissolution decision and their conduct “caused turmoil
and instability” in the administration.
[18]
That this reprehensible conduct is continuing is apparent from
the administrator’s affidavit. He records that
there has
been resistance by some employees that necessitated disciplinary
measures to “normalise the situation”.
He states
that, “[t]o a large extent, as at the time of the filing of
this affidavit, the situation at the [M]unicipality
has returned to
normality, although there are still areas of disruption”.
It is common cause that the Municipal Council
has resolved to resist
any attempt to implement the decision and that the employees of the
Municipality who have returned to work
resist taking instructions
from the administrator.
[23]
The effect of dismissal of the application
for leave to appeal against the refusal of the temporary interdict
application by this
Court is that, pending the finalisation of the
review application, the lawfulness of the administrator’s
intervention in
restoring services is beyond question. That
effectively provides the administrator with the legal authority that
will assist
him in the discharge of his responsibilities, rendering
any further order this Court might issue now superfluous. If
any
further interference occurs after the order of this Court, the
remedy for the administrator would be to approach the High Court
for
relief. And the same goes for complaints about any alleged
failure in performance by him of his responsibilities.
[24]
In view of the fact that an adverse costs
order against the Municipality will place an additional financial
burden on residents,
no costs order will be made.
Order
[25]
The following order is made:
1.
The fourth respondent’s application
for condonation is granted.
2.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed.
3.
The application for direct access is dismissed.
For
the Applicant: Lizel Venter Attorneys.
For
the Second, Third and Seventh Respondents: Hogan Lovells (South
Africa) incorporated as Routledge Modise Inc.
For
the Fourth Respondent: State Attorney.
[1]
Section
139(1) reads in relevant parts:
“
When
a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in
terms of the Constitution or legislation, the relevant
provincial
executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure
fulfilment of that obligation, including—
. .
.
(c)
dissolving the Municipal Council and appointing an administrator
until a newly elected Municipal Council has been declared
elected,
if exceptional circumstances warrant such a step.”
[2]
Represented
by the first, second and third respondents.
[3]
The
Municipality did so at the instance of the suspended municipal
manager.
[4]
Section
167(6) reads in relevant parts:
“
National
legislation or the rules of the Constitutional Court must allow a
person, when it is in the interests of justice and
with leave of the
Constitutional Court—
(a)
to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional Court”.
[5]
Ngaka
Modiri Molema District Municipality v Chairperson of the North West
Provincial Executive Committee and Others
,
unreported judgment of the North West High Court, Mahikeng, Case No
M390/2014 (High Court judgment) at para 8.
[6]
Section
27 reads:
“
(1)
Everyone has the right to have access to—
(a)
health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b)
sufficient food and water; and
(c)
social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves
and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.
(2)
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of each of these rights.”
See
also
Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Municipality and Others
[2009]
ZACC 33
;
2010 (4) BCLR 312
(CC)
at paras
47-50.
[7]
High
Court judgment above n 5 at paras 15-6.
[8]
National
Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Trolling Alliance and
Others
[2012] ZACC 18
;
2012 (6) SA 223
;
2012 (11) BCLR 1148
(CC) (
OUTA
)
at paras 45-7.
[9]
High
Court judgment above n 5 at para 11.
[10]
Id
at para 12.
[11]
OUTA
above n 8 at paras 22-9.
[12]
See
section 167(6)(a) of the Constitution quoted above at n 4. For
a conspectus of relevant considerations, see
Campus
Law Clinic, University of KwaZulu-Natal v Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd and Another
[2006] ZACC 5
;
2006 (6) SA 103
(CC);
2006 (6) BCLR 669
(CC) at para
26;
Zondi
v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs and Others
[2004]
ZACC 19
;
2005 (3) SA 589
(CC);
2005 (4) BCLR 347
(CC) at paras
12 21;
Mkontwana
v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality
[2004] ZACC 9
;
2005 (1) SA 530
(CC);
2005 (2) BCLR 150
(CC) at paras
9 16; and
Satchwell
v President of the Republic of South Africa
and
Another
[2003]
ZACC 2
;
2003 (4) SA 266
(CC);
2004 (1) BCLR 1
(CC) at para 6.
[13]
Zulu
and Others v eThekwini Municipality and Others
[2014] ZACC 17
;
2014 (4) SA 590
(CC);
2014 (8) BCLR 971
(CC) at para
62;
Minister
of Safety and Security v Van Der Merwe and Others
[2011] ZACC 19
;
2011 (5) SA 61
(CC);
2011 (9) BCLR 961
(CC) at para
59; and
Head
of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v
Hoërskool Ermelo and Another
[2009] ZACC 32
;
2010 (2) SA 415
(CC);
2010 (3) BCLR 177
(CC) at
paras 95-7.
[14]
Joseph
and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others
[2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (4) SA 55; 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC).
[15]
32
of 2000.
[16]
Joseph
above n 14 at paras 35-40.
[17]
See
Minister
of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2)
[2002] ZACC 15
;
2002 (5) SA 721
(CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)
at para 46 and
Government
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others
[2000] ZACC 19
;
2001 (1) SA 46
(CC);
2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) at
para 34.
[18]
See
[5].