CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case CCT 107/23
In the matter between:
SEIPATI JOYCE DITSOANE Applicant
and
ACWA POWER AFRICA HOLDINGS (PTY) LIMITED Respondent
Neutral citation: Ditsoane v ACWA P ower Africa Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2023]
ZACC 44
Coram: Maya DCJ, Kollapen J, Mathopo J, Mhlantla J, Rogers J,
Schippers AJ, Theron J and Tshiqi J
Judgments: Rogers J (unanimous)
Heard on: No hearing
Decided on: 12 December 2023
Summary: Notice of withdrawal of case — filed without client’s authority —
ratification and ostensible authority not proved
Labour Court – revival of withdrawn case
ORDER
2
On appeal from the Labour Court, Johannesburg:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal succeeds.
3. The Labour Court’s order of 24 October 2022 is set aside and replaced
with an order in the following terms:
“(a) The notice of withdrawal served by Mulima Denga Attorneys on
25 October 2017 is set aside as unauthorised.
(b) Insofar as needs be, the applicant’s statement of case is revived.
(c) There is no order as to costs.”
4. The parties are to bear their own costs in this Court and in the
Labour Appeal Court.
JUDGMENT
ROGERS J (Maya DCJ, Kollapen J, Mathopo J, Mhlantla J, Schippers AJ, Theron J
and Tshiqi J concurring):
Introduction
[1] The applicant, Ms Seipati Joyce Ditsoane , seeks leave to appeal a judgment of
the Labour Court. The effect of the Labour Court’s judgment is to bar the applicant
from pursuing her claim against the respondent, ACWA Power Africa
Holdings (Pty) Ltd, for unfair dismissal. The Chief Justice directed the parties to file
written submissions. The applicant was subsequently directed to file a full record. We
are deciding the case without an oral hearing.
ROGERS J
3
[2] The applicant began employment with the respondent in November 2015. On
27 October 2016, the respondent issued a retrenchment letter to the applicant stating
that she was to be dismissed with effect from 30 November 2016. The applicant referred
an unfair dismissal dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration (CCMA). On 5 December 2016 , the CCMA issued a certificate that the
dispute remained unresolved.
Litigation history
[3] On 11 May 2017, the applicant referred her unfair dismissal claim to the
Labour Court. At that stage she was represented by Mulima Denga Attorneys (MDA).
The respondent, which has at all material times been represented by
Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr (CDH), served a notice complaining that the statement of case
was excipiable and that the referral was out of time. The applicant promptly served an
application to condone the late referral. The respondent delivered an exception. The
condonation application was set down for hearing on 3 November 2017 and the
exception on 17 November 2017.
[4] On 24 October 2017, the applicant consulted with another firm of attorneys,
Ndumiso Voyi Incorporated (NVI), to get a second opinion on her case. NVI a dvised
her that she had good prospects of success but that her statement of claim needed to be
substantially amended. On the same day, the applicant informed MDA that she would
be changing attorneys and that they should file a notice of withdrawal.
[5] The next day MDA, evidently having misunderstood their instructions , sent an
email to CDH, copied to the applicant. In this email, MDA stated that the applicant had
informed them the previous evening that her husband had advised her to get the services
of another lawyer “and that we should withdraw the matter henceforth”. Later that day,
ROGERS J
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MDA delivered a notice in terms of rule 13(1) of the Labour Court’s rules, 1 purporting
to withdraw the applicant’s case.
[6] On 26 October 2017 , NVI, unaware of what M DA had done , wrote to CDH
attaching a notice substituting themselves as the applicant’s attorneys; stating that she
intended amending her statement of claim and to supplement her condonation
application; and proposing that the matter enrolled for hearing on 3 November 2017 be
removed from the roll. CDH replied that MDA had delivered a notice withdrawing the
case; that the applicant would need to bring a substantive application to demonstrate
why the notice of withdrawal should be set aside and the case revived; that the applicant
would have to tender wasted costs for 3 November 2017; and that only if the case was
revived would she be entitled to bring an application to amend her statement of case
and supplement her condonation application.
[7] On 1 November 2017, NVI con tacted MDA to query the notice of withdrawal,
stating that the applicant’s instruction had only been that MDA should withdraw as her
attorneys. MDA acknowledged its error and later confirmed this under oath.
[8] On 3 November 2017, the Labour Court made an order purported ly by consent.
In terms of this order, the condonation application was postponed sine die (without a
fixed new date), with the applicant to pay the wasted costs. The order provided, further,
that the applicant was granted leave, within 10 days, “to file an affidavit explaining why
the statement of case ought to be revived, failing which the statement of case will remain
withdrawn in its entirety”. How this order came to be made is not altogether clear:
(a) According to the applicant, NVI and CDH merely agreed that the matter
would be removed from the roll, with the applicant to pay the wasted
1 Rule 13(1)(a) states:
“A party who has initiated proceedings and wants to withdraw the matter must deliver a notice
of withdrawal as soon as possible.”
ROGERS J
5
costs. There was no agreement putting the applicant to terms to explain
why the statement of case should be revived.
(b) The attorney at CDH who dealt with the matter in November 2017 is no
longer with that firm, so CDH cannot positively assert that the order was
in all respects by agreement. What CDH says is that the respondent’s
attorney was present at court on 3 November 2017 whereas the applicant’s
attorney was not.
[9] According to the applicant, it was only on 18 January 2018 that she learnt that
an order had been made on 3 November 2017 putting her to terms to file an affidavit
explaining why her statement of case should be revived. This seems to be borne out by
the fact that on 19 January 2018 CDH sent a copy of the order to NVI and on
21 January 2018 apologised to NVI for only bringing the order to the latter’s attention
sometime after the order was handed down. In the same let ter, CDH agreed that the
10-day period for filing the revival application would only run from 19 January 2018.
[10] On 24 January 2018, the applicant served an application
(interlocutory application) to set aside the notice of withdrawal filed by MDA. She also
claimed relief in respect of condonation and the exception, but that is not now germane.
The respondent opposed the interlocutory application. One of the grounds of opposition
was that the interlocutory application had not been served within 10 days from
3 November 2017. In the light of CDH’s letter of 21 January 2018, this ground of
opposition is puzzling, to say the least.
[11] The interlocutory application was set down for hearing on 28 January 2022. The
applicant’s uncontested evidence is that the four-year delay was due to the
Labour Court’s congested rolls and not to any fault on her side. On 21 January 2022,
the applicant served an application to condone her failure to deliver the
interlocutory application within 10 days from 3 November 2017. I n view of the
agreement between NVI and CDH that the 10 days would run from 19 January 2018,
ROGERS J
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this condonation application should have been unnecessary. Unsurprisingly, the
respondent did not oppose condonation. When the matter was called on
28 January 2022, condonation was argued on an unopposed basis. On 31 January 2022,
the Labour Court delivered a short judgment granting condonation.2
[12] The seemingly unnecessary step of condonation led to a further delay of nearly
nine months. Again, the applicant’s uncontested evidence is that this delay had nothing
to do with her. Eventually, the interlocutory application was argued on
20 October 2022. In its judgment delivered on 24 October 2022, 3 the Labour Court
(Van Niekerk J) dismissed the interlocutory application with no order as to costs. The
Labour Court refused leave to appeal, as did the Labour Appeal Court.
[13] In this Court, the respondent filed a notice to abide the application for leave to
appeal, adding that if this Court granted leave it would oppos e the appeal. However,
this Court’s uniform practice is to deal simultaneously with an application for leave to
appeal and any resultant appeal. In response to the Chief Justice’s directions, both
parties filed submissions on the merits of the proposed appeal.
The Labour Court’s judgment
[14] Although the applicant sought the setting aside of the notice of withdrawal , the
Judge treated her application as being, in substance, a revival application as
contemplated in the order of 3 November 2017. The test to b e applied, said the Judge,
was the test ordinarily applied by the Labour Court in an application to reinstate or
retrieve an archived file. The Court had to recognise the respondent’s interest in finality
but should also take into account all relevant fac tors, including the explanation
proffered, the prospects of success in the main action, the respect ive prejudice to the
parties and the interests of justice.
2 Ditsoane v ACWA Power Africa Holdings (Pty) Ltd (JS 259/2017) [2022] ZALCJHB 1.
3 Ditsoane v ACWA Power Africa Holdings (Pty) Ltd (JS 259/2017) [2022] ZALCJHB 299.
ROGERS J
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[15] The Judge recorded the “breakdown in communication” that had occurred
between the applicant and MDA which led to the latter filing the notice of withdrawal.
The Judge accepted that her explanation was reasonable and that she had not intended
to withdraw her claim.
[16] But that, the Judge continued, was not the end of the matter. He also had to take
into account “the long period of delay since the notice was filed, all of that delay
occasioned by the applicant”. More than six years had passed since her dismissal, a nd
her case had not progressed beyond the referral of a statement of claim. The applicant
acknowledged that her statement of claim was defective and an exception against it was
still pending. In those circumstances, “there is little prospect of a trial date within the
next few years”. According to the Judge, the prejudice to the respondent w as obvious
– it would have to defend the case “years after the event”. Also to be taken into account
was the “statutory purpose of efficient and expeditious dispute resolution”, which would
be frustrated if the matter were allowed to proceed.
[17] As to the applicant’s prospects of success, the Judge did not regard them “to be
such as to outweigh an inordinate delay and the prejudice that the respondent would
suffer were the application to be granted”.
Directions and submissions
The directions
[18] The Chief Just ice’s directions required the parties, in addition to any other
matters they wished to canvass, to address the following questions:
“(a) On the assumption that the notice of withdrawal filed by [M DA] on
25 October 2017 was filed without the applicant’s actual authority, did the
filing of that notice have any legal effect or bring about the withdrawal of her
application?
(b) If the answer to question (a) is that the filing of the notice did not have the
effect of bringing about the withdrawal of her appli cation, did the applicant
ROGERS J
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need an order reviving her application or setting aside the notice of
withdrawal?”
The applicant’s submissions
[19] The applicant submits that, on the uncontested evidence, the notice of withdrawal
was indeed filed without her actual authority. The mandate initially given to MDA was
to prosecute her claim. Withdrawing the claim was the total opposite of the mandate.
The applicant was thus not bound by the purported notice of withdrawal. An implied
authority to withdraw a case does not fall within the scope of the implied authority
recognised in Kruizenga.4
[20] There was also , the applicant submits, no apparent or ostensible authority.
Although MDA’s email of 25 October 2017 spoke of the withdrawal of the claim, the
same email recorded that the applicant was going to appoint new attorneys to handle
the matter. Withdrawing the case was inconsistent with her intention as thus recorded.
[21] The purported notice of withdrawal, the applicant thus contends, did not bring
about the withdrawal of her claim in the Labour Court and there was no need for an
order reviving her claim. However, the order of 3 November 2017 required the
applicant to take steps for the revival of her claim. Unless she took step s (which she
did by bringing the interlocut ory application), the order would have had the effect of
treating her case as at an end.
The respondent’s submissions
[22] The respondent does not argue that MDA had the applicant’s actual authority to
withdraw the case, although the respondent does not explicitly concede the point. The
respondent submits that, if this Court accepts the applicant’s allegation of an absence
of actual authority, we should find that the applicant by conduct ratified the withdrawal.
4 MEC for Economic Affairs, Environment & Tourism: Eastern Cape v Kruizenga [2010] ZASCA 58; 2010 (4)
SA 122 (SCA); [2010] 4 All SA 23 (SCA).
ROGERS J
9
The respondent bases this argument on the fact that the applicant did not voice
disagreement in response to MDA’s email of 25 October 2017 and did nothing for about
three months until the interlocutory application was served on 24 January 2018.
[23] In the alternative, the respondent submits that the appli cant should be estopped
from denying MDA’s authority to withdraw the case. With reference to Kruizenga, the
respondent argues that the applicant represented to the respondent, which reasonably
believed, that MDA had “the usual and customary powers” associated with appointment
as an attorney. The respondent had no reasonable basis to question MDA’s authority to
file the notice of withdrawal. Although, according to Kruizenga, a court may on
grounds of equity reject reliance on estoppel, it would not be equ itable to do so in the
present case, since there is obvious prejudice to the respondent. But for the withdrawal
notice, the respondent would have proceeded with its opposition to the condonation
application on 3 November 2017 and with its exception on 17 November 2017. In that
event, the matter might have reached finality six years ago.
Jurisdiction and leave to appeal
[24] The effect of the Labour Court’s judgment is to preclude the applicant from
pursuing her claim for unfair dismissal. This prejudicially affects her right to fair labour
practices, which is guaranteed by section 23(1) of the Constitution. It also impacts on
her right, guaranteed by section 34 of the Constitution, to have her labour dispute
resolved by the application of law in a fair public hearing before a court. This Court
thus has jurisdiction.
[25] Whether leave to appeal should be granted depends on the interests of justice.
A relevant consideration is prospects of success. As I shall pre sently explain, the
applicant enjoys good prospects of success. Prospects of success will not necessarily
be decisive. Where a case does not involve any important issue of principle and turns
on the particular circumstances of a case, it might not be in the interests of justice for
this Court’s resources to be expended on resolving it. In the present case, however, we
are able to do justice without having to convene an oral hearing. A judgment from this
ROGERS J
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Court may provide guidance in how matters of this kind should be approached. It is
thus in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal.
The merits
MDA’s authority to withdraw the case
[26] The uncontested evidence is that the applicant asked M DA to withdraw as her
attorneys and that MDA misunderstood her instruction. In the condonation application
argued in January 2022, the responsible attorney at MDA filed a confirmatory affidavit
to this effect. The filing of the notice of withdrawal of the case thus occurred without
the applicant’s actual authority.
[27] The respondent’s contention that the applicant ratified MDA’s withdrawal of the
case is untenable. The evidence is clear that the applicant wanted MDA to withdraw as
her attorneys so that NVI could continue with the claim on her behalf. There is nothing
to show that the applicant, as a layperson, must have understood, from MDA’s email of
25 October 2017, that M DA was intent on withdrawing the whole case. This is
particularly so since the same email spoke of her intention to use new attorneys. The
very next day, NVI sent an email to CDH attaching a notice of substitution and making
proposals from which it was clear that the applicant intended to carry on with the case.
The delay from 3 November 2017 to 18 January 2018 is explained by the fact that t he
applicant was unaware until 18 January 2018 that she had been put to terms to take
action in order to prevent her case from being deemed to be permanently abandoned.
[28] In Kruizenga,5 which concerned High Court litigation, Cachalia JA was careful
to emphasise that the issue in that case was whether a party may resile from agreements
made by his attorney, without his knowledge, at a rule 37 conference. He emphasise d
that his judgment did “not deal with agreements reached outside of the context of
conducting a trial in the normal course of events”.6
5 Id.
6 Id at para 6.
ROGERS J
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[29] After a survey of various authorities, Cachalia JA summarised the position of an
attorney’s implied authority thus:
“To summarise it would appear that our courts have dealt with questions relating to the
actual authority of an attorney to transact on the client’s behalf in the following manner:
Attorneys generally do not have implied authority to settle or comprise a claim without
the consent of the client. However, the instruction to an attorney to sue or defend the
claim may include the implied authority to do so provided the attorney acts in good
faith. And the courts have said that they will set aside a settlement or compromise that
does not have the client’s authority where, objectively viewed, it app ears that the
agreement is unjust and not in the client’s best interests.”7
[30] Implied authority is a form of actual authority. If an attorney does something
that is contrary to the express instructions of the client, it is contrary to the attorney’s
actual authority. The fact that the attorney’s act would, but for the client’s express
contrary instruction, have been within the attorney’s implied authority does not convert
the act from an unauthorised one into an authorised one. However, the fact that the act
would, but for the contrary instruction, have been within the attorney’s implied
authority may be relevant in deciding whether the client is estopped from denying the
attorney’s actual authority.
[31] In Kruizenga, Cachalia JA said that the appointment of an attorney may
constitute a representation by the client that the attorney has “the usual and customary
powers associated with the appointment”. In the context of that particular case, the
usual and customary powers were said to include “instructing coun sel to defend the
claim, to draft the plea and to attend all pre -trial procedures, including rule 37
conferences”.8 The Court’s conclusion was that the defendant was estopped from
denying the authority of his attorney to reach certain agreements during pr e-trial
7 Id at para 11.
8 Id at para 17.
ROGERS J
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procedures, namely conceding the merits and admitting certain heads of damages, even
though these agreements were contrary to the client’s express instructions.
[32] In response to an argument that permitting estoppel to operate in this way could
lead to grave injustice, Cachalia JA said that, “because estoppel is a rule of justice and
equity, it is open to a court to disallow the defence on this ground”. 9 In that particular
case, however, the Court did not consider that justice and equity required rel iance on
estoppel to be disallowed.
[33] On the facts of the present case, there is no merit in the respondent’s invocation
of apparent or ostensible authority. The applicant herself did nothing to convey to the
respondent or CDH that MDA had authority to withdraw her claim. We have not been
referred to any authority in support of the proposition that, when an attorney is mandated
to pursue a claim, it is part of the attorney’s “usual and customary powers” to withdraw
the case out of the blue. By “out of the blue”, I mean a notice of withdrawal which the
other side was not expecting to receive pursuant, for example, to settlement discussions
at a pre-trial conference. And I emphasise, in fairness to MDA, that they did not deliver
the notice of withdrawal in the purported exercise of a discretion conferred on them by
a general mandate. MDA only acted as they did because they mistakenly believed that
this was the applicant’s specific instruction.
[34] In Ras,10 an attorney had, without authority, withdrawn his c lient’s licensing
application at the hearing of a liquor board. A Full Court of the Cape Provincial
Division of the Supreme Court said that it was clear from the authorities that a client is
not bound by the actions of his legal representative where the l atter “has exceeded the
mandate given him and he has achieved an object that had not been intended by his
principal”.11 The Court referred to a statement by one of the old authorities that “for
9 Id at para 21.
10 Ras v Liquor Licensing Board, Area No 11, Kimberley 1966 (2) SA 232 (C).
11 Id at 237E-F.
ROGERS J
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acts of great prejudice the attorney needs a special mandate”. 12 This applied to “any
material alteration in the object of the suit”. 13 The Court also referred14 to De Vos v
Calitz,15 where a distinction was drawn between an act performed by an attorney in the
course of his authority and discretion as an attorney and an act performed by an attorney
in the mistaken belief as to his client’s instructions.16
[35] Although apparent or ostensible authority cannot be based on the unauthorised
agent’s own conduct, MDA’s email of 25 October 2017 was in any event contradictory
or equivocal, since it referred not only to withdrawal but to the applicant’s intention to
appoint new attorneys. The very next day, the respondent’s attorneys received a notice
of substitution from NVI together with proposals which showed that the applicant was
intent on pursuing the pending case. At best for the respondent, it received mixed and
conflicting signals.
[36] I cannot accept the respondent’s contention that it acted to its prejudice in
reliance on M DA’s supposed authority. By the time the order was made on
3 November 2017, the respondent and its attorneys clearly knew that the applicant was
intending to pursue her claim and had not intended for it to be withdrawn. The
respondent complains that, but for the notice of withdrawal, it might have ach ieved
finality pursuant to the proceedings scheduled for hearing on 3 and 17 November 2017.
But the respondent did not give up those hearings in the belief that the case had been
withdrawn. The respondent knew that the applicant was contesting the suppos ed
12 Id at 237G-H.
13 Id at 238A.
14 Id at 238B -C. The statements from Ras to which I have referred in footnotes 10 to 13 were approved by a
Full Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in Transvaal Canoe Union v Butgereit 1990
(3) SA 398 (T) at 409E-410G. See also paras 21-2 of the judgment of a Full Court of the Eastern Cape Division
of the High Court in Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Rozani [2007] ZAECHC 113.
15 De Vos v Calitz & De Villiers 1916 CPD 465.
16 See also Forget v Knott 1921 EDL 164 at 172:
“It seems to me on the authorities quoted by Mr Van der Riet that an attorney, being a special
agent as far as this particular case is concerned, has no authority to do more than prosecute it to
its final determination in the interests of his client, and as soon as he proceeds to do something
which on the face of it is not for the benefit of his client, the opposite party is put upon enquiry,
and the attorney’s client can repudiate it.”
ROGERS J
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withdrawal. The respondent was seeking to take advantage of an error by insisting that
the enrolled matters be postponed and that the applicant motivate why her case should
be revived. If the respondent had simply acknowledged that MDA’s filing of the notice
of withdrawal was an error, the applicant would, in the absence of agreement by the
respondent, have had to apply for a postponement of the hearings on
3 and 17 November 2017.
[37] Since MDA had neither actual nor apparent or ostensible authority to wi thdraw
the applicant’s case, she was not bound by the notice of withdrawal. Although the Judge
who dealt with the matter on 3 November 2017 may not have known that the notice of
withdrawal was unauthorised, this was clearly established in the interlocutor y
application. Accordingly, the Labour Court should have found that, since the case was
never withdrawn, there was no need to revive it. The applicant should not have been
treated as a supplicant for an indulgence.
The Labour Court’s refusal to “revive” the claim
[38] Even if one assumes against the applicant that she needed the indulgence of a
revival, the Labour Court plainly misdirected itself in refusing to revive her case. 17 A
very important consideration was that the applicant never intended to withdraw her case,
something which the Judge evidently accepted.
[39] Where the Judge went astray was in his cursory discussion of delay. He said he
had to take into account “the long period of delay since the notice was filed”. The Judge
was presumably referring to the unauthorised notice of withdrawal, which was filed on
25 October 2017. There was a delay of five years from that date until the Labour Court
heard the interlocutory application in October 2022. The Judge regarded the whole of
that delay as attributable to the applicant. That is manifestly wrong:
17 The Labour Appeal Court has held that an applicant ma y be permitted to withdraw a notice of withdrawal,
thereby reinstating the case: Ellies Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration [2020] ZALAC 33; 2020 JDR 2897 (LAC) at para 12.
ROGERS J
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(a) The first period of delay, about three months, was from 25 October 2017
to 24 January 2018, when the applicant served her interlocutory
application. An intervening event was the order of 3 November 2017.
The applicant was unaware of that order, and in particular the requirement
that she file a revival application, until 18 January 2018. When she
became aware of it, she promptly delivered her interlocutory application,
well within the new 10 -day period to which the respondent had agreed.
The applicant was not at fault in this regard. To the extent that her failure
to comply with the initial 10 -day period required condonation, the
Labour Court later granted condonation.
(b) The second period of delay, about four years, was from 24 January 2018
to 28 January 2022, when the interlocutory application was initially
scheduled to be heard. It is uncontested that this period of delay was
entirely attributable to the Labour Court’s congested rolls. An additional
reason was, of course, that the respondent chose to oppose the revival of
the applicant’s case, despite not being able to contest that the withdrawal
had occurred without her authority.
(c) The third period of delay, about nine months, was from 28 January 2022
to 20 October 2022, when the interlocutory application was finally heard
on its merits. The reason why the interlocutory application could not be
argued on 28 January 2022 is that the applicant was put to the unnecessary
burden of bringing an application to condone non -compliance with the
10-day period mentioned in the order of 3 November 2017 – unnecessary,
because CDH had agreed that the 10 days would only run from
19 January 2018 and the applicant brought her application within the new
10-day period. In the event, condonation was granted unopposed.
[40] The Labour Court’s misdirection on delay so tainted its assessment of the matter
that we are entitled to consider the matter afresh. Given that the withdrawal of the case
was unintended and unauthorised an d that the applicant was not responsible for the
ROGERS J
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ensuing delay, it would be most unjust to bar her from proceeding with her case. Insofar
as prospects of success are concerned, on the applicant’s version there was virtually no
consultation prior to her re trenchment. She also attacks the retrenchment decision on
its merits. The respondent has not sought to persuade us that revival should be refused
because of poor prospects. The respondent has also not sought to establish trial
prejudice.
[41] In the result, the appeal must succeed. Although I question the respondent’s
conduct in resisting the applicant’s attempts to get her case back on track, I do not think
that this is sufficient to mark our displeasure with a costs order. I will thus follow the
lead of the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court in making no order as to costs.
Order
[42] The following order is made:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal succeeds.
3. The Labour Court’s order of 24 October 2022 is set aside and replaced
with an order in the following terms:
“(a) The notice of withdrawal served by Mulima Denga Attorneys on
25 October 2017 is set aside as unauthorised.
(b) Insofar as needs be, the applicant’s statement of case is revived.
(c) There is no order as to costs.”
4. The parties are to b ear their own costs in this Court and in the
Labour Appeal Court.
For the Applicant: Ndumiso Voyi Incorporated.
For the Respondent: M Edwards
Instructed by Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr
Incorporated.