Benicon Group v National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa and Others (622/97, 623/97) [1999] ZASCA 78 (1 October 1999)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour law — Unfair dismissal — Reinstatement — Appellant dismissed workers for participating in a nationwide stay-away called by a political alliance — Workers sought reinstatement, claiming unfair dismissal — Industrial Court ordered reinstatement for some workers; Labour Appeal Court overturned this, finding all dismissals were unfair — Appellant challenged findings of the Labour Appeal Court regarding the workers' understanding of stay-away policies — Court held that the fairness of the dismissals must be assessed in light of all relevant facts, ultimately affirming the Labour Appeal Court's decision that the dismissals constituted an unfair labour practice and ordering reinstatement of all dismissed workers.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned an appeal in labour law relating to an alleged unfair labour practice, specifically whether the dismissal of a large group of employees for participation in a nationwide stay-away amounted to an unfair labour practice and whether reinstatement was an appropriate remedy.


The appellant was The Benicon Group, a company operating in the mining and civil engineering sectors and involved in leasing related equipment. The respondents were the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) and 185 individual employees who had been dismissed.


The procedural history was as follows. The employees and NUMSA instituted unfair labour practice proceedings in the Industrial Court, where reinstatement was sought. The Industrial Court ordered reinstatement only for employees at the Syferfontein site, and refused relief for the remaining employees. The unsuccessful employees appealed to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC). The LAC allowed the appeal, set aside the Industrial Court’s refusal (in respect of the remaining employees), and ordered reinstatement on terms no less favourable than those existing at dismissal, with reinstatement effective only from 20 February 1996 (the date of the Industrial Court’s determination). Benicon then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether dismissals for participation in repeated stay-aways—particularly the stay-away on 3 and 4 August 1992—were fair in the circumstances, considering both employee conduct and employer conduct in managing workplace communication and discipline.


2. Material Facts


On 16 June 1992 (Soweto Day), Benicon experienced its first stay-away. The day before, on 15 June 1992, Benicon and union representatives met and agreed that the stay-away would be dealt with on a “no work/no pay/no penalty” basis. After this stay-away, management issued a memorandum to all staff stating that in future disciplinary action would be taken against any person participating in an illegal strike/stay-away.


On 23 July 1992, most of the employees (excluding those at the Syferfontein site) participated in another stay-away in the form of a march. Disciplinary charges were formulated for failure to report for duty, absence without permission, and disobeying company rules. On 25 July 1992, disciplinary hearings were held and dismissals were imposed, but these dismissals were not implemented because the parties agreed to meet on 28 July 1992.


That meeting on 28 July 1992—referred to as the “tentberaad”—was attended by the workforce and management. A central factual dispute at later stages of the litigation was whether a binding policy agreement on future stay-aways was concluded at this meeting. The Industrial Court found that workers agreed to a forward-looking operational arrangement aimed at minimising disruption (including working hours in advance to build stockpiles and providing a core staff during stay-aways). The LAC, however, found that no final or binding agreement was reached at the tentberaad. The SCA accepted the LAC’s finding on this point.


At the tentberaad, the earlier dismissals for the 23 July stay-away were withdrawn. There was also a factual dispute about whether an oral final warning was issued at that time, but the LAC treated this as not decisive for the overall fairness enquiry.


A further significant development was the establishment of a liaison committee at the tentberaad, elected in the presence of management. The LAC found that the liaison committee initiative originated with management, that it was intended to liaise about future stay-aways, and that it replaced the shop stewards’ committee. The LAC accepted that management did not deliberately seek to sideline the union, but described management’s initiative as an imprudent “gaffe”.


After union concerns were raised that the liaison committee could be “taking the union out”, workers decided on 29 July 1992 that the committee members should withdraw. On 30 July 1992, committee representatives withdrew; the reason given at the time was found by the LAC to be evasive, and the more accurate reason was an objection to bypassing union structures.


With the liaison committee collapsed, the parties did not finalise arrangements (such as advance work for stockpiling or agreeing on a core staff) before the planned nationwide stay-away of 3 and 4 August 1992. Instead, on 31 July 1992, management placed a memorandum in pay packets warning that those not at work on 3 August would face “no work no pay” and bonus penalisation steps, and that those not at work on 4 August (or future stay-away days) would run the risk of being “DISCHARGED IMMEDIATELY”.


On 3 and 4 August 1992, only 63 employees reported for duty. On 5 August, employees received notices to attend disciplinary hearings for alleged misconduct of being absent without permission on 3 and 4 August. On 6 August, following a mass hearing requested by workers, employees were found guilty of misconduct.


Further discussions occurred on 7 August and 10 August, focusing on how future stay-aways would be handled, including whether participation would result in discipline and whether employees would commit to working during future stay-aways. No agreement was reached. The employees insisted on a “no work/no pay/no penalty” principle for future stay-aways and demanded full security for any personnel who might work during such events. Benicon proposed that dismissals would be avoided if all employees signed a detailed agreement requiring 100% attendance and performance during any future stay-away/mass action/illegal strike and providing for immediate dismissal for breach. The proposal was rejected, and the employees were dismissed retrospectively from 4 August.


It was common cause that Benicon was nevertheless willing to take employees back on strict conditions. Some employees were re-employed on terms that included an undertaking not to participate in future illegal industrial action or stay-aways, and that a final written warning would replace the dismissal sanction in their case.


The Industrial Court’s conclusion that Benicon’s contracts with customers were cancelled because of the August production standstill was rejected by the LAC, which found that the evidence did not establish the necessary causal link between cancellations and the standstill.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether Benicon’s dismissal of the employees for their participation in the 3–4 August 1992 stay-away, in the context of the preceding events, constituted an unfair labour practice and, if so, whether reinstatement was justified and on what temporal basis.


A further question concerned the proper approach to and effect of the LAC’s factual findings on appeal, including whether the SCA was bound by those findings (particularly findings relating to the cause of the breakdown in communications and the significance of the liaison committee initiative).


The dispute primarily involved the application of law to fact and, as the SCA emphasised, a moral or value judgment centred on the ultimate determinant of fairness to both employer and employee. While certain factual disputes existed, the SCA treated the decisive enquiry as the evaluative assessment of fairness in light of the materially established facts.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The SCA (per Farlam AJA, with Zulman JA and Madlanga AJA concurring) framed the enquiry as one requiring a value judgment on fairness, with fairness understood as fairness to both sides. The Court considered that the outcome turned not on isolated factual findings but on the overall assessment of the circumstances leading to and following the stay-away and the dismissals.


A significant aspect of the reasoning concerned the relevance of the employees’ perception of the stay-away. Relying on the approach articulated in the Freegold decision, the SCA accepted that even if a stay-away is not necessarily treated as legitimate protest in the legal sense, the fact that participants perceived it to be legitimate and believed they had good reason to be absent can operate as a mitigating factor in evaluating fairness and proportionality of dismissal.


The SCA also addressed Benicon’s argument that management’s initiation of the liaison committee was irrelevant because the employees would have participated in the nationwide stay-away in any event. The SCA rejected the contention that the “tentberaad” and liaison committee events were causally irrelevant. While it accepted that the stay-away probably would have occurred irrespective of the tentberaad, it found that Benicon itself relied on the operational and commercial risk created by the stay-away (including the inability to stockpile coal) as an aggravating factor justifying dismissal. In that context, the SCA accepted the LAC’s finding that management was in central measure responsible for the breakdown in communication after the liaison committee failed, and reasoned that this breakdown contributed to the absence of mitigating operational arrangements. That reduced the weight that could fairly be placed on the employer’s argument that the company’s continued existence was imperilled solely by employee conduct.


On the contested issue of whether the SCA was bound by the LAC’s factual findings, Farlam AJA initially indicated a willingness to assume (without deciding) that the SCA might overturn certain LAC factual findings, but later explicitly stated that the Court was bound by the LAC’s key finding that management bore central responsibility for the communications breakdown and that there was no basis to overturn it under any of the approaches discussed in Betha and Others v BTR Sarmcol. The Court found no misdirection by the LAC and no basis to conclude that the LAC’s finding was one that no reasonable court could reach.


A further evaluative element in the SCA’s reasoning concerned proportionality of sanction. The Court noted that Benicon remained willing, even after the stay-away, to retain employees if they agreed not to participate in future illegal stay-aways, and that breach of such an agreement could later justify dismissal. However, the Court reasoned that a substantially similar protective outcome for the employer could have been achieved through a final written warning, rather than dismissal at that stage. The SCA emphasised, consistently with the approach approved in Freegold, that dismissal is the ultimate sanction and should generally be reserved as a last resort. On this basis, the Court concluded that disciplinary action falling short of dismissal would have been the fairer response in the particular circumstances.


The Court also treated the LAC’s limitation of reinstatement to operate only from the date of the Industrial Court order as itself reflecting that some disciplinary consequence for employees was appropriate, because the employees were not treated as blameless; rather, the fairness assessment did not justify the ultimate sanction of dismissal.


The judgment included a dissent by Olivier JA (with Hefer JA concurring). The dissent disagreed with the LAC’s assessment that management was centrally responsible for the communications breakdown, concluded that such a finding was not one a reasonable court could reach, and treated the employer’s demand for an undertaking not to participate in future illegal stay-aways as inherently reasonable. The dissent considered that the refusal to give such an undertaking was unreasonable and that, on an overall fairness assessment, dismissal was justified, particularly given repeated illegal stay-aways and operational pressures. The majority, however, maintained that even accepting the unlawfulness of the conduct, the fairness enquiry could still require a lesser sanction in the circumstances.


The SCA also dealt with three condonation applications (two by Benicon, one by the respondents). The Court granted all three. It accepted that Benicon’s late filings were attributable to its attorney’s negligence rather than Benicon’s default, and that Benicon had left the litigation to its attorney with no obvious basis to detect the extent of delay. Costs of Benicon’s condonation applications were awarded against Benicon, consistent with a concession by its counsel.


5. Outcome and Relief


The SCA (majority) dismissed Benicon’s appeal against the LAC’s judgment and confirmed that the dismissals constituted an unfair labour practice, with reinstatement as ordered by the LAC (including the limitation that reinstatement operated from 20 February 1996, not earlier).


Benicon’s two condonation applications (late notice of appeal and late record) were granted, but Benicon was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of those applications, including costs of opposition. The respondents’ condonation application (late affidavit opposing Benicon’s condonation for the record) was also granted.


The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.


Cases Cited


National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold and Uranium Co Ltd [1991] ZASCA 168; 1992 (1) SA 700 (A).


Performing Arts Council of the Transvaal v Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers’ Union and Others [1993] ZASCA 201; 1994 (2) SA 204 (A).


National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd and Others [1996] ZASCA 69; 1996 (4) SA 577 (A).


Betha and Others v BTR Sarmcol, a Division of BTR Dunlop Ltd [1998] ZASCA 5; 1998 (3) SA 349 (SCA).


National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines (Operations) Ltd; President Steyn Mine; President Brand Mine; Freddies Mine [1995] ZASCA 109; 1996 (1) SA 422 (A).


National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development Co (Pty) Ltd 1997 (4) SA 51 (SCA).


Duke and Others v Nasionale Sweiswerke (Pty) Ltd [1998] ZASCA 52; 1998 (3) SA 956 (SCA).


National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd and Others 1996 (4) SA 562 (A).


Benicon Group v National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa and Others [1996] 3 BLLR 330 (IC).


Benicon Group v National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa and Others (1997) 18 ILJ 123 (LAC).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was expressly cited in the judgment text provided.


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were expressly cited in the judgment text provided. The Court dealt with condonation in relation to late filing of the notice of appeal and the record, but without identifying particular numbered rules.


Held


The Supreme Court of Appeal (majority) concluded that Benicon’s dismissal of the respondent employees for participating in the 3–4 August 1992 stay-away, in the context of the preceding events and communications breakdown, amounted to an unfair labour practice. The Court accepted that fairness required consideration of mitigating features, including employees’ perception of the legitimacy of the stay-away and the employer’s role in the breakdown in communication that prevented workable operational arrangements before the stay-away.


The majority held that, although disciplinary action was warranted, dismissal was not fair in the circumstances because it was not the proportionate or last-resort response; a final written warning (or a similarly less drastic disciplinary step) could have achieved the necessary corrective and protective purpose without terminating employment.


The appeal was dismissed with costs (including two counsel), while various condonation applications were granted, with Benicon bearing the costs of its own condonation applications.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that determining whether conduct constitutes an unfair labour practice (in the dismissal context) requires an overall value judgment with fairness as the ultimate determinant, and fairness must be assessed to both employer and employee rather than from a single-sided perspective.


It reaffirmed the approach that dismissal is the ultimate sanction and generally a course of last resort, so that where the employer’s legitimate interests can be protected by a lesser sanction (such as a final written warning), fairness may require that lesser sanction instead of dismissal.


The judgment also applied the principle that, even where participation in a stay-away is unlawful or not treated as legitimate protest, employees’ subjective perception that the protest was legitimate (and that absence was for good reason) may be relevant as a mitigating factor in assessing the fairness of dismissal.


Finally, the judgment treated the employer’s conduct leading to a breakdown in workplace communication as potentially relevant to fairness, particularly where the employer relies on the operational consequences of the breakdown as aggravation justifying dismissal. In that context, the SCA accepted that key factual findings by the LAC regarding the cause and responsibility for such breakdown may bind the SCA absent a demonstrable basis to overturn them.

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[1999] ZASCA 78
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Benicon Group v National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa and Others (622/97, 623/97) [1999] ZASCA 78; (1999) 20 ILJ 2777 (SCA) (1 October 1999)

CASE
NO. 622/97 & 623/97
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
In
the matter between
THE BENICON GROUP
APPELLANT
AND
NATIONAL UNION OF METAL WORKERS OF
SOUTH
AFRICA AND 185 OTHERS
RESPONDENTS
BEFORE
:
HEFER, OLIVIER, ZULMAN JJA, FARLAM AND MADLANGA AJJA
HEARD
: 3
SEPTEMBER 1999
DELIVERED
: 1
OCTOBER 1999
Labour law
- unfair dismissal - reinstatement
FARLAM
AJA
________________________________________________________________
J U D G M E N T
________________________________________________________________
FARLAM AJA:
[1] The
appellant is a company involved in the mining industry, the civil
engineering industry and in leasing out civil engineering
and mining
equipment. [2] On 10 August 1992 the appellant dismissed those of
its workers who had participated in a nationwide
stay-away which
took place on Monday 3 and 4 August 1992 and which was called by the
ANC - COSATU - SA Communist Party Alliance
to protest against the
collapse of the CODESA constitutional negotiations.
[3] The
dismissed workers, together with their union, the National Union of
Metalworkers of SA, sought reinstatement in unfair
labour practice
proceedings in the Industrial Court before Labuschagne AM.
All
the workers who were dismissed, with the exception of those who
worked at a site at Syferfontein, had participated in an
earlier
stay-away on 23 July 1992. The Industrial Court ordered the
reinstatement of the workers who were employed at the Syferfontein

site but the application failed in so far as it related to the other
employees.
[4] The
unsuccessful applicants appealed to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC)
where the matter was heard by Cameron J and two assessors.
The
appeal was allowed and the determination of the Industrial Court
(insofar as it related to the unsuccessful individual applicants)

was set aside and in its place was substituted a determination to
the effect that the dismissal of the individual applicants
was an
unfair labour practice and that they were to be reinstated in their
employ on terms and conditions no less favourable
than those which
were operative at the date of their dismissal. It was further
ordered that the reinstatement was to be effected
from 20 February
1996, being the date of the Industrial Court determination but not
from any preceding date. There was no order
as to the costs of the
appeal.
[5] The
judgment of the Industrial Court has been reported: see
[1996] 3
BLLR 330
(IC). The judgment of the LAC has also been reported:
see (1997) 18 ILJ 123 (LAC).
[6] Counsel for the appellant attacked some of the
findings made by the LAC
and submitted that this court is not
bound thereby. On the other hand counsel who appeared for the
respondents, relying on
National
Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold and Uranium Co Ltd
[1991] ZASCA 168
;
1992 (1) SA 700
(A) at 723 B - G,
Performing
Arts Council of the Transvaal
v
Paper, Printing,
Wood and Allied Workers’ Union and Others
[1993] ZASCA 201
;
1994 (2) SA 204
(A) at 214 E - F,
National
Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd and Others
[1996] ZASCA 69
;
1996 (4) SA 577
(A) at 593 H - I and 583 I - 584 C and the judgments
of Smalberger JA and Scott JA in
Betha
and Others v BTR Sarmcol, a Division of BTR Dunlop Ltd
[1998] ZASCA 5
;
1998 (3) SA 349
(SCA) at 387 C - F and 405 C - 406 E, contended
that this court is bound by such findings inasmuch as they related
to the facts.
The
main findings which counsel for the appellant attacked related to
the question as to whether the workers in the appellant’s

employ could have been
confused
about the appellant’s policy regarding stay-aways immediately
before they participated in the stay-away which took
place on 3 and
4 August. The findings of the LAC which appellant’s counsel
attacked are contained in the LAC’s reported
judgment at 145 E
- I. For the purposes of this judgment I am prepared to assume,
without deciding the point, that this Court
is entitled to overturn
the findings in question. On the view I take of the matter these
findings are not decisive on the question
as to whether the
appellant’s action in dismissing the individual respondents
was an unfair labour practice.
[7] This
court’s task is to pass what by its nature is a moral or value
judgment on the question as to whether the appellant’s
action
in dismissing the individual respondents amounted to an unfair
labour practice. The ultimate determinant in such an enquiry
is
fairness, by which is meant fairness to both the employer and the
employee.
[8] Obviously
the inquiry whether the dismissals in this case were fair or unfair
involves a consideration of all the relevant
facts. As the
judgments of both the Industrial Court and the LAC have been
reported it will be sufficient to give a summary
of the more
significant facts.
[9] The
first stay-away experienced by the appellant was on Soweto Day, 16
June 1992.
On
15 June 1992 the appellant had a meeting with representatives of the
union, viz the union organizer from Witbank and the elected
shop
stewards. It was agreed at the meeting that the 16 June stay-away
would be dealt with by the application of the principle
“no
work/no pay/no penalty”.
[10] After
the 16 June 1992 stay-away a meeting took place between the
management of the appellant and the union organiser and
three of the
shop stewards. After this meeting management issued a memorandum to
all staff members in which it was stated that
in future disciplinary
action would be taken against any person taking part in an illegal
strike/stay-away action.
[11] On
21 July a further meeting took place between management and the
union organiser and certain shop stewards. At this meeting
the
union organiser mentioned that the union planned certain actions
beginning on 22 July but not that a stay-away was anticipated
for
23 July.
[12] On
22 July, after 4 pm, one of the shop stewards told the appellant’s
managing director and its plant director that
a stay-away was
planned for the next day. On 23 July the planned stay-away, which
took the form of a march to the office of
the local receiver of
revenue, took place.
[13] On
24 July the workers returned to work and each was served with a
notice to attend a disciplinary hearing on 25 July. The
charges
were:
1 failing to report for duty on 23 July 1992;
2 absence without permission from work; and
3 disobeying company rules and regulations.
[14] On
25 July disciplinary hearings were held. Those who had stayed away
on 23 July were found guilty and dismissed. The
dismissals were
not implemented but instead, at the end of the proceedings on 25
July it was agreed that a meeting would be held
on Tuesday 28 July.
On 27 July the workers were given the day off to prepare themselves
for the meeting the following day.
[15] On
28 July the meeting to which I have referred was held at the
appellant’s head office between the whole workforce
and
representatives of management. The shop stewards were present but
no union officials. The meeting was held in a large marquee
tent
which was hired for the occasion. In evidence and argument this
meeting was called the “tentberaad”.
Although
there was a dispute in the evidence between Van Rooyen, the
appellant’s plant director, who was the only witness
called on
its behalf, and Maduna, one of the shop stewards, who testified on
behalf of the respondents, as to the purpose of
the “tentberaad”
the LAC found that the determination of stay-away policy was pivotal
to the meeting. A workers’
committee, or liaison committee,
was elected in the presence of management. The LAC found that the
liaison committee idea originated
with management and that its
purpose was to liaise with management on future stay-aways. The LAC
also found that the liaison
committee replaced the shop stewards
committee but that management in initiating the liaison committee
had not deliberately
attempted to sideline the union. Nevertheless,
so it was held, management had acted imprudently (albeit in good
faith) in procuring
the replacement of the union and elected union
representatives by the workers themselves. The LAC in fact
described management’s
action in initiating the liaison
committee as a “gaffe”.
[16] There
was a dispute on the evidence as to whether those present at the
“tentberaad” decided in principle, as
management
alleged, that the entire workforce would in future report for duty
in the event of a stay-away but, if not, the hours
to be lost would
be worked in, in advance, so as to stockpile coal. In addition it
was agreed, so the appellant averred, that
a core of workers would
in any event report for duty during stay-aways.
[17] The Industrial Court found that
the workers did agree at the “tentberaad” as the
appellant alleged: see its judgment
at 337 E - F. This finding was
overturned by the LAC which found that no final or binding agreement
was reached at the “tentberaad”:
see the LAC judgment at
134 F. In my opinion there is no basis for not accepting this
finding by the LAC, whichever of the approaches
to factual findings
of the LAC set out in the various judgments in
Betha
and Others v BTR Sarmcol, a Division of BTR Dunlop Ltd
,
supra
is adopted.
[18] At
the “tentberaad” the dismissals of the workers for
participating in the 23 July stay-away were withdrawn.
There was a
dispute between the parties as to whether after the dismissals were
withdrawn the workers were given an oral final
warning. Although
the LAC said that it was open to question whether or not a warning
was given it held (at 136 F) that “the
presence or absence of
such a warning and its status as final or otherwise is . . . not
decisive for the justice of the case”.
[19] On
Wednesday 29 July, after the union’s Witbank organizer had
warned one of the shop stewards that the election of
the liaison
committee meant “taking the union out”, the workers had
a meeting at which it was decided that those
elected to the liaison
committee would withdraw therefrom.
[20] During
the morning of Thursday 30 July the two headquarters representatives
on the committee met with management. After
lunch the headquarters
representatives did not return to the meeting: instead they sent a
letter saying that they had decided
to withdraw because “to be
in the committee is too demanding”. The LAC found that this
reason was absurd and evasive
and that the reason given later, that
they perceived the liaison committee to be a strategy of the
appellant designed to bypass
proper consultation with the duly
elected shop stewards’ committee and/or officials of the
union, was “both more
candid and more accurate” (at 135
G).
[21] Following
on the collapse of the liaison committee neither the representatives
of management nor the workers appear to have
made any effort to
re-establish lines of communication so that hours could be worked
in, in advance, so as to stockpile coal
before the impending two
day stay-away planned for 3 and 4 August (for which a general
nation-wide call had gone out some three
weeks before) and
arrangements could be made for a core of workers to work on 3 and 4
August. Instead management caused a memorandum
to be put in each
worker’s pay packet on Friday, 31 July 1992. This memorandum,
which each worker received just before
leaving on the “pay
weekend” immediately before the stay-away planned for Monday 3
and Tuesday 4 August, read as
follows:

VERY IMPORTANT NOTICE!!!
The following steps will be taken
against persons not at work on the 3
rd
of August 1992.
NO WORK NO PAY
NORMAL BONUS PENALIZATION PROCEDURE
Persons not at work on 4 August 1992 or any other day
in future on which a stay-away or mass action takes place, will run
the
risk of being
DISCHARGED IMMEDIATELY !!!
By order
BENICON MANAGEMENT”
[22] On
3 and 4 August only 63 of the appellant’s workforce reported
for duty.
[23] On
Wednesday 5 August the workers returned to work. Each received an
“Advice to Attend disciplinary Hearing”,
which read in
part as follows:

Alleged misconduct: not at
work on 3
rd
and 4
th
of August 1992. The charges against you are: Absent from work
without permission.”
[24] On
Thursday 6 August, after a mass hearing, conducted at the insistence
of the workers, they were found guilty of misconduct.
[25] Further
discussions then took place on Friday 7 and Monday 10 August. The
subject of the discussions was further stay-aways.
Van Rooyen
testified that these discussions were designed to ascertain whether
satisfactory arrangements could be made with
regard to future
stay-away actions, which could then serve as mitigation in the
determination of an appropriate sanction.
[26] No
agreement on this topic was arrived at. The workers insisted that
the principle “no work/no pay/no penalty”
should apply
in respect of future stay-aways and that if some personnel was to be
provided during future stay-aways management
had to furnish full
security for it.
[27] Appellant
was not prepared to agree thereto. Its response was to propose to
the union that the workers who had been found
guilty of misconduct
for participating in the stay-away should not be dismissed provided
every employee signed an agreement in
the following terms:

1 Hundred per cent attendance of all employees
during any further stay-away, mass action, illegal strike and/or any
planned or
unplanned work boycotts or go-slow actions.
2 With reference to the actions mentioned in para 1
Benicon would not only expect employees to be present at their
normal place
of work, but also to perform their normal duties at the
required production tempo.
3 Normal working hours must be adhered to during action
referred to in para 1.
4 Should the employees not attend work and perform as
stipulated in 1, 2 and 3, the employees’ action will be viewed
as
breach of this agreement and will be dismissed immediately.
5 Benicon undertakes not to lock out any employee who
wishes to attend work at such times referred to as in para 1.
6 All other Benicon rules and regulations must be
adhered to.”
This
proposal having been rejected, the workers were dismissed,
retrospectively from 4 August.
[28] Management
was however, despite the dismissals, prepared to take the workers
back, provided they accepted its terms. The
re-employment terms
included an absolute prohibition on future participation in
stay-aways. A Memorandum of Agreement dated
12 August between the
appellant and certain newly re-employed workers read:

1 The employee undertakes not to take part in
any future illegal industrial action, mass actions, or stay-aways,
and to be present
at his workplace and to perform his duties
faithfully.
2 The employee undertakes to abide by all the rules and
regulations of the company at all times.
3 The company undertakes not to lock out the employee
during any action referred to in para 1, if he turns up to work.
4 The company undertakes to sanction [rescind?] the
decision to dismiss the employee as a result of the disciplinary
hearing held
on 6 August 1992. Instead a final written warning will
be placed on his file.”
[29] The Industrial Court, as has
been said, refused the application for re-instatement save in so far
as it related to the workers
at the Syferfontein site. A
substantial part of its judgment is devoted to comparing the facts
of this case with those in
National
Union of Mineworkers & Others v Free State Consolidated Gold
Mines (Operations) Ltd; President Steyn Mine; President
Brand Mine;
Freddies Mine
,
[1995] ZASCA 109
;
1996
(1) SA 422
(A) (the “
Freegold
case”): see the reported judgment of
the
Industrial Court at 349 F - 353 C.
[30] One
of the factors strongly relied on by the Industrial Court in support
of its finding that the dismissals were not an unfair
labour
practice was the fact that the workers had, as the Industrial Court
put it, “reneged on their undertaking”
given at the
“tentberaad” to minimise the disruption of the
appellant’s operations: see the judgment at 351
E - F. As has
previously been pointed out, the Industrial Court’s finding
that such an undertaking was given by workers
at the “tentberaad”
was overturned by the LAC.
[31] The
Industrial Court also found that contracts the appellant had with
its customers had been cancelled because of the August
production
standstill. The LAC found that the evidence did not warrant this
finding and that it was never established that causally
the
cancellations which did take place thereafter were attributable to
the standstill.
[32] The
LAC held that the factual premises and reasoning on which the
Industrial Court concluded that the dismissals in this
case were
fair could not be sustained. It summarised its views on the merits
at 146 G - 147 C of the reported judgment.
[33] Among
the points made by the LAC was that management was “in central
measure responsible” for the breakdown in
communication
between management and the workers shortly before the pay weekend of
1 and 2 August, which preceded the stay-away.
This was because
“[i]ts liaison committee initiative was naive in its
conception and misdirected in its execution. After
this”, so
continued the LAC, “the formulation or finalisation of a
mutually acceptable policy in time for the 3 -
4 August stay-away
became impossible. To hold the workers solely liable, as the
Industrial Court did, is most inequitable.”
(See the judgment
at 146 H - I.)
[34] Mr
Rabie
,
who appeared on behalf of the appellant, contended that the LAC fell
into error in adopting this approach. He submitted that
even if the
appellant did make a mistake in initiating the election of the
liaison committee this factor was irrelevant to a
decision as to
whether the dismissals were unfair. He said that this was so
because it was clear that even if the “tentberaad”
had
not taken place the stay-away would still have occurred and the
dismissed workers would have participated therein.
[35] He
submitted further that the workers’ subjective perception of
their entitlement to join the stay-away was also irrelevant
to the
decision as to whether the dismissals were unfair and that the LAC
erred in regarding it as a mitigating factor.
[36] He
also argued that an important aggravating factor to which adequate
weight had not been accorded by the LAC was the fact
that the
continued existence of the appellant had been put in danger by the
workers’ participation in the stay-away.
[37] In my view these contentions
cannot be sustained. It is clear from what was said in the
Freegold
case (at 449 C) that even if the stay-away was not to be regarded as
a legitimate form of protest in the particular circumstances
of this
case (a matter on which I, like the LAC, express no opinion), the
fact that those who participated in the stay-away perceived
it to be
legitimate and regarded their absence as being for good reason
constitutes a mitigating factor to be taken into account
in any
equitable assessment of the fairness of the dismissals.
[38] It was also not correct to say
that the management’s “tentberaad” initiative
regarding the liaison committee
was not causally related to what
happened thereafter and was accordingly irrelevant. While it is
true to say that the workers
on all the probabilities would have
participated in the stay-away even if the “tentberaad”
had not taken place the
matter does not end there. I say that
because Mr
Rabie
contended that it was an aggravating factor, weighing against the
workers, that their participation in the stay-away had put
the
future existence of the appellant at risk. This was due, in part at
least, to the fact that extra hours had not been worked
in, in
advance, before the stay-away so that a stockpile of coal could be
produced to tide the appellant over the stay-away period
when
production would cease. In my view the fact that a stockpile was
not produced was due, again in part at least, to the breakdown
in
communication between management and the workers which followed on
management’s “gaffe”, as the LAC called
it, in
initiating the formation of the liaison committee. That being so,
there was a causal connection between the putting at
risk of the
continued existence of the company and the appellant’s
actions at the “tentberaad”, which affected
the weight
to be given to this factor in deciding on the fairness of the
dismissals. It follows that in assessing the fairness
of the
dismissals what one can call the “tentberaad” factor was
relevant. It follows further that the factor which
Mr
Rabie
submitted
was an important aggravating factor weighing against the workers was
not accorded insufficient weight by the LAC.
[39] When a moral judgment or value
judgment has to be passed regarding the fairness or unfairness of
the dismissals it is important
to bear in mind, in my view, on the
particular circumstances of this case, that the appellant, even
after the stay-away, was
willing to keep the workers in its employ
if they were prepared to agree not to participate in future illegal
stay-aways. If
they had breached such an agreement in the future it
would have been difficult to contend that their dismissal for such
breach
would not be fair. But essentially the same result could
have been achieved by keeping them in their employment but giving
them
a final written warning. Such an approach would have been more
in keeping with the view, to which this court has given its approval

(
Freegold
case at 448 H - I), that dismissal “is the ultimate sanction;
a course of last resort”.
[40] In
my opinion the dismissals in this matter were unfair and the appeal
against the LAC’s judgment should be dismissed
with costs
including those of two counsel, there being in my view no reason
that costs should not follow the result.
[41] Together
with the appeal three applications for condonation were argued: two
brought by the appellant (one for the late
filing of the notice of
appeal and the other for the late filing of the record) and one by
the respondents (for the late filing
of an affidavit opposing the
appellant’s application for condonation of the late filing of
the record).
[42] In my opinion all three
applications should be granted. The respondents’ application
was not opposed and nothing more
need be said about it. The
appellant’s applications were opposed but it is clear that its
failure to file its notice of
appeal and the appeal record timeously
was not due to any default on its part but to the negligence of its
attorney. It cannot
be said on the facts of this case that it must
have been obvious to the appellant that there was a protracted delay
and it is
not disputed that it had left the matter entirely to its
attorney, in whom it had full confidence, and that it had no reason

to believe that the rules had not been complied with. As far as the
costs of the appellant’s applications for condonation
are
concerned
Mr Rabie
conceded that the respondents were entitled to the costs of the
application including the costs of opposition.
[43] Since
writing paragraphs [1] to [42] above I have had the advantage of
reading the judgment prepared in this matter by my
learned brother
Olivier in which the view is stated that the respondent workers were
not unfairly dismissed by the appellant.
I have carefully
considered all the points made in my learned brother’s
judgment and have retraced in my mind all the
steps along the path
which led me to the conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed.
Having done so, I remain of the view
that the dismissals in question
were unfair.
[44] As appears from paragraph [6]
of my learned brother’s judgment the major point of
disagreement between us is whether
the decision of the LAC that
management was “in central measure” responsible for the
breakdown in communications
and that “its liaison committee
initiative was naive in its conception and misdirected in its
execution” has to be
accepted as correct and relevant. I
agree with the LAC’s finding on the point and am of the view
that we are bound by
it. Whichever of the differing approaches to
factual findings of the LAC set out in the
BTR
case is adopted I am satisfied that no basis exists for overturning
the LAC’s finding on this point. I am not aware of
any
misdirection by the LAC nor do I think that it can be said that no
reasonable court could have come to that finding.
Indeed
the passages from Van Rooyen’s evidence quoted by my brother
in my respectful view, support the LAC’s finding.
When asked the direct question who
first came up with the idea of a new committee Van Rooyen’s
answer was hardly a model
of clarity but he did say that the workers
agreed
that the problem at the various sites was different and he added
that they, i e, management, said that if every site chose its

representative to bring the site’s problems to management then
the problem would be so much easier. These answers go very
far in
my view in providing a basis for the LAC’s finding on the
point that the initiative for the setting up of the liaison

committee came from management, as Maduna testified. Once one
accepts this finding by the LAC then the impact of the other factors

listed in paragraph [14] (a) to (h) of my brother’s judgment
becomes far less important.
[45] My
learned brother then poses two questions which he says are the real
important ones: (a) was the appellant’s demand
that the
workers undertake not to participate in future illegal stay-aways
reasonable? And (b) was the refusal of the workers
to accede to
this request reasonable?
I
am not sure that these questions are the real important ones nor do
I think that the converse of a finding in favour of management
on
the first is a finding against the workers on the second. As my
learned brother fairly points out (in paragraph [13] of his

judgment) the workers were in an invidious position.
[46] What
may be called the bottom line of my learned brother’s judgment
is to be found, in my view, in his statement in
paragraph [11] that
the refusal of the employees to agree to a regime of
non-participation in illegal stay-aways inexorably
implies an
intention to take part in illegal action against the employer and
“the law cannot countenance such an attitude”.
I
agree that the law cannot countenance such an attitude and I also
agree that the law will not inexorably uphold a dismissal
in such
a situation. I have tried to show in my judgment that there was
something the employer could have done, falling short
of dismissal,
which would have been appropriate in this case.
[47] That
does not mean that the workers were free from blame and not liable
to disciplinary action. Indeed as counsel for the
respondents
pointed out, the order made by the LAC, that the workers were only
to be re-instated with effect from the date of
the Industrial
Court’s order, does involve disciplinary steps being taken
against the workers. Though they were not solely
responsible for
the fact that steps were not taken to minimise the effects of the
disruption (as the Industrial Court wrongly
found) they were to a
substantial degree responsible and disciplinary steps, falling short
of dismissal, were appropriate.
[48] My
learned brother seeks to make something of the fact, which I accept
without hesitation, that the appellant adopted an
accommodating and
supportive attitude towards the workers and says (paragraph [14]
(d)) that “this, surely is not the attitude
of an employer
bent on getting rid of its employees in an unfair manner”. I
do not understand that to be the test. The
dismissals cannot only
be set aside if the employer was “bent on getting rid of its
employers in an unfair manner”
(and to be fair to my learned
brother I do not understand him to say that that is the test).
[49] What has been said over and
over again in these cases is that one must be fair
to
both sides
. If
the only test to be applied is fairness to the employer then there
is much to be said for a finding in the appellant’s
favour.
But fairness to the workers, in my considered judgment, requires a
disciplinary step falling short of the course of
last resort.
[50] The
following order is made:
1 (a) Appellant’s applications for condonation
for the late filing of the notice of appeal and the appeal record
are granted.
(b) Appellant is ordered to pay the respondents’
costs of the applications including the costs of opposition.
2 Respondents’ application for condonation of the
late filing of their affidavit opposing appellant’s
application
for condonation for the late filing of the appeal record
is granted.
3 The appeal is dismissed with costs including the
costs of two counsel.
I
G FARLAM
ACTING
JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR
ZULMAN
JA
MADLANGA
AJA
OLIVIER JA
OLIVIER JA
[1]
I
do not share the view that the appeal falls to be dismissed.
[2]
Cameron
J summarized the reasons for his finding that the dismissal was
unfair as follows:
1 There was confusion, both in
reality and in the workers’ minds, about the consistency and
rigour of management’s
policy on stay-aways.
2 There was a
breakdown in communication between Benicon and its employees,
following on the disintegration of the liaison committee
on 30 July,
shortly before the weekend preceding the stay-away. Management was
in central measure responsible for that breakdown.
Its liaison
committee initiative was naïve in its conception and
misdirected in
execution.
After this, the formulation or finalisation of a mutually
acceptable policy in time for the 3 and 4 August stay-away
became
impossible. To hold the workers solely liable, as the industrial
court did, is most inequitable.
3 Unlike some strike cases, the
withdrawal of labour here did not involve a fight to the death. By
admission of the perpetrators,
and by recognition of management, the
stay-away was designed to be incidental and limited.
4 Benicon seems to have dismissed
the workers not for participation in the stay-away on 3 and 4
August, but for refusing to agree
to work on future stay-aways.
In order to deal with these reasons
a brief discussion of the events from June to August 1992 is
required. I will refer to the
appellant as Benicon.
[3]
Although
Benicon agreed on 15 June not to take disciplinary action against
workers who did not report for duty on Soweto day
(16 June),
management issued a notice to all staff members on 19 June in the
following terms:

RE : ILLEGAL STRIKE
ACTION/STAY-AWAY ACTION
Please take note of the following :
In future disciplinary action will be
taken against any person taking part in an illegal strike/stay-away
action.
By order.
BENICON MANAGEMENT”
The company’s
policy could not have been expressed in clearer terms. Yet, on 23
July, another stay-away occurred when its
workers joined a march to
the office of the Receiver of Revenue. Not unexpectedly their
conduct lead to disciplinary hearings
and the dismissal of all the
guilty ones. But the dismissals were not immediately implemented
because the workers wanted to
discuss matters and management was
prepared to listen. For this purpose the
tentberaad
was arranged and held on 28 July. The so-called workers’
committee was elected and the dismissals withdrawn. But the
committee soon proved to be a failure and, because there was an
imminent threat of another stay-away on 3 and 4 August, management

on 31 July had the following notice inserted in every worker’s
pay-packet
:

VERY
IMPORTANT NOTICE!!!
The following
steps will be taken against persons not at work on the 3
rd
of August 1992.

NO WORK NO PAY

NORMAL BONUS
PENALISATION PROCEDURE

Persons
not at work on the 4
th
of August 1992 or any other day in future on which a stay-away or
mass action takes place, will run the risk of being DISCHARGED

IMMEDIATELY!!!!
By order
BENICON MANAGEMENT”
With a few
exceptions the entire workforce ignored this unambiguous ultimatum
with the result that those who had not heeded it
were again summoned
to attend disciplinary hearings. They were found guilty but again
further discussions were held to ascertain
whether suitable
arrangements with regard to future stay-aways could be made. When
this proved to be impossible because the workers
were not prepared
to commit themselves to
“hundred
percent attendance ... during any further stay-away, mass action,
illegal strike and/or any planned or unplanned
work boycotts or
go-slow actions” they
were dismissed.
Not one of the
stay-aways had anything to do with working conditions or with
anything that Benicon had done or not done. On 3
and 4 August the
workers took part in action called for by the tripartite
ANC/COSATU/SACP alliance to protest against the collapse
of the
CODESA constitutional negotiations. The evidence on this point is
clear, coming as it does from the respondents’
own witness,
Van Castle. He testified that approximately 100% of the employees
in the area supported the stay-away. Other
strategies to exert
political pressure on the then government were discussed, but the
Alliance decided upon that particular stay-away.
Frank Boshielo, a
secretary of Numsa in the region, testifying on behalf of the
respondents, confirmed that the stay-away of
3 and 4 August 1992 was
organised from June 1992 onwards by the Alliance. The looming
stay-away was discussed with the employers
in the region,
inter
alia
the Chamber of Commerce, Escom and Highveld Steel. He testified as
follows :

The Chamber of Commerce
requested us that are we able or could we be able to call off the
matter at our region. We said that
- our answer was that we can’t
say anything because it’s a matter which is from the national
level.”
It is quite plain,
therefore, that nothing that Benicon could do, could induce the
workers to work on 3 and 4 August. At the
tentberaad
it proposed as a compromise that the workers work on Saturday, 1
August or Sunday, 2 August in order to build up a stockpile
or that
they provide a skeleton staff on 3 and 4 August. As will presently
appear, this came to nought.
[4]
With
this in mind I proceed to deal with Cameron J’s reasons
seriatim.
[5] Ad 1
As appears from
129D of the Court
a
quo
’s
judgment, the possibility of confusion was mentioned in argument.
But it did not form part of the respondents’
statement of case
that the workers were confused at any stage, and not one of their
witnesses testified that he or she was uncertain
of Benicon’s
stance in respect of the stay-away of 3 and 4 August. Moreover, I
fail to see how they could have been after
receipt of the notices of
19 June and 31 July. As Cameron J himself said at 129G-H,

[t]he 19
June memorandum was placed in every worker’s pay-packet.
Whatever its provenance and purport, it contained a clear
warning
that management, whether consistently or inconsistently, and whether
in justifiable response to the breach of an agreement
or not,
proposed in future to apply ‘
disciplinary
action

against workers who took part in an illegal strike or stay-away
action.”
The learned judge held (at 129E-G)
that the impression of flux is accentuated by Benicon’s
willingness to negotiate about
its stay-away policy. But he lost
sight of the witness Van Rooyen’s undisputed evidence (still
to be cited) that it was
at the workers’ request that further
discussions took place after the dismissals following upon the
stay-away on 23 July.
And there was in any event no causal
relationship between the so-called confusion and the workers’
ultimate dismissal.
The evidence is clear that already two or three
weeks prior to 3 and 4 August 1992 the die had been cast : there was
going to
be a stay-away during the week commencing on Monday, 3
August.
[6] Ad 2
In my view, the
finding by Cameron J that management was in central measure
responsible for the breakdown in communications and
that ... its
liaison committee ... initiative was naïve in its conception
and misdirected in its execution, is one that
no reasonable court
could have come to. We are not bound by it. Because it plays a
central and pivotal role in the decision
of the court
a
quo
,
the misdirection on this point flaws the decision in its entirety.
Cameron J relied on the evidence of
Maduna which was to the effect that Van der Merwe had said, in the
course of the tentberaad,
that the workers must form a liaison
committee, and stated that at one point Van Rooyen virtually
conceded that management
had taken the initiative on this score.
But, in fact, Van Rooyen was cross-examined extensively and
repetitively on this point.
He explained over and over that after
the workers had complained about a lack of communication, the
problem of communication
was addressed at length. For the sake of
completeness, I quote from the record where Van Rooyen was
cross-examined by the Appellant’s
counsel :

Is dit
korrek, Meneer, dat die idee om die
liaison
committee
te stig, dit was Benicon bestuur se idee gewees, is dit korrek?
--- Nie in die minste nie, mnr die President.
Goed. Wie se idee was dit gewees?
--- Dit was ons almal se idee.
Wie almal? --- Al die mense wat
by Benicon gewerk het.
Nou beskryf net
asseblief ‘n bietjie hoe dit gekom het, hoe julle almal by
daardie idee uitgekom het? --- Mnr die President,
ek verwys
spesifiek na een van die dissiplinêre verhore wat gehou is by
ons hoofkantoor op Saterdag, die 25ste. Ons het
aan die mense
voorgehou dat hulle afbetaal is as gevolg van wegblyaksies, toe sê
hulle, ‘Nee, nee, nee, nee, daar
moet ‘n manier wees om
hierdie saak uit te sorteer’. Toe sê ons, ‘Okay,
wat is die - wat gaan ons doen?’
en op daardie dissiplinêre
verhoor is daar toe besluit dat ons bymekaar moet kom en hierdie
probleem wat ons het uit
te sorteer en ek het getuie daaroor gelewer
dat ons het gesê ons maak die deure van die ou Benicon toe en
hierdie is die
nuwe Benicon en dit het toe gelei tot by die
tentberaad. Daar het ons bymekaar gekom. Elkeen het sy
geleentheid gehad om
sy sê te sê. As hy wou praat, kon
hy praat. Wit, swart, almal en toe is daar voorstelle op die tafel
gesit en
gesê daar is ‘n kommunikasie probleem, ons kan
nie mooi met mekaar praat nie. Wat gaan ons doen? Toe is daar

besluit om op elke
site
mense te verkies. Hulle is ook verkies deur die mense. Nie een
van bestuur het daar gestaan en gesê, ‘Jy moet
gekies
word’ of, ‘Jy moet nie gekies word nie’.
Inteendeel, die werkvloerverteenwoordigers van NUMSA was
betrokke
van die begin af met hierdie ding. Hulle het die stemme getel en
vertaal, getolk. Dis wat gebeur het.
Maar
wie het nou vorendag gekom met die idee met nou ‘n nuwe
komitee?
Wie
was die eerste wat met daardie idee vorendag gekom het? --- Mnr
die President, die mense het vir ons gesê dat hulle
het ‘n
probleem om te kommunikeer met bestuur. Toe sê ek , ‘Nou
maar hoe gaan ons met bestuur praat?’.
‘n Voorstel was
dat verteenwoordigers van die
site
met bestuur kom praat en hierdie hele komitee idee was verfyn met
die bespreking wat ons met die mense gehad het. Hulle het

saamgestem dat die verskillende
sites
se probleme is anderste. Jy het die padmakers, jy het die ouens
wat die klippe grou. Jy het ouens wat met
bulldozers
by Landau werk, so elkeen se situasie was anderste en op daardie
vergadering het ons gesê, ‘Nou, maar as elke
site
sy mense - sy verteenwoordigers verkies om daardie
site
se probleme na bestuur toe te bring, dan gaan dit die probleem
soveel makliker maak’, want hulle probleme is nie almal

dieselfde nie en dit is op die tafel gesit en almal het saamgestem
en toe is die persone verkies.
Mnr Van Rooyen, dit is waar, nie
waar nie, dat die idee van ‘n afsonderlike komitee wat gekies
moet word, dit het van bestuur
se kant af gekom, korrek? --- Mnr
die President, dit was nie ‘n bestuur gedrewe ding nie.
Hierdie was ‘n ding
wat ons saam besluit het. Die enigste
ding wat bestuur gedoen het was om hierdie goed op ‘n stuk
papier neer te skryf,
maar wat gesê is in daardie - in daardie
tent op die 28ste, die mense is nie aan hulle neuse rondgelei nie.
Glad nie.
Daardie dinge is saam besluit en dinge waaroor ons
saamgestem het, het hulle hulle hande in die lug ingesteek, die
teken gegee,
hande geklap. Dit was die gemoed in daardie tent. ‘n
Gemoed van samewerking, van die ou deure toegemaak het van die

verlede. Dis wat die gemoed in daardie tent was en dit is hoe die
ding vorentoe gesien het.
Ek vra nie oor die besluit nie,
Meneer, ek vra u nog steeds wie het
aanvanklik met die
idee vorendag gekom en dit moes bestuur gewees het, nie waar nie?
--- Daar was ‘n probleem met kommunikasie,
wat die mense vir
ons gesê het van die
sites
af.
Daar was ‘n probleem, hulle kon nie met ons praat nie en al
wat ons gedoen het op in die tent daardie dag, is om die
struktuur
en die manier van kommunikasie op ‘n stukkie papier te skryf.
Dit het uit die werkers uitgekom, nie uit bestuur
uit nie.
............
Wel,
u het alreeds ‘n komitee gehad, die
werksvloerverteenwoordigende komitee. Hoekom benodig u ‘n
nuwe komitee?
--- Mnr die President, ek het reeds gesê dis
nie - die bestuur het ‘n nuwe komitee benodig het nie. Die
werkers
het vir ons gesê daar is ‘n probleem om met ons
te praat. Ons het nie gesê, ‘Stig ‘n nuwe
komitee’
nie of, ‘Moenie met die unie praat nie’.
Nooit nie. Inteendeel al die mense, ek dink die meeste van die
mense
wat verkies was op daardie werkerskomitee of - was mense wat
shop
stewards
was. Die enigste verskil was dat die mense wat verkies was, kom
uit die
site
uit. Dis die mense saam met
wie
hulle werk en wie hulle ken. Nou ek sou geen rede sien hoekom, as
die
shop
stewards
verkies was voor die tyd - ek dink daar is getuienis gelewer dat
daar in 1991 al
shop
stewards
was, dat hulle nie weer sou verkies nie, want dis mense wat tog saam
met hulle werk.
Bestuur
vat nie krediet vir daardie besluit nie, omdat dit nie bestuur se
besluit was nie.
Dit
was ‘n besluit van die mense.”
On the probabilities, Van Rooyen’s
evidence is clearly preferable to that of Maduna : the shop stewards
were present throughout
the proceedings and would surely not have
accepted any proposal by management inimical to the interests of the
Union, but they
would have bowed to a proposal coming from the
workers themselves. Moreover, the letter handed to management by the
two head
office representatives, Mapanga and Thabethe, after their
visit to the Union and after consultation with the workers reads as

follows :

To Benicon Management
We have now decided to withdraw from
the position of representing the workers. We
feel that to be in the committee is
too demanding.
We have informed the people and they
are still going to decide on that issue of the new names but they
are happy with the withdrawal.
The proposal of the people is that if
you wish to see us, we will have the following names (1) David (2)
Leonard (3) Obed
(4) Adries
Regards”
The point is that
the proposal of the four new names, coming now from the workers
acting on their own, sidelines the Union and
in fact proposes a new
liaison committee. It is ironic that the Leonard referred to is,
according to Van Rooyen’s uncontested
evidence,
Leonard
Mapanga
and the David referred to is
David
Thabethe
,
the two former members of the “liaison committee”at head
office who stated in the very same letter that they were
finding the
work on the committee too demanding!
Had the court
a
quo
taken a balanced view of the evidence as a whole, it should clearly
have found that the probabilities favour Van Rooyen’s

evidence; or, at the very least, that it could not decide the issue
either way.
Two further
points emerge from this analysis. The first is that whoever took the
initiative in the formation of the committee,
it was the workers who
terminated the communication established by the committee. Secondly,
after the breakdown, the representatives
of the workers
communicated with Van Rooyen. The latter’s undisputed
evidence is that subsequent to the dissolution
of the workers’
committee,
the
shop stewards informed Benicon that the workers were not prepared to
make up for loss of production, either before or after
3 and 4
August, nor were they prepared to constitute a skeleton staff on
these two days to maintain essential services.
This evidence is not mentioned in Cameron J’s judgment. Its
importance is evident: whether or not the Union was present
and
involved, the stay-way would have gone ahead and no accommodation,
such as sought by Benicon, would have been forthcoming..
The whole
furore about whose idea the formation of the liaison committee was,
is thus causally irrelevant.
[7] Ad 3
To say that the
withdrawal of the workers did not involve a fight to the death
because the stay-away was designed to be incidental
and limited,
misses the central point of the dispute. Between 16 June 1992 and
4 August 1992 Benicon had suffered three
illegal
stay-aways. The proposals for a compromise - stockpiling before
a stay-away, a skeleton staff on the day of the stay-away
- were
not accepted. There was deadlock on a matter vital to Benicon.
It then sought from the workers an undertaking
not to participate
in
illegal
stay-aways. The workers’ refusal to commit themselves was
the immediate, direct and effective cause of the dismissal.
The crux of this
case is thus, simply, whether the demand by Benicon that the workers
undertake not to participate in future
illegal
stay-aways, was reasonable or not. If not, that is the end of the
matter. If the demand was reasonable, was the refusal to
give the
undertaking reasonable and did it justify dismissal?
[8] Ad 4
To say that Benicon seems to have
dismissed the workers not for participation in the stay away but
for refusing to agree to
work on future stay-aways again misses the
point. The uncontested fact is that the workers were found guilty of
illegally staying-away
from work on 3 and 4 August. Negotiations
then took place regarding the proper sanction. When Benicon’s
demand, discussed
in the previous paragraph, was not met, the
workers were dismissed. This is not unusual or unknown in labour
disputes, nor
is it unreasonable.
[9]
I
turn to consider the two questions which I regard to be the real
important ones.
[10] Was the demand by
Benicon that the workers undertake not to participate in future
illegal stay-aways reasonable?
In my view, no court of law can find
that such a demand was unreasonable. To do so would be to
undermine the very ethos which
a court is required to uphold and to
protect. It would undermine the very conception of a state built
on the idea of justice
and would play havoc with the whole field of
labour law and of the sanctity of contracts lawfully entered into.
I need say
no more than to emphasise that during the later
negotiations Numsa conceded that Benicon’s demand was
reasonable.
[11] Was the refusal of the
employees of Benicon to accede to Benicon’s request
reasonable?
The converse of
the finding that Benicon’s request was reasonable is that a
refusal by the other contracting parties to
agree to it, was
unreasonable. To state the obvious : the refusal of the employees
to agree to a regime of non-participation
in
illegal
stay-aways, inexorably implies an intention to take part in illegal
action against the employer. The law cannot countenance
such an
attitude.
[12]
However,
the conclusions reached in the two preceding paragraphs do not
inevitably mean that the employer was entitled to dismiss
the
employees who stayed away on 3 and 4 August 1992 and who refused to
give the above-mentioned undertaking. The ultimate
question is one
of fairness to both sides.
[13]
It
must be said in favour of the workers that they found themselves in
an invidious position. At that time in our history -
1992 -
membership of one of the Alliance parties exacted a high degree of
solidarity with and obedience to Alliance orders.
Even if the
workers knew that their actions were illegal and could lead to
disciplinary action - as they did in this case
- there was very
little they could do about it. It is not even necessary to count
in their favour a subjective belief in the
legitimacy of their
actions - sympathy for their plight speaks objectively from the
facts. On the other hand Benicon had valid
and enforceable contracts
with the workers which the latter had unlawfully breached. The
company had pressing obligations towards
its clients and the
workers were informed on more than one occasion of its plight and of
the consequences of a stay-away. They
chose to be loyal to a
political alliance, rather than to their employer.
[14]
In
favour of Benicon it must be said that it is difficult to point to
any unreasonable
or unfair act or omission leading up
to the eventual dismissal. On the contrary, one gets the
impression of an employer leaning
over backwards to accommodate the
interests of its employees. I mention some of these facts :
(a) The first important relevant
fact, not dealt with by Cameron J and my brother Farlam, is that
Benicon throughout the events
culminating in the dismissal of the
Respondents, never refused to co-operate with Numsa, despite the
fact that it always queried
Numsa’s authority to act on behalf
of employees outside the metal industry. Not one of the
respondents’ witnesses
gave an inkling of a negative attitude
on the part of Benicon towards Numsa and Van Rooyen’s evidence
of the positive attitude
of Benicon was never disputed. This
factor is relevant, not only as regards Benicon’s attitude and
fairness in respect
of the dismissal of its employees, but also in
respect of the events at the tentberaad and the succeeding days.
(b) Another vital fact not
considered in their judgments by Cameron J or my brother Farlam, is
that Benicon differentiated between
the stay-away on 16 June 1992
(Soweto Day) and the stay-aways on 23 July and 3 and 4 August 1992.
Van Rooyen’s uncontradicted
evidence, was that Benicon
understood the importance of Soweto Day and agreed to a “ ...
no work, no pay, no discipline
... “ regime for that day.
But the latter stay-aways were of a different kind altogether. The
stay-away of 23 July
took the form of a mass march to the office of
the Receiver of Revenue at Witbank and to this day no explanation
has been given
or even suggested for this action. The stay-away on
3 and 4 August was manifestly politically inspired. In my view, it
was
quite proper and reasonable for Benicon to differentiate between
the events of 16 June and those of 23 July and 3 and 4 August.
(c) Another relevant factor in
judging the fairness of the dismissal, and not mentioned in the
judgments of Cameron J and my
brother Farlam, is the remarkably
accommodating and supportive attitude and actions of Benicon towards
its employees even in
a conflict situation.Time and again - on
Monday, 27 July and on Wednesday, 5 August - the employees were
excused from work to
enable them to go home to prepare for the
disciplinary hearing the next day. This, surely, is not the
attitude of an employer
bent on getting rid of its employees in an
unfair manner.
(d) On 3 and 4 August 63 workers
turned up for work. They had experienced no intimidation, and,
because Benicon had made provision
for transport for all workers,
they did not experience transport problems. Proper weight should be
given to this uncontradicted
evidence.
(e) A meeting took place on 7 August.
Mr Mashego from Numsa was present, as were the shop stewards and
representatives of management.
The workers and Mr Mashego did not
come forward with any proposals, but requested Benicon to send its
proposals to the Union
for discussion. After the meeting ended, Mr
van Rooyen faxed a letter to Numsa (still on 7 August), containing a
draft proposed
agreement regarding stay-aways/mass action. The
Union was requested to meet urgently with Benicon who proposed a
meeting for
the next day, Saturday, 8 August. The reason for the
urgency was that all Benicon operations had come to a standstill.
The
draft agreement contained proposals aimed at getting discussions
started. The demand by the union that Benicon must undertake
to
guarantee 100% safety for workers coming to work on stay-away days
was not acceptable to Benicon, because it could not guarantee
the
safety of the workers living in the townships. The demand was also
seen by Benicon as irrelevant, because there had been
no violence or
intimidation on 3 and 4 August. Nevertheless, the Union resolutely
persisted in its demand for 100% security.
It also flatly refused
to permit any workers to turn up for work on stay-away days.
(f) A further
meeting took place on 10 August. Two union representatives,
Mashego and Ntleko, and all the shop stewards were
present. The
company’s proposal was to be the starting point of the
negotiations,
viz
an
undertaking by the employees never to participate in
illegal
strikes or stay-aways. Maduna testified that the employees
required 100% security if that was to be the case. They also
insisted on ” ... no work, no pay, no discipline... “
Maduna conceded that it was possible that the Union’s

representative, Mr Mashijo, threatened that Numsa would see to it
that Benicon becomes isolated, locally, nationally and
internationally.
He doesn’t remember but does not deny Mr
Mashijo threat to get his Frelimo friends to subvert Benicon’s
contacts
in Mozambique. Neither can he remember Mr van Rooyen
almost begging them to come to some sort of an agreement. This
was
in fact Van Rooyen’s evidence. Maduna agreed that it is
possible that at that meeting the workers were shown letters by

Amcoal and Optimum Colliery addressed to Benicon to show the
seriousness of the situation. He remembers the Amcoal letter.
He
reiterated that there was no proposal by the Union to work in before
or after a stay-away; they proposed 100% work security.
Absolute
deadlock was reached.
(g) At the same
time an offer was made to all workers to re-apply for employment;
those who did apply were appointed. They signed
the company’s
contract containing an undertaking not to participate in
illegal
strikes and stay-aways. Mr van Rooyen’s evidence that this
condition, discussed before and after 10 August 1992 with
Numsa
representatives, and that it was never described by the latter as
unacceptable was not challenged.
(h) Benicon was under great pressure
from its clients to secure a continuous flow of coal. Failure to
do so could have dire
consequences for the continued existence of
Benicon - and the continued employment of its workers.
[15]
It
was argued for the respondents and is accepted by my learned brother
Farlam that Benicon should have given the employees a
further chance
by placing them on final warning. But it must be remembered that
since 16 June 1992 three stay-aways had occurred;
that Benicon could
not continue on this basis with its mining operations; that a
deadlock on the issue of stay-aways had occurred;
and that there
were no practical or feasible proposals coming from the union or the
employees.
[16]
It has been aptly said that it

... does not mean that a
dismissal cannot be justified whenever it is possible to point to
one or other course which the employer
(or both parties) might have
taken, but failed to take. A stage is reached when fairness
dictates that dismissal is justifiable.
In the course of the
negotiations and power-play leading up to that stage the options and
alternatives open to both parties
are no doubt numerous and varied.
The inquiry is not whether one or other course may have been more
successful in resolving
the dispute or whether the employer could
have endured the strike for longer; the inquiry is whether in all
the circumstances
(including, for example, the duration of the
strike and the extent of the measures actually taken by the parties
to resolve the
dispute) the dismissal can be said to have been
unfair.”
(Scott JA in
National
Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development Co (Pty)
Ltd
1997 (4) SA 51
(SCA) at 61 G -
I
.)
In
my view, such a time had arrived in the present case. Even if a
further written ultimatum had been given, the employees would,
under
the same circumstances that prevailed on 23 July 1992 or 3 and 4
August 1992, again have stayed away without a prior stockpiling.

No evidence was offered that a further warning would have changed
the attitude of the employees. The evidence suggests the
contrary.
The parties had clearly reached the end of the line. In this
respect, the findings made by my brother Zulman in
Duke
and Others v Nasionale Sweiswerke (Pty) Ltd
[1998] ZASCA 52
;
1998 (3) SA 956
(SCA) at 969 C -
I
are particularly apt and applicable to the present appeal. Dealing
with a comparable matter, he concluded at 969 H -
I

One must, of course, not lose
sight of the important fact that the relevant events occurred in
difficult political times. However,
respondent was not insensitive
to this. It agreed to absence on 3 and 4 August and took no
disciplinary steps in regard to
absence on 6 and 7 August. Bearing
in mind that the required value judgment in such cases seeks to
achieve fairness to both
sides, it could hardly have been expected
of respondent to continue indefinitely accepting the burden of mass
absence or mass
demonstration whenever political motives came to the
fore.”
A similar
approach was followed by this Court in the judgment of my Nienaber
JA (concurred in by Marais JA and Zulman JA) in
National
Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd and Others
1996 (4) SA 562
(A) at 602 A - B

Vetsak could not know, at the
time of making the decisions to issue and implement the ultimatum,
for how long it would find itself
either without any labour or with
only ‘scab’ labour. Such labour can generate its own
peculiar set of disruptive
problems. It seems to me that if the
initial decision to issue an ultimatum was fair in all the
circumstances, as I think was
in this case, an employer cannot be
criticised, if his employees remain recalcitrant, from implementing
it. And that, unpalatable
as it may be to them, is a consequence
of their own conduct which employees must be prepared to face. “
In my view the
appeal should succeed with costs. The court
a
quo
’s
order should be amended to read “Appeal dismissed with costs”.
__________________
PJJ OLIVIER
JA
Concurred:
Hefer
JA