Basil Read Sun Homes (Pty) Ltd v Nedperm Bank Ltd. (86/97) [1998] ZASCA 97; 1999 (1) SA 831 (SCA); [1999] 1 All SA 285 (A) (20 November 1998)

75 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Contracts — Breach of contract — Wrongful appropriation of funds — Appellant claimed against the CC and its members for the proceeds of cheques collected from the United Building Society (UBS) — Trial court found the CC had wrongfully appropriated the cheques but dismissed the claim against the bank, ruling no theft was proven — Full court affirmed that the CC acted with theftuous intent but dismissed the appeal due to lack of evidence regarding the UBS's knowledge of ownership — Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, concluding that the cheques were not stolen under s 81(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act as ownership had likely transferred to the CC upon collection.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was an appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeal concerning a delictual/statutory recovery claim arising from the misappropriation of cheque proceeds. The proceedings ultimately focused on a claim under section 81(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964, which provides a remedy to the true owner of a crossed, “not negotiable” cheque that has been stolen or lost and thereafter paid in circumstances not rendering the drawee bank liable.


The parties were Basil Read Sun Homes (Pty) Ltd (the appellant) and Nedperm Bank Limited (the respondent). The respondent’s involvement arose because it had taken over the assets and liabilities of SA Permanent Building Society (“SA Perm”) under section 55 of the Mutual Building Societies Act 24 of 1965, and SA Perm had become a possessor of the disputed cheques after their misappropriation.


The procedural history began with an action instituted in December 1989 in the Witwatersrand Local Division against four defendants: Sun Homes CC (“the CC”), the CC’s two members (Mrs PM de Beer and Mr WH Jeffrey), and the present respondent (cited as the fourth defendant at trial). After a lengthy trial, Mahomed J dismissed the statutory claim against the respondent (claim D) but granted judgment against the CC (claim A) and against the CC and its members (claim C). The appellant’s appeal to a Full Court succeeded on the finding of theftuous intent but was nonetheless dismissed on the basis that the appellant had not proved that the United Building Society (“UBS”) remained the true owner of the cheques. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal with special leave.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the unauthorised collection of cheques drawn by a building society in favour of the appellant, the diversion of those cheques into accounts controlled by the CC, and whether the statutory remedy in section 81(1) could be enforced (via cession from UBS) against the collecting/possessing bank (through its successor, Nedperm Bank Limited).


2. Material Facts


The appellant, previously dormant within the Basil Read group, commenced construction of housing units on certain erven in Ennerdale extensions during 1986. It concluded an agreement with the CC (an estate agency) under which the CC undertook to sell the housing units on the appellant’s behalf and, materially, to facilitate purchasers’ loan applications by completing and submitting documentation to building societies.


In the ordinary course, once a loan application was successful, UBS issued a guarantee to pay the appellant against registration of transfer (and the associated mortgage bond). When transfer was registered, UBS drew a cheque for the relevant amount in favour of the appellant as payee. The appellant’s bookkeeping was handled by Mrs van Vuuren, who had written to UBS specifying authorised drivers who could collect cheques for the appellant.


During Mrs van Vuuren’s leave (mid-December 1986 to early January 1987), twelve cheques drawn by UBS in favour of the appellant did not reach the appellant’s office. It later emerged that the CC had caused these cheques to be collected from UBS and eventually deposited them into six accounts opened at SA Perm, ostensibly in the appellant’s name but effectively controlled by the CC. The CC then utilised the funds for its own purposes. The total amount involved in relation to these twelve cheques was R292 496,31.


For purposes of claim D (the section 81(1) claim), it was common cause at trial (either proved or admitted) that immediately prior to the collection of each cheque, UBS was the true owner; the cheques were crossed and bore the words “not negotiable”; after collection and appropriation SA Perm became a possessor and gave value; the drawee banker paid the cheques without incurring liability to the true owner; if UBS acquired a section 81(1) claim it would be for R292 496,31; UBS ceded any such claim to the appellant; and SA Perm’s assets and liabilities were taken over by the respondent under section 55 of the Mutual Building Societies Act.


The two disputed factual issues at trial were whether the cheques were stolen and whether, after collection, UBS remained the true owner. The trial court found that the CC and its members unlawfully obtained possession and appropriated the proceeds, but held that theftuous intent had not been proved and therefore dismissed claim D. The Full Court, on appeal, found that the cheques were collected with theftuous intent, but dismissed the appeal on the basis that the appellant had not disproved a possibility that ownership passed to the CC if UBS had been induced to hand over the cheques on the representation that the CC was entitled to them in its own right.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions before the Supreme Court of Appeal were whether, on the facts and probabilities accepted or inferred, the twelve cheques were “stolen” within the meaning of section 81(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964, and whether UBS remained the true owner after parting with possession of the cheques.


These questions involved a combination of factual inference and application of legal standards to the facts. The court had to assess what inference should be drawn, in the absence of direct evidence, about the nature of the representation made to UBS when the cheques were collected, and the legal consequences for transfer of ownership in the instruments.


A further legal issue raised in argument was whether a cheque obtained by false pretences could qualify as “stolen” for purposes of section 81(1). Although this point was initially pressed in the respondent’s heads, it became substantially narrowed by a concession made at the hearing, linked to whether ownership passed.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Supreme Court of Appeal approached the matter by evaluating the probabilities regarding the circumstances under which UBS parted with possession of the cheques, particularly because there was no direct evidence from the individual who collected the cheques (likely the second defendant or a CC employee, Heyneman) or from any UBS employee involved in handing them over.


The court attached significance to the CC’s own stance in the litigation. It was clearly the case advanced by the CC and its members (in an affidavit opposing summary judgment and in their plea) that the cheques had been collected on behalf of the appellant. The second defendant’s trial evidence was also treated as inconsistent with any suggestion that she represented to UBS that the CC was entitled in its own right to the cheques; she in fact rejected the proposition that the cheques were collected on behalf of the CC. From this, and the overall probabilities, the court considered it unlikely that the CC collector represented entitlement in the CC’s own right.


The court also relied on the objective features of the instruments and the commercial setting. The cheques were drawn in favour of the appellant as payee and were crossed and marked “not negotiable”. The court reasoned that it was improbable that UBS would have handed over such cheques with the intention of transferring ownership to the CC, because a third party could acquire only limited rights in such instruments, and only after delivery to the payee and endorsement. This made it unlikely that UBS intended to pass ownership to the CC upon delivery to the collector.


On the probabilities, therefore, the court inferred that UBS handed over the cheques on the basis (expressly or impliedly) that the collector was authorised to collect them on behalf of the appellant, and that UBS intended to transfer ownership to the appellant. However, because the appellant had not authorised the second defendant or Heyneman to collect the cheques, the appellant did not become owner upon such delivery. The consequence was that ownership remained vested in UBS, which accordingly also remained the true owner after the cheques were taken.


In relation to the meaning of “stolen” in section 81(1), the court noted the respondent’s concession at the hearing that if ownership did not pass to the CC, the cheques were “stolen” within the subsection. The court accepted that concession as correct in the circumstances it found. It held that even if the initial obtaining of possession involved false pretences, the case at least involved a situation where only possession (not ownership) was obtained by such means, and the subsequent appropriation of the cheques for the CC’s own purposes constituted simple theft. On that footing the cheques were stolen for purposes of section 81(1), with reference to S v Haarhoff 1970(1) SA 253 (A).


Having found that the statutory requirements were satisfied on the common cause facts (crossed “not negotiable” cheques; payment by the drawee in circumstances not rendering it liable; possession after theft by a party who gave value; quantification; and cession of the UBS claim to the appellant), the court concluded that claim D should have succeeded. The respondent’s liability followed from its takeover of SA Perm’s assets and liabilities under section 55 of the Mutual Building Societies Act.


On costs, the court exercised a discretionary judgment by disallowing recovery of costs associated with substantial portions of the appeal record that were unnecessary for deciding the appeal (including transcripts of opening address and argument in the trial court and papers related to the application for leave to appeal).


5. Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and set aside the Full Court’s order, substituting it with an order upholding the appeal to the Full Court and granting judgment on claim D against the fourth defendant (the respondent) for R292 496,31, together with interest at 12% per annum from the date of service of the combined summons on the fourth defendant.


The court further ordered that any sum recovered from the first, second, or third defendants (the CC and its members) in respect of the judgment on claim C must be deducted from the capital amount payable by the fourth defendant under claim D, thereby preventing double recovery of the same capital amount.


The appeal succeeded with costs, including the costs of two counsel, but the costs order expressly excluded costs relating to specified unnecessary pages of the appeal record.


Cases Cited


Basil Read Sun Homes (Pty) Ltd v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1997 (2) SA 610 (W)


S v Haarhoff 1970 (1) SA 253 (A)


Basil Read Sun Homes (Pty) Ltd v Nedperm Bank Ltd (86/97) [1998] ZASCA 97; 1999 (1) SA 831 (SCA); [1999] 1 All SA 285 (A)


Legislation Cited


Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964, section 81(1)


Mutual Building Societies Act 24 of 1965, section 55


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, on the probabilities, UBS parted with possession of the twelve crossed “not negotiable” cheques in circumstances indicating an intention to transfer ownership to the appellant, not to the CC. Because the appellant had not authorised the CC or its employee to collect the cheques, ownership did not pass to the appellant upon delivery and therefore remained with UBS, which remained the true owner.


The court further held that the cheques were stolen for purposes of section 81(1) because, even if possession was initially obtained by false pretences, ownership did not pass to the CC and the CC’s later appropriation of the cheques constituted simple theft within the statutory framework. As SA Perm became a possessor after the theft and gave value, and UBS’s statutory claim was ceded to the appellant, the appellant was entitled to judgment against the respondent (as successor to SA Perm’s liabilities) for the amount of the loss, with interest and costs, subject to a deduction mechanism to prevent double recovery.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 81(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964 provides a statutory cause of action enabling the true owner of a crossed cheque bearing the words “not negotiable”, which has been stolen or lost, to recover the resulting loss from a person who became a possessor after the theft or loss and who gave consideration for it (or took it as a donee), where the drawee banker paid the cheque in circumstances not rendering it liable to the true owner.


In determining “true ownership” and whether a cheque was “stolen” for purposes of section 81(1), the court may draw inferences from probabilities where there is no direct evidence of the representations made when possession was obtained. The form of the instrument (including being made payable to a named payee and being crossed “not negotiable”) and the commercial context may inform whether it is probable that the drawer intended to transfer ownership to a third party upon delivery.


Where possession of a cheque is obtained without the transfer of ownership, and the possessor thereafter appropriates the cheque for its own purposes, that appropriation can constitute simple theft, supporting the conclusion that the cheque was “stolen” within the meaning of section 81(1), even if the initial obtaining of possession involved false pretences and irrespective of how the conduct might have been charged criminally.

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[1998] ZASCA 97
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Basil Read Sun Homes (Pty) Ltd v Nedperm Bank Ltd. (86/97) [1998] ZASCA 97; 1999 (1) SA 831 (SCA); [1999] 1 All SA 285 (A) (20 November 1998)

Case no: 86/97
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
In the matter between:
BASIL READ SUN HOMES (PTY) LTD
Appellant
and
NEDPERM BANK LIMITED
Respondent
COURT: Van Heerden DCJ, Vivier, Harms, Scott JJA and Farlam AJA
Heard:
2 November 1998
Delivered:
20 November 1998
JUDGMENT
2
VAN HEERDEN DCJ
In December 1989 the appellant instituted action against four defendants in the Witwatersrand Local Division. They were respectively
Sun Homes CC ("the CC"), its only two members, Mrs PM de Beer and Mr WH Jeffrey, and the present respondent.
Claim A was brought against the CC; claim B (and in the alternative claim C) against the CC and its members, and claim D against the
respondent. After a lengthy trial Mahomed J (as he then was) dismissed claim D but granted judgment in the sum of R439 706,71 against
the CC (on claim A), and in the amount of R292 496,31 against the CC and its members (on claim C). As regards claim A, the trial
judge found that during the period December 1986 to January 1987 the CC collected 16 cheques from their drawers; that in breach of
a contractual obligation the CC failed to hand over the cheques to the appellant and that the CC wrongfully appropriated the proceeds
for its own purposes, the total amount involved being R436 706,71.
Twelve of the above cheques were drawn by the United Building Society ("the UBS") in favour of the appellant as payee. Before
reverting to claims C and D it is necessary for me to mention briefly why the 12 cheques were so drawn. As from July 1986 the appellant,
3 which had been a dormant company in the Basil Read group of companies, caused housing
units to be constructed on erven in Ennerdale extensions 5 10,11,12, and 14. Prior thereto
an agreement had been concluded between the appellant and the CC. In terms of that
agreement the CC, which carried on the business of an estate agent, undertook to sell on
behalf of the appellant the housing units which the latter would construct. The CC also
undertook to cause applications for loans to be completed by purchasers and to submit such
documents to building societies. The purpose of the applications was to procure funds for the
payment, or part payment, of the purchase prices of housing units. The loans would obviously
be secured by the registration of mortgage bounds in favour of the building societies.
Pursuant to the above agreement the CC sold a number of housing units on behalf of the appellant and submitted completed loan applications
to
inter
alia the UBS. In respect of each successful application the UBS issued a guarantee for the payment of the amount owing to the appellant
against registration of transfer of the housing unit (and, of course, registration of a mortgage bond). When a transfer was registered
the UBS drew a cheque for the appropriate amount in favour of the appellant as payee.
The appellant's bookkeeping was attended to by Mrs van Vuuren, an employee of
4 Basil Read (Pty) Ltd. On 23 October 1986 she wrote a letter to the UBS in which she
specified the names and identity numbers of drivers who were authorised to collect cheques
on the appellant's behalf. The CC was apparently advised by the UBS of the registration of
transfer of a housing unit. The CC in turn passed on the information to Mrs van Vuuren. She
then sent a driver to the UBS to collect the cheque drawn by the UBS. All cheques so
collected were paid into an account which had been opened for the purposes of the appellant's
business activities.
Mrs van Vuuren was on leave from about 15 December 1986 to 7 January 1987. Soon thereafter she learned that 12 cheques drawn by the
UBS in favour of the appellant in respect of sales of housing units had not reached her office. It later transpired that the CC had
caused the 12 cheques to be collected from the UBS and had eventually deposited them in six accounts opened at the SA Permanent Building
Society ("the SA Perm"), the total amount being R292 496,31. Those accounts were ostensibly opened in the name of the appellant
but were effectively controlled by the CC which thereafter utilised the credits on the accounts for its own purposes.
As regards claim C Mahomed J found that subsequent to the collection of the 12
5 cheques the UBS remained the true owner of the instruments; that the CC and its members
wrongfully obtained possession of the cheques and appropriated their proceeds; that hence the
UBS suffered a loss of R292 496,31, and that by virtue of a cession effected by the UBS to
the appellant the latter was entitled to recover that amount from the CC and its members. The
trial judge ordered, however, that any payment made by the CC in respect of the judgment on
claim A should be deducted from its liability in terms of the judgment on claim C.
Claim D was based upon the provisions of s 81(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of
1964 ("the Act") which read as follows:
"If a cheque was stolen or lost while it was crossed as authorized by this Act and while it bore on it the words 'not negotiable',
and it was paid by the banker upon whom it was drawn, under circumstances which do not render such banker liable in terms of this
Act to the true owner of the cheque for any loss he may sustain owing to the cheque having been paid, the true owner shall, if he
suffered any loss as a result of the theft or loss of the cheque, be entitled to recover from any person who was a possessor thereof
after the theft or loss, and either gave a consideration therefor or took it as a donee, an amount equal to the true owner's said
loss or the amount of the cheque, whichever is the lesser."
During argument in the trial court it was common cause between the present appellant
and respondent that for the purposes of claim D the following had been either proved or
6
admitted:
(a)
that immediately prior to the collection of each of the 12 cheques the UBS was the true owner thereof;
(b)
that the cheques were crossed as authorised by the Act and bore on them the words "not negotiable";
(c)
that after the cheques had been collected and appropriated by the CC the SA Perm became a possessor of the instruments and gave value
therefor;
(d)
that the drawee banker, which paid the cheques, did not incur any liability to the true owner of the instruments;
(e)
that if the UBS did acquire a claim against the SA Perm under s 81(1) of the Act the amount thereof was R292 496,31.
(f)
that such claim was ceded by the UBS to the appellant, and
(g)
that prior to the institution of action all the assets and liabilities of the SA Perm had been taken over by the present respondent
in terms of s 55 of the Mutual Building Societies Act 24 of 1965.
What remained in dispute was whether the cheques were stolen and whether
7 subsequent to the collection of the cheques the UBS was still the true owner thereof.
For reasons which are not material to this appeal the trial judge held that although the first three defendants unlawfully obtained
possession of the 12 cheques and appropriated their proceeds, it was not proved that they had acted with theftuous intent, i.e. an
intention to commit either simple theft or theft by false pretences. In particular Mahomed J found that the appellant failed to prove
that the members of the CC had not honestly believed that the CC was entitled to the cheques and their proceeds, and consequently
failed to establish that the cheques had been stolen. For this reason he dismissed claim D.
With the leave of the trial court the appellant appealed to a full court of the Witwatersrand Local Division against the dismissal
of claim D. That court held that the members of the CC knew that the CC was not entitled to the cheques and their proceeds, and that
hence the cheques were collected and appropriated with a theftuous intent in the sense in which the phrase was used by the trial
judge. (The judgment has been reported:
Basil Read Sun Homes (Pty) Ltd v Nedperm Bank Ltd
. 1997(2) SA 610 (W).) The appeal was nevertheless dismissed for reasons which may be thus summarised (at 6T7E-619D):
(1) There was no evidence as to what induced the UBS to part with possession of
8
the 12 cheques. It was probable, however, that the UBS would have handed
over the cheques only if it had been represented to the UBS that the CC was
entitled to the cheques either on its own behalf or on behalf of the appellant.
(2)
Whichever representation was made, a theft by false pretences was committed when the UBS was induced to deliver the cheques to the
representor.
(3)
However, had the representation been that the CC was in its own right entitled to the cheques, ownership in the instruments would
on delivery have vested in the CC. The UBS would then no longer have been the true owner of the cheques.
(4)
The appellant failed to prove that such a representation had not been made .
With special leave the appellant appealed to this court. Counsel for the respondent
rightly did not challenge the finding of the full court that the 12 cheques were collected with intent to commit theft, but supported
the findings which led to the dismissal of the appeal to that court. Counsel furthermore contended that the cheques were not stolen
within the meaning of s 81 (1) of the Act.
It is not possible to determine with certainty who took delivery of the 12 cheques.
9
However, the probabilities are that the cheques were collected by either the second defendant
or an employee of the CC, one Heyneman, acting on her instructions. That much was conceded by counsel for the respondent.
There was, as pointed out by the court a
quo
and stressed by counsel for the respondent, no direct evidence of the representations which induced the UBS to part with possession
of the cheques. Neither Heyneman nor any employee of the UBS was called as a witness. However, it was clearly the case of the CC
and its members that the cheques had been collected on behalf of the appellant. This appears
inter alia
from an affidavit filed in opposition to an application for summary judgment and from the plea of the CC and its members. And when
giving evidence at the trial the second defendant never suggested that she represented to the UBS that the CC was in its own right
entitled to the cheques, or that she instructed Heyneman to make such a representation. Indeed, when she was asked whether the cheques
had been collected on behalf of the CC she emphatically rejected the proposition.
It is in any event unlikely that the UBS would have handed over the cheques with the intention of transferring ownership therein to
the CC. The cheques were drawn in favour of the appellant as payee and marked not negotiable: a third party could acquire but limited
rights
10
in the instruments only after they had been delivered to the appellant and endorsed by it. It is
accordingly impropable that the second defendant or Heyneman would have represented to the UBS that the CC was in its own right and
without more entitled to the cheques.
On the other hand a representation that the representor, as a member or employee of the CC, was authorised to collect the cheques
on behalf of the appellant may well have persuaded the UBS to hand over the cheques to the representor. The employee or employees
of the UBS who delivered the cheques probably knew that the loan applications had been processed by the CC for the ultimate benefit
of the appellant, and that the CC was informed by the UBS when a cheque was ready for collection. The postulated representation would
therefore hardly have given rise to misgivings.
It follows that the probabilities support the inference that when the UBS parted with possession of the cheques it intended to transfer
ownership therein to the appellant. Of course, because the appellant had not authorised the collection of the cheques by the second
respondent or Heyneman it did not become the owner of the instruments. Ownership therefore remained vested in the UBS. Unquestionably
the UBS also remained the true owner of the cheques.
11
In his heads of argument counsel for the respondent submitted that since the 12 cheques were obtained by false pretences they were
not "stolen" within the meaning of s 81(1) of the Act. At the hearing of the appeal he conceded, however, that if ownership
in the cheques did not pass to the CC they were so stolen. The concession was rightly made. It is unnecessary to decide whether s
81(1) of the Act is applicable to all cases in which a cheque is stolen by false pretences. We are concerned with a situation where
only possession - as distinguished from ownership - of the cheques was obtained by means of the false pretences. Subsequently the
CC appropriated the cheques for its own purposes. In doing so it committed simple theft, albeit that it may have been charged with
theft by false pretences. The cheques were therefore stolen within the framework of s 81(1) of the Act. (Cf
S v Haarhoff
1970(1) SA 253 (A) 258 C-D.)
Although the appeal must succeed, the appellant is not entitled to all the costs relating to the appeal record. This is so because
the record included transcripts of the opening address and of counsel's arguments in the trial court, as well as the papers filed
in connection with the appellant's application for leave to appeal to this court. As readily conceded by counsel for the appellant
that material - comprising more that 800 pages - was clearly unnecessary for the
12
decision of the appeal and hence should not have formed part of the appeal record.
In conclusion I should mention that counsel were ad
idem
that, in the event of the appeal being upheld, the orders set out in para 2(b)(i) and (ii) below should be substituted for par 4
of the order of the trial court.
The following orders are made :
(1)
The appeal succeeds with costs, including the costs of two counsel, save that
such costs shall not include those relating to pp 65 to 249,1378 to 1984 and
2095 to 2145 of the appeal record.
(2)
The order made by the court a quo is set aside and the following order is
substituted therefor:
"(a) The appeal is upheld with costs.
(b) The following is substituted for par 4 of the order of the trial court:
(i) On claim D judgment with costs, including the costs of two
counsel, is granted against the fourth defendant in the amount
of R292 496,31, which is to bear interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of service of the combined summons on
13
the fourth defendant.
(ii) Any sum recovered from the first, second or third defendant in respect of the judgment on claim C shall be deducted from the
capital amount of the judgment debt payable by the fourth defendant."
HJO VAN HEERDEN DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE
Concur: VIVIER JA HARMS JA SCOTT JA FARLAM AJA