Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions (CCT45/04B) [2006] ZACC 22; 2006 (2) BCLR 293 (CC); 2007 (1) SACR 347 (CC) (30 November 2006)

80 Reportability
Constitutional Law

Brief Summary

Constitutional Law — Death Sentences — Supervisory Order — Court supervises the substitution of death sentences declared unconstitutional in Makwanyane — Applicants sought to ensure compliance with the Court's previous order for the replacement of death sentences with lawful alternatives — Court issues a mandamus compelling respondents to take necessary steps for substitution and to report on progress — Delay in substitution process noted, prompting the need for supervision to ensure timely compliance.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings concerned the Constitutional Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation of an earlier mandamus and supervisory order. That order required the relevant state functionaries to ensure that all death sentences imposed before 5 June 1995 (the date shortly before the Constitutional Court’s decision in S v Makwanyane and Another) were set aside and replaced with lawful alternative sentences in terms of statutory procedures.


The applicants were Willy Aaron Sibiya, Purpose Khumalo, Jacobus Petrus Geldenhuys, and David Nkuna, all of whom were implicated in the broader process concerning persons sentenced to death prior to the declaration of the unconstitutionality of capital punishment. The respondents were the Director of Public Prosecutions: Johannesburg High Court, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, the President of the Republic of South Africa, and the Minister of Correctional Services. The supervision and reporting obligations in practice focused principally on the second and third respondents, who were responsible for furnishing reports and coordinating compliance.


The procedural history was rooted in the post-Makwanyane legal and administrative process. After Makwanyane invalidated the death penalty, Parliament enacted section 1 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, prescribing a mechanism for substituting death sentences with alternative sentences. Many years later, part of that legislative scheme was declared unconstitutional by the Witwatersrand High Court, and that order of invalidity came before the Constitutional Court for confirmation. In Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg, and Others [2005] ZACC 6; 2005 (5) SA 315 (CC); 2005 (8) BCLR 812 (CC) (“Sibiya 1”), the Court declined to confirm the invalidity. However, the Court also became aware that numerous pre-1995 death sentences still had not been lawfully substituted, prompting it to issue a mandamus coupled with a supervisory order.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was therefore not the constitutionality of the death penalty itself, but the completion of the substitution process required to bring the legal position into practical effect by ensuring that no person remained detained under an extant sentence of death imposed before the constitutional prohibition took effect.


Material Facts


It was common cause before the Court, and central to the supervisory process, that significant delay had occurred in implementing the consequence of S v Makwanyane and Another [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), namely the setting aside of death sentences and their replacement with lawful punishments. At the time the matter was argued in Sibiya 1, the Court was informed that 62 people who had been sentenced to death before 5 June 1995 still had not had their sentences replaced by lawful alternatives.


The Court’s supervisory order required detailed reporting, including identifying every person detained under a death sentence as at 5 June 1995, identifying those whose sentences had already been substituted (with particulars), and giving specific information on all persons whose death sentences still remained effective, including what steps had been taken and what obstacles existed. The requirement for detail was material because supervision was instituted at a point where substitution was already underway, and the Court considered it necessary to understand precisely the stage reached in each matter.


The second and third respondents were initially unable to comply with the reporting deadline and sought an extension of time. The Court granted an extension in Sibiya and Others v DPP, Johannesburg High Court and Others 2006 (2) BCLR 293 (CC) (“Sibiya 2”), primarily because supervision could not be meaningfully undertaken without the information, and refusal would prejudice those who stood to benefit from accelerated substitution.


After the extension, the respondents filed successive reports which documented progress and reduced the number of outstanding matters over time. In the first report (filed 15 September 2005), the respondents indicated that 40 persons still had unsatisfied substitution processes. The material facts recorded by the Court included that the substitution process (as described in the report) generally required two steps: a judicial recommendation after consideration of argument, followed by the President’s substitution of the death sentence with the recommended sentence. The report indicated that 24 cases had been considered by a court and were awaiting action in the Office of the President, while 16 had not yet been considered by a court.


The Court identified specific factual uncertainties requiring clarification in later reporting. These included incomplete information about Mr B W Pule, an apparent inconsistency concerning Mr D N Bezuidenhout, and confusion as to whether Mr P L Kadiege was deceased or still required substitution. In the second report (covering up to 31 October 2005), the outstanding cases were reduced from 40 to 28, with only five still needing consideration by a court and 23 awaiting presidential substitution. The second report further clarified that Bezuidenhout’s sentence had been substituted, Kadiege was deceased and had been mistakenly included among outstanding substitutions, and archival details were still being sought in relation to Pule.


By the third report (15 February 2006), only nine cases remained. A judicial recommendation had been made in respect of eight, while Mr Zacharia Machaisa had not yet been considered because a transcript was not available. The Court noted as a material fact that Mr Pule was established to have passed away.


The respondents’ later reporting showed that all substitutions were completed except Machaisa’s, leading to a final phase of supervision directed specifically at expediting that single outstanding substitution. On 28 July 2006, the second and third respondents reported that Machaisa’s sentence had been substituted, and the Court thereafter regarded the supervision as complete.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were concerned with the implementation and enforcement of constitutional and statutory obligations rather than the adjudication of guilt or the correctness of any particular substituted sentence. The Court was required to determine, in substance, how its supervisory order should operate to ensure compliance with its earlier mandamus, and how to respond procedurally to incomplete information, continuing delay, and obstacles affecting progress.


The issues were primarily about the application of law to administrative and procedural facts and the exercise of a supervisory and managerial judicial function. This included assessing whether the respondents’ reports constituted sufficient compliance with the reporting obligations, whether further directions were necessary, whether extensions of time should be granted in the interests of justice, and how the Court should structure continuing supervision to achieve completion.


The dispute therefore did not turn on contested evidentiary facts in the conventional sense. Instead, the Court’s task involved evaluating progress and adequacy of compliance with an existing constitutional remedy, and making value judgments about what supervisory measures were appropriate given the prolonged delay and the imperative to give practical effect to constitutional rights and earlier orders.


Court’s Reasoning


The Court located the need for the mandamus and supervision in the continuing failure, long after Makwanyane, to ensure that all pre-constitutional death sentences had been set aside and replaced. It explained that the mandamus compelled the respondents to take “all the steps that are necessary” to complete substitution “as soon as possible,” and that this compulsion was justified because the continued existence of effective death sentences was inconsistent with the required legal position following Makwanyane and the subsequent statutory procedure.


The Court further explained why supervision was added to the mandamus. It considered that the history of delay, coupled with the urgency and constitutional importance of finalising substitutions, made it inappropriate simply to assume that the executive and administrative process would reach completion without judicial monitoring. The Court acknowledged that the wording “as soon as possible” lacked specificity, potentially complicating enforcement, and that detailed reporting requirements were therefore central to enabling supervision that was both meaningful and verifiable.


In evaluating the supervisory mechanism, the Court emphasised that effective supervision required detailed, reliable information. It described the reporting requirements as necessary to ensure the Court could independently assess progress rather than relying solely on assurances from officials. This justified demanding particulars such as names, case numbers, courts involved, availability of records, steps taken, and reasons for non-compliance.


The Court’s approach to the extension application in Sibiya 2 reflected a pragmatic, interests-of-justice analysis. It accepted that without the information the Court could not perform its supervisory role, and that refusing an extension would harm the very persons whom the supervisory order sought to protect by expediting lawful substitution. The Court thus treated procedural flexibility as an instrument to secure the substantive purpose of the supervisory remedy.


Across the successive reports, the Court engaged in iterative evaluation: it assessed whether the reports substantially complied with the earlier order, identified ambiguities or deficiencies that prevented clear oversight, and issued further directions tailored to the updated state of progress. The Court’s directions progressively narrowed in focus as the number of outstanding substitutions reduced, culminating in orders specifically addressing the final remaining case (Machaisa), and requiring either immediate reporting upon substitution or a further report explaining ongoing delay and recommending steps to expedite completion.


In concluding remarks, the Court distilled observations about supervision as a remedial technique. It stated that successful supervision required detailed information, careful judicial evaluation of that information, cooperation from those responsible for implementation, and flexibility on the part of the Court. These observations were presented as lessons drawn from the supervision undertaken rather than as new doctrinal innovations detached from the case history.


Outcome and Relief


The Court recorded that, following its continuing supervision from 25 May 2005 until 28 July 2006, all death sentences imposed before 5 June 1995 that remained effective had been set aside and substituted with lawful alternative sentences, including the final outstanding case of Mr Zacharia Machaisa.


The final judgment delivered on 30 November 2006 did not grant new substantive relief beyond confirming completion of the supervisory process and providing an account of how the supervision was conducted and what enabled it to succeed. The Court’s concluding position was that the earlier orders in Makwanyane had at last been fulfilled in practice through the completed substitution process.


No costs order was set out in the text of the judgment as reproduced.


Cases Cited


S v Makwanyane and Another [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).


Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others [2005] 1 All SA 105 (W).


Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg, and Others [2005] ZACC 6; 2005 (5) SA 315 (CC); 2005 (8) BCLR 812 (CC).


Sibiya and Others v DPP, Johannesburg High Court and Others 2006 (2) BCLR 293 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 172(2)(a).


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, section 1 (including subsections (1) to (5), and references to subsections (3) and (4)).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the text of the judgment as reproduced.


Held


The Constitutional Court held that its earlier supervisory process—instituted because of prolonged delay in substituting pre-5 June 1995 death sentences—had been successfully completed once the respondents reported that the final outstanding sentence (Machaisa) had been substituted. It further held, by way of concluding observations grounded in the supervision undertaken, that meaningful supervision depends on detailed reporting, careful judicial evaluation, cooperation by implementing actors, and flexibility in the supervisory process.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that the Constitutional Court may, in appropriate circumstances, issue a mandamus compelling state actors to take necessary steps to implement constitutional obligations and the Court’s own orders, particularly where a history of delay demonstrates that declaratory relief alone is insufficient to secure compliance.


It also applied the principle that a court may exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the execution of its orders, and that such supervision must be supported by detailed and verifiable information enabling the court to assess progress and compliance independently.


The judgment further reflected that procedural flexibility (including the grant of extensions where justified) may be consistent with the interests of justice when necessary to render supervision effective and to avoid prejudicing those meant to benefit from the court’s remedial intervention.


Finally, it articulated, as conclusions drawn from the supervisory experience in this matter, that supervision is practically dependent on cooperation by officials and institutions involved in implementation, and on sustained judicial engagement through evaluation of reports and the issuing of tailored further directions until completion is achieved.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Constitutional Court
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Constitutional Court
>>
2006
>>
[2006] ZACC 22
|

|

Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions (CCT45/04B) [2006] ZACC 22; 2006 (2) BCLR 293 (CC); 2007 (1) SACR 347 (CC) (30 November 2006)

Links to summary

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case CCT 45/04
WILLY AARON SIBIYA First Applicant
PURPOSE KHUMALO Second
Applicant
JACOBUS PETRUS GELDENHUYS Third Applicant
DAVID
NKUNA Fourth Applicant
versus
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS:
JOHANNESBURG HIGH COURT First Respondent
MINISTER OF
JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL Second Respondent
DEVELOPMENT
PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH Third Respondent
AFRICA
MINISTER OF CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES Fourth Respondent
Supervision by Court commenced on : 25
May 2005
Supervision completed on : 28 July 2006
Final Judgment
on supervision delivered on : 30 November 2006
JUDGMENT
YACOOB J:
[1]
On
28 July 2006 this Court completed its supervision of the first mandamus and
supervisory order issued by it. Pursuant to this order
this Court supervised
the process by which sentences of death imposed before this penalty was declared
inconsistent with the provisions
of the interim Constitution in
Makwanyane
[1]
were substituted
by other lawful sentences. It is appropriate to give some account of and make
some comment on the process of supervision
that has lasted for more than a
year.
The supervisory order:
background
[2]
This Court in
Makwanyane
, in addition to declaring the death sentence unconstitutional,
ordered that all people who had been sentenced to death were to remain
in
custody under their sentences until these sentences had been set aside “in
accordance with law and substituted by lawful
punishments.”
[2]
Two years
after the decision in
Makwanyane
had been given, Parliament passed a law
prescribing the procedure for the replacement of any death sentence with an
appropriate alternative
sentence.
[3]
Some eight years later part of that
legislation
[4]
was declared
inconsistent with the Constitution by the Witwatersrand High
Court.
[5]
The order of constitutional
invalidity was referred to this Court for
confirmation.
[6]
On 25 May 2005, this
Court in
Sibiya 1
[7]
declined
to confirm the order of invalidity on the basis that the procedure prescribed
was not inconsistent with the Constitution.
[3]
In considering the
application for confirmation, it became clear that the sentences of 62 people
who had been sentenced to death before
the judgment in the
Makwanyane
matter was handed down, had still not been substituted by lawful
sentences.
[8]
The Court expressed
dismay at this delay and concluded that a supervisory order to monitor the
process of the substitution of these
sentences was appropriate in the
circumstances. The concern of this Court and the basis upon which a mandamus
and supervisory order
were granted is reflected in the following passage from
the judgment:
“The process of the substitution of sentences generally is not
satisfactory. At the time of the decision in
Makwanyane
it was estimated
that between 300 and 400 people were on death row in our country. By the time
the papers were filed in the High
Court the number of cases in which people who
had been sentenced to death still required attention was estimated at 134. When
the
case was argued before us we were informed by counsel for three of the
respondents that there were 62 people whose sentences had
not yet been
substituted. We were also told that every effort was being made to ensure that
all outstanding cases would be appropriately
dealt with before the end of
June.
The process of the substitution of sentences has taken far too long. It is
important that all outstanding death sentences be set
aside and substituted as
soon as it is possible.
Counsel for the second, third and fourth respondents was inclined to concede
that the substitution process should be completed quickly.
I accept his
statement to the effect that the relevant authorities envisage that the process
of the substitution of sentences will
be completed by the end of June. However,
the process has taken so long that it will be inadvisable for this Court to
assume that
the death sentences will be substituted as envisaged.
This Court has the jurisdiction to issue a
mandamus
in appropriate
circumstances and to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the process of the
execution of its order. It is appropriate
in this case for this to be done.
The question of a supervisory order was raised with counsel at the hearing of
the case. None
raised any objection to a supervisory
order.”
[9]
(footnotes
omitted).
The mandamus and supervisory order
[4]
The mandamus and supervisory
order made by this Court reads:
“. . . (2) The respondents are directed to take all the steps that are
necessary to ensure that all sentences of death imposed
before 5 June 1995 are
set aside and replaced by an appropriate alternative sentence in terms of
section 1 of the Act as soon as
possible.
(3) The respondents are required to report to this Court concerning all the
steps taken to comply with paragraph (2) of this order
by not later than 15
August 2005.
(4) The report must include the following information:
(a) the
name of every person who was being detained under a sentence of death as at 5
June 1995;
(b) the name of every person in respect of whom the death sentence has been
set aside and replaced by an appropriate alternative sentence,
particulars as to
whether the alternative sentence was determined and imposed in terms of ss (1)
to (5) or ss (7) to (10) of s 1
of the Act, particulars of the judge who advised
the President, or the Court of Appeal that imposed the new sentence as the case
may be, the date on which the new sentence was imposed and particulars of the
sentence; and
(c) the names of all people who are still being detained pursuant to the
sentences of death imposed upon them together with particulars
as to the date on
which the sentence of death was imposed, the case number and the Court that
imposed the death sentence, whether
a record of the proceedings before that
Court is available, all the steps that have been taken to ensure the setting
aside of the
death sentence and the imposition of a new sentence in each
case.
(5) The respondents are directed to ensure that an appropriate affidavit or
affidavits are filed with the Registrar of this Court
not later than 15 August
2005:
(a) setting out in full the reasons why each death sentence
has not yet been set aside, the steps that will be taken to ensure that
the
death sentence will be set aside and replaced by an appropriate alternative
sentence; and
(b) motivating fully any order that might be required of this Court to
facilitate the setting aside of the death sentence concerned
and replacing it
with an appropriate alternative punishment.
(6) This Court will issue further directions in relation to supervision of the
execution of paragraph (2) of this order as circumstances
may
require.”
[10]
[5]
Paragraph 2 of the order
contains what is generally referred to as a mandamus. It compels the
respondents to do certain things.
This Court deemed it appropriate in this case
to go beyond a declaration and to issue a mandamus aimed at ensuring the
completion
of the process of substitution of sentences. The essential reason
for this was that the death sentences had not been substituted
as required by
this Court’s order in
Makwanyane
. The mandamus was therefore
principally aimed at ensuring compliance with the order of this Court in
Makwanyane
.
[6]
The Court felt that given
the delay that had occurred since its order in
Makwanyane
coupled with
the pressing need for the sentences to be replaced, it was an appropriate case
for a supervisory order to be made in
addition to the mandamus. The relevant
respondents were ordered to take “all the necessary steps” with each
step not
being described in specific terms. The result is that the debate as to
whether the respondents did everything in their power that
was necessary would
be both pertinent and likely in any enforcement proceedings. There is no date
by which the death sentences must
be replaced. The words “as soon as
possible” carry a certain lack of specificity which brings enforcement
complications.
[7]
Paragraphs 3 and 4 are part
of the order. They may be referred to as the pre-requisites that must be
satisfied before effective supervision
is possible. It will have been seen that
paragraphs 4(a) and (b) require considerable detailed information to be
furnished in relation
to each person that had been sentenced to death and in
relation to people whose death sentences had already been set aside. This
became necessary because this Court’s order was made at a time when
substitution was already in progress. It would have been
impossible for this
Court to provide effective supervision until it knew exactly how far the process
had already moved forward.
The detail was also essential so that this Court
would not have to rely completely on the say-so of some other person that a
particular
stage in the process had been reached; there had to be sufficient
information for the Court itself to be satisfied that a particular
stage had
been reached. The detail was necessary in order to ensure that this Court did
not engage in the process of supervision
on an incorrect footing. It will be
seen later that the detail provided was subjected to careful
examination.
[8]
Paragraph 4(c) of the
supervisory order is an effort to secure information in relation to all people
whose death sentences had not
yet been replaced by other punishment. The Court
attempted to discover in relation to each person how far the process of
substitution
had progressed, what still needed to be done and most importantly
perhaps, the obstacles that stood in the way of substitution.
A proper
understanding of the obstacles was essential to appropriate supervision. The
sworn material required by paragraph 5 of
the order was aimed principally at
placing this Court in a position to be of assistance in the process of ensuring
the most speedy
substitution of sentences. This Court might have been able to
make an order at the specific request by the respondent designed to
assist in
the completion of the process in the light of the information received. Finally
the order in paragraph 6 was necessary
to ensure continuous supervision until
completion.
The application for an extension
of time
[9]
The second and third
respondents found themselves unable to furnish the required information by 15
August 2005 and made an application
to this Court requesting a one month
extension of time to enable them to furnish the information. After hearing oral
argument this
Court in
Sibiya
2
[11]
concluded that it was in
the interests of justice to grant the application for a number of
reasons.
[12]
Perhaps the most
powerful reason advanced was that it would be impossible for the Court to
perform its supervisory function unless
the information had been furnished. The
refusal to grant the extension of time would not prejudice anyone except those
likely to
benefit from the Court’s supervision and from the speedy
substitution of sentences; conversely the grant of an extension of
time would be
to the advantage of those people whose death sentences had not yet been set
aside.
The first report and this
Court’s response
[10]
The first report by the
second and third respondents was filed on 15 September 2005. That report was
carefully evaluated in
Sibiya
2
.
[13]
Save for certain
exceptions and concerns that are discussed later, this Court concluded that the
details furnished together with
the contents of the affidavit amounted to
substantial compliance with the orders made in terms of paragraphs 3 and 4. It
may also
be mentioned that the second and third respondents sought no order from
this Court that would facilitate the replacement of any sentence
of capital
punishment with an alternative
punishment.
[14]
[11]
The report demonstrated
that there were, as at 15 September 2005, 40 people who had been sentenced to
death at a time when that sentence
was still competent and whose sentences had
not yet been replaced by other punishment. The process by which their sentences
were
to be substituted entailed two steps: the first was the recommendation by a
judge after considering
argument;
[15]
the second and final
step was the order made by the President substituting capital punishment with
the sentence recommended by the
judge
concerned.
[16]
According to the
report, sentences of 40 people had not yet been substituted; the cases of 24
people had already been considered
by a court and awaited finalisation by the
office of the President; the cases of the other 16 people had not yet been
considered
by a court. Acceptable reasons were given for the fact that the
sentences of 40 people had not yet been substituted. In the circumstances,
it
was ordered that the process of supervision should continue and that a further
report should be filed by the respondents on or
before 7 November 2005. The
report was unclear in relation to three
people:
(a) In the case of Mr B W Pule, although the report said that the death sentence
had been set aside and substituted, no details were
given.
(b) While Mr D N Bezuidenhout was listed as a person who had been sentenced to
death his name did not appear anywhere else in the
report except that an
annexure to the affidavit mentioned that the case concerning him was to be heard
by a court.
(c) There was some confusion in the documentation about whether Mr P L Kadiege
had died or whether the death sentence imposed upon
him had still to be
substituted.
Clarity was therefore required in respect of these
issues.
[12]
In the result, on 7 October
2005 the Court made the following order after considering the first
report.
“The second and third respondents are ordered to ensure that a report is
filed in this Court on or before 7 November
2005:
(a)
on the
progress made in the substitution process by 31 October 2005;
and
(b)
complying with the terms of this
Court’s order dated 25 May 2005 in relation to Mr D N Bezuidenhout, Mr P L
Kadiege and Mr B
W Pule.”
The second
report and the consequent order
[13]
The second report covered
the period up to and including 31 October 2005 and showed that the number of
people who had not yet had
their sentences substituted had decreased from 40 to
28. The report also showed that only five of the outstanding cases had yet
to
be considered by a court and that the position of the remaining 23 people had
been considered by a court and had still to be substituted
by the President.
Continued supervision was again indicated and
ordered.
[14]
In relation to the specific
difficulties that had been raised in the order made pursuant to the first
report, the second report informed
us
that:
(a) particulars in relation to Mr Pule were still being sought from the National
Archives;
(b) the sentence of Mr Bezuidenhout had been substituted; and
(c) Mr Kadiege was deceased and the documents had erroneously mentioned that his
sentence had still to be substituted.
[15]
Accordingly, on 30 November
2005 the following order was made:
“(1) The second and third respondents are ordered to file in this Court on
or before 15 February 2006 a further progress report
in respect of the
substitution of sentences of death that had been imposed before the death
penalty was declared to be inconsistent
with the Constitution with other
appropriate punishment.
(2) If the further report contemplated in paragraph 1 of this Order is to the
effect that the process of substitution has not yet
been completed, the second
and third respondents are ordered to file an
affidavit:
a. setting out fully the reasons why the death sentences that
remain effective have not yet been substituted;
b. indicating the time that is required to effect the remaining substitution
accompanied by a proper motivation;
c. making out an appropriate case justifying any additional orders that may
be required from this Court to facilitate the substitution.”
The
third report and consequent order
[16]
The third report filed
timeously on 15 February 2006 showed that there were now only nine people whose
sentences had not yet been
substituted. A judicial recommendation had been made
in respect of eight people while the ninth person Mr Z Machaisa had not yet
been
considered by a court because a transcript had not been available. In the
circumstances, supervision had to continue. The
Court considered however that
it was reasonable to expect the process to be completed by 15 May
2006.
[17]
In relation to Mr Pule it
was now established that he had passed away.
[18]
Accordingly on 16 March
2006 this Court made the following order:
“1. The second and third respondents are ordered to file in this Court on
or before 15 May 2006 a final report in respect of
the substitution of sentences
of death that had been imposed before the death penalty was declared to be
inconsistent with the Constitution
with other appropriate
punishment.
2. If it becomes impossible to file this report on time, the second and third
respondents are required to make a fully motivated
application for an extension
of time on or before 7 May 2006.”
The
end of the process
[19]
The second and third
respondents filed what they termed a final report on 15 May 2006 showing that
the sentences of all the people
who had been subjected to capital punishment had
been substituted except the case of one person, Mr Zacharia
Machaisa.
[20]
This Court made the
following order on 1 June
2006:
“1. The second and third respondents are required to ensure that the
process in relation to the replacement of the sentence
of death imposed upon Mr
Zacharia Machaisa by an appropriate alternative sentence and to report to this
Court:
(a) as soon as the sentence has been appropriately substituted; or
(b) on 1 September 2006 if the sentence has not yet been substituted by that
date.
2. If the sentence has not yet been substituted, the report must set out the
reasons why this has not yet been done and recommend
the steps that may be taken
to expedite substitution.”
[21]
On 28 July this year, the
second and third respondents reported that the sentence of Mr Machaisa had been
substituted.
Conclusion
[22]
Each report that was
submitted was considered by a conference of judges of the Court. The order to
be issued was determined by the
conference. This judgment on the supervisory
process in relation to the substitution of the death sentence shows the
following:
(a) Successful supervision requires that detailed information be placed at the
disposal of a court.
(b) Supervision entails a careful analysis and evaluation of the details
provided.
(c) Supervision cannot succeed without the full co-operation of others in the
process.
(d) Courts should exercise flexibility in the supervisory
process.
[23]
Once the supervisory order
had been made, all the members in the offices of the second and third
respondents, the office of the Director
of Public Prosecutions and all the
courts involved made a contribution towards ensuring that the vexed issued of
the substitution
of sentences of death by alternative appropriate sentences was
brought to an end. This Court is indebted to all who were part of
the process
for their contribution. We appreciate in particular the fact that the orders
made in
Makwanyane
have at last been fulfilled and that the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty can now be said to have been realised
in practice.
Langa CJ, Moseneke DCJ,
Madala J, Mokgoro J, O’Regan J, Sachs J, Nkabinde J and Van der Westhuizen
J concur in the judgment
of Yacoob J.
For the applicant: F
Snyckers
For second and third respondents: V Soni SC and T Machaba
instructed by the
State Attorney, Johannesburg
[1]
S v Makwanyane and
Another
[1995] ZACC 3
;
1995 (3) SA 391
(CC);
1995 (6) BCLR 665
(CC).
[2]
Id at para 2(b) of the
order.
[3]
Section 1
of the
Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997
.
[4]
Id at subsections (1) to
(5).
[5]
In
Sibiya and Others v
Director of Public Prosecutions and Others
[2005] 1 All SA 105
(W).
[6]
In terms of section 172(2)(a)
of the Constitution.
[7]
Sibiya and Others v Director
of Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg, and Others
[2005] ZACC 6
;
2005 (5) SA 315
(CC);
2005
(8) BCLR 812
(CC).
[8]
See above n 3.
[9]
Above n 7 at paras 59-62.
[10]
Id at para 64.
[11]
Sibiya and Others v DPP,
Johannesburg High Court and Others
2006 (2) BCLR 293
(CC).
[12]
Id at paras 11-13.
[13]
Above n 12 at paras
16-21.
[14]
Paragraph 5(b) of the
Sibiya 1
order quoted in paragraph 4.
[15]
Above n 3 at section
1(3).
[16]
Id at section 1(4).