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[2011] ZACC 35
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Occupiers of Portion R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355 JR v Golden Thread Ltd and Others (CCT 25/11) [2011] ZACC 35; 2012 (2) SA 337 (CC); 2012 (4) BCLR 372 (CC) (7 December 2011)
Links to summary
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case CCT 25/11
[2011] ZACC 35
In the matter between:
OCCUPIERS OF PORTION R25 OF
THE FARM MOOIPLAATS 355 JR
….........................................................
Applicants
and
GOLDEN THREAD LIMITED
….......................................................
First
Respondent
CITY OF TSHWANE
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
….........................................
Second
Respondent
MINISTER FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
…................................
Third
Respondent
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING, GAUTENG
….........................
Fourth
Respondent
Heard on : 13 September 2011
Decided on : 7 December 2011
JUDGMENT
YACOOB J:
Introduction
The
applicants are about 170 families who unlawfully occupy certain
land
1
(land) within the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (City)
owned by the first respondent
2
(Golden Thread). They seek leave to appeal against the judgment of
the North Gauteng High Court
3
which ordered their eviction. Broadly, the applicants contest the
correctness of the conclusion of the High Court that the eviction
order was just and equitable within the meaning of section 4(6) of
the PIE Act.
4
We can evaluate this conclusion only if we grant leave to appeal.
The
City was joined before the High Court and has also made submissions
to this Court. The Member of the Executive Council for
Local
Government and Housing, Gauteng (MEC), and the Minister for Human
Settlements (Minister) were joined as respondents in
and at the
instance of this Court. Affidavits filed on behalf of the Minister
and the MEC took the same stance. Written argument
was filed on
behalf of the MEC alone.
Leave to appeal
This
Court may grant leave to appeal only if the case raises
constitutional issues and only if it is in the interests of justice
to do so. The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Appeal was dismissed both by the High Court and the Supreme
Court
of Appeal. The PIE Act was passed to give effect to section 26(3) of
the Constitution
5
with the result that its interpretation and application raise a
constitutional matter. In addition, it is in the interests of
justice to grant leave to appeal for two inter-related reasons:
there are prospects of success and the homelessness of a large
number of families is at stake. The only issue before us is whether
the High Court was correct that the eviction of these families
was
just and equitable. This is an important issue. Leave to appeal will
be granted.
Inappropriate
citation
It is
necessary, before addressing the issue at the crux of this case, to
refer to a matter that is cause for considerable concern.
Golden
Thread cited two groups of respondents before the High Court. The
applicants before us were the second group of respondents
before the
High Court. The first two respondents joined in the case before the
High Court were cited respectively as “[t]he
people who intend
invading Portion 25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355/JR, Tshwane, Gauteng”
and “[t]he people who invaded
Portion 25 of the Farm
Mooiplaats 355/JR, Tshwane, Gauteng”.
6
This description of human beings is less than satisfactory and
cannot pass without comment. It detracts from the humanity of
the
occupiers, is emotive and judgmental and comes close to
criminalising the occupiers. This form of citation should not be
resorted to. A more neutral appellation like “occupiers”
might well be more appropriate.
In the High Court
The
relevant sections of the PIE Act are set out before looking at the
High Court’s reasoning:
“
4.
Eviction of unlawful occupiers
(6) If an unlawful occupier has
occupied the land in question for less than six months at the time
when the proceedings are initiated,
a court may grant an order for
eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do
so, after considering all the
relevant circumstances, including the
rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and
households headed by women.
(7) If an unlawful occupier has
occupied the land in question for more than six months at the time
when the proceedings are initiated,
a court may grant an order for
eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do
so, after considering all the
relevant circumstances, including,
except where the land is sold in a sale of execution pursuant to a
mortgage, whether land has
been made available or can reasonably be
made available by a municipality or other organ of state or another
land owner for the
relocation of the unlawful occupier, and including
the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and
households
headed by women.
(8) If the court is satisfied
that all the requirements of this section have been complied with and
that no valid defence has been
raised by the unlawful occupier, it
must grant an order for the eviction of the unlawful occupier, and
determine—
(a) a just and equitable date on
which the unlawful occupier must vacate the land under the
circumstances; and
(b) the date on which an
eviction order may be carried out if the unlawful occupier has not
vacated the land on the date contemplated
in paragraph (a).”
It
must be pointed out now that the High Court rightly expressed
misgivings about the conduct of the City during the proceedings:
“
I have
already noted during the hearing that the [City] is conspicuous in
its absence. It is a very sad state of affairs, especially
as the
[City] is the one body which is constitutionally bound to address the
problem which exists. They have not only failed dismally
in that
respect and have done so for many years, but they have not even
attended this hearing to assist the court to come to a
decision. The
[City] merely briefed counsel on a watching brief.”
7
The
High Court appreciated that the pertinent enquiry was whether the
eviction was just and equitable and if so, it will have
to concern
itself with determining a just and equitable date of eviction. The
High Court sketched certain surrounding circumstances
before
proceeding with the justice and equity enquiry:
The
Itireleng informal settlement was established in 2004.
When
Itireleng became overcrowded, certain of those occupiers (and
probably other occupiers who had come from elsewhere) started
to
move onto property adjacent to Itireleng.
8
The
occupiers were evicted from that property during 2009.
The
applicant families moved onto the land which they presently occupy
during December 2009 and, after the homes they had constructed
there were demolished, began rebuilding their homes on 15 January
2010.
The
proceedings before the High Court were initiated by Golden Thread
on 21 January 2010.
The
High Court conducted the justice and equity enquiry on the bases
that the right of access to adequate housing is not enforceable
at
common law or in terms of the Constitution against any individual
landowner and that the unlawfulness of the occupation by
the
applicants was common cause. The High Court took into account a
number of factors in coming to the conclusion that the eviction
of
the applicants was just and equitable. The Court first emphasised
that “there does not appear to be any elderly persons,
children, disabled persons or households headed by women” on
the land. The Court considered that the applicants would have
been
motivated by the fact that living on vacant land would be better
than being in over-populated Itireleng and that the conditions
in
Itireleng had to be taken into account. It remarked, correctly in my
view, that it was unfortunate that the people who came
from
elsewhere had not said anything about the conditions that existed
whence they came.
On
the other side of the coin, the Court accorded some weight to the
fact that most of the applicants occupied the land “in
contempt of a court order”. The High Court considered it
significant that Golden Thread had instituted proceedings quite
quickly and remarked that, if Golden Thread allowed the occupation
to continue, the occupiers “might start to establish
rights
which would make it very difficult and even impossible to protect
its property.” The judge also took into account
that the
applicants had been on the land for a short time, that there is no
infrastructure or basic services on the land, and
that Golden Thread
had no obligation to “carry the burden to supply the present
and any would-be land invaders with accommodation.”
Finally,
the High Court considered it significant that there was vacant
property adjacent to Itireleng belonging to the City
which could
accommodate the occupiers.
The
order of eviction was accordingly granted:
“
2. The
persons in occupation of Portion R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats, JR/355,
Tshwane Gauteng (Portion R25) are hereby evicted from
Portion R25 and
shall vacate Portion R25 by not later than 29 March 2010.
3. The persons in occupation of
Portion R25 are hereby ordered to demolish and remove their
structures and/or shacks from Portion
R25 by not later than 29 March
2010.
4. In the event of any persons
in occupation of Portion R25 failing to comply with the order in
paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the sheriff
of this court is hereby
authorised and ordered to evict any and all occupiers on Portion R25
from Portion R25, from 1 April 2010.
5. The sheriff of this court is
hereby authorised and ordered to demolish and remove any and all
structures and/or shacks mentioned
in paragraph 3 above from Portion
R25 from 1 April 2010.
6. The sheriff of this court is
hereby authorised and ordered to request any person including members
of the Tshwane Metro Police
and members of the South African Police
Services to assist him in the eviction, demolition or removal of the
occupiers of Portion
R25 and/or their structures and/or their shacks
from Portion R25.
7. The first and second
respondents are ordered jointly and severally to pay the applicant’s
costs of suit.”
In this Court
It is
as well to get a dispute between the City and the MEC out of the way
before investigating the correctness of the High Court
order. The
MEC disputed the contention of the City that Chapter 12 of the
National Housing Code and the relevant legislative
framework
conferred neither the obligation nor any power on it to expend its
own resources in the provision of emergency housing.
The City
contended that the province of Gauteng, not the City itself, was
obliged to finance all emergency housing provision.
This proposition
was roundly rejected by this Court in
Blue Moonlight
:
9
“
Besides
its entitlement to approach the province for assistance, the City has
both the power and the duty to finance its own emergency
housing
scheme. Local government must first consider whether it is able to
address an emergency housing situation out of its own
means. The
right to apply to the province for funds does not preclude this. The
City has a duty to plan and budget proactively
for situations like
that of the Occupiers. This brings the issue of available resources
to the fore.”
This
judgment must therefore proceed on the basis that the City does
indeed have the power and the obligation to make reasonable
provision
for emergency housing from its resources.
The
applicants made various interesting submissions and criticised the
judgment of the High Court on different bases. It is however
necessary to investigate only one of the applicants’
submissions. That concerns the role of the City in the proceedings
before the High Court. The first leg of this submission was that,
bearing in mind that a large number of families would probably
become homeless, it was obligatory on the High Court to require the
City to provide particulars of the applicants’ housing
situation and whether the City could provide emergency housing.
Secondly, the applicants say that the Court should also have
investigated the possibility of mediation to be facilitated by the
City between Golden Thread and the applicants.
10
This
submission is sound. Although the High Court bemoaned the conduct of
the City and was critical of that conduct, it did not
oblige the
City either to investigate the matter or to furnish information
about its ability to help with emergency housing in
the
circumstances. Nor was the mediation aspect explored.
In
Shorts Retreat
11
the Supreme Court of Appeal had occasion to consider an appeal
against the order of a High Court evicting a group of people,
the
majority of whom were “unemployed, poor and homeless”
and who had been in unlawful occupation for more than six
months.
The municipality had not been joined in those proceedings. The
Supreme Court of Appeal unanimously emphasised that the
municipality
should have been joined, focusing on the fact that because the
appellants had been in occupation for more than six
months section
4(7) of the PIE Act obliged the High Court to investigate whether
land could reasonably be made available by the
municipality or an
organ of state for the relocation of the occupiers. The High Court
should also have had before it, the Supreme
Court of Appeal said,
information relating to the needs of the elderly, children, persons
with disability, and households headed
by women.
12
The Supreme Court of Appeal also emphasised the importance of
mediation and the role of the municipality in this process.
13
Now
this case is distinguishable from
Shorts Retreat
. The
applicants in that case had been in unlawful occupation for years.
When the High Court considered the case before us the
applicants had
been in occupation for several months. The difference between the
cases lies in the circumstance that, where residents
have been in
occupation of land for less than six months, a court is not
expressly obliged to investigate whether a municipality
can
reasonably make land available for people who might be evicted.
14
On the other hand a court is enjoined to make the alternative land
investigation if the occupation exceeds six months.
While
this distinction is important, I do not think it is decisive to the
justice and equity enquiry. This is because, if a court
has before
it a case in which the land occupation falls short of six months, it
is obliged to consider all the relevant circumstances.
In an enquiry
of this kind, a court should determine what the relevant
circumstances are. Close to 200 families would have been
evicted and
in all probability rendered homeless consequent upon the order of
the High Court. In the face of this consequence
the question whether
the City was reasonably capable of providing alternative land or
housing was of crucial importance. And
what is more, the High Court
was alive to the fact that the City did indeed own land which was
vacant and which might be made
available for that purpose. It was
impossible for the High Court to conclude that the eviction was just
and equitable without
investigating this aspect.
It is
possible that the High Court was motivated to some extent by its
view that Golden Thread had no obligation towards the applicants;
that it had sought an eviction order early; and that the applicants
may have acquired greater rights had Golden Thread not acted
quickly. This smacks of the thesis that an owner’s right to
land is virtually unlimited. This Court in
Blue Moonlight
held that ownership in South Africa is not as unrestricted:
“
Of
course a property owner cannot be expected to provide free housing
for the homeless on its property for an indefinite period.
But in
certain circumstances an owner may have to be somewhat patient, and
accept that the right to occupation may be temporarily
restricted . .
. . An owner’s right to use and enjoy property at common law
can be limited in the process of the justice
and equity enquiry
mandated by PIE.”
15
It is
of some significance in this context that Golden Thread has not put
the land to any use, nor is there any evidence that
it intends to
subject the land to use in the foreseeable future. If this is true,
there would be little prejudice to Golden Thread
if the applicants
remain in occupation for some months longer until alternative land
becomes available.
The
appeal must succeed. It is appropriate like in
Shorts Retreat
,
for the High Court to be given the chance to consider the matter
afresh after the City has furnished the relevant information
and the
applicants and Golden Thread have been given the opportunity to
respond.
Costs
There
is no reason why costs should not follow the result.
Order
The
following order is made:
Leave
to appeal is granted and the appeal is upheld with costs, including
the costs of two counsel.
The
order of the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria in case number
3492/2010 is set aside.
The
matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration after
paragraphs 4 and 5 of this order have been complied with.
The
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality is ordered to file in the
High Court a report, confirmed on affidavit, by 28 February
2012 on—
the
particulars of the housing situation of the applicants, including
details as to the number of families that will be rendered
homeless
if the eviction order were to be carried out;
the
steps it has taken, is able to take, and intends to take to provide
alternative land or housing as emergency accommodation
for the
applicants if they are evicted;
when
alternative land or accommodation can be provided;
the
effects of an eviction on the applicants and the surrounding
residents, if the eviction order is executed without alternative
land or emergency accommodation being made available; and
the
steps that can be taken to alleviate the effects of the occupation
of the land in question on the landowner if the occupiers
were
physically evicted only after the municipality has made alternative
land or accommodation available to those applicants
who will be
rendered homeless by their eviction.
The
applicants and the first respondent may, within 15 days of the
delivery of the report by the municipality, file affidavits
in the
High Court in response to the report.
Mogoeng
CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Froneman J, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Nkabinde J,
Skweyiya J and Van der Westhuizen J concur in the judgment
of Yacoob
J.
For the
Applicants: Advocate R Jansen and Advocate H Barnes instructed by
Lawyers for Human Rights.
For the Second Respondent: Advocate JJ Botha instructed by Mphahlele
Attorneys.
For the Third Respondent: Advocate N Cassim SC and Advocate J Kanyane
instructed by the State Attorney.
For the Fourth Respondent:Advocate T Motau SC and Advocate K Pillay
instructed by Mdhluli, Pearce and Mdzikwa Incorporated.
1
Remainder
of Portion 25 of the farm Mooiplaats 355 JR.
2
Golden
Thread Limited.
3
Golden
Thread Limited v People who intend invading Portion R25 of the farm
Mooiplaats 355JR Tshwane, Gauteng and Others
, [2010] ZAGPPHC
262;Case No. 3492/2010, 2 March 2010, unreported.
4
Prevention
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of
1998.
5
Section
26(3) provides:
“
No one may be evicted from
their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court
made after considering all the
relevant circumstances. No
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.”
6
This
description of the parties is also resorted to in the North Gauteng
High Court, Pretoria in the matter of
PPC Aggregate Quarries
(Pty) Ltd v The people who intend invading the Remaining Extent of
the Farm Skurweplaas 353, J.R., Tshwane,
Gauteng and Others
Case
No. 12289/2010, North Gauteng, High Court Pretoria
,
24 March 2010,
unreported. Reasons for the order are dated 5
May 2010. The judgment on the application for leave to appeal to
this Court in
the
Skurweplaas
case is being handed down
concurrently with this judgment.
7
Above
n 3 at 5.
8
Described
in that judgment as Portion R15.
9
City
of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another (Lawyers for Human Rights
as
Amicus Curiae)
[2011] ZACC 33
, 1 December 2011, as yet
unreported, at para 67.
10
In
terms of section 7 of the PIE Act which provides:
“
Mediation
(1) If the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction
the land in question is situated is not the owner of the land the
municipality
may, on the conditions that it may determine, appoint
one or more persons with expertise in dispute resolution to
facilitate
meetings of interested parties and to attempt to mediate
and settle any dispute in terms of this Act: Provided that the
parties
may at any time, by agreement, appoint another person to
facilitate meetings or mediate a dispute, on the conditions that the
municipality may determine.
(2) If the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction
the land in question is situated is the owner of the land in
question, the
member of the Executive Council designated by the
Premier of the province concerned, or his or her nominee, may, on
the conditions
that he or she may determine, appoint one or more
persons with expertise in dispute resolution to facilitate meetings
of interested
parties and to attempt to mediate and settle any
dispute in terms of this Act: Provided that the parties may at any
time, by
agreement, appoint another person to facilitate meetings or
mediate a dispute, on the conditions that the said member of the
Executive Council may determine.
(3) Any party may request the municipality to appoint
one or more persons in terms of subsections (1) and (2), for the
purposes
of those subsections.
(4) A person appointed in terms of subsection (1) or
(2) who is not in the full-time service of the State may be paid the
remuneration
and allowances that may be determined by the body or
official who appointed that person for services performed by him or
her.
(5) All discussions, disclosures and submissions which
take place or are made during the mediation process shall be
privileged,
unless the parties agree to the contrary.”
11
Occupiers
of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v
Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others
2010
(4) BCLR 354 (SCA).
12
Id
at para 6.
13
Id
at para 9.
14
Section
4(6) of the PIE Act.
15
Above
n 9 at para 40.