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[2026] ZAGPJHC 885
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Iheanacho v Registrar University of Johannesburg and Others (Leave to Appeal) (2020/02375) [2026] ZAGPJHC 885 (5 August 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
2020-02375
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED.
5
August 2026
In the matter between:
IHEANACHO,
HENRY EMEKA
Applicant
And
THE
REGISTRAR, UNIVERSITY OF
JOHANNESBURG
First
respondent
PROFESSOR
MICHELLE VAN DER BANK
Second
respondent
MR
RONNY KABONGO
Third
Respondent
PROFESSOR
STEPHAN BOATWRIGHT
Fourth
respondent
DR
ANTHONY MAGEE
Fifth
respondent
THE
UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG
Sixth
respondent
This
Order is made an Order of Court by the Judge whose name is reflected
herein, duly stamped by the Registrar of the Court and
is submitted
electronically to the Parties / their legal representatives by email.
This Order is further uploaded to the electronic
file of this matter
on Caselines/CourtOnline by the Judge’s secretary. The date of
this order is deemed to be 5 August 2026.
JUDGMENT: LEAVE TO
APPEAL
CORAM: LIEBENBERG AJ:
[1]
Dissatisfied with my judgment and order of
2 April 2026, the applicant seeks leave to appeal raising six
grounds. I am satisfied
that leave to appeal should be refused
for the reasons hereunder.
Mootness/Jurisdiction
[2]
The applicant contends that the exclusion
decision and re-registration decision form one continuous impugned
process. I am
satisfied that given the different times of the
decisions and differing identities of the decision makers concerned,
the decisions
are distinct and separate from each other.
[3]
As appears from the main judgment,
impugning the exclusion decision leaves intact the re-registration
decision which results in
the applicant being unable to further his
studies. Similarly, setting aside the re-registration decision
leaves intact the
exclusion decision with the same result. In
both scenarios the practical effect is the same: the result is
moot.
[4]
Another court would not come to a different
conclusion.
PAJA 180 day
period/knowledge/section 9
[5]
The applicant did not seek condonation for
the late bringing of the application for review. On any
construction, the application
was brought beyond the 180 days allowed
for from the date of the exclusion decision as well as the date upon
which he learnt of
the exclusion decision. The application was
also launched beyond 180 days from the date of the re-registration
decision and
the reasons provided for that decision.
[6]
Absent a substantive application for
condonation a section 9 enquiry was not triggered and no argument was
presented for condonation.
[7]
In the result, the review was not
justiciable and another court would not come to a different
conclusion.
Pleadings/ “New
case”
[8]
The applicant contends that this court
adopted an overly rigid approach in finding that the case advanced at
the hearing was a new
case not pleaded in the affidavits. As appears
from the main judgment, the main aim of attack in the affidavits was
the exclusion
decision and not the re-registration decision.
The new case presented at the hearing of the matter was simply not
supported
by the affidavits filed.
[9]
I
am satisfied that the approach was not rigid but consonant with the
authorities including NDPP v Zuma
[1]
.
[10]
Another court would not come to a different
conclusion.
Failure to engage the
merits
[11]
The review faltered on three preliminary
points and the merits of the application was not entered into. Absent
a rational basis
for leave to appeal being advanced in respect of
each of these points, this application is doomed to failure.
Joinder and
interconnected relief
[12]
As already stated, the attack in the
applicant’s affidavits was at the exclusion decision and not
the re-registration decision.
The two decisions are distinct.
The exclusion decision was taken by the Department of Botany and the
re-registration decision by
a quai-appeal body, the Senate Higher
Degrees Committee some two and half years later. The affidavits
filed do not evidence
the interconnected roles the applicant contends
for.
[13]
The attack on the re-registration decision
at the hearing was not supported by the affidavits and another court
would not come to
a different conclusion.
Costs
[14]
It is only in exceptional circumstances
that leave to appeal is granted in respect of a costs order.
The applicant did not
advance any exceptional circumstances in either
his notice of application for leave to appeal or during argument.
Nor was
any argument advanced on the court’s alleged
misdirection.
[15]
The first to fifth respondents were not
cited in their official capacities but as privately named litigants.
Nothing in the
affidavits indicated that these respondents were cited
in official capacities nor was the abandoned relief sought against
them
in their official capacities. The third, fourth and fifth
respondents are not even employed by the University. Accordingly, the
Biowatch principle did not find application to these respondents.
[16]
There is no reasonable prospect of another
court coming to a different conclusion.
Conclusion
[17]
In the result, the application is dismissed
and the applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the first to fifth
respondents including
counsel’s fees on scale B.
SARITA LIEBENBERG
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
For the applicant:
Adv Ndlokovane (Ms)
Instructed by Masewawatla
Attorneys
For the respondents:
Adv Molver
Instructed by Lawton
Africa
Heard on 7 July 2026
Judgment on 5 August 2026
[1]
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009 (2) SA 277
(SCA)
2009
(2) SA 277
(SCA)