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S v Mento en 'n Ander (275/94, 505/94) [1997] ZASCA 43 (20 May 1997)

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Criminal Law
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Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Murder — Conviction based on circumstantial evidence — Two appellants charged with murder and robbery — First appellant pleads guilty; second appellant claims duress — Evidence shows second appellant present at crime scene and participating in robbery — Court finds no credible evidence of duress — Conviction of both appellants upheld, with first appellant sentenced to death and second appellant to imprisonment.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This was an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal arising from a criminal trial in the former Cape Provincial Division, where two accused were tried (before an acting judge and two assessors) on multiple charges stemming from a violent incident at the home of an elderly woman in Kleinmond.


The parties were P Mento (first appellant) and M Barends (second appellant) as appellants, and the State as respondent. At trial both initially pleaded not guilty, but the first appellant later changed his plea to guilty on the counts of robbery and murder. After the conclusion of the trial, both were convicted of murder. On the property-related charge, the first appellant was convicted of robbery (without aggravating circumstances) in respect of certain items and theft of the deceased’s motor vehicle; the second appellant was convicted only of theft of certain items and the vehicle. Both were sentenced to death for murder, and to terms of imprisonment on the remaining convictions.


In this appeal, the first appellant pursued an appeal only against the death sentence. The second appellant appealed (with leave where necessary) against both his convictions and the sentences imposed. The dispute concerned (i) whether the second appellant’s participation was sufficiently proved—particularly in light of his claim (contained in a statement) that he acted under compulsion, (ii) whether his conviction on the property charge should have been robbery rather than theft, and (iii) the legal consequence for the imposed death sentences following subsequent constitutional developments.


Material Facts


The deceased, an 83-year-old woman, lived alone at 15de Laan 19, Kleinmond. On the late afternoon of 13 October 1992, she was violently assaulted and killed in her bedroom. She sustained numerous injuries mainly to her head and upper body; the medical evidence established the cause of death as a depressed skull fracture with brain damage. The nature and extent of the injuries left no doubt, in the court’s view, that the attacker or attackers had direct intent to kill.


Certain property was taken from the deceased’s home, including a gold wristwatch, toiletries, and a bunch of keys. The deceased’s Volkswagen motor vehicle was removed from her garage but was later found abandoned a short distance away in the street. The keys to the vehicle were in the ignition. It was later established that the vehicle’s battery was flat, which prevented it from starting. A secateurs with blood on it was found on the back seat of the vehicle, and the removed toiletries were also found in the vehicle. A blood-stained bread knife was found in the deceased’s bedroom.


The second appellant made a statement before a magistrate one day after the incident (admitted as part of the State case after an initial admissibility objection was withdrawn). In that statement, he placed himself at the deceased’s house at the relevant time but claimed that he did not assault the deceased and that his conduct occurred under duress imposed by the first appellant. In addition, the second appellant made a formal admission that, during the afternoon before approximately 17:30 on 13 October 1992, he was inside the house at the given address.


A key part of the objective evidence relied on by the court was the testimony of Mr Williams, who saw the second appellant pushing the deceased’s vehicle while the first appellant sat behind the steering wheel. Mr Williams observed them for several minutes and testified that both then ran away together into nearby bushes in the direction of the golf course, apparently after they noticed someone. Despite some momentary confusion about identification, Mr Williams ultimately had no doubt that it was the second appellant—whom he knew well—who was pushing the vehicle. This evidence was accepted by the trial court and treated as important by the appeal court. The second appellant’s fingerprints were also found on the deceased’s vehicle, which supported his involvement with it.


The court treated the following as significant objective and inferential facts: the two appellants had been together socially from about 11:00 that day drinking alcohol; the crimes occurred shortly before 17:00; both appellants were present at or about that time in the deceased’s house; two different weapons (a knife and secateurs) were used and later found bloodstained; the second appellant actively participated in removing the vehicle after the deceased’s death; he made an exculpatory statement which the court considered false in material respects; and he did not testify at trial, despite a prima facie case pointing to guilt.


Legal Issues


The central issues the court was required to determine were whether the second appellant’s convictions were correct on the proved facts, and whether the sentences—particularly the death sentences—could stand.


On the second appellant’s convictions, the main questions were whether, on the circumstantial evidence and in light of his admitted presence at the scene, the only reasonable inference was that he acted in concert with the first appellant in the robbery and murder; and whether his version of acting under duress (as contained in his magistrate’s statement) could reasonably be accepted as possibly true when weighed against the objective facts and probabilities.


A further legal issue, involving application of law to fact and the scope of appellate powers, was whether the trial court erred by convicting the second appellant of theft (rather than robbery) in relation to the items taken, and whether the appeal court had the competence to substitute a more serious conviction where the charge sheet justified it and the trial court had convicted of a lesser offence due to a factual or legal error.


Regarding sentence, the court had to determine the effect of the Constitutional Court’s decision declaring the death penalty unconstitutional, and what procedural course should follow for the murder sentences imposed before that decision—specifically whether the death sentences had to be set aside and replaced, and whether resentencing should occur in the appeal court or by remittal to the trial court.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the second appellant’s case on the basis that the State relied mainly on circumstantial evidence, and that the second appellant did not testify. His defence appeared from his magistrate’s statement, which was before the court as part of the State case. The court accepted that exculpatory portions of such a statement must be considered, but emphasised that they are not automatically to be accepted as reasonably possibly true. They must be weighed against proven objective facts and overall probabilities, and their weight is diminished because they are not under oath and were not tested by cross-examination, as highlighted in the cited authority.


Applying those principles, the court found the second appellant’s narrative of events inherently improbable. It considered it unlikely that, after spending the day on friendly terms with the first appellant, the second appellant would have followed him merely out of curiosity at a distance to the deceased’s home, and then that the first appellant would suddenly threaten him with a firearm. The court noted, in this connection, that no firearm was used in the attack and none was found in the first appellant’s possession. The court further observed that, on the second appellant’s own version, there were opportunities for earlier escape if he had truly wished to remove himself from forced participation.


The court attached decisive significance to Mr Williams’s evidence. That evidence indicated that the second appellant had ample opportunity to flee while the first appellant was seated at the wheel, yet he did not do so. Instead, when the first appellant ran away, the second appellant ran together with him in the same direction, which the court considered inconsistent with a person acting unwillingly under coercion. The court also reasoned that Mr Williams’s observations contradicted the second appellant’s assertion in his statement that he ran away only when the first appellant looked under the vehicle.


In addition, the court relied on the evidence of Sergeant Human (“Sers Jackie”), whose testimony was not challenged. Sergeant Human’s account was that, shortly after the incident, the second appellant did not immediately report that he had been at the scene and had acted under compulsion. Instead, he only identified the first appellant as the sought person and mentioned that the first appellant had blood on his hands and shoes, while appearing “dead calm”. It was only about an hour after the first appellant’s arrest that the second appellant first said that he had been involved at the murder scene and that the first appellant forced him to participate. The court treated this as undermining the impression created by the statement that he promptly disclosed his coerced involvement at the first opportunity.


On the totality of the objective facts and probabilities, the court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the two appellants went together to the deceased’s house with a shared purpose to rob her. It reasoned that they could reasonably have expected her to be present and that there was no one else at the scene besides the deceased and the two appellants. The court considered the use of two different weapons, later found bloodstained, as prima facie indicative of more than one attacker (while acknowledging that one person could possibly have used more than one weapon). It also placed weight on the second appellant’s active role in removing the vehicle after the deceased’s death, which the court viewed as at least an association with the preceding events. It further treated his exculpatory statement as materially false and noted his failure to testify despite the strength of the prima facie case.


As to the murder conviction, the court reasoned that the appellants must necessarily have foreseen that the deceased could resist a robbery and that violence might be used to overcome that resistance. Additionally, both appellants were known to the deceased, which supported the inference that they appreciated the danger of later identification and killed her to prevent it. Whether or not the fatal injuries were inflicted by one or both of them, the court held that, on the inferred foresight and shared enterprise, both would in any event be guilty of murder.


On the property-related conviction, the court held that because the robbery was committed in furtherance of a common purpose to rob, the second appellant ought to have been convicted of robbery (as was the first appellant) rather than merely theft in relation to the items taken. Relying on authority, the court held that where an appellate court is satisfied that—due to an incorrect factual finding or a legal error—the trial court convicted an accused of a less serious crime than warranted by the indictment, the appellate court may intervene and alter the conviction accordingly. The court therefore altered the second appellant’s conviction on the relevant count.


In relation to sentencing, the court noted that the death sentences had been imposed before the commencement of the interim Constitution. After the Constitutional Court’s decision declaring the death penalty invalid from the date of its order, the court held that the death sentences could not stand and had to be set aside and replaced with competent sentences. The court considered it appropriate to remit the matter to the trial court for resentencing on the murder charge. On the robbery count as amended, the court considered the relative roles of the appellants and held that they had more or less equal shares in the robbery; it therefore imposed on the second appellant the same sentence that had been imposed on the first appellant for that count, finding no compelling reason why the appeal court should not make that correction itself.


Outcome and Relief


The appeal against the second appellant’s murder conviction was dismissed, and his conviction for murder remained intact.


The second appellant’s conviction on the property count was altered from theft to robbery in respect of the wristwatch, toiletries, and bunch of keys, and his appeal against conviction on that count was otherwise dismissed. His sentence on that count was altered to five years’ imprisonment.


Both appellants’ appeals against the death sentence on the murder count succeeded. The death sentences were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the trial court for the imposition of competent sentences on the murder convictions.


The excerpted judgment does not record any separate costs order.


Cases Cited


S v Ngcobo 1992 (1) SACR 544 (A)


S v E 1979 (3) SA 973 (A)


S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC)


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court are recorded as having been cited in the judgment.


Held


The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the objective facts and probabilities, viewed cumulatively, justified the inference that the second appellant acted jointly with the first appellant in going to the deceased’s house to rob her, and that the deceased’s death was foreseen in the course of that joint enterprise such that both were guilty of murder regardless of who inflicted the fatal injuries.


It further held that the second appellant’s exculpatory account of acting under duress, contained in a statement not made under oath and not tested in cross-examination, was inherently improbable and was contradicted by credible evidence regarding his conduct at the vehicle and his later conduct when encountered by the police.


The court also held that, on the proven facts and common purpose, the second appellant should have been convicted of robbery (not theft) in relation to the items taken, and that the appeal court had the power to correct the conviction.


Finally, it held that the death sentences could not stand in light of constitutional invalidity and therefore had to be set aside, with the matter remitted for resentencing on the murder count.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that exculpatory portions of an accused’s prior statement must be considered but are not necessarily to be accepted as reasonably possibly true; they must be assessed against objective proven facts and probabilities, and their weight is significantly reduced where the statement was not made under oath and was not subject to cross-examination, as articulated in S v Ngcobo 1992 (1) SACR 544 (A).


It applied principles governing inference from circumstantial evidence, treating a coherent set of objective facts—such as proven presence at the scene, participation in removal of stolen property, the use of multiple weapons, flight, and subsequent conduct—as capable of justifying the conclusion that a joint criminal enterprise existed and that the second appellant associated himself with it, notwithstanding denial of direct assault.


It applied the doctrine underlying liability in the context of a shared criminal enterprise by reasoning that where two persons act together to commit robbery and foresee lethal violence occurring in the execution of the plan (or at least foresee it once a deadly assault is underway), both may be guilty of murder irrespective of which one actually delivered the fatal blow.


It applied the appellate principle that where, due to incorrect factual findings or a legal error, a trial court has convicted an accused of a less serious offence than the offence warranted on the indictment, an appellate court is competent to alter the conviction to the appropriate offence, as recognised in S v E 1979 (3) SA 973 (A).


It applied the constitutional principle that following S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), the death penalty is not a competent sentence and previously imposed death sentences may not be executed; such sentences must be set aside and replaced, with remittal for resentencing being an appropriate procedural course in a case of this nature.

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[1997] ZASCA 43
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S v Mento en 'n Ander (275/94, 505/94) [1997] ZASCA 43 (20 May 1997)

SAAKNOMMERS: 275/94
505/94
In die saak tussen:
P MENTO
EERSTE APPELLANT
M BARENDS
TWEEDE APPELLANT
en
DIE STAAT
RESPONDENT
CORAM: SMALBERGER, MARAIS et SCHUTZ ARR
VERHOORDATUM: 9 MEI 1997
LEWERINGSDATUM: 20 MEI 1997
UITSPRAAK
SMALBERGER AR...
2
SMALBERGER AR:
Die 83 jarige mev A M Dombrowsky ("die oorledene") was 'n beminde inwoner van Kleinmond. Gedurende die laat namiddag op
13 Oktober 1992 is sy by haar huis te 15de Laan 19, waar sy alleen gewoon het, op gruwelike en gewelddadige wyse aangerand en om
die lewe gebring. Sy is 'n aansienlike aantal beserings toegedien, hoofsaaklik aan haar kop en bolyf. Daar is mettertyd bevind dat
die oorsaak van haar dood 'n ingedrewe skedelfraktuur met breinskade was. Die aard en omvang van haar beserings was sodanig dat dit
geen twyfel gelaat het nie dat haar aanvaller of aanvallers die direkte opset gehad het om haar te dood. Sover vasgeste
kon word, is daar uit haar woning 'n goue polshorlosie, sekere toiletware en 'n bos sleutels geneem. Haar Volkswagen motor ("die
voertuig") is ook uit haar motorhuis verwyder. Dit is later 'n entjie in die straat-af gevind, waar dit geabandoneer was. Die
sleutels
3
van die voertuig was in die skakelaar. Dit het later geblyk dat die voertuig se battery pap was. Dit het verhoed dat die aangeskakel
kon word. Op die agterste sitplek was 'n snoeisk
r waarop bloed was. Die verwyderde toiletware is ook in die voertuig gevind. In die oorledene se slaapkamer, waar sy dood aangetref
is, is daar 'n bloedbevlekte broodmes gevind.
Voortspruitend uit die gebeure wat aanleiding gegee het tot die dood van die oorledene het die twee appellante in die destydse Kaapse
Provinsiale Afdeling voor Hom Wnd R en twee assessore tereggestaan op aanklagte van, onder andere, roof met verswarende omstandighede
(aanklag 2) en moord (aanklag 4). Albei het aanvanklik onskuldig gepleit, maar die eerste appellant het gedurende die verhoor sy
pleit verander na een van skuldig aan die genoemde twee aanklagte. Na afloop van die verhoor is albei appellante skuldig bevind aan
moord. Op die roofaanklag is die eerste appellant skuldig bevind aan roof (sonder verswarende omstandighede) ten opsigte van die
polshorlosie,
4
die toiletware en die sleutels, en diefstal ten opsigte van die voertuig. Die tweede appellant is skuldig bevind alleenlik aan diefstal
van die toiletware, sleutels en voertuig. Hulle is vrygespreek op die ander aanklagte hulle ten laste gel
. Albei appellante is die doodvonnis opgel
ten opsigte van die moord; wat die oorblywende skuldigbevinding berref, is die eerste appellant en die tweede appellant onderskeidelik
tot 5 en 4
jaar gevangenisstraf gevonnis. Die eerste appellant kom nou in ho
r beroep alleenlik teen die doodvonnis hom opgel
; die tweede appellant appelleer (met verlof, sover dit nodig is) teen beide sy skuldigbevindings en die vonnisse wat daarmee gepaard
gaan.
Ek behandel eerstens die tweede appellant se app
l teen sy skuldigbevindings. Die Staat se saak teen hom berus hoofsaaklik op omstandigheidsgetuienis. Hy self het nie getuienis afgel
nie. Sy verweer blyk uit 'n verklaring wat hy 'n dag na die betrokke voorval voor 'n landdros afgel
het. Aanvanklik was die toelaatbaaiheid van die verklaring betwis, maar die
5
beswaar daarteen is later teruggetrek, en die verklaring is ingehandig as deel van
die Staat se saak. Die verklaring lui soos volg:
"Gister so 11 vm het ek opgehou met werk. Ek loop toe dorp toe. Ek kry vir Pieter Mentoor. Ek het 'n half dosyn bier by my gehad.
Pieter gee my toe R12 vir 'n bottel Honey Blossom en Lion bier. Ek het dit vir hom gaan koop. Ons gaan sit toe by die see. Ek het
nie van die Honey Blossom gedrink nie. Jim Reeve, Sanien en nog 'n ou wat by Heuningklip bly was ook daar. Ek het vir hulle bier
gegee. Hu
le loop toe. Ek en Pieter Mentoor het oorgebly. Pieter s
hy het nie geld en is lus om te gaan inbreek. Hy loop toe. Ek het hom agtervolg. Ek sien hy staan by iemand met 'n bruin jas en rooi
broek. Ek weet nie wie dit was nie. Ek het hom dopgehou so
20/50 meter weg. Ek sien hy gaan by die erf in. Ek hardloop toe nader. Ek hoor toe 'n fyn stemmetjie in die huis. Ek hoor glase breek.
Ek het toe by die kamer venster gestaan. Die gordyn was toe. Ek gaan na die deur toe. Ek draai die knip oop. Ek gaan saggies in en
loop saggies. Ek gaan die kamer in. Ek sien daar l
'n vrou onder bloed. Toe ek wou omdraai druk hy iets in my rug en s
, 'staan of ek skiet jou vrek en sit jou hande op jou kop.' Hy s
ek moet saam stap. Hy sluit toe die voordeur met 'n sleutel wat hy by hom gehad het. Hy s
ek moet weer die kamer ingaan. Sy hand was nog steeds agter my. Hy het my broek los gemaak. Hy stoot my toe op haar. Ek l
toe oor haar onderlyf. Hy s
ek moet gou maak. Ek het nie gemeenskap gehad nie want die vrou was al dood en my piepie was pap. Hy s
toe ek moet die telefoon vas hou en die draad afsny. Hy het die mes vir gegee. Ek het toe die draad afgesny. Hy het die hele tyd
agter
6
my gestaan en my gedwing. Ek was bang gewees. Hy s
toe ek moet soek na geld in die huis. Hy loop agter my aan. Ek het toe my broek nat gemaak omdat ek vol senuwees was. Hy het oorringe
in sy hand gehad en nog iets in 'n sakkie. Ek luister toe ek hoor toe of dit klink dat daar iemand in die garage is. Hy het die kar
se sleutels gehad. Ons gaan toe uit. Hy laat my voorloop. Hy s
ons moet die kar uit stoot. Ons stoot dit toe uit tot in die pad. Die kar wou nie start nie. Hy kyk toe onder die kar. Ek kry toe
kans om weg te hardloop. Ek sien toe die polisie wa. Ek kry toe vir Sers Jackie. Ek vertel toe vir hom wat gebeur het. Hy het
oe oor die radio gepraat. Hy het toe na Pieter gaan soek en hom gekry. Ek het niks aan die vrou gemaak of iets gevat nie. Pieter was
alleen daar en hy het alles gedoen. Hy het ook geld, R10 note, uit die handsak uitgehaal en gevat. Dit is al."
Die verklaring plaas die tweede appellant op die misdaadstoneel om en
by die tyd toe die verskeie misdade gepleeg is. Sy teenwoordigheid aldaar word
ook bevestig deur 'n formele erkenning wat hy gemaak het dat "namiddag, en
voor ongeveer 17:30, op Dinsdag 13 Oktober 1992 was beskuldigde nommer 2
binne die huis te 15de Laan 19, Kleinmond, Kaap." Dit word verder bevestig
deur die getuienis van die getuie WiIIiams (waama ek aanstons in meer detail
7
sal verwys) wie die twee appellante kort voor 17:00 in die straat by die oorledene se voertuig gesien het.
Luidens die verklaring ontken die tweede appellant dat hy deelgeneem het aan die aanranding op die oorledene. Sy verweer, soos in
die verklaring geopenbaar, kom daarop neer dat sy optrede op die toneel onder dwang van die eerste appellant geskied het. Ofskoon
die verontskuldigende gedeeltes van die verklaring in oorweging geneem moet word, volg dit nie dat hulle as redelik moontlik waar
aanvaar moet word nie. Hulle moet teen die aanvaarde of bewese objektiewe feite en die algehele waarskynlikhede opgeweeg word ten
einde te bepaal welke gewig (indien enige) aan hulle verleen kan word. Daarbenewens moet in gedagte gehou word dat "[t]he fact
that the statements are not made on oath and were not subject to cross-examination detracts very much from the weight to be given
to those portions of the statement favourable to its author as compared with the weight which would be given to them if he
8
had made them under oath." (S v Ngcobo 1992 (1) SASV 544 (A) op 546 j.) Uit die tweede appellant se verklaring blyk dit dat hy
en die eerste appellant vanaf 11-uur die oggend op vriendskaplike voet met mekaar verkeer het. Sy weergawe van hoe hulle later uiteen
is en hy, eintlik vanwe
nuuskierigheid, die eerste appellant op 'n afstand gevolg het tot in die oorledene se huis, is hoogs onwaarskynlik. Al sou daar argumentshalwe
aanvaar word dat hulle nie saam na die oorledene se huis gegaan het nie (iets wat ernstig te betwyrel is), bestaan daar geen rede
nie waarom, en is dit gevolglik onwaarskynlik dat, die eerste appellant skielik 'n aggressiewe houding teenoor die tweede appellant
sou inneem en dreig om hom te skiet. (Wat dit betref, val dit terloops op dat geen vuurwapen
f in die aanranding gebruik is
f in die eerste appellant se besit gevind is nie.) Die tweede appellant se weergawe van wat daarna sou gebeur het, kom uiters vreemd
voor en, in die konteks van sy blykbare vriendelike verhouding met die eerste appellant, ook inherent
9
onwaarskynlik. Uit die verklaring blyk dit ook dat daar geleentheid tot vroe
r ontsnapping was indien die tweede appellant werklik onder dwang opgetree het en van die eerste appellant wou wegkom.
Maar dit is veral die getuienis van mnr Williams wat na my mening die tweede appellant se bewering van dwang die nekslag gee. Hy het
gesien hoedat die tweede appellant die voertuig stoot terwyl die eerste appellant agter die stuur daarvan sit. Hy het hulle vir ongeveer
vier of vyf minute dopgehou terwyl hy in hulle rigting aangestap het. Hulle het toe saam die aangrensende bosse in weggehardloop,
in die rlgting van die gholfbaan, vermoedelik toe hulle hom, of iemand anders in die omgewing, gewaar het. Ondanks 'n mate van verwarring
op een tydstip aangaande sy uitkenning, het daar op die ou end geen twyfel by hom ontstaan nie dat dit wel die tweede appellant,
wat hy goed geken het, was wat die voertuig gestoot het. Sy getuienis in di
opsig, wat myns insiens tereg deur die verhoorhof aanvaar is, word tot 'n mate bevestig deur die tweede
10
appellant se formele erkenning da
sy vingerafdrukke op die oorledene se voertuig gevind is.
Dit volg uit mnr Williams se getuienis dat die tweede appellant ruim ge
eentheid gehad het, indien sy bewering van dwang eg was, om hom uit die voete te maak terwyl die eerste appellant agter die voertuig
se stuur was. Hy het egter nie van hierdie gulde geleentheid gebruik gemaak nie. Daarbenewens, toe die eerste appellant weghardloop,
hardloop die tweede appellant
saam
met hom in
dieselfde
rigting, nouliks die gedrag van 'n persoon wat teen sy wil gedwing is om mee te doen aan onwettige optrede. Daar sou redelik van
hom verwag kon word om
f op die toneel te bly,
f in 'n ander rigting as die van die eerste appellant te hardloop. Mnr Williams se waamemings weerspreek ook die tweede appellant
se bewering in sy verklaring dat hy die kans gekry het om weg te hardloop toe die eerste appellant onder die voertuig gekyk het.
Waar die tweede appellant in sy verk
aring beweer "Ek kry toe vir Sers
11 Ja
ckie. Ek vertel hom wat gebeur het", wek dit die indruk dat hy vir "Sers ackie" op die eerste, beste geleentheid vertel
het wat daar met hom gebenr het, oos verwag sou word van 'n onskuldige persoon wat 'n nare ervaring eurgemaak het. Dit was egter
nie die geval nie. Volgens Sers Human (wie in ie omgewing bekend staan as "Sers Jackie"), het hy na die aangifte van die
misdaad in die rigting van Kleinmond gery op soek na verdagtes. Hy het die tweede appellant deur die veld sien aankom. Die tweede
appellant het hom ewys om stil te hou.
n die daaropvolgende gesprek het die tweede appellant om meegedeel dat die persoon waama hui soek Pieter Mento (die eerste ppellant)
is, en dat "sy hande vol bloed is en dat daar op sy tekkies se oorpunte ook bloed is". Die tweede appellant het "dood
kalm voorgekom". Iy het op daardie tydstip geen melding gemaak van die feit dat hy op die toneel vas en dat hy gedwing is om
aan sekere van die gebeure aldaar mee te doen lie. Dit was eers omtrent 'n uur na die arrestasie van die eerste appellant (nog
12
dieselfde aand), toe hy die tweede appellant weer teegekom het, dat laasgenoemde aan hom vir die eerste keer ges
het dat "hy was by die moordtoneel betrokke gewees" en dat "Pieter Mento hom gedwing het om saam met hom die daad
te doen" (wat ook nie heeltemal ooreenstemmend is met die tweede appellant se verklaring nie as aanvaar is dat "die daad"
waarna die tweede appellant verwys het die moord op die oorledene was). Die getuienis van Sers Human is geensins betwis nie.
Na my mening kan daar in die omstandighede, en veral by ontstentenis van die herhaling onder eed van wat in die verklaring staan,
en die toetsing daarvan onder kruisondervraging, geen waarde geheg word aan die verontskuldigende gedeeltes van die tweede appellant
se verklaring nie.
Om terug te keer na die onbetwiste of bewese objektiewe feite, die waarskynlikhede wat daaruit voortvloei en die afleidings wat hnlle
regverdig. Soos reeds gemeld, het die twee appellante vanaf ongeveer 11:00 die betrokke
13
dag gesellig met mekaar verkeer en saam 'n hoeveelheid sterk drank gedrink. Die misdade is kort voor 17:00 gepleeg. Albei appellante
was om en by daardie tyd in die oorledene se huis teenwoordig. Dit is waarskynlik dat hulle saam soontoe is met dieselfde doel voor
o
. Daar was niemand anders daar nie, net hulle en die oorledene. Volgens die mediese getuienis was twee verskillende wapens gebruik
in die aanval op die oorledene, 'n snoeisk
r en 'n mes, wat a
bei later gevind is, beide bebloed, die een in die voertuig en die ander in die huis. Dit is prima facie aanduidend daarvan dat die
oorledene deur meer as een persoon aangeval is. Terwyl dit moontlik is dat een persoon van meer as een wapen gebruik kon gemaak het,
dui twee wapens eerder op twee aanvallers. Die tweede appellant het aktief deelgeneem in die verwydering van die oorledene se voertuig
na haar dood. Sy latere optrede kom, op die oog af, minstens op vereenselwiging met die voorafgaande gebeure neer. Daarbenewens het
die tweede appellant 'n verontskuldigende verklaring gemaak wat in wesenlike
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opsigte vals is. Hy het ook versuim, ondanks 'n sterk prima facie saak teen hom aanduidend van skuld, om getuienis af te l
.
In die omstandighede, en gesien die gebeure wat plaasgevind het, is die enigste redelike afleiding dat die twee appellante saam na
die huis van die oorledene gegaan het. Hulle kon redelikerwys haar aanwesigheid by die huis te wagte gewees het. Hulle opset was
klaarblyklik om haar te beroof. In die loop van die rooftog is die oorledene ernstig aangerand en doodgemaak. Hulle moes noodwendig
voorsien het dat sy moontlik weerstand sou bied, in welke geval geweld gebruik sou moes word om haar weerstand te bowe te kom. Afgesien
hiervan, was beide appellante goed bekend aan die oorledene. Die afleiding is feitlik onafwendbaar dat die appellante die gevaar
van latere uitkenning deur haar besef het en haar doodgemaak het om dit te voorkom. Om welke rede ookal sy om die lewe gebring is,
is die enigste redelike afleiding dat haar dood deur beide appellante voorsien was, waarskynlik toe hulle haar huis
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binnegegaan het om haar te beroof, maar beslis op die laatste toe sy op die wyse reeds beskryf, aangerand is. In daardie omstandighede
maak dit regtens geen verskil of haar dood daadwerklik veroorsaak is deur een of albei die appellante nie. In iedere geval sou albei
aan moord skuldig wees.
Omdat die roof plaasgevind het ter uitvoering van 'n gemeenskaplike opset om te roof behoort die tweede appellant, soos in die geval
van die eerste appellant, skuldig bevind te gewees het aan roof ten opsigte van die toiletware en sleutels, asook die polshorlosie,
en nie net diefstal nie. Waar, soos in die onderhawige geval, 'n app
lhof oortuig is dat, weens
f 'n verkeerde feitebevinding
f 'n regsdwaling, die verhoorhof 'n appellant skuldig bevind het aan 'n minder ernstige misdaad as die waaraan hy, ingevolge die akte
van beskuldiging, skuldig bevind behoort te gewees het, het die appelhof die bevoegdheid om in te gryp en die skuldigbevinding dienooreenkomstig
te verander (S v E 1979(3) SA 973 (A) op 977 D). Gevolglik behoort die tweede
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appellant op aanklag 2 skuldig bevind te gewees het aan roof van die reeds genoemde artikels.
Soos aanstons sal blyk, moet die doodvonnis tersyde gestel word, en sal die aangeleentheid terugverwys moet word na die verhoorhof
om die appellante opnuut te vonnis op die moordaanklag. Die vraag ontstaan of dit ook aangewese is om in die geval van die tweede
appellant terugverwysing te gelas vir vonnis op die roofaanklag. Die eerste appellant is op daardie aanklag 5 jaar gevangenisstraf
opgel
. Na my mening, wat die roof betref, het die twee appellante min of meer 'n gelyke aandeel daaraan gehad, en behoort hulle, sover
dit vonnis aangaan, oor dieselfde kam geskeer te word. Gevolglik behoort die tweede appellant dieselfde vonnis as die eerste appellant
opgel
te word, en bestaan daar geen oortuigende rede waarom die nodige regstelling nie deur hierdie Hof gedoen kan word nie.
Dit bring my by die doodvonnisse. Hulle is opgel
voordat die Grondwet
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van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993 in werking getree het. Sedertdien het die Konstitusionele Hof in S v Makwanyane and
Another 1995(3) SA 391 (KH) op 453A-D beslis dat vanaf die datum van die bevel in daardie saak die doodvonnis nie 'n geldige vonnis
is nie en dat reeds opgelegde doodvonnisse nie voltrek mag word nie. Gevolglik moet die opgelegde doodvonnisse tersyde gestel word
en met 'n bevoegde ander vonnis vervang word. Na my mening sou hierdie 'n gepaste geval wees vir terugverwysing van die saak na die
verhoorhof vir die heroplegging van vonnis op die moordaanklag.
Die volgende bevel word uitgereik:
(a)
Die tweede appellant se app
l teen sy skuldigbevinding op aanklag
4 (moord) word afgewys;
(b)
Die tweede appellant se skuldigbevinding op aanklag 2 (roof) van
diefstal van toiletware en 'n bos sleutels word verander na een van roof
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van 'n polshorlosie, toiletware en 'n bos sleutels. Sy app
l teen sy skuldigbevinding op daardie aanklag word andersins afgewys;
(c)
Die tweede appellant se vonnis op aanklag 2 word verander na 5 jaar gevangenisstraf;
(d)
Die eerste en tweede appellante se app
lle teen die doodvonnis elk van hulle opgel
op aanklag 4 word gehandhaaf en hulle onderskeie doodvonnisse word tersyde gestel;
(e)
Die saak word na die verhoorhof terugverwys vir die heroplegging van vonnis op eerste en tweede appellante op aanklag 4.
TwSMALBERGER APP
LREGTER
MARAIS, AR)
SCHUTZ, AR) Stem saam

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