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1995
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[1995] ZASCA 153
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LTA Mitec Ltd. v Genrec Steel Structures (Pty) Ltd. (258/94) [1995] ZASCA 153 (29 November 1995)
CASE NO 258/94
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (APPELLATE DIVISION)
In the matter between
LTA MITEC LIMITED APPELLANT
and
GENREC STEEL STRUCTURES
(PTY) LIMITED RESPONDENT
CORAM
: VAN HEERDEN, F H GROSSKOPF, et MARAIS JJA
HEARD
: 3 November 1995
DELIVERED
: 29 November 1995
JUDGMENT
MARAIS JA/
2
MARAIS JA
During 1989 the Matimba electric power station was being
constructed at Ellisras in what was then Transvaal. Certain steel gantries
required to be erected and that necessitated using a sophisticated and powerful
crawler crane. A crane owned by Genrec Steel Structures
(Pty) Ltd. ("Genrec")
was used for that purpose by Orbit Engineering (Pty) Ltd. ("Orbit"). LTA Mitec
Limited ("Mitec") had been instrumental
in procuring from Genrec the use of the
crane for Orbit. How that was achieved lies at the heart of the dispute in this
litigation.
On 26 August 1989 the crane capsized while it was being used and was
badly damaged. The reasonable and necessary cost of repair is
alleged to be R2
042 726,87.
On 17 August 1992 Genrec issued summons in the
3
Witwatersrand Local Division against three defendants. First defendant was
LTA Process Engineering (Pty) Ltd ("Process Engineering");
second defendant was
Mitec; and third defendant was Orbit. Genrec's claim was for the cost of
repairing the crane. The manner in
which Genrec initially pleaded the causes of
action upon which it relied is of considerable significance in deciding the
factual
issues which arise. In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of its particulars of claim
it alleged that it was orally agreed between itself, Mitec
and Orbit that it
would hire the crane to Orbit for the erection of the steel gantries by Orbit on
its (Genrec's) standard terms
and conditions of hire and on condition that Mitec
or another company in the LTA group of companies "place(d) an order with
(Genrec)
for such hire"; that Process Engineering or Mitec placed an order with
Genrec "for the hire of the crane"; that "in the premises"
Genrec, Process
Engineering Mitec and Orbit
4
"concluded an oral agreement in terms whereof (Genrec) agreed to hire the
said crane for reward to (Orbit) on (Genrec's) standard
terms and conditions of
hire" a copy of which was annexed; that it was "a tacit, alternatively implied
term" of the agreement of
hire that Process Engineering "and/or" Mitec would
cause the crane to be returned to Genrec in the same condition in which it was
when delivered to Orbit; that the crane was delivered in good order and
condition to Orbit "pursuant to the said agreement of hire";
that whilst being
used by Orbit for the erection of the steel gantries and whilst under its
control and in its possession "pursuant
to the said agreement of hire" extensive
damage was caused to the crane; that the fair, reasonable and necessary cost of
repair was
R2 042 726,87; and that "in the premises and by virtue of the
provisions of the aforestated agreement" Process Engineering and/or
Mitec and/or
Orbit is liable to Genrec for that sum.
5
The standard terms and conditions of hire contained inter alia the following
provisions:
"21 a The HIRER shall be responsible for all expenses including the cost of
repairs to the CRANE arising from the breakdown of the
CRANE or from accidental
damage to the CRANE, occurring through the HIRER'S negligence, misdirection or
misuse and shall include
the travelling time and costs of the OWNER or his/its
nominee and expenses incurred through the CRANE being immobilised or bogged
in
wet ground, rockfall, subsidence, inundation or the like. INDEMNITY DAMAGE TO
CRANES.
21 b Save for fair wear and tear and where the provisions of Clause 21 a
apply, whilst the CRANE is on SITE, the HIRER shall be responsible
for and
indemnifies the OWNER against any loss of or damage to the CRANE howsoever
caused."
I shall refer to this cause of action as the first cause of action. I
emphasise that the case pleaded at this juncture is that the
crane was hired to
Orbit and not to Mitec and that liability for the damage to the crane was
founded upon Genrec's standard terms
and conditions.
6
In paragraph 10 of the particulars of claim an alternative cause of action
was pleaded. It was alleged that Genrec and Orbit "concluded
an oral agreement
in terms whereof (Genrec) agreed to hire the said crane for reward to (Orbit),
and that it was "an express, alternatively
tacit, alternatively implied term"
that Orbit would return the crane to Genrec in the same condition in which it
was when delivered
to Orbit. For the rest, the same allegations regarding the
occurrence of damage to the crane and the cost of repairing it were made
and
Orbit was alleged to be liable to Genrec "in the premises and by virtue of the
provisions of the said agreement". I shall refer
to this cause of action as the
second cause of action. Again, there is no suggestion that the crane was to be
hired by Mitec. Liability
for the damage is now (as an alternative) founded upon
a breach of a term that the crane would be returned in good order and
condition.
7
On 6 November 1992 Genrec gave notice of its intention to amend its first
cause of action. All that the amendment entailed was the
insertion of the names
of the particular persons who were alleged to have represented Genrec, Mitec and
Orbit in concluding the oral
agreement pleaded.
On 6 August 1993 Genrec set about amending its pleadings again. It sought to
introduce in the first cause of action the allegation
that at all material times
one Campbell was employed by Mitec and acting in the course and scope of his
employment and that he, alternatively
Mitec, was duly authorized to represent
Orbit. It was also sought to allege, as a further alternative, that Campbell,
alternatively
Mitec, represented to Genrec that they were authorized to
represent Orbit. It sought to eliminate the second cause of action altogether.
However, it sought further to amend the first cause of
8
action by introducing for the first time an allegation that it was orally
agreed on 15 August 1989 that Genrec would for reward hire
the crane to Mitec on
Genrec's standard terms and conditions of hire. The allegation originally made,
namely, that it was orally
agreed that Orbit would hire the crane was persisted
in but only as an alternative allegation. The date upon which it was allegedly
so agreed was altered from 9 August 1989 to 15 August 1989. The allegation that
Process Engineering was liable either singly or jointly
was sought to be
withdrawn.
On 11 August 1993 Genrec gave notice yet again of its intention to amend its
particulars of claim. This notice appears to have been
intended to supersede the
notice of 6 August 1993 for it incorporated all the amendments of which notice
had been given in the notice
of 6 August 1993. In addition it was sought to make
it plain
9
that the allegation that it was orally agreed that Genrec would hire for
reward the crane to Mitec, alternatively Orbit, was an alternative
allegation to
the allegation that it was orally agreed that Genrec would hire the crane to
Mitec, alternatively Orbit, on Genrec's
standard terms and conditions of hire.
However, the attempt to make that plain was undermined to some extent because in
yet another
paragraph (6.3) the allegation that in the premises Genrec hired the
crane for reward to Mitec, alternatively Orbit, was retained
as the primary
allegation and the allegation that the crane had been hired by Genrec to Mitec,
alternatively Orbit, on Genrec's standard
terms and conditions of hire appeared
as a secondary allegation made as an alternative. Be that as it may, the parties
appear to
have understood that Genrec's primary allegation was that its standard
terms and conditions applied and that the allegation that
it was a case of hire
for reward was put forward
10
only as an alternative. That became clear because Genrec continued to allege
that, if it should be found that the agreement of hire
was not on Genrec's
standard terms and conditions, it was a tacit, alternatively an implied, term of
the agreement (i.e. of hire
for reward) that Mitec, alternatively Orbit, would
ensure the return of the crane to Genrec in the same condition in which it had
been delivered by Genrec. It was also alleged for the first time and in the
alternative that Mitec had represented Orbit when the
agreement was
concluded.
Orbit's attitude was to deny that it had entered into an agreement to hire
the crane from Genrec and to allege that it was Mitec,
represented by Campbell,
which had done so. It also raised other defences but I need not set them out.
Mitec's stance was fundamentally
the same. It denied having entered into any
agreement of hire with Genrec either on Genrec's standard terms and
conditions
11
or at all. It pleaded the circumstances which gave rise to Orbit's need for
the crane and alleged that Genrec was prepared to hire
the crane to Orbit on
condition that Mitec undertook to pay the hire charges to Genrec if they were
not paid by Orbit, that Campbell
conveyed to one Ahlers who was acting on behalf
of Genrec that Mitec undertook to pay if Orbit did not, and that Campbell had no
authority to hire the crane on behalf of Mitec. Other alternative defences were
pleaded but again it is unnecessary to recite them.
Genrec responded by filing a replication in which estoppel was raised as an
answer to Mitec's denial that Campbell was authorised
by it to conclude a
contract of hire between Genrec and Mitec and also as an answer to Mitec's
allegation that it "only intended
to guarantee the payment of the hire charges
by (Orbit)".
An order was granted in terms of Rule of Court 33 (4)
12
directing that certain of the issues be decided separately from the remainder
of the issues between the parties. The former issues
were whether the contract
of hire was concluded by Genrec with Mitec or with Orbit and what the terms of
the contract of hire were.
The Court a quo (Flemming D J P) heard evidence
relevant to those issues and, in the result, absolved Orbit from the instance at
the close of Genrec's case and, after hearing the evidence adduced by Mitec and
the arguments of counsel, and after allowing Genrec
to amend its particulars of
claim during such argument, it concluded that Genrec had proved that it hired
the crane to Mitec and
that Genrec's standard terms and conditions governed the
lease. Consequential costs orders were also made. It is against those findings
and costs orders that Mitec appeals with leave granted by the Court a quo.
There was much which was either common cause or not
13
disputed. The power station had been under construction for some years. Mitec
was the main contractor to Escom for the construction
of certain parts of the
power station. An associated company, Steeldale (Pty) Ltd ("Steeldale"), was a
sub-contractor to erect the
steel gantry beams to which I referred earlier.
Genrec was a sub-contractor to one of the other main contractors. Genrec also
carried
on the business of hiring out cranes and during the first two phases of
the erection of the gantry beams Orbit had hired a crane
from Genrec to carry
out the work. Mitec had no knowledge of those arrangements and played no role in
making them.
When phase 3 of the gantry beam erection programme was about to commence
Orbit had in mind to hire a crane again from Genrec. There
was some concern
about delays in the construction programme and it was in the interests of all
concerned to expedite the
14
erection of the gantries. Genrec had a crane available for hire but there had
been some dissension between Genrec and Orbit arising
out of a previous hire
transaction and Genrec let it be known that it lacked confidence in Orbit's
ability to pay the hire charges
and was therefore unwilling to make the crane
available to Orbit unless Mitec placed an order for it. In the result, an order
number
was given to Genrec by Mitec. Mitec had no stationery of its own so it
used a letterhead of another company in the LTA group, namely,
Process
Engineering, in order to send a facsimile to Genrec which read "order number for
hire of crane for Orbit Engineering 156255/1978".
It was the use of this
letterhead which led to Process Engineering being cited as one of the defendants
in the summons which Genrec
issued. As I have said, Genrec later withdrew the
action against Process Engineering.
Given the virtually absolute liability for damage to
the
15
crane which, if applicable, Genrec's standard terms and conditions of hire
imposed upon the hirer, it is not surprising that neither
Mitec not Orbit was
willing to be dubbed the hirer of the crane after the accident occurred.
Ascertaining ex post facto which company
had in fact hired the crane (assuming
for the moment that one or other had done so) was no easy task. Almost all
involved in the
making of the arrangements which led to Orbit having the use of
the crane were more concerned about achieving their primary objective
of
procuring the use of the crane for Orbit as expeditiously as possible so as not
to hold up the construction programme, than about
spelling out in precise terms
and recording in appropriate documentation exactly what the legal relationship
inter se of the actors
was to be. There was the risk that subsequently given
oral evidence might consciously or unconsciously be coloured to favour the
party
in whose interest it was
16
given. Such contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous written documentation
as there was, was largely inconclusive as we shall see.
The probabilities and
improbabilities inherent in the situation were not so plain or obvious that they
assisted greatly in resolving
the issues.
The court a quo found that it had been proved on a balance of probabilities
that Mitec had hired the crane on Genrec's standard terms
and conditions. The
learned deputy judge president based his conclusion upon an accumulation of
factors. The witnesses called by
Genrec impressed him as responsible people who
"tried to act responsibly and honestly when giving evidence" and were willing to
make
concessions and to admit to uncertainty. Mitec's witnesses he found to be
"unpersuasive" with the consequence that he "mistrusted
the evidence on
(Mitec's) side". He regarded the unqualified telefax in which Mitec furnished
Genrec with an order number as playing
a
17
"pivotal role". In the context in which it was sent, it signified, so he
thought, contracting for the hire of the crane and not the
undertaking of
liability as a surety for Orbit. He drew attention to the inability of either
Metcalfe (Mitec's project manager) or
Campbell to point to any document in which
it was made clear that Mitec was not hiring the crane but merely undertaking to
pay the
hire charges if Orbit did not, and to their concession that the telefax
failed to set out explicitly what they claimed the agreement
to have been. He
regarded it as improbable that an order number would have been issued if Mitec
had merely undertaken to pay if Orbit
did not in view of the ease with which an
appropriate letter or telefax to that effect admittedly could have been drawn.
He considered
that the mere furnishing by Mitec of an order number which was not
in fact intended to reflect that an actual order had been placed
by Mitec would
have been an empty
18
gesture so devoid of any practical significance and value to Genrec, that
Genrec would never have accepted it as sufficient reason
to let Orbit have the
use of the crane. He considered that the absence from the meetings at which the
contractual arrangements were
made of any of Orbit's management or staff
indicated that it could not have been intended by either Genrec or Mitec that
Orbit would
become the hirer as a consequence of their arrangements. He pointed
to the absence of any subsequent dealings between Orbit and Genrec
to give
effect to a contract of hire between Genrec and Orbit. He said that Venter
(Genrec's maintenance foreman) would have behaved
very differently if he had
considered Orbit to be the hirer and Mitec to be a surety. Although he
recognised that there was some
vagueness and uncertainty in the evidence of
Genrec's witnesses, he thought it to be too remote a possibility that all of
them would
have failed to recollect a
19
discussion the thrust of which was that Mitec should undertake the liability
of a surety if such a discussion had taken place. He
did not think that the
"suretyship solution" to the impasse which had arisen was any more likely to
have been favoured by Mitec than
the solution provided by Mitec hiring the crane
itself because Orbit, Mitec and Steeldale were so situated vis-à-vis one
another
that hire charges paid by Mitec as hirer could be recouped equally
effectively from Orbit.
The court a quo also concluded that Campbell had Mitec's authority to bind it
to such a contract and that although there was no evidence
to support a finding
that it had been expressly orally agreed that Genrec's standard terms and
conditions would apply, it was open
to Genrec on the pleadings to contend that
it was tacitly agreed that those terms would apply. The court found that such
tacit agreement
had been proved. Its reasoning was essentially this:
20
application of the well-known officious bystander test to the
question
of what rates were to apply yields the answer "Genrec's
applicable
rate". Mitec's representatives "knew that they were hiring where
Orbit
wanted to hire but could not". The fact that they had made
no
enquiries regarding rates evidenced "an attitude of blanket 'taking
over'
of what Orbit wanted to achieve". Even were there no such
"blanket
approach", the absence of any queries about tariffs and any attempt
to
negotiate levels acceptable to Mitec tended to signify acceptance
of
Genrec's usual rates. By parity of reasoning the "most plausible
and
acceptable inference is that (Mitec) was hiring the specific crane
on
(Genrec's) terms which usually apply to the letting thereof".
For
reasons which I need not detail he rejected a submission that
the
inference that the hiring was to take place on Mitec's standard
terms
and conditions was no less plausible and acceptable. He regarded
the
21
situation as one analogous to that in which a person hires a motor car or
travels on an airline; in the absence of any stipulation
to the contrary by such
person, he or she is taken to accept that the usual terms of the car hire firm
and the airline apply. Those,
stripped of elaboration, were the reasons why the
learned deputy judge president reached his conclusions.
The appeal is therefore concerned principally with questions of fact. It is
trite that the findings of fact of a trial court are not
lightly disturbed and
the grounds upon which an appellate court may be obliged nonetheless to
disregard them either wholly or partially
and reach its own conclusions on the
record are too well known to merit repetition. In the instant case I have come
to the reluctant
conclusion that the primary finding of fact of the court a quo
namely, that Mitec hired the crane is vitiated by a failure to weigh
22
certain factors which, in my view, should have been taken into account. In
saying this I appreciate that it cannot reasonably be expected
of a trial court
to set out each and every factor, however peripheral, to which it has given
attention in reaching its conclusions.
But when a judgment is entirely silent on
factors of such importance that they manifestly needed to be weighed, one cannot
simply
assume that proper attention was given to them. Even the most experienced
and conscientious of judges are but human and may sometimes
fail to take account
of something of which account should have been taken. I turn now to the factors
which do not appear to have
received the consideration they should have
received.
Firstly, there is the belatedness of Genrec's allegation that it was to
Mitec, and not to Orbit, that it hired out the crane. No such
allegation was
made prior to the issue of summons in August 1992
23
and even then no such allegation was made in the particulars of claim. On the
contrary, while Genrec did allege a tripartite oral
agreement to which Genrec,
Mitec and Orbit were parties, it alleged plainly and unambiguously that it was
to Orbit that it was hiring
out the crane on its (Genrec's) standard terms and
conditions. What is more, it pleaded that the hiring out of the crane to Orbit
was conditional upon Mitec or another company in the LTA group placing an order
for such hire. If there was any ambiguity in those
allegations they were set at
rest by the distinction that was drawn by the pleader between the source of
Process Engineering's or
Mitec's obligation to return the crane in the same
condition in which it was when delivered to Orbit and the source of Orbit's
obligation
to do so. In paragraph 6.3 it was alleged that the hiring out of the
crane to Orbit was on Genrec's standard terms and conditions
a copy of which was
annexed. In paragraph 6.4 it was
24
alleged that it was by virtue of a tacit, alternatively implied, term that
Process Engineering and/or Mitec were obliged to return
the crane to Genrec in
the same condition in which it was when delivered to Orbit. In other words,
Orbit's liability arose from the
standard terms and conditions. The liability of
Process Engineering and/or Mitec arose from the tacit, alternatively implied,
term
pleaded. Indeed, an alternative cause of action was pleaded against Orbit
alone. That cause of action was an oral contract of hire
for reward which did
not incorporate any standard terms or conditions but did incorporate an express,
alternatively tacit, alternatively
implied, term that Orbit would return the
crane in the same condition as it was when Orbit received it.
It was only in August 1993 (a year later) that Genrec sought to allege, as
its first cause of action, that it was orally agreed
25
that Genrec would hire for reward on its standard terms and conditions the
crane to Mitec. The earlier allegation that it was hired
to Orbit on those terms
and conditions was relegated in status to an alternative allegation.
Secondly, there is the failure of Kriedemann (Genrec's projects manager) in a
written report prepared on 14 September 1989 soon after
the accident to spell
out as clearly as he did when giving evidence that it was not to Orbit but to
Mitec that Genrec had agreed
to hire the crane.
Thirdly, there are the answers given in cross-examination by Kriedemann in
regard to hiring to Orbit. He conceded that his only concern
was whether Genrec
would be paid by Orbit and that once that concern had been met, whether by
payment in advance, or the provision
of a bank guarantee, or a guarantee of
payment by LTA, his
26
objection to hiring to Orbit would fall away. He said that he sought
to
overcome the difficulty by asking for an LTA order. The following
ensued:
"And if LTA had given an order number Genrec would have
hired to Orbit? Yes." [He was then read what had been
said in Genrec's pleadings at one time; it was put to him in the following
manner. I have used the actual names of the companies
for clarity's
sake].
"Genrec and Mitec and Orbit orally agreed that Genrec
would for reward hire the said crane to Orbit for the erection of certain steel
gantries by Orbit on Genrec's standard terms and conditions of hire and on
condition furthermore that Mitec, alternatively another
company in the LTA group
places an order with Genrec for such hire. Do you agree with all that?" [The
Court intervened and rephrased
the lengthy question.] "
Court
: The first
point is, was there an agreement to hire the
crane to Orbit? There was.
And there were two conditions to that agreement, that it had to be on your
standard conditions and that you had to get an LTA
order number, order? That is correct."
After he had agreed that in this case an actual order never followed the
furnishing of the order number and that Genrec had never
asked for "an order
proper, an order form", it was put to him that Genrec was "in these
circumstances happy with an order number".
He replied:
27
"We were happy to contract with LTA. We were not happy to contract with Orbit
Engineering."
Later it was put to him:
"Mr Campbell never used the words to you that LTA Mitec will hire the crane from
Genrec?"
His reply was "I do not recall".
In re-examination
the following passage occurs:
"In response to a question by my learned friend Mr Burman whether in your
opinion an agreement of hire of the crane took
place to Orbit, you said yes? That is correct.
Now what do you understand by that? That Orbit
Engineering were
going to make use of the crane."
This illustrates the imprecision and ambiguity with which
Kriedemann used language in the witness-box. There is little reason
to suppose that he was any less imprecise and ambiguous when
dealing with Mitec. It may also explain why Genrec's pleadings were
initially drafted in the way I have described. It was he who had
furnished Genrec's attorney with the information required for the
purpose of issuing summons and drafting the particulars of claim.
28
Nowhere in the judgment of the trial court can I find any
recognition of the relevance of these factors to the factual
enquiry
unless they are to be regarded as embraced in a generalisation
reading:
"Then there is the fact that plaintiff's version comes from the mouth of
witnesses who despite some contradictions of their own evidence
and of the
evidence of others, despite vagueness and lackness (sic) of memory, and despite
other deficiencies, came across as honest
and very convinced on the crucial
issue."
Certainly there is no acknowledgement of
their
significance and importance and no attempt to explain how they were
fully reconcilable with the evidence on the "crucial issue" being given
by witnesses who were "honest and very convinced". At face value
these considerations constituted serious obstacles to a positive
acceptance of Genrec's allegation that it was to Mitec that it hired the
crane and if they were not considered to be so by the trial court, it was
incumbent on it to say why. The recital which the trial court gave of
29
factors regarded by it as being inimical to Mitec's version of the agreement
provides no assurance that in evaluating them and concluding
that they were
indeed fatally inimical to Mitec's version, the trial court gave consideration
and assigned appropriate weight to
those apparent obstacles.
This Court is
therefore obliged to assess the recorded evidence afresh and as best it can
without having had the advantage of seeing
and hearing the witnesses testify.
If, notwithstanding its best efforts, it finds itself unable to come to firm
conclusions upon
a balance of probability the result is that the decision must
go against the bearer of the onus of proof. Cf
Van Aswegen v De Clercq
1960 (4) SA 875
(A) at 882 B-E. There is undoubtedly a good deal to be said for
Genrec's contention that it is more probable that Mitec hired the
crane for the
use of Orbit than that Orbit hired the crane and Mitec
30
undertook to pay the hire charges if Orbit did not. But, in my view, the
respective merits and demerits of the witnesses who testified
on either side are
not so manifest ex facie the record and the probabilities are not so patent that
it can be said that Genrec has
discharged the onus of establishing upon a
balance of probability that there was indeed either real or apparent consensus
between
it and Mitec that Mitec would hire the crane.
I do not intend to discuss this aspect of the case in any greater detail
because I consider that there is in any event yet another
ground upon which
Genrec's claim against Mitec must fail. For the same reason I find it
unnecessary to discuss the questions of authority
which were debated before us.
Even if it be assumed in Genrec's favour that it did indeed prove that Mitec
hired the crane, in order
to succeed in establishing that Mitec is liable for
the damage to the crane,
31
Genrec had to prove on a balance of probability either that Genrec's standard
terms and conditions of hire were applicable, or that
there was a tacit or
implied term that Mitec would cause the crane to be returned to Genrec in the
same condition as it was upon
delivery.
I turn first to Genrec's case in regard to the applicability of its standard
terms and conditions. From the inception of the litigation
right up to the stage
of closing arguments Genrec had relied primarily upon an oral agreement that the
hire was to be on its standard
terms and conditions of hire. That plainly
negatived any reliance upon either a tacit or implied agreement or terms to that
effect.
An allegation that parties have orally agreed upon something is
incompatible with their having tacitly or impliedly agreed upon it.
See the
comments on Rule of Court 18 (6) of Erasmus,
Superior Court
Practice, at
page B 1-132. Any doubt about the intention of the
32
pleader is entirely eliminated when one sees the manner in
which the
alternative cause of action was pleaded. There it was
specifically
alleged that it was "a tacit, alternatively an implied term"
that Mitec,
alternatively, Orbit would cause the crane to be returned to
Genrec in
the same condition as it was when delivered. The contrasting ways
in
which these two alternative aspects of the pleadings were pleaded
are
striking. As a fact there was no evidence upon which a finding
could
have been based that an express agreed term that the standard
terms
and conditions would apply had been proved and counsel for
Genrec
did not contend otherwise. Indeed, despite the state of the
pleadings,
he asserted that it had never been expressly agreed that
Genrec's
standard terms and conditions would apply and that its case
was
always that it was a tacitly agreed term of an orally agreed contract
of
hire. At the stage of final argument, the trial judge seems to
have
33
regarded the state of Genrec's pleadings as an obstacle to the raising of
such a contention for, largely at his urging so we were
told, Genrec applied for
and, despite Mitec's opposition, was granted leave to amend its pleadings by
inserting the words "alternatively
tacitly" between the words "orally" and
"agreed" in paragraph 6 of the particulars of claim. The effect of that was the
making of
an alternative allegation that the entire agreement to hire (as
opposed to any particular term of it) was tacit. That too was obviously
not
borne out by the evidence and again counsel for Genrec disavowed any intention
of contending that it was. As I have said, he
maintained that Genrec's case had
always been, and remained, that there was an express oral agreement of hire one
of the tacit terms
of which was that Genrec's standard terms and conditions
would apply, alternatively that the crane would be returned to Genrec in
the
same condition as it was
34
when delivered by Genrec.
Assuming, without deciding, that it was open to Genrec on either its original
or amended pleadings to raise that contention, the question
is whether the
existence of either of those tacit terms has been established. I return to the
question of whether the standard terms
and conditions were proved to be
applicable. In my judgment they were not. Mitec had not hired cranes from Genrec
on previous occasions
so that there was no antecedent history of dealing with
Genrec with knowledge of the particular terms and conditions upon which it
did
business. The fact that other companies in the LTA group had hired cranes from
Genrec in the past does not serve to fix Mitec
with such knowledge. No written
documents purporting to reflect or incorporate any standard terms and conditions
were placed by Genrec
before Mitec for signature or other acknowledgement by
35
Mitec nor were any such documents issued to Mitec. Merely
because
there often are standard terms and conditions upon which those
who
hire out cranes do so does not oblige a prospective hirer of a crane
to
assume that the particular firm from which he proposes to hire a
crane
will necessarily have such standard terms and conditions or, even if
it
does have such terms and conditions,that it will seek to impose
them
silently in every case irrespective of the circumstances. There is
no
analogy whatsoever to be drawn between this class of case and
the
well-known "ticket" class of cases. Genrec did nothing whatsoever
to
alert Mitec to the existence of its standard terms and conditions
of
hire. Generalised concessions by Campbell about the practices
followed
by car hire firms and the tacit acceptance by clients of
standard terms and
conditions take Genrec's case no further. It was
contended that Campbell had
made specific admissions relating to
36
crane hire. Despite the fact that he had said that he had not hired a
car
for 10 years and that he did not know what "the system" was "at
the moment",
it was put to him that "most of" the crane hiring firms
use "forms" of a
"similar type" to the car hire firms. His reply was
"That is possible." Having assented to the proposition that the type of
forms used are normally forms which contain a time sheet on the front
and the conditions on the back "very much like car hiring", he was
required to respond to a series of propositions put to him by the Court.
The relevant passages read:
"
COURT
: If you phoned Avis today by phone and say look, I want the car
in Cape Town for three days tomorrow, you will expect that you will
have to pay
their tariff, whatever their tariff
is normally for that car. Yes.
You will expect that before they give the car to you, you will have to accept
their conditions, you will not be able to bargain,
you must accept their conditions. Yes.
Now, in the case of a crane hire, would the same apply? You know that they
have terms and conditions on which they hire.
37
Correct.
So if you just say I want to hire the crane and nothing more,
you are accepting their tariff and their terms. No, no, no.
Why not? When I normally hire a crane, when the crane
arrives on site or arrives in my yard, or whatever, the first thing they do,
they produce you with the acceptance of the crane on
site in good order and you
accept the conditions. If you do not accept the conditions, they take the crane
back.
It is easy. Yes, of course.
Of course. That is why I said, if you say nothing more, you
expect that you are accepting their terms. Yes.
Is that not so? That is correct.
Now in the cases where you say you hired a crane, did that
happen more than once? I very seldom - it is normally
the sub-contractor that hires.
So in these cases you conclude contracts. Conclude
contracts?
You hire them. No, that is wrong. I would, if I was to -
I want to hire a crane, I would go the normal
procedure."
In my view these answers fall far short
of unequivocal
admissions that in this instance Genrec's standard terms and
conditions
were to apply. The entire exchange postulates that at some stage
the
crane hire firm requires an acknowledgment of acceptance of the crane
38
in good order and on the crane hire firm's conditions. But that is precisely
what did not occur in this instance. Mitec was never
asked to do anything of the
kind prior to the accident.
Nor does the fact, if fact it be, that Mitec had agreed to hire the crane in
lieu of Orbit strengthen Genrec's case. It does not follow
that because Orbit
would have been bound by the standard terms and conditions because of its
previous dealings with Genrec and its
knowledge of the standard terms and
conditions, Mitec would be similarly bound. Orbit's knowledge and readiness to
contract on those
terms and conditions cannot arbitrarily be imputed to Mitec
simply because Mitec hired the crane in lieu of Orbit. Cf
Micor Shipping
(Pty) Ltd v Treger Golf and Sports (Pty) Ltd and Another
1977 (2) SA 709
(W)
at 712 H - 718 A. Nor does the fact that there was no discussion of the tariff
and other matters relevant to the use of the
39
crane advance Genrec's case. In the particular circumstances of the
transaction these were matters to which Mitec was indifferent
because Orbit was
to use the crane and would ultimately be debited one way or another with the
cost of hiring the crane. Moreover,
silence on Mitec's side as to tariff would
imply at worst for Mitec that it was content to pay either Genrec's usual tariff
or a
reasonable rate. It would not imply that Mitec was tacitly accepting
whatever other uncommunicated terms and conditions, however
onerous, Genrec
might wish to impose. In short there is no adequate basis for inferring that
Mitec had tacitly agreed that Genrec's
standard terms and conditions of hire
would apply.
I turn to the question of whether Genrec succeeded in proving the existence
of the alternative tacit term which it pleaded, namely,
that the crane would be
returned to it in the same good order
40
and condition. The test to be applied is of course not whether such a term
might have been reasonable or even appropriate but whether
it can safely be said
that the parties to the contract of hire either thought it to be so obvious that
it was unnecessary to mention
it or, if they did not advert to the question at
all in their own minds, that if they had been asked whether such a term should
exist,
they would have concurred in an affirmative answer. In my judgment, it
cannot be said that both parties would have assented to such
a term It is
reasonably conceivable that Mitec might have responded "But surely only if any
damage to the crane is attributable to
our actions or those of our employees." I
cannot accept that it would undoubtedly have assented to so absolute an
imposition of liability.
The appeal succeeds and is upheld with costs including the costs of two
counsel. The judgment of the trial court is altered to
41
one of absolution from the instance with costs, including the costs of two
counsel.
R M MARAIS
VAN HEERDEN )
CONCUR F H GROSSKOPF )