Mupfunguri v Comit Capital (Pty) Ltd (2026/176298) [2026] ZAGPJHC 868 (31 July 2026)

40 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Urgent Applications — Urgency — Requirement for establishing urgency in urgent motion proceedings — Applicant seeking mandatory relief for reinstatement of trading account — Court finding applicant failed to demonstrate urgency or that substantial redress would not be available in due course — Application struck from the roll with costs.

THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case no 2026-176298
In the matter between:
ONAI MUPFUNGURI Applicant
and
COMIT CAPITAL (PTY) LTD Respondent
JUDGMENT
DU PLESSIS J
Introduction
[1] The applicant seeks urgent
final mandatory relief directing the respondent to
reinstate a funded trading account and to process a payout request said to arise under
the parties’ agreement. The respondent opposes the application, amongst other
things, on the issue of urgency.
[2] The respondent submits that in any case, the applicant has failed to establish
the clear right required for final mandatory relief and characterises the dispute as an
(1) REPORTABLE: Yes☐/ No ☒
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes ☐ / No ☒
(
3) REVISED: Yes ☒ / No ☐
Date: 31 July 2026

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ordinary commercial contractual dispute concerning the interpretation and
enforcement of a simulated trading agreement, contractual compliance assessments,
disputed trading data and the application of proprietary trading rules.

[3] Since I am inclined to strike the matter for lack of urgency, it is unnecessary to
decide any of the underlying merits. The application falls to be struck from the urgent
roll because the applicant has failed to establish that he will not obtain substantial
redress in due course. I provide written reasons for this decision for the benefit of the
applicant, who represented himself.

[4] In terms of Rule 6(12), the applicant must set out explicitly the circumstances
that render the matter urgent, and the reasons why substantial redress will not be
available at a hearing in due course. Colloquially, the question that is often asked in
urgent court is “where is the fire that needs to be put out now”? The test is somewhat
stringent, and the reason for that lies in the fact that bringing an application to urgent
court on truncated timelines deprives the respondent of a fair opportunity to prepare
its case. It also burdens the court with having to prepare and decide matters on rather
short notice, which might be necessary to do if there is a fire to be put out, but should
be avoided if the applicant can obtain substantial redress in the ordinary courts.

[5] The enquiry is thus not whether the immediate relief would be convenient,
commercially desirable, or advantageous. The enquiry is whether, if the matter were
to proceed in the ordinary course, the applicant would be deprived of substantial
redress.

[6] The applicant sought to justify urgency on two bases. The first was what he
termed “visa expiry / total lack of redress”, namely that his visitor’s visa would expire
on 10 September 2026 and that relegation of the matter to the ordinary roll would
outlast his lawful presence in the Republic, thereby barring his access to the court and

outlast his lawful presence in the Republic, thereby barring his access to the court and
rendering the principal relief nugatory. The second was what he called “fluid asset
lockdown”, namely that the continued deactivation of the funded account prevented
him from managing real-time market risk and caused continuous commercial harm not
remediable by damages.

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[7] The difficulty is that these assertions lack a factual foundation sufficient to meet
Rule 6(12). The respondent submits that the applicant has not explained why leaving
South Africa temporarily would hinder him from pursuing proceedings via legal
representatives, or why he could not return if his personal attendance becomes
necessary. Furthermore, the respondent points to the applicant’s own visa records,
which reportedly show at least two instances of leaving and re-entering the country
within a year, including same-day trips. These records serve as objective material
undermining the claim that his current departure would prevent him from engaging in
future litigation.

[8] There is thus nothing in the papers that convinces me that substantial redress
would not be available in due course. The dispute is at its core a commercial
contractual dispute concerning the alleged termination of a funded account, the refusal
of a payout request, and the continuation of a trading relationship. The applicant does
not explain why, if he is ultimately right on the contract, damages, specific
performance, or other contractual relief pursued in the ordinary course would not
constitute substantial redress.

[9] The applicant’s submission regarding his visa expiry does not change that
conclusion. On his own version, he is presently in South Africa on a visitor’s visa. That
does not, without more, show that he cannot litigate in due course. The documents do
not prove that he cannot instruct lawyers, pursue proceedings remotely if needed, or
return to the country if required for the case.

[10] The requirement that substantial redress must be unavailable in due course is
a threshold jurisdictional requirement of urgent motion procedure. Where an applicant
fails to satisfy that requirement, the court should not relax the Rules merely because
the applicant would prefer an immediate commercial outcome.

[11] The respondent was required on severely truncated timelines to oppose an

[11] The respondent was required on severely truncated timelines to oppose an
urgent application seeking final mandatory relief. It was compelled to, in two court
days, investigate a complex commercial dispute and prepare the necessary affidavits
and heads of argument. In circumstances where urgency was not established, there
is no reason why costs should not follow the result.

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Order
[12] The following order is made:
1. The application is struck from the roll for lack of urgency, with
costs.


______________
WJ du Plessis
Judge of the High Court, Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg


Date of hearing:

30 July 2026
Date of judgment:

31 July 2026
For the applicant:

In person.
For the respondent:

S Meyer instructed by Ulrich Roux and
Associates.