S v Pennington and Another (271/94) [1997] ZASCA 41 (16 May 1997)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Fraud — Conviction of accused for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding existence of consortium — Appellants, Pennington and Summerley, convicted of fraud involving misrepresentation to the Registrar concerning the acquisition of shares in NELSA — Evidence indicated no genuine intention to form a consortium, with fraudulent activities established prior to the share acquisition — Court held that the alleged consortium was a fabrication to facilitate the takeover and deceive regulatory authorities — Appeal dismissed, confirming convictions and sentences.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


These were criminal appeal proceedings in the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa against convictions and sentences imposed for multiple counts of fraud arising from complex commercial transactions involving a group of companies known as the Magnum Group of Companies.


The appellants were J D Pennington (first appellant; accused 2 at trial) and M E Summerley (second appellant; accused 3 at trial). The respondent was the State. Two other persons were tried with the appellants in the court of first instance: G M Trail (accused 1) and K J R Summerley (accused 4). A fifth accused initially indicted left the Republic before trial. Although leave to appeal was originally granted to the three convicted accused, accused 1 later abandoned his appeal, with the result that the appeal proceeded only in respect of accused 2 and accused 3.


The procedural history was unusually protracted. The trial took place in the then Witwatersrand Local Division before Gordon AJ, lasted almost three years, and concerned an indictment containing 172 counts of fraud. Accused 2 and accused 3 were convicted on counts 1–150 and acquitted on the remaining counts; accused 4 was acquitted on all counts. Sentences were imposed with imprisonment terms on count 1 and on counts 2–150 (with partial suspension for accused 2), with the count 1 sentences ordered to run concurrently with the sentences on the other counts. The matter reached the appellate court long after the events underpinning the prosecution, following a lengthy investigative and prosecutorial timeline that included proceedings under section 417 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, police investigations, and a forensic accounting report that provided the foundation for the indictment.


The general subject-matter of the dispute on appeal concerned whether the appellants had received a fair trial, and whether the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that they participated, together with a bank employee (accused 1), in fraudulent schemes that channelled funds through South African Bank of Athens (SABA) to Magnum and that misled investors and/or SABA. A separate issue concerned the correctness of the conviction on count 1, relating to the 1982 acquisition of the shares of National Employers Life Assurance Company of South Africa (NELSA), allegedly through a consortium, and the representations and non-disclosures made to the Registrar of Financial Institutions.


2. Material Facts


The Magnum Group’s main company was Magnum Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd (MFH), with subsidiaries including Magnum Acceptances Ltd (MAL) and (initially) Magnum Leasing Ltd (MLL). Accused 2 and accused 3 held directorships within key Magnum entities. The evidence accepted by the court placed accused 3 as the dominant figure and chief executive of the group, with accused 2 heading the group’s money market division and serving as managing director of MAL. Accused 1 was employed at SABA as money market manager and chief accountant at head office, and had previously been succeeded in that SABA role by accused 2.


It was common cause that the transactions underlying counts 2–150 occurred. The court treated as undisputed that substantial sums were moved through SABA in a manner that, in substance, made credit available to Magnum entities. The disputes concerned authority, knowledge, intention, and collaboration, particularly whether accused 1 acted with SABA’s authority and whether accused 2 and accused 3 knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud investors and/or SABA.


In respect of counts 2–114 (the “conduit transactions”), the accepted factual pattern was that Magnum procured investors to place funds with SABA, often because investors were unwilling to lend to Magnum directly without security or without dealing with a recognised financial institution. Investors paid funds into SABA (by cheque or via Reserve Bank mechanisms), and on the same day accused 1 caused SABA to issue cheques for identical amounts to Magnum companies (principally MLL or MAL) or to credit MLL’s account at SABA. When repayment was required, Magnum supplied cheques to SABA, and accused 1 paid the investor using SABA cheques. Magnum also supplied interest payments plus an additional amount described as a 1% commission for SABA. The court relied materially on evidence that no security was received by SABA for the on-lending to Magnum and that SABA’s ordinary internal recording systems did not reflect these transactions, notwithstanding their volume. The transactions in this category spanned December 1979 to December 1982 and involved a total amount just under R112 million.


In respect of counts 115–125, the accepted facts were that certain investors were induced to invest in Magnum on the strength of unauthorised written “letters of guarantee” signed by accused 1 purportedly on behalf of SABA. One investor (Putco) suffered substantial loss when Magnum could not repay in December 1982 and SABA denied knowledge of the undertakings.


In respect of counts 126–150, the accepted facts were that investors received post-dated SABA cheques as purported security for investments made with Magnum, with arrangements made by a Magnum treasury official (Mrs Lawrence) and the cheques issued by accused 1. None of the investors in this category suffered a financial loss, but the court treated the exposure and risk as central to potential prejudice.


The court accepted that Magnum collapsed in December 1982 after banks refused to honour certain cheques, resulting in liquidations and leaving SABA with losses of about R30 million. The factual background accepted also included that, in the months before the collapse, Magnum’s financial position was steadily worsening and the group had an increasing need for funds.


Count 1 concerned the 1982 acquisition of NELSA shares. The core accepted facts included that an offer dated 15 February 1982 was made on behalf of a named consortium (“the Struthers Consortium”) to purchase all NELSA shares, with a clause recording that each consortium member would acquire less than 25% of the shares, a feature linked to avoiding the reporting consequences under section 27 bis of the Insurance Act 27 of 1943. The purchase price was paid using funds flowing from Magnum entities through accused 3’s account. After the acquisition, NELSA’s securities were taken into the control of accused 2 and accused 3 and converted into cash, with proceeds paid into a NELSA account with SABA. The Registrar became involved, raised concerns, sought details of the purchasers, and required an additional R2 million to bolster NELSA. A pledge of NELSA shares was executed in favour of Rand Merchant Bank (RMB) as part security for a loan, and later a cession in security of NELSA shares was concluded. Communications with the Registrar omitted, among other things, the internal Magnum funding and accounting mechanism used to pay for the shares, the early realisation and diversion of NELSA securities, and the pledge of shares.


On the consortium question, the court (through the judgments) distinguished between competing versions. One version (advanced by the defence) treated the consortium as genuine or at least honestly intended but not finalised, partly due to the Registrar’s intervention. The opposing inference, accepted by the majority, treated the consortium as fictitious and deployed to avoid regulatory scrutiny and facilitate the takeover.


3. Legal Issues


The appeal required the court to determine multiple central legal questions, predominantly involving the application of legal standards to largely common-cause transactional facts, as well as factual inferences concerning state of mind, knowledge, and intention.


One set of issues concerned procedural fairness. The appellants contended that the trial was unfair due to cumulative factors including delay before prosecution, lack of legal representation, admission and alleged use of a confession by a co-accused, the forensic accountant’s reliance on enquiry evidence and hearsay, and the admission and use of records from a commission of enquiry. This raised questions of law (the applicable standard for a fair trial at the time) and mixed law-and-fact (whether any identified irregularity resulted in a failure of justice).


A further set of issues concerned whether accused 1 was authorised, expressly or tacitly, to conduct the transactions giving rise to counts 2–150 on behalf of SABA, and whether he was aware of any lack of authority. This was a question of fact, evaluated through testimony about bank policy, record-keeping, and the absence of internal documentation.


The next issues concerned whether there was a common purpose between accused 1 and Magnum officials to defraud investors and/or SABA, and whether accused 2 and accused 3 knew accused 1 lacked authority and nevertheless collaborated. These issues required the court to make inferential factual findings about knowledge and intention from circumstantial evidence and the appellants’ roles within Magnum.


A discrete issue concerned the correctness of the conviction on count 1, which involved both factual and inferential determinations about whether a consortium existed or was honestly intended, whether the representations and non-disclosures were fraudulent, and whether there was culpable non-disclosure relating to the Registrar’s condition requiring an increase in NELSA’s capital.


4. Court’s Reasoning


Procedural fairness and the applicable test


The court held that constitutional fair trial provisions in the interim and final Constitutions did not apply because the trial was completed before the interim Constitution came into operation. Relying on authority governing the position at the time, the court approached fairness as requiring compliance with the then-existing formalities, rules, and principles of criminal procedure. An appeal could succeed only if there had been a procedural irregularity or illegality and such irregularity resulted in a failure of justice.


On delay, the court accepted that aspects of the prosecution’s delay were unsatisfactory, particularly while the docket was with the prosecuting authority. However, it reasoned that the critical question was whether the delay affected the appellants’ ability properly to present a defence. The court attached significance to the fact that no complaint of prejudicial delay amounting to unfairness was raised during the trial, including at points when the appellants had legal representation and when postponements were sought.


On lack of legal representation, the court held that absence of representation did not itself render the proceedings irregular. It examined whether the trial court complied with the established rules designed to assist undefended accused. The court noted that the appellants had counsel at critical moments (early postponements, plea explanations, and advice at the close of the State case) and that the trial judge actively assisted them through postponements, guidance in cross-examination, and clarifying issues. The court rejected the contention that the trial judge was obliged during the trial to explain substantive law elements such as fraud and common purpose.


On the co-accused’s confession, the court assumed for argument that it may have been wrongly admitted but found no indication that the trial judge used it against accused 2 and accused 3. The court emphasised the existence of abundant other evidence supporting their convictions.


On the forensic accountant (Wright) and hearsay concerns, the court reasoned that Wright’s evidence served primarily to explain and trace transactions which were in substance common cause, and where any aspect was hearsay, necessary witnesses were called. It found no basis to conclude that the trial court merely adopted Wright’s conclusions without its own assessment of oral and documentary evidence.


On the commission of enquiry record, the court held that, as the law stood, each accused’s own enquiry evidence was admissible against that accused and could be used for cross-examination. It acknowledged that cross-examination of accused 3 on another accused’s enquiry evidence would not be admissible as co-conspirator statements because the conspiracy would have ended, but found that accused 3 was not pressed and no failure of justice resulted.


Authority at SABA and concealment


On counts 2–150, the court accepted the evidence of SABA’s managing director (Philippides) and internal audit head (Landsberg) concerning SABA’s policies and the limits of accused 1’s authority. It found that the transactions—large-scale unsecured on-lending, unauthorised guarantees, and post-dated cheques—were inconsistent with SABA policy and with what would be expected of a bank of SABA’s size, and therefore lay outside accused 1’s authority.


A central evidential basis for the court’s conclusion was the absence of SABA records that would ordinarily have existed had the transactions been authorised and properly processed. The court relied, in particular, on the fact that certain investor transactions were not recorded on ledger cards where they would have been expected, leading to the inference that transactions were deliberately not recorded. It rejected as speculative the suggestion that SABA officials destroyed records, noting both the lack of such a challenge in cross-examination and the improbability and futility of such conduct.


From the absence of records and the manner of execution, the court inferred not only lack of authorisation but also accused 1’s knowledge that he was acting without authority. The court emphasised that accused 1 did not claim at trial to have been unaware of a lack of authority.


Common purpose and the appellants’ participation


The court reasoned that the schemes necessarily required collaboration from Magnum personnel. It found that Magnum kept records of transactions; that letters confirming investments were typed at Magnum on SABA letterheads and signed by accused 1; that investors were steered to accused 1; and that the Magnum treasury official Mrs Lawrence made statements to auditors describing “washing and laundering of money” and conveying that SABA management was not aware. The court treated those statements, made while the common design was still in execution, as admissible evidence of common purpose.


In relation to accused 3, the court placed weight on his role as Magnum’s controlling executive, his knowledge of money market operations, and his personal involvement in placing large funds with SABA (including funds derived from NELSA and I L Back). It reasoned that he knew investors were using SABA because they were unwilling to lend to Magnum directly and that the scale and unsecured nature of SABA’s exposure made it implausible that it was authorised. It further relied on documentary irregularities bearing his signature or initials and on the removal of MLL from the group (while it ceased trading) as consistent with an intent to use it as a conduit and to complicate tracing. The court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that accused 3 knew accused 1 lacked authority and that he associated himself with and participated in the schemes.


In relation to accused 2, the court considered the case even stronger, given his position as head of Magnum’s money market division and his prior employment in the equivalent function at SABA. It inferred that he knew SABA’s policies and the limits of accused 1’s authority, and that his involvement in procuring investments and his response to auditor enquiries were consistent with knowledge of irregularity. The court regarded his decision not to testify as leaving a strong State case unanswered.


Fraud elements on counts 2–150


The court applied the general definition of fraud as unlawful misrepresentation made with intent to defraud causing actual or potential prejudice. It reasoned that investors were misled into believing accused 1 was authorised to accept investments and issue guarantees and post-dated cheques on behalf of SABA and that investments would be dealt with in the normal manner and recorded properly. Alternatively, the court treated the failure to disclose accused 1’s lack of authority and the absence of proper recording as a fraudulent non-disclosure. It found actual or potential prejudice in the risks created for investors and in SABA’s exposure, and it treated the non-disclosure to SABA as part of the common purpose for which accused 2 and accused 3 were legally responsible.


Count 1 and the split between the judgments


On count 1, Smalberger JA would have allowed the appeal, holding that the State failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the absence of a bona fide intention to form a consortium, and further that there was substantial compliance with the Registrar’s requirement because NELSA’s assets increased by R2 million even if the “share capital” increase was arguably not strictly achieved in form. Smalberger JA stressed that the consortium featured throughout documentation and dealings, that continuity existed in participant names more than the trial court accepted, and that the State did not call certain potential witnesses who might have clarified whether the consortium was genuine.


Howie JA disagreed on count 1 and, with Plewman JA concurring, formed the majority. Howie JA reasoned that the consortium issue had to be assessed against the broader proved context of established fraudulent machinations and Magnum’s need for funds. He treated the documentary references to a consortium as neutral because such documents would be expected whether genuine or fabricated, particularly once the Registrar began active enquiries. He placed weight on the improbability that genuine consortium members would have remained interested had they known that NELSA’s securities were realised and proceeds diverted to Magnum; on the pledges and cessions to RMB which purported to treat the shares as Magnum’s property and included a guarantee of beneficial ownership; and on the non-disclosures and shifting, unresolved consortium membership presented to the Registrar. Howie JA also relied on evidence of inconsistencies and irregularities relating to allotment and recording of consortium shares, and on the unconvincing nature of defence evidence regarding consortium membership. He concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the consortium never existed and accused 2 and accused 3 never honestly intended to create it, and that the consortium story was part of the scheme to deceive the Registrar and facilitate the NELSA takeover. On that approach, the majority upheld the conviction on the first leg of count 1 and found it unnecessary to consider the second leg for purposes of outcome.


Sentence


Both judgments (despite the disagreement on count 1) accepted that, on the convictions upheld by the majority, there was no basis to interfere with sentence. Howie JA emphasised the warranted distinction the trial judge drew between the blameworthiness of accused 2 and accused 3, and the predominance of aggravating features, including the illicit nature of building a commercial empire at SABA’s expense and the magnitude of losses avoided only through substantial parent-bank intervention.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in all respects. The convictions of accused 2 and accused 3 on counts 1–150 were therefore upheld, as were the sentences imposed by the trial court.


The court made no alteration to the custodial sentences, including the concurrency orders relating to count 1, and it did not grant any relief on costs in a manner distinct from the ordinary consequences applicable in criminal appeals (the judgment’s operative conclusion was that the appeal was dismissed).


Cases Cited


S v Mhlungu and Others [1995] ZACC 4; 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC).


S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 (A).


R v Mayef 1957 (1) SA 492 (A).


Legislation Cited


Insurance Act 27 of 1943 (section 27 bis, since repealed).


Companies Act 61 of 1973 (section 417).


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (interim Constitution).


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) (final Constitution).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the portions of the judgment provided.


Held


The court held that the constitutional fair-trial provisions relied upon by the appellants did not apply retrospectively to a trial completed before the interim Constitution commenced, and that the applicable pre-constitutional standard required proof of a procedural irregularity or illegality resulting in a failure of justice. On the facts, no such failure of justice was established on the grounds advanced, including delay, lack of representation, evidentiary complaints regarding a co-accused’s confession, alleged hearsay in expert evidence, or the use of commission of enquiry material.


On the merits, the court held that accused 1 acted without SABA’s authority in the transactions underlying counts 2–150, that he knew he lacked authority, and that the absence of ordinary bank records supported deliberate concealment. The court held further that accused 2 and accused 3, given their positions within Magnum and the surrounding circumstances, knew of accused 1’s lack of authority and acted in concert with him and others pursuant to a common purpose, thereby satisfying the elements of fraud through misrepresentation and/or non-disclosure causing actual or potential prejudice.


On count 1, the majority held that the only reasonable inference was that the alleged consortium for the acquisition of NELSA was fictitious and not honestly intended, and that the consortium narrative served to facilitate the takeover and to deceive the Registrar, thereby supporting the conviction on the first leg of count 1. A dissenting view would have set aside the count 1 conviction, but it did not prevail. The appeal against sentence was dismissed and the trial court’s sentencing approach was upheld.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The law applicable to assessing trial fairness in a pre-interim-Constitution criminal trial required that a conviction be set aside only if there was a procedural irregularity or illegality and it resulted in a failure of justice, rather than by reference to abstract ideals of fairness.


In evaluating claims of prejudice arising from prosecutorial delay, the decisive focus was the effect of the delay on the accused’s ability to present a defence, not merely the fact or length of the delay.


An undefended accused is not automatically denied a fair trial; the trial court’s duty is to ensure compliance with established procedural practices designed to reduce unfairness, including explaining basic procedural rights and providing appropriate assistance during the conduct of the defence, without necessarily giving substantive-law instruction during the trial.


Fraud consists in unlawfully making, with intent to defraud, a misrepresentation that causes actual prejudice or potential prejudice. A misrepresentation may occur by express statement or by non-disclosure where there is a duty to disclose, and potential prejudice suffices for the offence.


Where persons act together pursuant to a common purpose to commit fraud, deliberate non-disclosures and misrepresentations made in execution of the scheme may render each participant legally responsible for the fraudulent conduct carried out within the scope of that common purpose.


In determining whether a purported consortium arrangement was genuine for purposes of assessing fraudulent misrepresentation, the court’s reasoning (in the majority) illustrates an inferential approach based on the proved factual context, including objective conduct inconsistent with genuine multi-party ownership, the content and omissions of regulatory communications, and transactional features treating the property as belonging beneficially to a single interest.

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[1997] ZASCA 41
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S v Pennington and Another (271/94) [1997] ZASCA 41 (16 May 1997)

SEE ORIGINAL JUDGEMENT BADGE
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
CASE NO
: 271/94
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
In the matter between:
J D PENNINGTON
First Appellant
M
E SUMMERLEY
Second Appellant
and
THE STATE
Respondent
CORAM
: SMALBERGER, HOWIE
et
PLEWMAN J J A
HEARD
: 24, 25 MARCH 1997
DELIVERED
: 16 May 1997
JUD
GMENT
/
HOWIE JA
...
2
HOWIE
JA:
I agree in all respects with the reasons set out in the
judgment of my Colleague Smalberger, save in regard to Count 1. As
he indicates, the crucial issue on that count is whether at the time of the
relevant representations and non-disclosures it is reasonably possibly true
that a consortium existed or that accused 2 and 3 - primarily accused 3 -
ever honestly intended that a consortium would subsequently be formed.
In that regard it does not assist the accused, in my opinion, that the
formation of a consortium was openly declared, that sundry persons were
approached to be members of it or that references to a consortium or its
alleged members are to be found in the documentary evidence. One
would expect to encounter such evidence whether the consortium was
genuine or fraudulently fictitious. And in so far as the comparatively
large measure of documentary evidence in this connection might seem
to tip the balance in the accused's favour, it must be remembered that
once the Registrar learnt of the NELSA share acquisition, made active
3
enquiries about it and set conditions for compliance to his satisfaction,
generation of such documentation was unavoidable. Accordingly I think
that the existence and tenor of this evidence are merely neutral
considerations.
What is essential, in my view, is to assess the consortium
issue in the proved factual context, in other words, against the broad
picture. When UAL put forward the offer on 15 February 1982 to buy
the NELSA shares, the accused's fraudulent machinations for the
procurement of funds for the use and expansion of the Magnum Group
were well established. 74 of the crimes laid to their charge had already
been committed by the end of 1981. The Group had by then grown
extensively but there was an ever-increasing need for more funds not
only for its maintenance but, during 1982, also for its survival. It was in this climate that the accused decided to acquire, at roughly
the same
time, control of two companies with readily available resources of cash
and quoted shares. One was NELSA and the other was IL Back. The
4
quantum of their cash and cashable assets was attractively large without
the price being, to any curious observer, manifestly out of reach. In the
case of I L Back no formalities beyond the usual were involved.
NELSA, however, was an insurer and s 27 bis of the Insurance Act
posed complications. In terms of that section (since repealed) any
acquisition of a quarter or more of an insurer's shares had to be reported
to the Registrar. Accordingly it was not legally possible for a Magnum
company to become the sole owner of the shares without notification to
the Registrar and the inevitability of his close attention. There would
have been no need for a consortium if a Magnum Company could have
raised the purchase price and if its financial affairs and standing would
have withstood the Registrar's scrutiny. One knows that MAL did
indeed raise the price. But quite obviously investigation by the
Registrar would have been unwelcome to say the least. In the
circumstances it is not surprising that from the outset the existence of a
consortium was alleged, of which every member would acquire less than
5
a quarter of the shares. On that basis it was unnecessary to give the
required notification to the Registrar.
True to the accused's established scheme, the Back and
NELSA acquisitions had hardly been effected when the cash and cashed
assets of those companies were channelled through
SABA
to Magnum.
Even viewed in February, 1982 it is most unlikely that any interested prospective consortium members would have retained their interest
had
they known of that manoeuvre and the reasons for it. The improbability
became steadily stronger as the year wore on, the membership of the
consortium remained apparently unresolved and Magnum approached
liquidation.
Consistent with the inference that the NELSA acquisition
was by Magnum interests and no one else, was the fact of the pledge to
RMB on 3 May 1982 by MAL of the existing 500 000 NELSA shares
and the cession in security on 19 November 1982 of 1,5 million NELSA
shares, also to RMB. (Only 1 million additional shares were issued in
6
August 1982 so that it is not clear whether the cession involved a
miscalculation or a second pledge of the initial shares, but no matter.)
Furthermore the pledge clearly purported to be of MAL's own property and in the deed of cession MFH guaranteed that it was the beneficial
holder of the ceded shares.
Equally supportive of that inference were the circumstances
of payment for the NELSA shares and the salient facts which accused 3
failed to tell the Registrar once communication with the latter became
unavoidable. It was a provision of the offer document that ownership of the shares would vest in the alleged consortium on payment
of the
purchase price. But there is no evidence that such a consortium existed
at the time or that it had appointed nominees. Nothing in the offer
suggests that all that there was at the time was merely a contemplation that a consortium would in the future be formed. Had that
been the case
there would clearly have been an obligation to inform the Registrar that,
despite the fact that the price had been paid on 15 February (it seems
7
through accused 3's personal bank account) by MAL, the shares would
nonetheless later be transferred to named persons in a distribution which
would avoid a contravention of s 27 bis.In fact, however, it was not
at that time that any representation was made to the Registrar. He only
learnt of the transaction because Cain (of NEG) insisted that he be
informed. And it was only as a result of the Registrar raising a query
that accused 3 wrote to him. That was on 29 June 1982. Purporting
to "report on the financial position" of NELSA, accused 3 made no
mention in the letter of the fact that MAL had paid for the shares and
then, by journal entry, had debited the purchase price to MFH which, in turn, had debited an account in its books called "Investment
in Nelsa".
(This, of course, meant that MFH was the owner of the shares.) The
letter also failed to disclose that as early as 23 February 1982 and 7
March 1982 accused 2 and 3 had realised all NELSA's securities and
proceeded to divert the proceeds to Magnum. Nor did the letter refer
to the pledge to RMB. Accused 3 further purported to give the
8
Registrar details of each "shareholder", specifying different consortium
members from those recorded in the offer document. They now included infer alios RMB (a gross improbability seeing that it was a
pledgee) and Beckett. Beckett was forced in evidence to concede that
he was never allocated shares or even had a definite participation in a
consortium.
Also in conflict with the existence of a consortium were
further vacillations in its alleged membership and the fact that, for
inadequately explained reasons, no finality was ever reached in this.
regard. At a NELSA directors' meeting on 12 November 1982 it was
announced that the Registrar had consented to NELSA's operating as an
insurer thereby, in effect, giving the all-clear at last. Even at that late
stage the Magnum spokesperson could reveal nothing more specific
about the alleged consortium than that he sought the registration of the
entire NELSA share capital in the name of the Summerley Family Trust,
as nominees for "the beneficial owners". The latter, however, were not
9
named. The post-liquidation entries in MFH's records, apparently in
acceptance of the existence of a consortium, were unexplained in
evidence. They are, moreover, as questionable as the entire consortium
version.
Then there are the numerous inconsistencies and
irregularities, pointed out by the witness Heckroodt, pertaining to the
allotment and recording of the consortium shares and related matters.
These are far more likely to have been occasioned by perfunctory and
ill-directed efforts to maintain the pretence of a consortium than by
almost chronically inefficient attempts to record the truth.
As far as the defence evidence in this connection is
concerned, Beckett's testimony reads most unconvincingly. Accepting
his honesty, the compelling reason for his vagueness, in my opinion, is
that although the concept of a consortium was talked about, and, for
reasons already given, talked about with a purpose, it was never proceeded with, or intended to be proceeded with.
10
The evidence of accused 3 relative to this count was
unsatisfactory for all the reasons stated by the trial Judge. His
conclusion that such evidence was to be rejected is amply supported by
a study of the record.
In my opinion, therefore, the only reasonable inference is
that although prospective new shareholders might have been solicited,
the alleged consortium never existed and accused 2 and 3 at no time had
the honest intention to bring it into being. It is further to be inferred
that the story of a consortium was, viewed broadly, part and parcel of the
fraudulent scheme to procure funds for Magnum and, viewed narrowly,
aimed at facilitating the NELSA takeover by deceiving the Registrar,
among others.
Accused 2 and 3 were therefore correctly convicted in
respect of the first leg of count 1 and it is unnecessary for the present
purposes to consider the second.
As far as sentence is concerned I am not persuaded that the
11
trial Judge misdirected himself. He drew a fully warranted distinction
between the blameworthiness of accused 2 and that of accused 3 and
their respective sentences reflect that difference appropriately. They
also mirror a balanced assessment of the competing mitigating and
aggravating features of the case. The latter clearly predominate. To
establish a commercial empire was one thing. To do so illicitly at the
expense of
SABA
was quite another.
SABA
's elimination from the
financial scene was only prevented at a cost to its parent bank of many
millions.
The appeal is dismissed in all respects.
C T Howie
PLEWMAN JA) concurs
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL,
CASE NO
: 271/94
In the matter between:
J D PENNINGTON
FIRST APPELLANT
M
E SUMMERLEY
SECOND APPELLANT
and
THE STATE
RESPONDENT
CORAM
: SMALBERGER, HOWIE and PLEWMAN JJA
HEARD: 24, 25 MARCH 1997
DELIVERED
: 16 MAY 1997
JUDGMENT
SMALBERGER, JA ...
2
SMALBERGER JA:
The appellants, J D Pennington and M
E Summerley
,
and two others, were arraigned before Gordon AJ in the then
Witwatersrand Local Division on 172 counts of fraud. The appellants
were accused 2 and 3 respectively. Their co-accused were G M Trail
(accused 1) and K J R Summerley (accused 4). For the sake of
convenience I shall refer to them all as in the court below. A fifth
accused, Mrs L Horftmanshof (formerly
Lawrence
), who had originally
been indicted with the others, left the Republic permanently before the
trial and could not be extradited in time. After a protracted hearing
lasting almost three years accused 2 and 3 were each convicted on
counts 1-150; accused 1 was convicted on counts 2-150. They were
acquitted on the remaining counts. Accused 4 was acquitted on all
3
counts. The convicted accused were sentenced as follows:
Accused 1
: Seven years' imprisonment.
Accused 2
: Six years' imprisonment on counts 2-150, half of
which was conditionally suspended, plus nine
months' imprisonment on count 1 to run concurrently
with the sentence on the other counts.
Accused 3
: Seven years* imprisonment on counts 2-150, plus eighteen months' imprisonment on count 1 to run
concurrently with the sentence on the other counts.
The three convicted accused sought, and were granted, leave to
appeal to this Court against both their convictions and sentences.
Subsequently accused 1 abandoned his appeal. Hence the present appeal
is confined to accused 2 and 3.
4
The charges against the accused arose from their alleged
involvement in the activities of a group of companies commonly referred
to as the Magnum Group of Companies ("Magnum Group" or
"Magnum") over the period December 1979 to December 1982. The
main company in the Magnum Group was Magnum Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd ("MFH"), a financial holding company carrying on
the
business of a financial dealer. Accused 2 and 3 were both directors of
MFH. The Summerley Family Trust ("SFT"), a trust with accused 3 as
donor and his wife and children as beneficiaries, was the sole
shareholder of MFH. Amongst the wholly owned subsidiaries of MFH
were Magnum Acceptances Ltd ("MAL") and (initially) Magnum
Leasing Ltd ("MLL"). The directors of MAL included accused 2 and
the erstwhile accused 4. Its primary business related to money and
5
capital market transactions, lease financing and other financial activities.
MLL was also involved in lease financing and related activities. Its
directors included accused 2 and 3. During June 1981 accused 3 acquired the total shareholding of MLL from Magnum. Apart from
those already mentioned, MFH had, over the relevant period, a 100%
shareholding or controlling interest in a number of other companies with
varied interests and activities, including property, engineering, aviation,
computers and security. The Magnum Group employed a large number
of people and had considerable assets. It also, over the relevant period,
had very substantial liabilities.
Accused 3 was the guiding hand and dominant figure in MFH and
thus of the Magnum Group as a whole. It was he who was primarily
responsible for its growth over a period of years. He was its chief
6
executive officer and the effective owner of all or most of the shares in
the various Magnum companies. In addition to certain directorships,
including the position of managing director of MAL, accused 2 was a
senior employee of the Magnum Group and the head of its money
market division. Accused 1 was at all relevant times the money market
manager of the South African Bank of
Athens
("
SABA
") as well as the
chief accountant at its head office. Accused 2 had been his predecessor
as money market manager at
SABA
. Mrs Lawrence (as she was at the
relevant time) was a senior employee in Magnum operating as its chief
treasury officer and money market manager.
The Magnum Group "collapsed" in December 1982 after Volkskas
Bank refused to honour certain of its cheques totalling millions of rand
(including one to SABA for R4.5 million in respect of which
SABA
had
7
issued a contra bank cheque to one
Hobbs
). Consequent thereon MFH
and certain companies in the Group went into liquidation.
SABA
was
left with losses of about R30 million. The upshot of all this was the
appointment of a Commission of Enquiry under section 417 of the
Companies Act 61 of 1973 to investigate Magnum's affairs. The Commission commenced its hearing on 21 December 1982. The
proceedings before it lasted almost two years. In the interim police
investigation began. A firm of chartered accountants was engaged in about August 1983 to conduct an in-depth investigation into certain
aspects of Magnum's dealings and to report on their findings. The
relevant report was compiled by Mr D J Wright. This report eventually provided the foundation for the charges against the accused.
Wright's
report was completed late in 1984. On the strength of it a police docket
8
was compiled and referred to the Attorney-General in August 1985.
Thereafter followed a delay of nearly four years before the Attorney-General's office finally produced an indictment. It was served
in May
1989. Proceedings in court began in August 1989 but due to
postponements at the request of the defence the trial only commenced in
February 1990.
Accused 1 enjoyed the benefit of legal representation for part of the trial; accused 2 and 3 were unrepresented save on certain occasions
to be mentioned presently. From time to time the accused requested,
and were granted, further postponements to enable them better to
prepare and deal with the State's evidence. A large number of witnesses
testified on behalf of the State. At the close of the State's case the
accused were granted a postponement in order that they might seek legal
9
advice with regard to the future conduct of their respective cases.
Accused 1 and 2 declined to testify; accused 3 did (as did accused 4).
Certain witnesses gave evidence for the defence. Judgment was
ultimately delivered in January 1992 and sentence was passed six months
after that. The matter now comes on appeal more than fourteen years
after the events giving rise to the prosecution, a regrettable state of
affairs, to say the least.
The charges of which the accused were ultimately convicted fall
into four broad categories. Briefly, the first (count 1) related to the
take-over in 1982 of the National Employers Life Assurance Company
of South Africa ("NELSA") by an alleged consortium of which SFT was
purportedly a member. The second category (counts 2-114) dealt with
so-called "conduit transactions", the depositing of money with SABA by
10
investors procured by the Magnum Group and the almost simultaneous
channelling of like amounts by accused 1 to a company in the Magnum
Group. The State alleged that the transactions were part and parcel of
a fraudulent scheme which enabled Magnum to obtain investments,
which would otherwise not have been available to it, as a result of
unauthorised conduct by accused 1 at SABA. The third category (counts 115-125) was a variation on the theme of the previous one. It
related
to obtaining or securing loans to or investments in Magnum against
alleged unauthorised written guarantees signed by accused 1, purportedly
on behalf of SABA. The fourth category (counts 126-150) was similar
to the third. It related to the obtaining of loans and/or investments by
Magnum against which unauthorised post-dated cheques, provided by
accused 1 and purportedly issued by SABA, were given to investors as
11
security for the loans and/or investments. It is common cause that the actual transactions underlying counts 2-150 took place. Of
the fifteen
paragraphs of the general preamble to the indictment containing material
factual allegations, all but two were admitted by the accused. In relation
to those two it was said by the accused (somewhat obscurely) that they
could "neither admit nor deny the allegations". The essence of the
State's case in relation to counts 2-150 is that accused 1 did not have
authority from SABA to act as he did, and that the schemes
underpinning them were the product of a conspiracy or common purpose
between accused 1, 2 and 3 and Mrs Lawrence to defraud the investors
concerned and/or SABA.
Argument on appeal centred on the following issues:
1) Whether or not the accused had a fair trial.
12
2)
Whether accused 1 was authorised, expressly or tacitly, to
conduct the transactions giving rise to counts 2-150 on behalf of
SABA. A related matter is whether, if accused 1 lacked the
necessary authority, he was aware of that fact.
3)
Whether there was a common purpose between accused 1 and
Magnum officials to defraud investors and/or SABA.
4)
Whether, if accused 1 lacked authority, accused 2 and 3 were at
all relevant times aware of that being so, and were party to a
common purpose to defraud.
5)
The correctness of the conviction on count 1.
As to the first issue, it was contended on behalf of accused 2 and
3 that their trial was unfair by reason of the cumulative effect of a
number of factors. In assessing the impact of those factors we were
13
invited to have regard to what might loosely be referred to as the
fairness requirements of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) and
the final Constitution (Act 108 of 1996).
In the majority judgment in S v Mhlungu and Others
[1995] ZACC 4
;
1995 (3) SA
867
(CC) para [41] at 888 A - D, it was pointed out that an appeal
inherently involves the complaint that the court below erred in terms of
the law applicable at the time of the proceedings at first instance.
Consequently, if the right sought to be asserted on appeal did not exist
at the time of a criminal trial then the appellant can have no legitimate
cause for such complaint and the appeal must be decided on the law
applicable at the time of the trial.
The trial in this matter was completed well before the interim
Constitution came into operation. It is therefore clear that the
14
constitutional provisions referred to by accused's counsel cannot apply
in the present case.
The relevant law at the time of the trial was stated in the judgment
in S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana
1992 (1) SA 343
(A). A
fair trial had then to be achieved in accordance with the formalities,
rules and principles of procedure which the law required, not in
accordance with abstract ideals. Although those formalities, rules and
principles were designed to ensure a fair trial, their infringement could
not result in a successful appeal unless there had been a procedural
irregularity or illegality in the trial and such irregularity or illegality had
resulted in a failure of justice. (See, in the above respects, 375 A-D,
377 A-D and 387 A-B.) The question now, therefore, is whether such
a failure occurred.
15
The first factor on which counsel for accused 2 and 3 relied was
the delay between the relevant events and the commencement of the
prosecution. As already indicated, the total period involved was in
excess of six years. Several of the reasons for that time lapse have
already been mentioned. Having regard to the mass of documentation
to be examined, the number of transactions requiring analysis and their
complicated nature, it seems to me that but for one exception those
reasons are acceptable and that they adequately explain the delay
preceding referral of the docket to the Attorney-General. The exception
concerns the period while the police docket was in the hands of the
Attorney-General's staff. According to the evidence of one of the
investigating officers the lack of progress in that time - some three years
and nine months till the indictment was served - was occasioned by the
16
transfer of the first State advocate assigned to the matter and the
eventual resignation of his successor. As a result, it was only towards
the end of 1988 that prosecuting counsel who appeared at the trial took
over the preparation of the case. No attempt was made in evidence to
I
determine whether the hold-up was perhaps due to an excessive
workload or a shortage of staff but on the face of them these facts
reflect a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. It was one potentially
prejudicial to the prosecution witnesses, to the accused and their
witnesses and to the proper administration of criminal justice in general.
The blame for it must unquestionably be laid at the door of the
prosecuting authorities.
However that may be, neither the fact of that culpability nor the
passage of over six years served in themselves to create or lead to an
17
irregularity of the required kind. That is because the crucial question
when there has been a lengthy delay in bringing an accused to trial must
always focus upon the effect of the delay upon the accused person's
ability properly to present a defence.
In the present case it is true that the two accused now on appeal
were not legally represented for almost the duration of the trial, but they
did have the services of senior and junior counsel when the case was
first called on 28 August 1989. On that occasion their counsel
presented argument in support of a postponement to enable them to
prepare for trial. In doing so he even hinted at the possibility, given
the nature of the case, that further adjournments might have to be sought
during the trial for what was termed ad hoc preparation. The argument
was transcribed and forms part of the appeal record. One would
18
imagine that had the matter of delay struck those concerned as
something so prejudicial that it was inimical to a fair trial, an objection
of the present tenor would have been raised there and then. It was not.
The postponement application was granted and the proceedings
were then adjourned until 30 October. On that date two senior counsel
and a junior appeared for accused 2 and 3 and a second postponement
was sought, this time until February 1990. The application was
opposed. The argument advanced in support of it is also on record. From what was said on that occasion it is beyond question that
the
accused's counsel were fully alive to the extent of the delay, the
complexity of the case and the need for thorough and lengthy preparation. Once again, however, no attempt was made to suggest
that to prosecute after the time lapse in question was irregular.
19
When, in February 1990, the trial was due to begin, the accused
were represented by junior counsel, who applied for further particulars
to the indictment. This led to a week's postponement in the course of
which the matter of particulars was resolved and the trial at last reached
the plea stage. Counsel referred to then withdrew because the accused
were unable to afford his services any longer. Before withdrawing,
however, he assisted them with the compilation of a written statement
in explanation of their respective pleas of not guilty on all counts. On
neither of these two last-mentioned occasions was the question of
prejudicial delay raised. The trial then proceeded and ran its lengthy
course.
It is only now, for the first time on appeal, that the complaint has
been voiced that delay was, in effect, good ground for branding the
20
entire trial as unfair. The merits of an objection such as this are hardly,
if ever, capable of assessment by reference to extrinsic factors wholly
divorced from what an accused says and does at the trial. It was essentially within the knowledge of accused 2 and 3 whether the
protracted delay in their being brought to trial prejudiced the proper
presentation of their defence to the extent that to try them at all would
be unfair. Their silence in this issue up till now is therefore a highly
significant consideration.
Obviously the passage of time would have dimmed the memories
of all the witnesses. Accused 2 did not give evidence but accused 3
testified and was in the witness box for a long time. He felt free on
many occasions to say that he could not recall events in certain instances
and indeed explained this with specific reference to the lapse of time
21
since the liquidation. In his judgment the trial Judge duly considered
this aspect and accepted the explanation in so far as it concerned points
of detail. On matters which he considered to be of substantial
importance, he did not accept it. This, of course, all entailed an
assessment by the trial Judge of issues of fact and credibility. The
merits of that assessment will be dealt with later. It is its procedural
fairness that is relevant at the moment.
A final point to mention as regards the question of delay is that at
some stages during the trial reference was made by or on behalf of the
accused to the death of one Marais, a senior official of SABA, who
would, it was suggested, have been able to furnish material evidence in
support of the defence. However, Marais died within two years of the
liquidation and would therefore have been unavailable even had the
22
prosecution been instituted with exemplary expedition.
Having considered the present submission in the light of all the
relevant circumstances I am unpersuaded that the factor of delay gave
rise to any irregularity, in the sense explained earlier, either in trying
the accused at all or in the manner of their trial.
The next factor relied upon by the accused's counsel was their
lack of legal representation. As already mentioned, this was not
absolute and reference has been made to times when they were indeed
represented. A further occasion when they had the services of counsel
was at the close of the State case. The record shows that counsel was
briefed specifically to advise them of the appropriateness or otherwise
of a discharge application at that stage and, with regard to the evidence
presented by the prosecution, the advisability of their giving evidence.
23
The proceedings were in fact postponed to allow the advocate concerned
the opportunity to study the record. On resumption of the trial he
announced the termination of his mandate but there is nothing on record
indicating that he did not or could not give the necessary advice.
The fact that the accused were unrepresented at other times in the
trial was due to their inability to afford counsel and to the unavailability
of Legal Aid. It is clear from the Rudman decision that the absence of
legal representation did not in itself render the instant proceedings
irregular. What one has to assess here is whether the trial was
conducted in accordance with established rules of practice evolved for
the assistance of an undefended accused to reduce the risk of an unfair
trial (Rudman, 381 D-E). The presently applicable rules were stated at
some length by the court a quo in the Rudman case and cited with
24
approval by this Court on appeal. The quotation concerned appears at
381 E - 382 C and reads as follows:
" 'Before the accused is called upon to plead the presiding judicial
officer is obliged to examine the charge-sheet, ascertain whether
the essential elements of the alleged offence(s) have been averred with reasonable clarity and certainty and then give the accused
an
adequate and readily intelligible exposition of the charge(s) against
him. Unless the charge-sheet contains an appropriate reference
to it and the factual basis for bringing it into operation, the
accused should be informed by the presiding judicial officer or the
prosecutor of the operation of any presumption he may have to
rebut and the prosecutor should inform the court and the accused
of the content of the evidence he intends to lead. Again, where it is competent for a court to convict an accused of an offence
other than the one alleged in the charge-sheet a judicial officer
may be obliged to inform an undefended accused of the competent
verdict

eg where an undefended accused is charged with theft
or with housebreaking with intent to steal and theft the presiding
judicial officer should explain to the accused the competent
verdicts, viz that he may be convicted of contravening s 36 or s
37 of Act 62 of 1955 or of contravening s 1 of Act 50 of 1956
unless the contravention is an alternative charge or the prosecutor
indicates that the State's case is restricted to the offence(s) alleged
in the charge-sheet.
25
At all stages of a criminal trial the presiding judicial officer
acts as the guide of the undefended accused. The judicial officer is obliged to inform the accused of his basic procedural rights

the right to cross-examine, the right to testify, the right to call witnesses, the right to address the court both on the merits and
in
respect of sentence

and in comprehensible language to explain
to him the purpose and significance of his rights.
During the State case a presiding judicial officer is at times
obliged to assist a floundering undefended accused in his defence.
Where an undefended accused experiences difficulty in cross-
examination the presiding judicial officer is required to assist him
in (a) formulating his question, (b) clarifying the issues and (c)
properly putting his defence to the State witnesses.
Where, through ignorance or incompetence, an undefended
accused fails to cross-examine a State witness on a material issue,
the presiding judicial officer should question

not cross-examine

the witness on the issue so as to reduce the risk of a possible
failure of justice.
If, at the close of the State case, an undefended accused is
not discharged, the presiding judicial officer is obliged to inform
him of his rights and in clear and unequivocal terms explain the
courses open to him. The judicial officer is obliged to inform the
undefended accused in clear and simple language of any
presumption the prosecutor is relying on, the implications thereof
and the manner in which it can be rebutted.
The judicial officer should assist an undefended accused
26
whenever he needs assistance in the presentation of his case and
should protect him from being cross-examined unfairly. "
From what I have said already it is clear that the accused were represented or had counsel's assistance when they had to consider
the
indictment, when they pleaded and at the close of the State case. It
remains to examine the role played by the trial judge at other stages in
the proceedings.
After accused 2 stated his decision to call evidence but not to
testify, the trial Judge explained to the accused their available alternative
rights: to remain silent, to call evidence, to testify or to make an
unsworn statement. Both accused 2 and 3 indicated their awareness of
these rights. On appeal counsel for the accused argued that despite all
this the trial Judge ought to have explained the relevant substantive law,
more particularly the elements of fraud and the principles of common
27
purpose.
In my view the trial court was under no obligation to do that in
the course of the trial. I am not at all sure it would not have been counter-productive to embark on what would have amounted, in
effect, to an abridged lecture at that stage. At the close of the whole case
prosecuting counsel presented detailed written argument, so says the trial
Judge in his judgment, and this would in itself have alerted the accused
to the legal requirements that had to be met by the State and the relevant
evidence adduced to meet them. Conceivably the trial Judge might at
that juncture have felt it appropriate to draw the accused's attention to some weakness of their evidence in relation to this or that
legal element or principle but it is not contended that the argument stage was when the
Judge's contribution was irregularly inadequate.
28
The case against the accused was such that the crucial factual
questions were whether accused 1 was dishonestly diverting SABA
money for Magnum's use and whether accused 2 and 3 knew it and co-
operated to achieve that purpose. The trial Judge assessed accused 2
and 3 as of quite sufficient intellectual capacity both to understand those
questions and to deal adequately with them in all phases of the trial.
A study of the record supports that assessment entirely. I might add
that one cannot but be struck by the articulate and logical way in which
accused 3 expressed himself both in cross-examining and in evidence.
Apart from what I have said thus far, the record is replete with
instances in which the trial Judge afforded the accused postponements
in order to prepare for cross-examination, to consider documentary
evidence or for other associated purposes, and when he assisted them to
29
conduct cross-examination, to clarify evidence or to indicate issues that
required attention. All in all I am satisfied that the rules enunciated in
the above quotation were complied with.
It remains to mention that the accused had the additional benefit
that accused 1 was represented by senior counsel when the major State
witnesses testified, which evidence was subjected to close and lengthy
cross-examination before accused 2 and 3 themselves cross-examined.
Accordingly I find no irregularity in the proceedings in so far as
the lack of legal representation is concerned.
The third factor which was said to render the trial unfair was the
admission in evidence, and the use against accused 2 and 3, of a
confession made by accused 1. It was contended that this statement had
been obtained by way of undue pressure from senior SABA personnel
30
and that its very content had been influenced by what Mrs Lawrence had
earlier told Magnum's auditors.
Assuming in favour of accused 2 and 3, purely for the sake of
argument, that the confession was wrongly admitted, I cannot find
anything in the trial judgment which, by express or implied findings,
indicates that the trial Judge used it against them. Where the
confession is discussed it is in relation to the case against accused 1.
Moreover the abundance of evidence, to be referred to presently, which
supports the State case against accused 2 and 3, militates completely
against the inference that the court employed the contents of the
confession in order to convict them.
The fourth factor on which the unfairness argument was based,
concerned the frequency with which Wright referred in his report and
31
in his testimony to evidence given at the Commission of Enquiry and to
other hearsay matter. It was to be inferred, so it was argued, that
Wright actually relied on this tainted material in making his findings
which, in turn, were wrongly accepted by the trial Judge.
It seems clear enough that Wright was called to give background
evidence, to describe the various transactions involved and to trace the
manner in which money was moved by way of such transactions. It emerged during the course of his evidence, however, that the
transactions and the manner of their execution were in fact common
cause. And where his evidence was in any important respect hearsay,
the necessary witnesses were called to back it up. Moreover, it is
nowhere apparent from the trial judgment that the court a quo simply
adopted Wright's factual findings as its own. The conclusions reached
32
by the court were manifestly based on the trial Judge's assessment of
the oral and documentary evidence and his own inferences.
Consequently, no irregularity attached to the admission of Wright's
evidence or the court's reliance on any of it.
The penultimate point raised with regard to the present issue was
that the record of the Enquiry was wrongly admitted and wrongly used
as a basis for cross-examination by prosecuting counsel. There is no
substance in this argument. As the law stood at the time of the trial,
the evidence given at the Enquiry by each accused was admissible
against him. It was therefore permissible to prove at the trial what an accused said at the Enquiry and to cross-examine him on it.
It was also
permissible for the trial court to infer adversely to accused 3 where an
important part of his trial evidence did not appear in his Enquiry
33
evidence. Finally, in so far as accused 3 was cross-examined on what
another accused said at the Enquiry, the latter's evidence was not, in my
view, admissible as the statement of a co-conspirator because by then any conspiracy was a thing of the past and the co-accused's
statement
nothing better than an admission inadmissible against accused 3. However, examination of the record reveals that accused 3 was not
pressed on any subject thus raised. The matter in question was left
there and the course and quality of his evidence cannot be said to have
been adversely affected by any irregularity which might have been inherent in such cross-examination.
To sum up on this issue, no irregularity or illegality occurred in,
or in relation to, the trial save, possibly, in regard to the aspect most recently discussed. As to that, no failure of justice resulted.
34
In order to deal satisfactorily with the second, third and fourth
issues it is necessary to enlarge upon the factual background to counts
2-150. SABA was a registered commercial bank. It was relatively
small in respect of both its capital and assets. Its managing director at
the relevant time was Mr A P Philippides ("Philippides"), he having
assumed duty as such in March 1979. Mr F J Landsberg ("Landsberg")
was the bank's chief inspector and head of its internal audit department.
Both men were widely experienced in banking. Apart from its normal
commercial banking activities SABA conducted a small money market
business. Accused 1 was in fact SABA's only money market official.
According to the evidence, a bank's money market transactions would
normally involve either the buying and selling of securities or the short-
term (largely overnight) investment of surplus funds with other banking
35
or financial institutions. Funds invested overnight with such institutions
constituted loans for which no underlying security was given. The
market in this regard operated on the basis of trust. While such dealings
were mainly confined to banks and financial institutions there were also
relationships between them, or some of them, and certain large
corporations or so-called "blue chip" companies. (They were apparently
known as "grey market operators".) It is common cause that Magnum
was not a "blue chip" company. Any dealings of this kind with a non
"blue chip" company would almost invariably require the furnishing of security. Apart from banks and financial institutions
there were also
concerns such as the company, Central Money Market ("CMM"), which
was part of the Magnum Group, which operated on the periphery of the
money market in the securities field, but which was apparently not
36
active during the period of the indictment. There was evidence by
accused 3 and the defence witness Heiberg that there had, over a period
of years, been extensive money market dealings in respect of securities,
involving considerable sums of money, between CMM and SABA.
They also testified to the existence of a "bank cheque facility" with SABA. When trading in securities, the seller of such
securities would
normally require a bank cheque before parting with them. In terms of
the bank cheque facility CMM would issue a Magnum cheque in favour
of SABA and would in turn receive a SABA cheque in favour of the
seller. This facility, it was claimed, was in existence when accused 1
took up employment with SABA in October 1978 and was subsequently
continued by him. According to Heiberg, the bank cheque facility
involved no real risk to SABA because the transactions to which it
37
related provided sufficient underlying security.
The transactions relating to counts 2-114 may be summarised as
follows. (I borrow extensively from the judgment of the court a quo.)
The Magnum Group, in the search for finance to fund or expand its
investments, approached prospective investors with the request to invest
their surplus funds with SABA. Some of these investors were initially requested to make their investments directly with Magnum but
were not
prepared to do so on an unsecured basis, or were only willing to do so
with a recognised financial institution. For example, Mercabank (counts
62-81) refused Mrs Lawrence's request for a loan of money to Magnum
because it was not on the approved list of institutions that Mercabank
could lend money to on the overnight money market without security.
It was, however, prepared to place its money with SABA. A similar
38
request was turned down by the SABC (counts 21-52) because Magnum
was not a registered bank or approved financial institution. It too was prepared to invest in SABA. In all instances where investors
refused to
invest in Magnum, SABA became the suggested alternative institution
for investment. As a registered commercial bank it was considered to
pose no risk for investors. The invitation to invest with SABA was
made attractive by offering higher rates of interest than were generally
obtainable elsewhere. The investors issued cheques in favour of SABA
or, through the Reserve Bank, credited the account of SABA. On the
same day as the funds were received by SABA, accused 1 issued a SABA cheque for the identical amount in favour of either MLL or
MAL, or credited the amount to the account of MLL at SABA. (Of the
Magnum Group, only MLL had an account at SABA.) The SABA
39
cheques were drawn on its head office cheque account. When
repayment of investors was required, a Magnum company would issue
a cheque for the amount involved to SABA, and the investor would be
paid with a SABA cheque issued by accused 1. In respect of interest,
a Magnum company would supply SABA with a cheque for the interest
plus an additional 1% as commission or remuneration for SABA. In
turn a SABA cheque would be issued by accused 1 to the investor
concerned for the exact amount of interest due to it. Certain investors
received letters from SABA confirming the investments made by them.
Some 40 of these were typed at the Magnum offices (which were
situated in the same building) on SABA letterheads. They were signed
by accused 1 purporting to act on behalf of SABA. No security was
received by SABA for amounts on-lent by it to Magnum. Counts 2-114
40
relate to the period from December 1979 to December 1982 and involve
an amount of just less than R112 million. The vast majority of the
transactions occurred in 1981 and 1982 - forty one in 1981 and sixty one
in 1982.
Counts 115-125 relate to letters of guarantee issued by accused 1
ostensibly on behalf of SABA. On four occasions during 1982 (counts
115-118) money was invested by Putco directly with Magnum. On each
occasion Putco was not satisfied with the negotiable instruments offered
by Magnum as security. As a result letters of guarantee purporting to
be from SABA signed by accused 1 were obtained. These were
acceptable to Putco. In the letters SABA ostensibly undertook to repurchase the instruments concerned from Putco in the event of Magnum
failing to do so by a certain date. When Putco sought to recall certain
41
of its funds from Magnum in December 1982 it was informed that
Magnum was not in a position to refund them. When called upon to
honour the undertakings in terms of the letters of guarantee, SABA
denied all knowledge of the transactions. Ultimately Putco suffered a
loss in excess of R4 million. Similar letters of guarantee were given as
additional security in respect of loans made to Magnum by other
investors (counts 119-125) over the period December 1981 to October
1982. In the case of Rand Merchant Bank (counts 121-124) the letters concerned were signed by accused 1 and another signatory. Two
of the
companies concerned each suffered a loss of approximately R400
000,00. All other investors had the amounts invested by them repaid.
The total amount involved in these counts was R19 million.
Counts 126-150 relate to instances where, as security for
42
investments made with Magnum, post-dated SABA cheques were
furnished to investors. In most cases the cheques were for the capital
amounts plus agreed interest. The cheques were post-dated to the date
of repayment. In some cases repayment dates were extended and fresh cheques issued. In the case of Didier SA (Pty) Ltd (counts 133-141,
143, 146-150) interest was paid separately by means of Magnum
cheques. The arrangements for the post-dated cheques were made in
each case by Mrs Lawrence. The cheques were issued by accused 1.
Five of the counts related to post-dated cheques issued in 1980, fifteen
to cheques issued in 1981 and five to cheques issued in 1982. The total
amount involved was in the order of R17 million. None of the investors
suffered any financial loss.
As I have previously mentioned, it is common cause that the
43
transactions underlying counts 2-150 took place. Wright was able to
trace these transactions through the books of Magnum. Even though all
the entries were not completely straightforward, Wright did not suggest
that there was a deliberate attempt to disguise anything in Magnum's
accounting records. As will appear more fully in due course, there was
a dearth of records at SABA. Each of the transactions resulted in credit
becoming directly available to one or other of the companies in the
Magnum Group, irrespective of the course followed. In each case the
participation of SABA's money market division, and more particularly
accused 1, was established. His signature appears on the relevant
documentation in respect of all but two of the counts. In respect of
those two counts the unchallenged evidence was to the effect that
accused 1 had made suitable arrangements with other employees to
44
provide the necessary signature during his temporary absence. Accused
1 was therefore directly involved in each count.
The evidence of Philippides is dealt with at length in the judgment
of the court a quo. There is no need for me to set it out in detail. I
shall concentrate on its essential features. Philippides was described by
the trial Judge as "an honest and honourable witness who never
exaggerated the position". He accordingly had "no hesitation in
accepting his evidence". While Philippides's evidence may be open to
some degree of criticism, I have no reason to doubt the general
correctness of the trial Judge's assessment of him. According to
Philippides, SABA's general policy, on account of the limited size of its
operations, was not to allow facilities of more than R500 000,00 to any
customer. There were, however, certain exceptions. In addition, SABA
45
generally declined deposits in excess of R250 000,00 unless they were
split, in order to limit the amounts it could be called upon to re-pay at
any one time. Money market dealings to cover shortages or invest
surplus funds were only permitted with banking or financial institutions.
Accused 1 was fully aware of SABA's policy in those respects and had
no authority to act to the contrary. Nor was he authorised to make
loans or give advances to any customer. Philippides recalled an
occasion on which accused 1 advised him that he had received money
from Magnum to cover a shortage at the month's end. His response was
that the money should be returned as soon as possible as he did not like
having dealings with Magnum.
Philippides further testified that it was not the policy of SABA to
give letters of guarantee such as those to which counts 115-125 relate.
46
It was also against SABA's policy to give post-dated cheques. If SABA
undertook a future obligation to a third party, it did so by issuing an
ordinary bank guarantee in proper form. Accused 1 had no authority to
give either letters of guarantee or post-dated cheques on behalf of SABA
since he had no authority to offer credit facilities to customers. To the
extent that a bank cheque facility existed, it clearly did not apply to post-dated cheques; in the latter case there was no exchange
of cheques
and the underlying security was lacking. While it appears from the
evidence that SABA's policies may have been transgressed on isolated
occasions, this does not in my view detract from the acceptability of
Philippides's testimony.
It is clear from the evidence of Philippides that accused 1 did not
have authority from SABA to enter into the transactions which are the
47
subject of counts 2-150. Any suggestion that SABA's management, including Philippides, knew, or must have known, of accused l's
irregular activities, and condoned them, is without foundation.
According to Philippides, he only became aware of these irregularities
after the Magnum cheques were dishonoured in December 1982 and, as
it was put in evidence, "the bubble burst". Although accused 1 reported
to him monthly, the relevant transactions were never brought to his
attention by accused 1, either verbally or in any documents. Nor was
it possible to have had knowledge of the transactions from the bank
records.
Leaving aside the question of authorization, Philippides was
adamant that proper records had to be kept for all money market
transactions. Apart from source documents such as cheque requisition
48.
slips and cheques, proper ledger cards in the name of each investor had
to be opened and maintained. These should have reflected, inter alia,
the amounts invested, the period of the investment and the applicable
rate of interest. These cards would have served as SABA's records of
the transactions. An example of such a ledger card is exhibit Y1. It is
a copy of the ledger account for SABC and records deposits and
withdrawals. It reflects, inter alia,deposits of R500 000,00 on 17 and
31 January 1980 and one of Rl 000 000,00 on 29 October 1980. There
was therefore a ledger card for SABC investments in the money market.
Yet over the period 8 January 1980 to 28 November 1980 there were ten
instances of amounts invested by SABC with SABA on the money
market (all of which were on-lent to Magnum and gave rise to counts
22-31) not reflected on the ledger card. Nor were a further twenty-one
49
instances during 1981 and 1982 (counts 32-52) reflected therein. The
inference is irresistible that the SABC transactions to which counts 22-52
relate were deliberately not recorded in SABA's records.
Philippides further testified that letters should have been sent to
all customers (investors) confirming details of their investments.
Examples of these are to be found in the exhibits in the record. Copies
of such letters would normally be filed with the general records, the
customer's file and, if another department was involved, that
department. All letters would have had reference and serial numbers
and would have been filed accordingly. There should have been similar
records for amounts lent by SABA.
According to Philippides and Landsberg no such records for the
transactions relating to counts 2-114, or equivalent records in respect of
50
the other counts, were to be found at SABA. This was confirmed by
Wright to whom such records as were available were handed by
Landsberg. (While there was evidence that records are not necessarily
kept of
overnight
money market transactions, the transactions which are
the subject matter of the charges against the accused clearly do not fall
into that category.) Landsberg was the person primarily responsible for
the search for relevant records at SABA. He too was found by the trial
Judge to be an honest witness whose integrity was beyond question.
That he was a man of integrity was repeatedly endorsed by accused 3
when cross-examining Landsberg.
When giving evidence accused 3 claimed that there must have
been records of the relevant transactions at SABA. His attitude is
understandable, for without such records the clear inference would be
51
that such transactions were unauthorised. When confronted with the
evidence of Philippides and Landsberg, which he was in no position
personally to refute, he resorted to "speculation" that the records must
have been destroyed by, amongst others, Philippides and Landsberg.
This had never been suggested to either of them under cross-
examination, and smacks of an afterthought on the part of accused 3
when he realised the significance of the absence of relevant documents.
Apart from this "speculation" running counter to acceptable evidence,
it is unlikely that Philippides and Landsberg would have jeopardized
their careers by acting in this manner or have undertaken so enormous
a task. Furthermore, it would have made no sense for them to have destroyed SABA's records. The only purpose in doing so would have
been to avoid claims against SABA. And that would have been an
52
exercise in futility, as any claimants would have been in possession of
authentic documentation to establish their claims.
A number of SABA employees or ex-employees who testified
stated that it was widely rumoured at SABA that there were extensive
dealings with Magnum. Philippides and Landsberg claim not to have
been aware of such dealings, nor to have had reasonable grounds for
believing that there were any such dealings. While this may be
somewhat surprising in view of the volume of the transactions that
actually took place between SABA and Magnum within the context of
a relatively small bank, there is not sufficient reason to cast doubt on
their evidence in this regard. It is apparent from the record that
Philippides was never well disposed towards Magnum and he could have
been expected to take steps to stop any unauthorised dealing involving
53
Magnum which would have put SABA at risk. Quite clearly large sums
of money passed through SABA's head office bank cheque account en
route to and from Magnum. This account was not one that normally
invited, or required, the attention of management. On perusal it would
have reflected balances rather than details, and it is unlikely to have
alerted Philippides or Landsberg to accused l's intrigues. The cheque
requisition slips and spent cheques would have been assigned to the waste department where they would not have come to the attention
of
Philippides and Landsberg. There were also deliberate attempts by
accused 1 to hide transactions with Magnum. Thus in the account reflecting the 1% interest or commission received by SABA from Magnum
accused 1 simply referred to the amounts involved as
"accruals" (in contrast to his earlier practice, before the period of the
54
charges, where the source was disclosed as CMM). Where additional
signatures were required, accused 1 succeeded in obtaining them without
full disclosure of the transactions concerned. In the absence of records
such as ledger cards, letters of confirmation, written reports and the like
it is perhaps not surprising that the unauthorised transactions involving
SABA did not came to the knowledge of Philippides or Landsberg or
someone occupying a senior position like Marais or that they remained
undiscovered by the regular internal and external audits that were
conducted. While SABA's overall controls may have been, and
probably were, somewhat lax, there is nothing to suggest that accused
l's irregular conduct was known to, and condoned by, management and
consequently enjoyed tacit approval.
The absence of proper records not only supports a finding that
55
accused 1 was not authorised,to conduct the transactions to which the
charges relate, but also provide evidence of an awareness on his part of
lack of authorization. If the transactions were authorised he would
undoubtedly Have kept proper records, for there would have been no
need for him not to. His failure to keep such records strongly suggests
that he had something to hide. Significantly, accused 1, who had
intimate knowledge of all the transactions, never sought to refute the
evidence of Philippides or Landsberg, nor did he ever claim to be
unaware of any lack of authority to act as he did.
On an overall conspectus of all the relevant evidence, direct and
circumstantial, pertaining to this issue I am satisfied that it was
established beyond all reasonable doubt that accused 1, to his
knowledge, did not have authority to enter into the transactions to which
56
counts 2-150 relate and that SABA's responsible management was
neither aware of, nor tacitly approved or condoned, his actions.
The unauthorised schemes conducted by accused 1 at SABA enured for the benefit of Magnum. They assisted Magnum to raise
funds (counts 2-114) or facilitated the acquisition of funds (counts 115-
150), mainly at a time when Magnum's financial position was steadily
worsening and it was trading in insolvent or near insolvent
circumstances. The schemes must inevitably have been carried out with
the knowledge and collaboration of a person or persons associated with
Magnum. That this is so is evident, inter alia, from the fact that
records of the transactions were kept at Magnum (in lieu of appropriate
records at SABA); letters to investors and auditors seeking confirmation
of investments were typed at Magnum by accused 3's personal secretary
57
on SABA letterheads; the letters in question did not contain the
customary reference or serial numbers to link them to SABA's records;
on two occasions investor cheques in favour of SABA were paid directly
into MLL's account; certain interest payments were made directly to
investors with Magnum cheques; and prospective investors were
specifically referred to accused 1 by Magnum employees. The person
from Magnum most closely associated with accused 1 was Mrs Lawrence. That she must have been fully aware of the schemes in operation
is beyond doubt. When Fontaine, then a partner in
Richardson, Reid and Partners, Magnum's auditors, approached her in
mid-November 1982 to obtain a certificate from SABA in respect of
MLL's liability to SABA, she responded by saying, according to
Fontaine's notes, that "the situation was delicate and that washing and
58
laundering of money had taken place." She gave Fontaine the
impression that management at SABA was not aware of what was going
on. She referred Fontaine to the former accused 4 who in turn referred
her to accused 2. Both expressed a lack of knowledge of transactions
with SABA. Eventually Fontaine took the matter up with accused 3
who professed that nothing was amiss. On 28 November 1982 he again
spoke to Mrs Lawrence. She basically repeated what she had told him
earlier and added, inter alia, that investors funds were being channelled
to Magnum by SABA, that Magnum did not acknowledge the loan of
such funds in writing and that the transactions were not reflected in
SABA's books. From what she told Fontaine it is apparent that she
acted in concert with accused 1 to implement the schemes in question.
Her statements to him amounted to executive statements made in
59
furtherance of a common purpose which was still in execution. As such
it was admissible against the other accused as proof of the existence of
a common purpose (R v Mayef 1957(1) SA 492 (A) at 494). For
reasons to follow, the object of the common purpose was to defraud
investors and/or SABA. What remains to be considered is whether
accused 2 and 3 were at all relevant times aware of accused l*s lack of
authority and were party to the common purpose.
I shall deal first with the position of accused 3. He was the
founder and effective owner of the Magnum Group. He was its chief
executive officer and the person in overall charge of its activities. In his
own words he was "running the show". According to his evidence his
"major efforts during the period 1981-1982 were directed at expanding
the Group's investment base". Money was clearly needed for that
60
purpose. He would have looked to his money market department to
raise the necessary funds. Magnum did not have overdraft facilities with
banks and to all intents and purposes used the money market as a bank.
Accused 3 had an intimate knowledge of the workings of the money
market. It may well be, as he claimed, that he did not over the relevant !
period concern himself with Magnum's day to day dealings on that
market. But one would have expected him to take a close personal
interest in whether or not his financial needs for investment/expansion
were being met, particularly having regard to Magnum's deteriorating
financial position of which he must have been aware. Accused 2 in fact
constantly kept him abreast of developments on the money market. On
his own admission the vaguely defined "loan facility" which he claims
Magnum had with SABA was "unquestionably of assistance within the
61
total funding programme of Magnum". It is apparent from his evidence
that he was aware from December 1979 that SABA's money market was.
placing funds with Magnum, although he claimed not to have known
who initiated the dealings. When asked under cross-examination about
the transactions giving rise to counts 2-114 he replied:
"I would say that I definitely had knowledge that those
transactions were taking place. As to their nature, their extent
and to what they were, I did not have an intimate knowledge."
It appears, therefore, that while he may not have been involved
personally in all the details, he had a general picture of what was
happening.
Accused 3 was personally responsible for ensuring that large sums
of money were deposited at SABA. He was instrumental in converting
NELSA's assets into cash and causing the proceeds to be invested with
62
SABA. Likewise he was the prime mover behind the investment of I L
Back's substantial cash assets with SABA. He played an active role in
persuading Mr Joubert of the Southern Trident Building Society to place
surplus funds with SABA. When Fontaine in November 1982 sought an
explanation from him regarding certain transactions, he informed
Fontaine that he had been instrumental in raising monies to be lent to
SABA by a number of investors. These funds were in turn lent to
Magnum by SABA. Accused 3 therefore knew full well that in respect of monies procured for investment with SABA, corresponding amounts
would be lent to Magnum. Hence his efforts to secure investments with
SABA. Those amounts would not have constituted overnight loans on
the money market. They would have been unsecured term loans of
substantial magnitude. Accused 3 was aware that such loans were not
63
usual. It is further apparent from the evidence that he must have known
that many investors were not prepared to invest directly in Magnum,
hence their referral to SABA. Others were only prepared to invest in Magnum provided they were furnished with adequate security. From
his
dealings with the witness Roth he knew that unsecured post-dated SABA
cheques were being issued as security for investments with Magnum.
In the circumstances accused 3 could not possibly have believed that
SABA, a relatively small bank with limited capital and assets, would be
prepared to expose itself to the extent it did (at least in the instances in
which he was personally involved) without security. As a corollary he
could not have believed that accused 1, who was dealing with these
matters at SABA, could have been authorized to do what he did. This
is all the more so in view of the fact that, to the knowledge of accused
64
3, a request by Magnum to SABA for loan facilities had previously been
turned down.
There are a number of other factors that bear on accused 3's
knowledge of what was taking place. He was proved to have signed or
initialled numerous cheques and documents relating to counts 2-150
which reflected incorrect information. He was admittedly a busy man
and may not always have paid attention to what he was signing or
initialling. But at the same time he was quite clearly a meticulous
person and it is unlikely that all the inaccuracies would have escaped his
attention. The fact that he did nothing about them suggests that he knew
what was taking place.
In June 1981 accused 3 acquired the entire shareholding in MLL.
It was thereafter no longer part of the Magnum Group. It had already
65
ceased trading and did not trade again. There was no reason for it to
have been taken out of the Group at the time other than for the dishonest
purpose of using it as a means for transferring funds and circulating
cheques to and from various Magnum companies along devious routes.
There is no explanation for the seemingly irrational bookkeeping
procedures that were followed in this respect. One can only infer that
the intention was to make it difficult for the auditors to trace the origin
and destination of certain funds and to conceal in the Magnum Group's
financial statements the full impact of what was occurring. While
accused 3 was no doubt not personally responsible for these bookkeeping
entries it is extremely unlikely that he had no inkling of what was on the
go. Finally, although he testified that he did not know about the letters
typed at Magnum and the records kept there, accused 3 claimed he
66
would not have been concerned had those facts been known to him. ' This is hardly the response one would expect from a reasonably
responsible person in his position ignorant of what was happening.
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from all the facts is
that accused 3 knew that accused 1 did not have authority to act as he
did; that accused 3 was aware of, associated himself with and
participated in the fraudulent schemes underlying counts 2-150 and acted
in concert with accused 1 and others in their implementation. In coming
to this conclusion I am mindful of the fact that the trial Judge found accused 3 to be an untruthful witness in certain respects.
There is no
reason to differ from his credibility findings in this regard. I suspect
that he may have been the person who initiated such schemes because
he conceived the money market to be a loophole for the requisition of
67
funds, but there is no proof to that effect.
The case against accused 2 is as strong, if not stronger, than that
against accused 3. He was, as I have mentioned before, the managing
|
director of MAL, the company directly involved in money market
transactions. As such he was the head of Magnum's money market
department and thus the person primarily responsible for ensuring that
Magnum received the funding it required. He was more intimately
involved in the day to day dealings on the market than accused 3. Mrs
Lawrence reported directly to him, and he in turn reported to accused
3. He was accused 1's immediate predecessor at SABA. He would
therefore have been fully acquainted with SABA's policies and the limits
of accused 1's authority. He must have realised that SABA's dealings
with Magnum were far in excess of what would have been usual for a
68
bank of its size. He could have had no illusions about accused 1
exceeding his authority. Like accused 3, he was actively involved in the
procurement of investments in SABA well knowing that the money
invested would be on-lent to Magnum, without corresponding security.
When approached by Fontaine to obtain a certificate from SABA
reflecting its exposure to Magnum he, despite being the obvious person to make the necessary arrangements, was unwilling or unable
to assist,
a situation indicative of knowledge on his part of accused 1's
irregularities and the fact that SABA would be unable to furnish the
required information. It is not necessary to canvass any further
indications of his involvement and guilt. Suffice it to say that he chose
to leave a strong State case against him unanswered. There can be no
doubt about his participation in the fraudulent schemes and his resultant
69
guilt.
In arriving at the conclusion that accused 2 and 3 both participated
in the fraudulent schemes, I am mindful of the fact that in June 1981 a
letter was written to accused 1 by accused 2 offering him a position with
Magnum. There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the offer. Prima facie
this letter would appear to militate against the existence of
a common purpose, for the continued presence of accused 1 at SABA
was essential to the successful implementation of any fraudulent scheme.
Why then, if accused 2 (and 3) were involved, would they be prepared
to lose the mainstay of such schemes? The evidence does not, however,
reveal in what circumstances the letter was written, and any suggestion
of innocence that it conjures up is negated by the sheer weight of those
factors pointing to guilt.
70
With regard to the question of fraud, it was not seriously
contended that if accused 2 and 3 acted in concert with accused 1,
knowing that he lacked authority, they were rightly convicted of fraud
!
on counts 2-150. "Fraud consists in unlawfully making, with intent to
defraud, a misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is
potentially prejudicial to another". (South African Criminal Law and
Procedure:Vol
II:
3rd Ed (Milton) at 702.) A misrepresentation is a
distortion of the truth. The elements of fraud have all been established
in respect of counts 2-150. It was falsely represented to investors and
prospective investors, by accused 2 and 3 and others with whom they
acted in concert (including accused 1), that accused 1 was authorised by
SABA to act as he did in accepting investments and issuing letters of
guarantee and post-dated cheques from which it would follow that
71
accused 1 would deal with the investments in the normal way and enter
them in the appropriate records of SABA, so protecting the investors' .
interests. Alternatively, the failed to disclose to them that accused 1
lacked the authority to do so and would not make appropriate entries in
SABA's records. There was actual or potential prejudice to investors
in that the misrepresentations caused them to suffer loss or placed their
investments at risk. Furthermore, accused 1, being under a duty to do so, failed to disclosed to SABA that he was acting in an unauthorised
manner, thereby causing SABA actual or potential prejudice. As the non-disclosure formed part of a common purpose involving accused
2
and 3, they are in law equally responsible for it. The non-disclosures
referred to were deliberate. Likewise the representations made were, to
the knowledge of those who made them, false. Both the non-disclosures
72
and misrepresentations were calculated to deceive and cause prejudice.
|
The requisites for fraud were clearly established.
It follows that the appeals of accused 2 and 3 against their
convictions on counts 2-150 cannot succeed.
I turn, lastly, to consider the conviction on count 1. Prior to the
events giving rise to that count NELSA was a subsidiary of National
Employers General ("NEG"). Its main business was that of life
insurance. The preamble to count 1 recites, inter alia, that:
"2. On the 15th of February 1982 MFH and/or MAL, under the
pretence of being a consortium, purchased all the shares in
NELSA from NEG.
7.
At the request of The Registrar of Financial Institutions
("The Registrar"), as a prerequisite for the transfer of NELSA to
the consortium or purported consortium, the share capital of
NELSA had to be increased by two million rand (R2 000 000,00).
8.
The two million rand (R2 000 000,00) was paid to NELSA
by MFH."
7.
73
The gravamen of the charge on count 1 was, first, that the
accused made a false and fraudulent representation to the Registrar
and/or NELSA and/or MEG and/or their respective employees that the
shares of NELSA were to be bought and/or were bought by a
consortium consisting of certain persons (natural and legal) of whom
none would hold more than 24% of the shareholding of NELSA; whereas they knew that the shares were not to be acquired by a
consortium, were to be paid for by MFH and/or MAL and that either
MFH or MAL were to hold all or more than 24% of the shares in
NELSA; and thereby, inter alia induced NEG to sell the shares, and the
Registrar to give his permission for the sale of the shares. The second
main allegation, brought about by an amendment to the indictment
during the course of the trial, was that the accused, knowing that no
74
real/actual increase in the share capital of NELSA had been effected, as
prescribed by the Registrar, failed to inform the Registrar and/or
NELSA and/or NEG to that effect.
The existence or contemplation of a consortium to acquire the
NELSA shares is central to the first leg of count 1. Mr Fourie, for the State, fairly conceded that if there had always been a consortium,
or a bona fide
intention to establish one, there would not have been a
misrepresentation or the intention to mislead necessary for proof of
fraud, nor any resultant prejudice. The onus of course rested upon the
State to prove beyond reasonable doubt that no such consortium existed
or was ever genuinely contemplated.
On 15 February 1982 Union Acceptances Limited ("UAL") made
a written offer on behalf of "A J Struthers, A J D Hobbs, Summerley
75
Family Trust, Fairhead's Trust and/or their nominees ('The Struthers
Consortium')" to purchase the entire issued share capital of NELSA
comprising 500 000 ordinary shares from NEG at 660 cents per share.
The offer records, in clause 17, that:
"17.1 the members of the Struthers Consortium will agree between them the number of shares in NELSA purchased by each of them;
and
17.2 the members of the Struthers Consortium will each
acquire less than 25% of the shares in NELSA."
Clause 17.2 was inserted to obviate the need for the Registrar's approval
of the acquisition of the shares in terms of the then section 27 bis of the
Insurance Act 27 of 1943. A consortium of more than four members
must ultimately have been contemplated, for if there were only four it
was mathematically impossible for all four of them each to have held
less than one-quarter of NELSA's shareholding. It appears from the
76
evidence that in the negotiations preceding the offer accused 3 was the
principal representative of the consortium.
The offer was accepted by NEG on the same day. The purchase
price of R3 million was paid to NEG by accused 3. The amount had
previously been paid into accused 3's account by MAL. It in turn had
debited MFH with that amount. The money for the purchase price
therefore came from MAL or MFH. On the assumption that there was
a consortium, and that the final composition of the consortium and the
number of shares of each member had not yet been agreed upon, so that
their respective contributions could not be determined, it is not
unreasonable to assume that payment may have been made on behalf of
the consortium members.
On 23 February 1982 accused 3 took control of the bulk of
77
NELSA's assets in the form of securities. The balance was effectively
taken into accused 2's custody on 7 March 1982. The securities were
in due course converted into cash, and the proceeds were paid into a
NELSA account with SABA. The amount involved was in excess of
R5 million.
The acquisition of NELSA's shares came to the attention of the
Registrar in March 1982. He was apparently of the view that he should
have been consulted in advance. On 5 April 1982 a meeting was held
between the Registrar and Mr Cain of NEG. In a subsequent written
report on the meeting Cain mentioned the following points that had
arisen:
"1. That the Registrar considered the acquisition of the shares
as a 'backdoor' registration and, as such, was unacceptable.
2. That, in his opinion, the shareholders must produce
minimum capital of between R5M and R10M to justify the
78
continuation of the licence.
3.
That pending the finalisation of the matter with the new
shareholders, no new life policies are to be underwritten.
4.
That pending finalisation of the matter with the
shareholders, NEG should continue to manage the company
and that all investment funds must be controlled by NEG.
5.
He would expect the new shareholders to report to him with
the financial information which he requires by the latest
16th April, 1982.
6.
Unless he is satisfied with the status of the new
shareholders, he will consider applying to the Court for the
appointment of a Curator to manage the life funds."
(According to accused 3, the intervention of the Registrar put the whole
acquisition, including the finalisation of the consortium arrangements,
"on ice" until the Registrar's concerns had been dealt with and his
requirements met.)
On 3 May 1982 accused 3, acting on behalf of MAL, pledged all
the NELSA shares to Rand Merchant Bank ("RMB") as part security for
a loan of R2 million. On 6 May 1982 a further meeting was arranged
79
with the Registrar. Messrs Beckett and van der Merwe (Magnum's
attorney) represented or purported to represent the consortium. On the
previous day Magnum's accountants (Richardson, Reid and Partners)
had written to the Registrar in the following terms:
"We have been asked by the members of the Struthers Consortium
who have recently purchased the shares in the above company, to
report on the financial position. The following are the details of
the members of the Consortium:
Member
A.J. Struthers
A.J.D. Hobbs
Fairheads Trust Limited
A.T. Beckett
The Magnum Group of Companies
The Summerley Family Trust
H.R. van der Merwe."
Details were furnished of the members and an estimate given of their
combined assets.
At the meeting with the Registrar on 6 May 1982 an undertaking
80
was given to him that the consortium would enter into an interim
agreement with NEG which would leave NEG in charge of NELSA until
the Registrar had approved the change of control. The Registrar
requested information about the members of the consortium. He also
insisted that additional funds in an amount of R2 million be provided,
which sum was to remain untouched in NELSA. The Registrar was not
informed that a consortium had not yet been finally constituted; that
NELSA's assets had been delivered to accused 2 and 3 and were being
sold; and that the NELSA shares had been pledged against a loan of R2
million.
On 29 June 1982 accused 3 wrote to the Registrar with regard to
his requirements. In his letter he stated, inter alia:
"The shareholding of NELSA has been arranged as follows:
Name
Percentage
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The Summerley Family Trust
24%
Rand Merchant Bank Limited
24%
AT Beckett
996
A J D Hobbs
996
A J Struthers
15%
H R van der Merwe
9%
Fairheads Trust Limited (as
trustees for employees)
10%
He further stated that the shareholders were about to enter into a
management agreement with NEG, and submitted a copy of the "semi-
final" draft of such agreement. He also noted in the letter that "the
shareholders of NELSA have been approached by the Inkatha-movement
to obtain, through its operating Khulani Holdings Limited, an interest in
NELSA. This approach resulted from the Registrar's advice to the
Inkatha-movement, when they requested permission to incorporate their
own insurance company, to buy into an existing life company."
To comply with the Registrar's demand that additional funds be
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provided MFH issued NELSA with a cheque for R2 million on 2
September 1982. On 21 October 1982 Cain wrote to the Registrar on
behalf of NEG advising him that "the capital of the Life Company was
increased by R2 000 000,00 and the payment of this amount was made
on 2nd September 1982."
On 10 November 1982 SFT requested NEG to transfer all the
NELSA shares to the trust as nominee "for the various members of the
consortium." The share certificates were requested in denominations
equal to 24% of the shareholding (two), 12% (one) and 10% (four). On
17 November 1982 the Registrar formally authorized the acquisition of
the NELSA shares.
On 19 November 1982, in terms of a written agreement, MFH
ceded to RMB all the NELSA shares as security for its debts. By then
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NELSA had changed its name to Magnum National Life Assurance
Company Limited, and the number of shares had increased to 1 500
000. In terms of clause 1.3 of the agreement MFH guaranteed to RMB
that it was the beneficial holder of the shares.
According to Wright, MFH's books reflected the NELSA shares
as an investment. In terms of a MFH journal entry dated 18 December
1982 the investment was credited and debited against loans to the
following:
Summerley Family Trust
24%
Rl 272 000
Khulani Holdings (Proprietary)
Limited
24%
1 272 000
A T Beckett
10%
530 000
A Hobbs
10%
530 000
A J Struthers
12%
636 000
Staff Trust
10%
530 000
H van der Merwe
10%
530 000
R5 300 000
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These entries were apparently made on the instructions of the liquidators
of MFH. The entries are otherwise unexplained. Subsequently the entry relating to van der Merwe was reversed.
The loan acquired by MAL from RMB was never repaid. The former NELSA shares were ultimately purchased by RMB from the liquidators
for R250 000,00.
Through the whole saga of the acquisition of the NELSA shares
the consortium figures from first (the offer to purchase) to last (the
journal entry). It also features prominently in the discussions and the
events that took place in between. It is true that, contrary to what might
have been expected, the consortium does not seem to have been finalised before liquidation and that its suggested composition changed
from time
to time. This is not necessarily inconsistent with a bona fide intention
85
to form a consortium and for such consortium to acquire the NELSA
shares. Matters were complicated by the intervention of the Registrar and the need to satisfy his requirements. His approval was only
given
shortly before liquidation. Finalization may have been delayed pending the Registrar's approval, and time and other events may have
precluded
it thereafter.
With regard to the composition of the consortium it must be borne
in mind that the concept of nominees was ever present. SFT, Struthers,
Hobbs and Fairheads Trust (later the Staff Trust) figured throughout as
members of the consortium. Subsequently Beckett and van der Merwe
were included and their names appeared consistently until the end. The
Magnum Group was mentioned at one time but was then replaced by RMB which in turn was replaced by Khulani Holdings, who had had
86
discussions with the Registrar. On balance there appears to have been
a greater deal of continuity in the consortium participants than the trial
Judge was prepared to credit.
It was probably not beyond accused 3 to have devised the whole
scheme as a sham. And there are indications to suggest that the
consortium was just that. But none of them is conclusive on the point.
Entries in Magnum's books indicate the purchaser of NELSA's shares
as MAL or MFH. Not too much can be made of the uncertainty
concerning the involvement of MAL or MFH as clear distinctions were
not always drawn between companies in the Magnum Group when it
came to financial matters. More significant is the fact that there was no
entry in the Magnum books to show that the money paid for the shares
and increase in capital was paid on behalf of a consortium. Both
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transactions are simply reflected as "Investment in NELSA". The
NELSA shares were originally pledged by MAL and later ceded to
MFH. The pledge was clearly unauthorised and irregular, but MAL had expended money to pay for the shares and would have needed to
raise
funds to compensate for its outlay pending payment by members of the
consortium for their shares. The pledge is not therefore wholly
destructive of the notion of a consortium. Nor is the cession. Accused
3 maintained that despite the claim in the cession that MFH was the beneficial owner of the shares involved, RMB was at all times
aware
that there was a consortium that owned them. This was in effect
confirmed by the witness Sinclair who was employed by RMB. He
testified that the shares were registered in the name of SFT, but RMB had the shares re-issued in the names of what were believed
to be the
88
members of the consortium, and they in turn each signed blank transfer
forms in respect of their shareholding.
The only one of the named members of the consortium to testify
was Beckett. He was a defence witness. Although his evidence was
very vague he clearly always believed that there was to be a consortium
of which he was to be a member. He was also involved with
discussions with the Registrar on behalf of the consortium. Cain, who
was intimately involved in all the dealings, also believed at the time that
there was a consortium, until events at the trial caused him to have
doubts. UAL also accepted there was a consortium.
At best for the State there is doubt as to whether a consortium was
contemplated. There was no evidence explaining the journal entries
which the liquidators caused to be made. It is not known whether
89
claims were made against the persons concerned in respect of monies
advanced by MAL to acquire the NELSA shares on their behalf.
Struthers, Hobbs and van der Merwe appeared on the State's list of
witnesses and were presumably available to testify, yet they were not
called. (Struthers apparently died during the course of the trial which
may account for his not being called.) There was no obligation on the
accused to call them. The onus to prove its case rested upon the State
and it ran the risk of not discharging that onus by not calling them. In
my view, on a conspectus of all the relevant evidence, the State has
failed to prove the absence of a bona fide intention that NELSA's shares
were to be acquired by a consortium. The State therefore failed to
establish its case on this leg of count 1.
This brings me to the second leg of count 1 which rests on the
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alleged failure on the part of accused 2 and 3 to inform the Registrar that no real or actual increase in the share capital of NELSA
had been
effected. What the Registrar wished to ensure was that NELSA's
policyholders would be sufficiently protected. It was for this reason that
he required that NELSA's capital base should be increased. As
mentioned previously, in compliance with the Registrar's requirements
MFH issued NELSA with a cheque for R2 million on 2 September 1982
for the increase of NELSA's share capital. The cheque was paid into
NELSA's Barclays Bank account on the same day. Thereafter NEG, at
the request of MAL, placed the R2 million on call with SABA on behalf
of NELSA. SABA in turn lent the money to MLL. (This transaction
formed the basis of count 17.) MLL issued accused 3 with a cheque for
R2 million. He in turn provided MFH with a cheque for a similar
91
amount which MFH then banked in its Barclays Bank account. All
these events took place on the same day. The increase of NELSA's
capital base was therefore brought about by the exchange of cheques
within the Magnum Group and the involvement of SABA. MFH,
according to the evidence, did not have sufficient funds for this purpose
at its disposal in its Barclays Bank account. Be that as it may, and
irrespective of the circuitous and devious route by which the funding
took place, at the end of the day NELSA had some R7 195 354,00 on
call with SABA instead of its previous R5 195 354,00. Its assets were
accordingly increased by the R2 million paid to it by MFH. Rand
Merchant Bank, after acquiring the NELSA shares, succeeded in
recovering the full amount from SABA. That there was a "genuine
increase" appears from the following passage in Wright's evidence in
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chief:
"In other words, was there a genuine increase of R2-million?

From the books of Nelsa it would appear as if there was a
genuine increase of R2-million. I did not see the books of Nelsa .
but I would imagine so, because they actually received R2-million
It follows that even though strictly speaking there may not have
been an increase in NELSA's share capital, its capital or asset base was
increased. This constituted substantial compliance with the Registrar's
requirements. In the result there was no culpable non-disclosure by accused 2 and 3 and the State cannot succeed on this leg of count
1
either.
I would accordingly have set aside the convictions of accused 2
and 3 on count 1. As a consequence interference with their sentences
would have been justified and I would have been inclined to ameliorate
93
their sentences somewhat. As the majority, however, are of the view that the appeal in respect of count 1 cannot succeed, the matter
is
academic. I agree that otherwise no basis exists for interfering with the
sentences imposed.
J
W SMALBERGER
JUDGE OF APPEAL